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INTRODUCTION
The Ethics of Aristotle is one half of a single treatise of which his
Politics is the other half. Both deal with one and the same subject. This
subject is what Aristotle calls in one place the “philosophy of human
affairs;” but more frequently Political or Social Science. In the two works
taken together we have their author’s whole theory of human conduct or
practical activity, that is, of all human activity which is not directed merely
to knowledge or truth. The two parts of this treatise are mutually
complementary, but in a literary sense each is independent and selfcontained. The proem to the Ethics is an introduction to the whole subject,
not merely to the first part; the last chapter of the Ethics points forward to
the Politics, and sketches for that part of the treatise the order of enquiry to
be pursued (an order which in the actual treatise is not adhered to).
The principle of distribution of the subject-matter between the two works
is far from obvious, and has been much debated. Not much can be gathered
from their titles, which in any case were not given to them by their author.
Nor do these titles suggest any very compact unity in the works to which
they are applied: the plural forms, which survive so oddly in English
(Ethics, Politics), were intended to indicate the treatment within a single
work of a group of connected questions. The unity of the first group arises
from their centring round the topic of character, that of the second from
their connection with the existence and life of the city or state. We have
thus to regard the Ethics as dealing with one group of problems and the
Politics with a second, both falling within the wide compass of Political
Science. Each of these groups falls into sub-groups which roughly
correspond to the several books in each work. The tendency to take up one
by one the various problems which had suggested themselves in the wide
field obscures both the unity of the subject-matter and its proper
articulation. But it is to be remembered that what is offered us is avowedly
rather an enquiry than an exposition of hard and fast doctrine.
Nevertheless each work aims at a relative completeness, and it is
important to observe the relation of each to the other. The distinction is not

that the one treats of Moral and the other of Political Philosophy, nor again
that the one deals with the moral activity of the individual and the other
with that of the State, nor once more that the one gives us the theory of
human conduct, while the other discusses its application in practice, though
not all of these misinterpretations are equally erroneous. The clue to the
right interpretation is given by Aristotle himself, where in the last chapter of
the Ethics he is paving the way for the Politics. In the Ethics he has not
confined himself to the abstract or isolated individual, but has always
thought of him, or we might say, in his social and political context, with a
given nature due to race and heredity and in certain surroundings. So
viewing him he has studied the nature and formation of his character—all
that he can make himself or be made by others to be. Especially he has
investigated the various admirable forms of human character and the mode
of their production. But all this, though it brings more clearly before us
what goodness or virtue is, and how it is to be reached, remains mere theory
or talk. By itself it does not enable us to become, or to help others to
become, good. For this it is necessary to bring into play the great force of
the Political Community or State, of which the main instrument is Law.
Hence arises the demand for the necessary complement to the Ethics, i.e., a
treatise devoted to the questions which centre round the enquiry; by what
organisation of social or political forces, by what laws or institutions can we
best secure the greatest amount of good character?
We must, however, remember that the production of good character is not
the end of either individual or state action: that is the aim of the one and the
other because good character is the indispensable condition and chief
determinant of happiness, itself the goal of all human doing. The end of all
action, individual or collective, is the greatest happiness of the greatest
number. There is, Aristotle insists, no difference of kind between the good
of one and the good of many or all. The sole difference is one of amount or
scale. This does not mean simply that the State exists to secure in larger
measure the objects of degree which the isolated individual attempts, but is
too feeble, to secure without it. On the contrary, it rather insists that
whatever goods society alone enables a man to secure have always had to
the individual—whether he realised it or not—the value which, when so
secured, he recognises them to possess. The best and happiest life for the
individual is that which the State renders possible, and this it does mainly

by revealing to him the value of new objects of desire and educating him to
appreciate them. To Aristotle or to Plato the State is, above all, a large and
powerful educative agency which gives the individual increased
opportunities of self-development and greater capacities for the enjoyment
of life.
Looking forward, then, to the life of the State as that which aids support,
and combines the efforts of the individual to obtain happiness, Aristotle
draws no hard and fast distinction between the spheres of action of Man as
individual and Man as citizen. Nor does the division of his discussion into
the Ethics and the Politics rest upon any such distinction. The distinction
implied is rather between two stages in the life of the civilised man—the
stage of preparation for the full life of the adult citizen, and the stage of the
actual exercise or enjoyment of citizenship. Hence the Ethics, where his
attention is directed upon the formation of character, is largely and centrally
a treatise on Moral Education. It discusses especially those admirable
human qualities which fit a man for life in an organised civic community,
which makes him “a good citizen,” and considers how they can be fostered
or created and their opposites prevented.
This is the kernel of the Ethics, and all the rest is subordinate to this main
interest and purpose. Yet “the rest” is not irrelevant; the whole situation in
which character grows and operates is concretely conceived. There is a
basis of what we should call Psychology, sketched in firm outlines, the
deeper presuppositions and the wider issues of human character and
conduct are not ignored, and there is no little of what we should call
Metaphysics. But neither the Psychology nor the Metaphysics is elaborated,
and only so much is brought forward as appears necessary to put the main
facts in their proper perspective and setting. It is this combination of width
of outlook with close observation of the concrete facts of conduct which
gives its abiding value to the work, and justifies the view of it as containing
Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy. Nor is it important merely as summing up the
moral judgments and speculations of an age now long past. It seizes and
dwells upon those elements and features in human practice which are most
essential and permanent, and it is small wonder that so much in it survives
in our own ways of regarding conduct and speaking of it. Thus it still
remains one of the classics of Moral Philosophy, nor is its value likely soon
to be exhausted.

As was pointed out above, the proem (Book I., cc. i-iii.) is a prelude to
the treatment of the whole subject covered by the Ethics and the Politics
together. It sets forth the purpose of the enquiry, describes the spirit in
which it is to be undertaken and what ought to be the expectation of the
reader, and lastly states the necessary conditions of studying it with profit.
The aim of it is the acquisition and propagation of a certain kind of
knowledge (science), but this knowledge and the thinking which brings it
about are subsidiary to a practical end. The knowledge aimed at is of what
is best for man and of the conditions of its realisation. Such knowledge is
that which in its consumate form we find in great statesmen, enabling them
to organise and administer their states and regulate by law the life of the
citizens to their advantage and happiness, but it is the same kind of
knowledge which on a smaller scale secures success in the management of
the family or of private life.
It is characteristic of such knowledge that it should be deficient in
“exactness,” in precision of statement, and closeness of logical
concatenation. We must not look for a mathematics of conduct. The subjectmatter of Human Conduct is not governed by necessary and uniform laws.
But this does not mean that it is subject to no laws. There are general
principles at work in it, and these can be formulated in “rules,” which rules
can be systematised or unified. It is all-important to remember that practical
or moral rules are only general and always admit of exceptions, and that
they arise not from the mere complexity of the facts, but from the liability
of the facts to a certain unpredictable variation. At their very best, practical
rules state probabilities, not certainties; a relative constancy of connection is
all that exists, but it is enough to serve as a guide in life. Aristotle here
holds the balance between a misleading hope of reducing the subject-matter
of conduct to a few simple rigorous abstract principles, with conclusions
necessarily issuing from them, and the view that it is the field of operation
of inscrutable forces acting without predictable regularity. He does not
pretend to find in it absolute uniformities, or to deduce the details from his
principles. Hence, too, he insists on the necessity of experience as the
source or test of all that he has to say. Moral experience—the actual
possession and exercise of good character—is necessary truly to understand
moral principles and profitably to apply them. The mere intellectual
apprehension of them is not possible, or if possible, profitless.

The Ethics is addressed to students who are presumed both to have
enough general education to appreciate these points, and also to have a solid
foundation of good habits. More than that is not required for the profitable
study of it.
If the discussion of the nature and formation of character be regarded as
the central topic of the Ethics, the contents of Book I., cc. iv.-xii. may be
considered as still belonging to the introduction and setting, but these
chapters contain matter of profound importance and have exercised an
enormous influence upon subsequent thought. They lay down a principle
which governs all Greek thought about human life, viz. that it is only
intelligible when viewed as directed towards some end or good. This is the
Greek way of expressing that all human life involves an ideal element—
something which it is not yet and which under certain conditions it is to be.
In that sense Greek Moral Philosophy is essentially idealistic. Further it is
always assumed that all human practical activity is directed or “oriented” to
a single end, and that that end is knowable or definable in advance of its
realisation. To know it is not merely a matter of speculative interest, it is of
the highest practical moment for only in the light of it can life be duly
guided, and particularly only so can the state be properly organised and
administered. This explains the stress laid throughout by Greek Moral
Philosophy upon the necessity of knowledge as a condition of the best life.
This knowledge is not, though it includes knowledge of the nature of man
and his circumstances, it is knowledge of what is best—of man’s supreme
end or good.
But this end is not conceived as presented to him by a superior power nor
even as something which ought to be. The presentation of the Moral Ideal
as Duty is almost absent. From the outset it is identified with the object of
desire, of what we not merely judge desirable but actually do desire, or that
which would, if realised, satisfy human desire. In fact it is what we all, wise
and simple, agree in naming “Happiness” (Welfare or Well-being)
In what then does happiness consist? Aristotle summarily sets aside the
more or less popular identifications of it with abundance of physical
pleasures, with political power and honour, with the mere possession of
such superior gifts or attainments as normally entitle men to these, with
wealth. None of these can constitute the end or good of man as such. On the

other hand, he rejects his master Plato’s conception of a good which is the
end of the whole universe, or at least dismisses it as irrelevant to his present
enquiry. The good towards which all human desires and practical activities
are directed must be one conformable to man’s special nature and
circumstances and attainable by his efforts. There is in Aristotle’s theory of
human conduct no trace of Plato’s “other worldliness”, he brings the moral
ideal in Bacon’s phrase down to “right earth”—and so closer to the facts
and problems of actual human living. Turning from criticism of others he
states his own positive view of Happiness, and, though he avowedly states
it merely in outline his account is pregnant with significance. Human
Happiness lies in activity or energising, and that in a way peculiar to man
with his given nature and his given circumstances, it is not theoretical, but
practical: it is the activity not of reason but still of a being who possesses
reason and applies it, and it presupposes in that being the development, and
not merely the natural possession, of certain relevant powers and capacities.
The last is the prime condition of successful living and therefore of
satisfaction, but Aristotle does not ignore other conditions, such as length of
life, wealth and good luck, the absence or diminution of which render
happiness not impossible, but difficult of attainment.
It is interesting to compare this account of Happiness with Mill’s in
Utilitarianism. Mill’s is much the less consistent: at times he distinguishes
and at times he identifies, happiness, pleasure, contentment, and
satisfaction. He wavers between belief in its general attainability and an
absence of hopefulness. He mixes up in an arbitrary way such ingredients as
“not expecting more from life than it is capable of bestowing,” “mental
cultivation,” “improved laws,” etc., and in fact leaves the whole conception
vague, blurred, and uncertain. Aristotle draws the outline with a firmer hand
and presents a more definite ideal. He allows for the influence on happiness
of conditions only partly, if at all, within the control of man, but he clearly
makes the man positive determinant of man’s happiness he in himself, and
more particularly in what he makes directly of his own nature, and so
indirectly of his circumstances. “‘Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus”
But once more this does not involve an artificial or abstract isolation of the
individual moral agent from his relation to other persons or things from his
context in society and nature, nor ignore the relative dependence of his life
upon a favourable environment.

The main factor which determines success or failure in human life is the
acquisition of certain powers, for Happiness is just the exercise or putting
forth of these in actual living, everything else is secondary and subordinate.
These powers arise from the due development of certain natural aptitudes
which belong (in various degrees) to human nature as such and therefore to
all normal human beings. In their developed form they are known as virtues
(the Greek means simply “goodnesses,” “perfections,” “excellences,” or
“fitnesses”), some of them are physical, but others are psychical, and
among the latter some, and these distinctively or peculiarly human, are
“rational,” i e, presuppose the possession and exercise of mind or
intelligence. These last fall into two groups, which Aristotle distinguishes
as Goodnesses of Intellect and Goodnesses of Character. They have in
common that they all excite in us admiration and praise of their possessors,
and that they are not natural endowments, but acquired characteristics But
they differ in important ways. (1) the former are excellences or developed
powers of the reason as such—of that in us which sees and formulates laws,
rules, regularities systems, and is content in the vision of them, while the
latter involve a submission or obedience to such rules of something in us
which is in itself capricious and irregular, but capable of regulation, viz our
instincts and feelings, (2) the former are acquired by study and instruction,
the latter by discipline. The latter constitute “character,” each of them as a
“moral virtue” (literally “a goodness of character”), and upon them
primarily depends the realisation of happiness. This is the case at least for
the great majority of men, and for all men their possession is an
indispensable basis of the best, i e, the most desirable life. They form the
chief or central subject-matter of the Ethics.
Perhaps the truest way of conceiving Aristotle’s meaning here is to
regard a moral virtue as a form of obedience to a maxim or rule of conduct
accepted by the agent as valid for a class of recurrent situations in human
life. Such obedience requires knowledge of the rule and acceptance of it as
the rule of the agent’s own actions, but not necessarily knowledge of its
ground or of its systematic connexion with other similarly known and
similarly accepted rules (It may be remarked that the Greek word usually
translated “reason,” means in almost all cases in the Ethics such a rule, and
not the faculty which apprehends, formulates, considers them).

The “moral virtues and vices” make up what we call character, and the
important questions arise: (1) What is character? and (2) How is it formed?
(for character in this sense is not a natural endowment; it is formed or
produced). Aristotle deals with these questions in the reverse order. His
answers are peculiar and distinctive—not that they are absolutely novel (for
they are anticipated in Plato), but that by him they are for the first time
distinctly and clearly formulated.
(1.) Character, good or bad, is produced by what Aristotle calls
“habituation,” that is, it is the result of the repeated doing of acts which
have a similar or common quality. Such repetition acting upon natural
aptitudes or propensities gradually fixes them in one or other of two
opposite directions, giving them a bias towards good or evil. Hence the
several acts which determine goodness or badness of character must be
done in a certain way, and thus the formation of good character requires
discipline and direction from without. Not that the agent himself contributes
nothing to the formation of his character, but that at first he needs guidance.
The point is not so much that the process cannot be safely left to Nature, but
that it cannot be entrusted to merely intellectual instruction. The process is
one of assimilation, largely by imitation and under direction and control.
The result is a growing understanding of what is done, a choice of it for its
own sake, a fixity and steadiness of purpose. Right acts and feelings
become, through habit, easier and more pleasant, and the doing of them a
“second nature.” The agent acquires the power of doing them freely,
willingly, more and more “of himself.”
But what are “right” acts? In the first place, they are those that conform
to a rule—to the right rule, and ultimately to reason. The Greeks never
waver from the conviction that in the end moral conduct is essentially
reasonable conduct. But there is a more significant way of describing their
“rightness,” and here for the first time Aristotle introduces his famous
“Doctrine of the Mean.” Reasoning from the analogy of “right” physical
acts, he pronounces that rightness always means adaptation or adjustment to
the special requirements of a situation. To this adjustment he gives a
quantitative interpretation. To do (or to feel) what is right in a given
situation is to do or to feel just the amount required—neither more nor less:
to do wrong is to do or to feel too much or too little—to fall short of or
over-shoot, “a mean” determined by the situation. The repetition of acts

which lie in the mean is the cause of the formation of each and every
“goodness of character,” and for this “rules” can be given.
(2) What then is a “moral virtue,” the result of such a process duly
directed? It is no mere mood of feeling, no mere liability to emotion, no
mere natural aptitude or endowment, it is a permanent state of the agent’s
self, or, as we might in modern phrase put it, of his will, it consists in a
steady self-imposed obedience to a rule of action in certain situations which
frequently recur in human life. The rule prescribes the control and
regulation within limits of the agent’s natural impulses to act and feel thus
and thus. The situations fall into groups which constitute the “fields” of the
several “moral virtues”, for each there is a rule, conformity to which
secures rightness in the individual acts. Thus the moral ideal appears as a
code of rules, accepted by the agent, but as yet to him without rational
justification and without system or unity. But the rules prescribe no
mechanical uniformity: each within its limits permits variety, and the
exactly right amount adopted to the requirements of the individual situation
(and every actual situation is individual) must be determined by the
intuition of the moment. There is no attempt to reduce the rich possibilities
of right action to a single monotonous type. On the contrary, there are
acknowledged to be many forms of moral virtue, and there is a long list of
them, with their correlative vices enumerated.
The Doctrine of the Mean here takes a form in which it has impressed
subsequent thinkers, but which has less importance than is usually ascribed
to it. In the “Table of the Virtues and Vices,” each of the virtues is flanked
by two opposite vices, which are respectively the excess and defect of that
which in due measure constitutes the virtue. Aristotle tries to show that this
is the case in regard to every virtue named and recognised as such, but his
treatment is often forced and the endeavour is not very successful. Except
as a convenient principle of arrangement of the various forms of
praiseworthy or blameworthy characters, generally acknowledged as such
by Greek opinion, this form of the doctrine is of no great significance.
Books III-V are occupied with a survey of the moral virtues and vices.
These seem to have been undertaken in order to verify in detail the general
account, but this aim is not kept steadily in view. Nor is there any wellconsidered principle of classification. What we find is a sort of portrait-

gallery of the various types of moral excellence which the Greeks of the
author’s age admired and strove to encourage. The discussion is full of
acute, interesting and sometimes profound observations. Some of the types
are those which are and will be admired at all times, but others are
connected with peculiar features of Greek life which have now passed
away. The most important is that of Justice or the Just Man, to which we
may later return. But the discussion is preceded by an attempt to elucidate
some difficult and obscure points in the general account of moral virtue and
action (Book III, cc i-v). This section is concerned with the notion of
Responsibility. The discussion designedly excludes what we may call the
metaphysical issues of the problem, which here present themselves, it
moves on the level of thought of the practical man, the statesman, and the
legislator. Coercion and ignorance of relevant circumstances render acts
involuntary and exempt their doer from responsibility, otherwise the act is
voluntary and the agent responsible, choice or preference of what is done,
and inner consent to the deed, are to be presumed. Neither passion nor
ignorance of the right rule can extenuate responsibility. But there is a
difference between acts done voluntarily and acts done of set choice or
purpose. The latter imply Deliberation. Deliberation involves thinking,
thinking out means to ends: in deliberate acts the whole nature of the agent
consents to and enters into the act, and in a peculiar sense they are his, they
are him in action, and the most significant evidence of what he is. Aristotle
is unable wholly to avoid allusion to the metaphysical difficulties and what
he does here say upon them is obscure and unsatisfactory. But he insists
upon the importance in moral action of the agent’s inner consent, and on the
reality of his individual responsibility. For his present purpose the
metaphysical difficulties are irrelevant.
The treatment of Justice in Book V has always been a source of great
difficulty to students of the Ethics. Almost more than any other part of the
work it has exercised influence upon mediaeval and modern thought upon
the subject. The distinctions and divisions have become part of the stock-intrade of would be philosophic jurists. And yet, oddly enough, most of these
distinctions have been misunderstood and the whole purport of the
discussion misconceived. Aristotle is here dealing with justice in a
restricted sense viz as that special goodness of character which is required
of every adult citizen and which can be produced by early discipline or

habituation. It is the temper or habitual attitude demanded of the citizen for
the due exercise of his functions as taking part in the administration of the
civic community—as a member of the judicature and executive. The Greek
citizen was only exceptionally, and at rare intervals if ever, a law-maker
while at any moment he might be called upon to act as a judge (juryman or
arbitrator) or as an administrator. For the work of a legislator far more than
the moral virtue of justice or fairmindedness was necessary, these were
requisite to the rarer and higher “intellectual virtue” of practical wisdom.
Then here, too, the discussion moves on a low level, and the raising of
fundamental problems is excluded. Hence “distributive justice” is
concerned not with the large question of the distribution of political power
and privileges among the constituent members or classes of the state but
with the smaller questions of the distribution among those of casual gains
and even with the division among private claimants of a common fund or
inheritance, while “corrective justice” is concerned solely with the
management of legal redress. The whole treatment is confused by the
unhappy attempt to give a precise mathematical form to the principles of
justice in the various fields distinguished. Still it remains an interesting first
endeavour to give greater exactness to some of the leading conceptions of
jurisprudence.
Book VI appears to have in view two aims: (1) to describe goodness of
intellect and discover its highest form or forms; (2) to show how this is
related to goodness of character, and so to conduct generally. As all
thinking is either theoretical or practical, goodness of intellect has two
supreme forms—Theoretical and Practical Wisdom. The first, which
apprehends the eternal laws of the universe, has no direct relation to human
conduct: the second is identical with that master science of human life of
which the whole treatise, consisting of the Ethics and the Politics, is an
exposition. It is this science which supplies the right rules of conduct
Taking them as they emerge in and from practical experience, it formulates
them more precisely and organises them into a system where they are all
seen to converge upon happiness. The mode in which such knowledge
manifests itself is in the power to show that such and such rules of action
follow from the very nature of the end or good for man. It presupposes and
starts from a clear conception of the end and the wish for it as conceived,
and it proceeds by a deduction which is dehberation writ large. In the man

of practical wisdom this process has reached its perfect result, and the code
of right rules is apprehended as a system with a single principle and so as
something wholly rational or reasonable He has not on each occasion to
seek and find the right rule applicable to the situation, he produces it at once
from within himself, and can at need justify it by exhibiting its rationale, i.e.
, its connection with the end. This is the consummate form of reason
applied to conduct, but there are minor forms of it, less independent or
original, but nevertheless of great value, such as the power to think out the
proper cause of policy in novel circumstances or the power to see the proper
line of treatment to follow in a court of law.
The form of the thinking which enters into conduct is that which
terminates in the production of a rule which declares some means to the end
of life. The process presupposes (a) a clear and just apprehension of the
nature of that end—such as the Ethics itself endeavours to supply; (b) a
correct perception of the conditions of action, (a) at least is impossible
except to a man whose character has been duly formed by discipline; it
arises only in a man who has acquired moral virtue. For such action and
feeling as forms bad character, blinds the eye of the soul and corrupts the
moral principle, and the place of practical wisdom is taken by that parody
of itself which Aristotle calls “cleverness”—the “wisdom” of the
unscrupulous man of the world. Thus true practical wisdom and true
goodness of character are interdependent; neither is genuinely possible or
“completely” present without the other. This is Aristotle’s contribution to
the discussion of the question, so central in Greek Moral Philosophy, of the
relation of the intellectual and the passionate factors in conduct.
Aristotle is not an intuitionist, but he recognises the implication in
conduct of a direct and immediate apprehension both of the end and of the
character of his circumstances under which it is from moment to moment
realised. The directness of such apprehension makes it analogous to
sensation or sense-perception; but it is on his view in the end due to the
existence or activity in man of that power in him which is the highest thing
in his nature, and akin to or identical with the divine nature—mind, or
intelligence. It is this which reveals to us what is best for us—the ideal of a
happiness which is the object of our real wish and the goal of all our efforts.
But beyond and above the practical ideal of what is best for man begins to
show itself another and still higher ideal—that of a life not distinctively

human or in a narrow sense practical, yet capable of being participated in
by man even under the actual circumstances of this world. For a time,
however, this further and higher ideal is ignored.
The next book (Book VII.), is concerned partly with moral conditions, in
which the agent seems to rise above the level of moral virtue or fall below
that of moral vice, but partly and more largely with conditions in which the
agent occupies a middle position between the two. Aristotle’s attention is
here directed chiefly towards the phenomena of “Incontinence,” weakness
of will or imperfect self-control. This condition was to the Greeks a matter
of only too frequent experience, but it appeared to them peculiarly difficult
to understand. How can a man know what is good or best for him, and yet
chronically fail to act upon his knowledge? Socrates was driven to the
paradox of denying the possibility, but the facts are too strong for him.
Knowledge of the right rule may be present, nay the rightfulness of its
authority may be acknowledged, and yet time after time it may be
disobeyed; the will may be good and yet overmastered by the force of
desire, so that the act done is contrary to the agent’s will. Nevertheless the
act may be the agent’s, and the will therefore divided against itself.
Aristotle is aware of the seriousness and difficulty of the problem, but in
spite of the vividness with which he pictures, and the acuteness with which
he analyses, the situation in which such action occurs, it cannot be said that
he solves the problem. It is time that he rises above the abstract view of it as
a conflict between reason and passion, recognising that passion is involved
in the knowledge which in conduct prevails or is overborne, and that the
force which leads to the wrong act is not blind or ignorant passion, but
always has some reason in it. But he tends to lapse back into the
abstraction, and his final account is perplexed and obscure. He finds the
source of the phenomenon in the nature of the desire for bodily pleasures,
which is not irrational but has something rational in it. Such pleasures are
not necessarily or inherently bad, as has sometimes been maintained; on the
contrary, they are good, but only in certain amounts or under certain
conditions, so that the will is often misled, hesitates, and is lost.
Books VIII. and IX. (on Friendship) are almost an interruption of the
argument. The subject-matter of them was a favourite topic of ancient
writers, and the treatment is smoother and more orderly than elsewhere in
the Ethics. The argument is clear, and may be left without comment to the

readers. These books contain a necessary and attractive complement to the
somewhat dry account of Greek morality in the preceding books, and there
are in them profound reflections on what may be called the metaphysics of
friendship or love.
At the beginning of Book X. we return to the topic of Pleasure, which is
now regarded from a different point of view. In Book VII. the antagonists
were those who over-emphasised the irrationality or badness of Pleasure:
here it is rather those who so exaggerate its value as to confuse or identify it
with the good or Happiness. But there is offered us in this section much
more than criticism of the errors of others. Answers are given both to the
psychological question, “What is Pleasure?” and to the ethical question,
“What is its value?” Pleasure, we are told, is the natural concomitant and
index of perfect activity, distinguishable but inseparable from it—“the
activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.” It is
therefore always and in itself a good, but its value rises and falls with that
of the activity with which it is conjoined, and which it intensifies and
perfects. Hence it follows that the highest and best pleasures are those
which accompany the highest and best activity.
Pleasure is, therefore, a necessary element in the best life, but it is not the
whole of it nor the principal ingredient. The value of a life depends upon
the nature and worth of the activity which it involves; given the maximum
of full free action, the maximum of pleasure necessary follows. But on what
sort of life is such activity possible? This leads us back to the question,
What is happiness? In what life can man find the fullest satisfaction for his
desires? To this question Aristotle gives an answer which cannot but
surprise us after what has preceded. True Happiness, great satisfaction,
cannot be found by man in any form of “practical” life, no, not in the fullest
and freest exercise possible of the “moral virtues,” not in the life of the
citizen or of the great soldier or statesman. To seek it there is to court failure
and disappointment. It is to be found in the life of the onlooker, the
disinterested spectator; or, to put it more distinctly, “in the life of the
philosopher, the life of scientific and philosophic contemplation.” The
highest and most satisfying form of life possible to man is “the
contemplative life”; it is only in a secondary sense and for those incapable
of their life, that the practical or moral ideal is the best. It is time that such a
life is not distinctively human, but it is the privilege of man to partake in it,

and such participation, at however rare intervals and for however short a
period, is the highest Happiness which human life can offer. All other
activities have value only because and in so far as they render this life
possible.
But it must not be forgotten that Aristotle conceives of this life as one of
intense activity or energising: it is just this which gives it its supremacy. In
spite of the almost religious fervour with which he speaks of it (“the most
orthodox of his disciples” paraphrases his meaning by describing its content
as “the service and vision of God”), it is clear that he identified it with the
life of the philosopher, as he understood it, a life of ceaseless intellectual
activity in which at least at times all the distractions and disturbances
inseparable from practical life seemed to disappear and become as nothing.
This ideal was partly an inheritance from the more ardent idealism of his
master Plato, but partly it was the expression of personal experience.
The nobility of this ideal cannot be questioned; the conception of the end
of man or a life lived for truth—of a life blissfully absorbed in the vision of
truth—is a lofty and inspiring one. But we cannot resist certain criticisms
upon its presentation by Aristotle: (1) the relation of it to the lower ideal of
practice is left somewhat obscure; (2) it is described in such a way as
renders its realisation possible only to a gifted few, and under exceptional
circumstances; (3) it seems in various ways, as regards its content, to be
unnecessarily and unjustifiably limited. But it must be borne in mind that
this is a first endeavour to determine its principle, and that similar failures
have attended the attempts to describe the “religious” or the “spiritual”
ideals of life, which have continually been suggested by the apparently
inherent limitations of the “practical” or “moral” life, which is the subject
of Moral Philosophy.
The Moral Ideal to those who have most deeply reflected on it leads to
the thought of an Ideal beyond and above it, which alone gives it meaning,
but which seems to escape from definite conception by man. The richness
and variety of this Ideal ceaselessly invite, but as ceaselessly defy, our
attempts to imprison it in a definite formula or portray it in detailed
imagination. Yet the thought of it is and remains inexpungable from our
minds.

This conception of the best life is not forgotten in the Politics The end of
life in the state is itself well-living and well-doing—a life which helps to
produce the best life The great agency in the production of such life is the
State operating through Law, which is Reason backed by Force. For its
greatest efficiency there is required the development of a science of
legislation. The main drift of what he says here is that the most desirable
thing would be that the best reason of the community should be embodied
in its laws. But so far as that is not possible, it still is true that anyone who
would make himself and others better must become a miniature legislator—
must study the general principles of law, morality, and education. The
conception of [Grek: politikae] with which he opened the Ethics would
serve as a guide to a father educating his children as well as to the legislator
legislating for the state. Finding in his predecessors no developed doctrine
on this subject, Aristotle proposes himself to undertake the construction of
it, and sketches in advance the programme of the Politics in the concluding
sentence of the Ethics His ultimate object is to answer the questions, What
is the best form of Polity, how should each be constituted, and what laws
and customs should it adopt and employ? Not till this answer is given will
“the philosophy of human affairs” be complete.
On looking back it will be seen that the discussion of the central topic of
the nature and formation of character has expanded into a Philosophy of
Human Conduct, merging at its beginning and end into metaphysics The
result is a Moral Philosophy set against a background of Political Theory
and general Philosophy. The most characteristic features of this Moral
Philosophy are due to the fact of its essentially teleological view of human
life and action: (1) Every human activity, but especially every human
practical activity, is directed towards a simple End discoverable by
reflection, and this End is conceived of as the object of universal human
desire, as something to be enjoyed, not as something which ought to be
done or enacted. Anstotle’s Moral Philosophy is not hedonistic but it is
eudæmomstic, the end is the enjoyment of Happiness, not the fulfilment of
Duty. (2) Every human practical activity derives its value from its efficiency
as a means to that end, it is good or bad, right or wrong, as it conduces or
fails to conduce to Happiness Thus his Moral Philosophy is essentially
utilitarian or prudential Right action presupposes Thought or Thinking,
partly on the development of a clearer and distincter conception of the end

of desire, partly as the deduction from that of rules which state the normally
effective conditions of its realisation. The thinking involved in right
conduct is calculation—calculation of means to an end fixed by nature and
foreknowable Action itself is at its best just the realisation of a scheme
preconceived and thought out beforehand, commending itself by its
inherent attractiveness or promise of enjoyment.
This view has the great advantage of exhibiting morality as essentially
reasonable, but the accompanying disadvantage of lowering it into a
somewhat prosaic and unideal Prudentialism, nor is it saved from this by
the tacking on to it, by a sort of after-thought, of the second and higher
Ideal—an addition which ruins the coherence of the account without really
transmuting its substance The source of our dissatisfaction with the whole
theory lies deeper than in its tendency to identify the end with the maximum
of enjoyment or satisfaction, or to regard the goodness or badness of acts
and feelings as lying solely in their efficacy to produce such a result It
arises from the application to morality of the distinction of means and end
For this distinction, for all its plausibility and usefulness in ordinary thought
and speech, cannot finally be maintained In morality—and this is vital to its
character—everything is both means and end, and so neither in distinction
or separation, and all thinking about it which presupposes the finality of this
distinction wanders into misconception and error. The thinking which really
matters in conduct is not a thinking which imaginatively forecasts ideals
which promise to fulfil desire, or calculates means to their attainment—that
is sometimes useful, sometimes harmful, and always subordinate, but
thinking which reveals to the agent the situation in which he is to act, both,
that is, the universal situation on which as man he always and everywhere
stands, and the ever-varying and ever-novel situation in which he as this
individual, here and now, finds himself. In such knowledge of given or
historic fact lie the natural determinants of his conduct, in such knowledge
alone lies the condition of his freedom and his good.
But this does not mean that Moral Philosophy has not still much to learn
from Aristotle’s Ethics. The work still remains one of the best introductions
to a study of its important subject-matter, it spreads before us a view of the
relevant facts, it reduces them to manageable compass and order, it raises
some of the central problems, and makes acute and valuable suggestions

towards their solution. Above all, it perpetually incites to renewed and
independent reflection upon them.
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ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

BOOK I
Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like
manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good: for
which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief
Good is, “that which all things aim at.”
Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some cases
they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible results
beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are certain Ends
beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their nature better than the
acts of working. Again, since actions and arts and sciences are many, the
Ends likewise come to be many: of the healing art, for instance, health; of
the ship-building art, a vessel; of the military art, victory; and of domestic
management, wealth; are respectively the Ends.
And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one
faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and all that
are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in general; this itself
again, and every action connected with war, under the military art; and in
the same way others under others), in all such, the Ends of the master-arts
are more choice-worthy than those ranging under them, because it is with a
view to the former that the latter are pursued.
(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of
working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further beside
them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just speaking of.)
II] Since then of all things which may be done there is some one End which we desire for its
own sake, and with a view to which we desire everything else; and since we do not choose in all
instances with a further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the desire
would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the Chief Good, i.e. the best thing of all.

Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the
knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark in
view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so, we ought

to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of which of the sciences
and faculties it is the End.
1094b] Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most commanding
and most inclusive: and to this description, [Greek: politikae] plainly answers: for this it is that
determines which of the sciences should be in the communities, and which kind individuals are
to learn, and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also ranging under this
the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art military, and that of domestic management,
and Rhetoric. Well then, since this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays down
rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End of this must include the Ends
of the rest, and so must be The Good of Man. And grant that this is the same to the individual
and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover
and preserve: for to do this even for a single individual were a matter for contentment; but to do
it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.
III] Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the nature of [Greek:
politikae]: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly
clear as the nature of the subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not be looked for in all
discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft. Now the notions of nobleness and
justice, with the examination of which politikea is concerned, admit of variation and error to
such a degree, that they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in the nature
of things: but then, again, the things which are allowed to be goods admit of a similar error,
because harm comes to many from them: for before now some have perished through wealth,
and others through valour.

We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data,
to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we are
speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also conclusions
merely general. And in the same spirit should each person receive what we
say: for the man of education will seek exactness so far in each subject as
the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly much the same absurdity to
put up with a mathematician who tries to persuade instead of proving, and
to demand strict demonstrative reasoning of a Rhetorician.
1095a] Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a good judge: on
each particular matter then he is a good judge who has been instructed in it, and in a general
way the man of general mental cultivation.

Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has
no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes and is
concerned with these: and in the next place, since he is apt to follow the
impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no
profit, the end in view being practice and not mere knowledge.

And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in
temper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct result of
the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and following each
object as it rises. For to them that are such the knowledge comes to be
unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control: but, to those who form
their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these
points must be very profitable.
Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the
student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and the
object which we propose.
IV] And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all knowledge and moral
choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what good is that which we say [Greek: politikai]
aims at? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?

So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for
HAPPINESS both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living
well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;”
but about the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do
not in their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of
those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or
honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same
man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health; when
poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who
talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held it to be
something by itself, other than and beside these many good things, which is
in fact to all these the cause of their being good.
Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task; so it
shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or are thought to
have some reason in them.
1095b] And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from principles, and
reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato too doubt about this, and inquire whether
the right road is from principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges to the
further end, or vice versâ.

Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two
kinds, what we do know, and what we may know: perhaps then as
individuals we must begin with what we do know. Hence the necessity that

he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with any
tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and moral
philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact, and if the fact is
sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in addition of the reason for
the fact. And he that has been thus trained either has principles already, or
can receive them easily: as for him who neither has nor can receive them,
let him hear his sentence from Hesiod:
He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;
Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;
But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from
another
Layeth it to heart;—he is a useless man.

V But to return from this digression.

Now of the Chief Good (i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their
notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the
many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content
with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which
stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the life in society,
and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.
Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute
animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great
share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again conceive it to
be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the life in society: yet it is
plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to
rest with those who pay rather than with him who receives it, whereas the
Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is our own, and
not easily to be taken from us.
And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may *[Sidenote:
1096a] believe themselves to be good: for instance, they seek to be
honoured by the wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for
virtue: clearly then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher
than honour. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this to be
the end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not sufficiently final:
for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed of virtue might sleep or be
inactive all through his life, or, as a third case, suffer the greatest evils and

misfortunes: and the man who should live thus no one would call happy,
except for mere disputation’s sake.
And for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at
sufficient length in my Encyclia.
A third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we shall
make our examination in the sequel.
As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth
manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that is, for
the sake of something further: and hence one would rather conceive the
forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest content with them for
their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the objects of our search either,
though many words have been wasted on them. So much then for these.
VI] Again, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that is, in all things), it is better perhaps
we should examine, and discuss the meaning of it, though such an inquiry is unpleasant,
because they are friends of ours who have introduced these [Greek: eidae]. Still perhaps it may
appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the truth is concerned, to upset if need be
even our own theories, specially as we are lovers of wisdom: for since both are dear to us, we are
bound to prefer the truth. Now they who invented this doctrine of [Greek: eidae], did not apply it
to those things in which they spoke of priority and posteriority, and so they never made any
[Greek: idea] of numbers; but good is predicated in the categories of Substance, Quality, and
Relation; now that which exists of itself, i.e. Substance, is prior in the nature of things to that
which is relative, because this latter is an off-shoot, as it were, and result of that which is; on
their own principle then there cannot be a common [Greek: idea] in the case of these.

In the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there are
modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of Substance, as
God, Intellect—and in that of Quality, as The Virtues—and in that of
Quantity, as The Mean—and in that of Relation, as The Useful—and in that
of Time, as Opportunity—and in that of Place, as Abode; and other such
like things], it manifestly cannot be something common and universal and
one in all: else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in
one only.
1096b] Thirdly, since those things which range under one [Greek: idea] are also under the
cognisance of one science, there would have been, on their theory, only one science taking
cognisance of all goods collectively: but in fact there are many even for those which range
under one category: for instance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness (which I have before
mentioned as being in the category of Time), the science is, in war, generalship; in disease,
medical science; and of the Mean (which I quoted before as being in the category of Quantity),
in food, the medical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic science. A person might

fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by very-this that or the other, since, as they would
themselves allow, the account of the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any
individual Man: for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both Man, they will not differ
at all: and if so, then very-good and any particular good will not differ, in so far as both are
good. Nor will it do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more good; for what
has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what lasts but for a day.

No. The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the
matter, who place “One” among the goods in their double list of goods and
bads: which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus seems to have followed.
But of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is plainly
a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea that the theory I
have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all good: but those goods
only are spoken of as being under one [Greek: idea], which are pursued, and
with which men rest content simply for their own sakes: whereas those
things which have a tendency to produce or preserve them in any way, or to
hinder their contraries, are called good because of these other goods, and
after another fashion. It is manifest then that the goods may be so called in
two senses, the one class for their own sakes, the other because of these.
Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the
instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one [Greek:
idea]. But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call
independent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other
goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and
honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in
view, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it come
in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except the [Greek:
idea], and so the concrete of it will be nought?
If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall require
that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all, just as that of the
whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands the fact? Why of
honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are distinct and different in
so far as they are good. The Chief Good then is not something common,
and after one [Greek: idea].
But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly
a case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things called

good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one end, or
rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to the body,
and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these questions now, for an
accurate investigation of them is more properly the business of a different
philosophy. And likewise respecting the [Greek: idea]: for even if there is
some one good predicated in common of all things that are good, or
separable and capable of existing independently, manifestly it cannot be the
object of human action or attainable by Man; but we are in search now of
something that is so.
It may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a
knowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable and
practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we shall the
better know what things are good for us individually, and when we know
them, we shall attain them.
Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is contradicted
by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these, though aiming at some
good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet pretermit the knowledge of it:
now it is not exactly probable that all artisans without exception should be
ignorant of so great a help as this would be, and not even look after it;
neither is it easy to see wherein a weaver or a carpenter will be profited in
respect of his craft by knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the
more apt to effect cures or to command an army for having seen the [Greek:
idea] itself. For manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract
fashion which is the subject of the physician’s investigation, but the health
of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal individuals.
—Thus much on these points.

VII
And now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can it
be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts: for it is
different in the healing art and in the art military, and similarly in the rest.
What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not “that for the sake of which
the other things are done?” and this in the healing art is health, and in the art
military victory, and in that of house-building a house, and in any other
thing something else; in short, in every action and moral choice the End,

because in all cases men do everything else with a view to this. So that if
there is some one End of all things which are and may be done, this must be
the Good proposed by doing, or if more than one, then these.
Thus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same
point which we reached before. And this we must try yet more to clear up.
Now since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with
a view to others (wealth, for instance, musical instruments, and, in general,
all instruments), it is clear that all are not final: but the Chief Good is
manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one only which is final,
this must be the object of our search: but if several, then the most final of
them will be it.
Now that which is an object of pursuit in itself we call more final than
that which is so with a view to something else; that again which is never an
object of choice with a view to something else than those which are so both
in themselves and with a view to this ulterior object: and so by the term
“absolutely final,” we denote that which is an object of choice always in
itself, and never with a view to any other.
And of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we choose
always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further: whereas
honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for their own
sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these even if no result
were to follow), but we choose them also with a view to happiness,
conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be happy: but no man
chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact with a view to any other
thing whatsoever.
The same result is seen to follow also from the notion of self-sufficiency,
a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now by sufficient for Self, we
mean not for a single individual living a solitary life, but for his parents also
and children and wife, and, in general, friends and countrymen; for man is
by nature adapted to a social existence. But of these, of course, some limit
must be fixed: for if one extends it to parents and descendants and friends’
friends, there is no end to it. This point, however, must be left for future
investigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient “which
taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of nothing;” now of

such kind we think Happiness to be: and further, to be most choice-worthy
of all things; not being reckoned with any other thing, for if it were so
reckoned, it is plain we must then allow it, with the addition of ever so
small a good, to be more choice-worthy than it was before: because what is
put to it becomes an addition of so much more good, and of goods the
greater is ever the more choice-worthy.
So then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being
the end of all things which are and may be done.
But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and
what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object
may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work of man;
for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any kind, or, more
generally, all who have any work or course of action, their Chief Good and
Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with
man, if there is any work belonging to him.
Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain
works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature
without a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and foot,
and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special work; so
too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work of his own?
What then can this be? not mere life, because that plainly is shared with
him even by vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to him. We must
separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and next will
come the life of sensation: but this again manifestly is common to horses,
oxen, and every animal. There remains then a kind of life of the Rational
Nature apt to act: and of this Nature there are two parts denominated
Rational, the one as being obedient to Reason, the other as having and
exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken of in two ways, we must take
that which is in the way of actual working, because this is thought to be
most properly entitled to the name. If then the work of Man is a working of
the soul in accordance with reason, or at least not independently of reason,
and we say that the work of any given subject, and of that subject good of
its kind, are the same in kind (as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good
harp-player, and so on in every case, adding to the work eminence in the

way of excellence; I mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the harp, and
of a good harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is so, and we assume the
work of Man to be life of a certain kind, that is to say a working of the soul,
and actions with reason, and of a good man to do these things well and
nobly, and in fact everything is finished off well in the way of the
excellence which peculiarly belongs to it: if all this is so, then the Good of
Man comes to be “a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,” or, if
Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect
Excellence.
And we must add, in a complete life; for as it is not one swallow or one
fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes
a man blessed and happy.
Let this then be taken for a rough sketch of the Chief Good: since it is
probably the right way to give first the outline, and fill it in afterwards. And
it would seem that any man may improve and connect what is good in the
sketch, and that time is a good discoverer and co-operator in such matters: it
is thus in fact that all improvements in the various arts have been brought
about, for any man may fill up a deficiency.
You must remember also what has been already stated, and not seek for
exactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the subject-matter,
and so far as properly belongs to the system. The carpenter and
geometrician, for instance, inquire into the right line in different fashion:
the former so far as he wants it for his work, the latter inquires into its
nature and properties, because he is concerned with the truth.
So then should one do in other matters, that the incidental matters may
not exceed the direct ones.
And again, you must not demand the reason either in all things alike,
because in some it is sufficient that the fact has been well demonstrated,
which is the case with first principles; and the fact is the first step, i.e.
starting-point or principle.
And of these first principles some are obtained by induction, some by
perception, some by a course of habituation, others in other different ways.
And we must try to trace up each in their own nature, and take pains to

secure their being well defined, because they have great influence on what
follows: it is thought, I mean, that the starting-point or principle is more
than half the whole matter, and that many of the points of inquiry come
simultaneously into view thereby.

VIII
We must now inquire concerning Happiness, not only from our
conclusion and the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from
what is commonly said about it: because with what is true all things which
really are are in harmony, but with that which is false the true very soon
jars.
Now there is a common division of goods into three classes; one being
called external, the other two those of the soul and body respectively, and
those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially good. Well,
in our definition we assume that the actions and workings of the soul
constitute Happiness, and these of course belong to the soul. And so our
account is a good one, at least according to this opinion, which is of ancient
date, and accepted by those who profess philosophy. Rightly too are certain
actions and workings said to be the end, for thus it is brought into the
number of the goods of the soul instead of the external. Agreeing also with
our definition is the common notion, that the happy man lives well and does
well, for it has been stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well and
doing well.
But further, the points required in Happiness are found in combination in
our account of it.
For some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom, others a kind of
scientific philosophy; others that it is these, or else some one of them, in
combination with pleasure, or at least not independently of it; while others
again take in external prosperity.
Of these opinions, some rest on the authority of numbers or antiquity,
others on that of few, and those men of note: and it is not likely that either
of these classes should be wrong in all points, but be right at least in some
one, or even in most.

Now with those who assert it to be Virtue (Excellence), or some kind of
Virtue, our account agrees: for working in the way of Excellence surely
belongs to Excellence.
And there is perhaps no unimportant difference between conceiving of
the Chief Good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere state
or as a working. For the state or habit may possibly exist in a subject
without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is asleep, or in any
other way inactive; but the working cannot so, for it will of necessity act,
and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is not the finest and strongest
men who are crowned, but they who enter the lists, for out of these the
prize-men are selected; so too in life, of the honourable and the good, it is
they who act who rightly win the prizes.
Their life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a mental
sensation, and that is to each pleasant of which he is said to be fond: a
horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a sight to him who is
fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to him who is fond of justice,
and more generally the things in accordance with virtue to him who is fond
of virtue. Now in the case of the multitude of men the things which they
individually esteem pleasant clash, because they are not such by nature,
whereas to the lovers of nobleness those things are pleasant which are such
by nature: but the actions in accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that
they are pleasant both to the individuals and also in themselves.
So then their life has no need of pleasure as a kind of additional
appendage, but involves pleasure in itself. For, besides what I have just
mentioned, a man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in noble
actions, just as no one would call that man just who does not feel pleasure
in acting justly, or liberal who does not in liberal actions, and similarly in
the case of the other virtues which might be enumerated: and if this be so,
then the actions in accordance with virtue must be in themselves
pleasurable. Then again they are certainly good and noble, and each of
these in the highest degree; if we are to take as right the judgment of the
good man, for he judges as we have said.
Thus then Happiness is most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant,
and these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian

inscription—
“Most noble is that which is most just, but best is health; And naturally
most pleasant is the obtaining one’s desires.”
For all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say that
Happiness is these, or one, that is, the best of them.
Still it is quite plain that it does require the addition of external goods, as
we have said: because without appliances it is impossible, or at all events
not easy, to do noble actions: for friends, money, and political influence are
in a manner instruments whereby many things are done: some things there
are again a deficiency in which mars blessedness; good birth, for instance,
or fine offspring, or even personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of
Happiness who is very ugly, or is ill-born, or solitary and childless; and still
less perhaps supposing him to have very bad children or friends, or to have
lost good ones by death. As we have said already, the addition of prosperity
of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of Happiness; hence
some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with Happiness.
And hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be
learned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind, or
whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the way of
chance.
Now to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is
probable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because of all
human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a question belonging
more properly to an investigation different from ours: and it is quite clear,
that on the supposition of its not being sent from the Gods direct, but
coming to us by reason of virtue and learning of a certain kind, or
discipline, it is yet one of the most Godlike things; because the prize and
End of virtue is manifestly somewhat most excellent, nay divine and
blessed.
It will also on this supposition be widely participated, for it may through
learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have not been
maimed for virtue.

And if it is better we should be happy thus than as a result of chance, this
is in itself an argument that the case is so; because those things which are in
the way of nature, and in like manner of art, and of every cause, and
specially the best cause, are by nature in the best way possible: to leave
them to chance what is greatest and most noble would be very much out of
harmony with all these facts.
The question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of
Happiness, that it is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or virtue
of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some we must have to begin with,
and those which are co-operative and useful are given by nature as
instruments.
These considerations will harmonise also with what we said at the
commencement: for we assumed the End of [Greek Text: poletikae] to be
most excellent: now this bestows most care on making the members of the
community of a certain character; good that is and apt to do what is
honourable.
With good reason then neither ox nor horse nor any other brute animal do
we call happy, for none of them can partake in such working: and for this
same reason a child is not happy either, because by reason of his tender age
he cannot yet perform such actions: if the term is applied, it is by way of
anticipation.
For to constitute Happiness, there must be, as we have said, complete
virtue and a complete life: for many changes and chances of all kinds arise
during a life, and he who is most prosperous may become involved in great
misfortunes in his old age, as in the heroic poems the tale is told of Priam:
but the man who has experienced such fortune and died in wretchedness, no
man calls happy.
Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would
have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position, is a
man then happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete absurdity,
specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a certain kind?
If on the other hand we do not assert that the dead man is happy, and
Solon does not mean this, but only that one would then be safe in

pronouncing a man happy, as being thenceforward out of the reach of evils
and misfortunes, this too admits of some dispute, since it is thought that the
dead has somewhat both of good and evil (if, as we must allow, a man may
have when alive but not aware of the circumstances), as honour and
dishonour, and good and bad fortune of children and descendants generally.
Nor is this view again without its difficulties: for, after a man has lived in
blessedness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may befall him
in right of his descendants; some of them may be good and obtain positions
in life accordant to their merits, others again quite the contrary: it is plain
too that the descendants may at different intervals or grades stand in all
manner of relations to the ancestors. Absurd indeed would be the position
that even the dead man is to change about with them and become at one
time happy and at another miserable. Absurd however it is on the other
hand that the affairs of the descendants should in no degree and during no
time affect the ancestors.
But we must revert to the point first raised, since the present question
will be easily determined from that.
If then we are to look to the end and then pronounce the man blessed, not
as being so but as having been so at some previous time, surely it is absurd
that when he is happy the truth is not to be asserted of him, because we are
unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason of their liability to
changes, and because, whereas we have conceived of happiness as
something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact is that good and
bad fortune are constantly circling about the same people: for it is quite
plain, that if we are to depend upon the fortunes of men, we shall often have
to call the same man happy, and a little while after miserable, thus
representing our happy man
“Chameleon-like, and based on rottenness.”

Is not this the solution? that to make our sentence dependent on the
changes of fortune, is no way right: for not in them stands the well, or the
ill, but though human life needs these as accessories (which we have
allowed already), the workings in the way of virtue are what determine
Happiness, and the contrary the contrary.

And, by the way, the question which has been here discussed, testifies
incidentally to the truth of our account of Happiness. For to nothing does a
stability of human results attach so much as it does to the workings in the
way of virtue, since these are held to be more abiding even than the
sciences: and of these last again the most precious are the most abiding,
because the blessed live in them most and most continuously, which seems
to be the reason why they are not forgotten. So then this stability which is
sought will be in the happy man, and he will be such through life, since
always, or most of all, he will be doing and contemplating the things which
are in the way of virtue: and the various chances of life he will bear most
nobly, and at all times and in all ways harmoniously, since he is the truly
good man, or in the terms of our proverb “a faultless cube.”
And whereas the incidents of chance are many, and differ in greatness
and smallness, the small pieces of good or ill fortune evidently do not affect
the balance of life, but the great and numerous, if happening for good, will
make life more blessed (for it is their nature to contribute to ornament, and
the using of them comes to be noble and excellent), but if for ill, they bruise
as it were and maim the blessedness: for they bring in positive pain, and
hinder many acts of working. But still, even in these, nobleness shines
through when a man bears contentedly many and great mischances not from
insensibility to pain but because he is noble and high-spirited.
And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the
character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched,
because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For the
man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume,
becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances, just
as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has with him;
or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of the leather
which has been given him; and all other good artisans likewise. And if this
be so, wretched never can the happy man come to be: I do not mean to say
he will be blessed should he fall into fortunes like those of Priam.
Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one hand
from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary mischances,
but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and, on the other, after
such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a little time; but, if at all,

in a long and complete period, during which he has made himself master of
great and noble things.
Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of
perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for acting his
part in the drama of life: and this during no ordinary period but such as
constitutes a complete life as we have been describing it.
Or we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his death must be in
keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and Happiness we
assume to be in every way an end and complete. And, if this be so, we shall
call them among the living blessed who have and will have the things
specified, but blessed as Men.
On these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much.

XI
Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally,
contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly a
very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions.
But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of ways,
and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute particular
distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and so it may
suffice to speak generally and in outline.
If then, as of the misfortunes which happen to one’s self, some have a
certain weight and turn the balance of life, while others are, so to speak,
lighter; so it is likewise with those which befall all our friends alike; if
further, whether they whom each suffering befalls be alive or dead makes
much more difference than in a tragedy the presupposing or actual
perpetration of the various crimes and horrors, we must take into our
account this difference also, and still more perhaps the doubt concerning the
dead whether they really partake of any good or evil; it seems to result from
all these considerations, that if anything does pierce the veil and reach
them, be the same good or bad, it must be something trivial and small,
either in itself or to them; or at least of such a magnitude or such a kind as

neither to make happy them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their
blessedness them that are.
It is plain then that the good or ill fortunes of their friends do affect the
dead somewhat: but in such kind and degree as neither to make the happy
unhappy nor produce any other such effect.

XII
Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to
Happiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or things
precious; for to that of faculties it evidently does not.
Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised for
being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something else: for
instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good man, and virtue
itself, we praise because of the actions and the results: and the strong man,
and the quick runner, and so forth, we praise for being of a certain nature
and bearing a certain relation to something good and excellent (and this is
illustrated by attempts to praise the gods; for they are presented in a
ludicrous aspect by being referred to our standard, and this results from the
fact, that all praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard).
Now if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is
applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and better:
which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods blessed and
happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who most nearly
resemble the gods. And in like manner in respect of goods; no man thinks
of praising Happiness as he does the principle of justice, but calls it blessed,
as being somewhat more godlike and more excellent.
Eudoxus too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support of
the claim of pleasure to the highest prize: for the fact that, though it is one
of the good things, it is not praised, he took for an indication of its
superiority to those which are subjects of praise: a superiority he attributed
also to a god and the Chief Good, on the ground that they form the standard
to which everything besides is referred. For praise applies to virtue, because
it makes men apt to do what is noble; but encomia to definite works of body
or mind.

However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia to
pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that from what
has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the class of things
precious and final. And it seems to be so also because of its being a
starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it we all do everything else
that is done; now the starting-point and cause of good things we assume to
be something precious and divine.

XIII
Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of
perfect Excellence, we must inquire concerning Excellence: for so probably
shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again, he who is
really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most pains on this, for
he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. (For
examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and
Lacedaemonians and whatever other such there have been.) But if this
investigation belongs properly to [Greek: politikae], then clearly the inquiry
will be in accordance with our original design.
Well, we are to inquire concerning Excellence, i.e. Human Excellence of
course, because it was the Chief Good of Man and the Happiness of Man
that we were inquiring of just now. By Human Excellence we mean not that
of man’s body but that of his soul; for we call Happiness a working of the
Soul.
And if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the Soul
is necessary for the statesman, just as for the Oculist a knowledge of the
whole body, and the more so in proportion as [Greek: politikae] is more
precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact physicians of the higher
class do busy themselves much with the knowledge of the body.
So then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he must
do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice for the
objects of his special inquiry: for to carry his speculations to a greater
exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls within his province.

In fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises
are quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that the Soul
consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational (as to whether these are
actually divided, as are the parts of the body, and everything that is capable
of division; or are only metaphysically speaking two, being by nature
inseparable, as are convex and concave circumferences, matters not in
respect of our present purpose). And of the Irrational, the one part seems
common to other objects, and in fact vegetative; I mean the cause of
nourishment and growth (for such a faculty of the Soul one would assume
to exist in all things that receive nourishment, even in embryos, and this the
same as in the perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be
a different one).
Now the Excellence of this manifestly is not peculiar to the human
species but common to others: for this part and this faculty is thought to
work most in time of sleep, and the good and bad man are least
distinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying that during one
half of life there is no difference between the happy and the wretched; and
this accords with our anticipations, for sleep is an inactivity of the soul, in
so far as it is denominated good or bad, except that in some wise some of its
movements find their way through the veil and so the good come to have
better dreams than ordinary men. But enough of this: we must forego any
further mention of the nutritive part, since it is not naturally capable of the
Excellence which is peculiarly human.
And there seems to be another Irrational Nature of the Soul, which yet in
a way partakes of Reason. For in the man who controls his appetites, and in
him who resolves to do so and fails, we praise the Reason or Rational part
of the Soul, because it exhorts aright and to the best course: but clearly
there is in them, beside the Reason, some other natural principle which
fights with and strains against the Reason. (For in plain terms, just as
paralysed limbs of the body when their owners would move them to the
right are borne aside in a contrary direction to the left, so is it in the case of
the Soul, for the impulses of men who cannot control their appetites are to
contrary points: the difference is that in the case of the body we do see what
is borne aside but in the case of the soul we do not. But, it may be, not the
less on that account are we to suppose that there is in the Soul also

somewhat besides the Reason, which is opposed to this and goes against it;
as to how it is different, that is irrelevant.)
But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for
instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in the man
of perfected self-mastery, or the brave man, it is yet more obedient; in them
it agrees entirely with the Reason.
So then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely
vegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition
generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient to it and
capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase we say we have
[Greek: logos] of our father or friends, and this in a different sense from
that in which we say we have [Greek: logos] of mathematics.)
Now that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason,
admonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then we are
to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as the Irrational,
will be twofold, the one supremely and in itself, the other paying it a kind of
filial regard.
The Excellence of Man then is divided in accordance with this
difference: we make two classes, calling the one Intellectual, and the other
Moral; pure science, intelligence, and practical wisdom—Intellectual:
liberality, and perfected self-mastery—Moral: in speaking of a man’s Moral
character, we do not say he is a scientific or intelligent but a meek man, or
one of perfected self-mastery: and we praise the man of science in right of
his mental state; and of these such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences.

BOOK II
Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral: now the
Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, from teaching
(for the most part that is), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas
the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a
slight deflection from the term denoting custom in that language.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to be in
us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be
changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards,
could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and
accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could file again be
brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way
be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtues then come to be in us
neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature
with a capacity for receiving themu and are perfected in them through
custom.
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties
first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is
afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often
seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them
and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised
them. But the Virtues we get by first performing single acts of working,
which, again, is the case of other things, as the arts for instance; for what
we have to make when we have learned how, these we learn how to make
by making: men come to be builders, for instance, by building; harpplayers, by playing on the harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come
to be just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in
self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave.
And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place in
communities: because the law-givers make the individual members good
men by habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every law-giver,

and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and herein consists the
difference between a good Constitution and a bad.
Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the very
same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by playing the harp
that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed: and similarly
builders and all the rest; by building well men will become good builders;
by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this had not been so, there would have
been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or
bad in their several arts without them.
So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various relations in
which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be, some just, some
unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being habituated to feel
fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, others cowards.
Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger: for
some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others destitute of
all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving in one way under
them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one word, the habits are
produced from the acts of working like to them: and so what we have to do
is to give a certain character to these particular acts, because the habits
formed correspond to the differences of these.
So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from
childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I would
say it makes all the difference.

II
Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it
is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we may know what
virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have been useless),
we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them,
because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits that shall be formed
depends on these.
Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general
maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of it

hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its relations to
the other virtues.
1104a

But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all
which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were, and
not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning only
must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, and matters
of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more than matters of
health. And if the subject in its general maxims is such, still less in its
application to particular cases is exactness attainable: because these fall not
under any art or system of rules, but it must be left in each instance to the
individual agents to look to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in
the art of healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present
subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.
First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to be
spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and strength
(since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we must use those
that can), for excessive training impairs the strength as well as deficient:
meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or too small quantities, impair
the health: while in due proportion they cause, increase, and preserve it.
Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and
Courage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and fears all
things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a coward; and he
who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be rash. In like manner
too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains from none comes to lose
all self-control; while he who avoids all, as do the dull and clownish, comes
as it were to lose his faculties of perception: that is to say, the habits of
perfected Self-Mastery and Courage are spoiled by the excess and defect,
but by the mean state are preserved.
Furthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of the
habits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts of
working after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: for so it
is also with those other things which are more directly matters of sight,
strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of food and doing

plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is best able to do
these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do we by abstaining from
pleasures come to be perfected in Self-Mastery, but when we have come to
be so we can best abstain from them: similarly too with Courage: for it is by
accustoming ourselves to despise objects of fear and stand up against them
that we come to be brave; and [Sidenote(?): 1104b] after we have come to
be so we shall be best able to stand up against such objects.
And for a test of the formation of the habits we must [Sidenote(?): III]
take the pleasure or pain which succeeds the acts; for he is perfected in
Self-Mastery who not only abstains from the bodily pleasures but is glad to
do so; whereas he who abstains but is sorry to do it has not Self-Mastery: he
again is brave who stands up against danger, either with positive pleasure or
at least without any pain; whereas he who does it with pain is not brave.
For Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because
by reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline
doing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should have
been trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and pain from
proper objects, for this is the right education). Again: since Virtues have to
do with actions and feelings, and on every feeling and every action pleasure
and pain follow, here again is another proof that Virtue has for its objectmatter pleasure and pain. The same is shown also by the fact that
punishments are effected through the instrumentality of these; because they
are of the nature of remedies, and it is the nature of remedies to be the
contraries of the ills they cure. Again, to quote what we said before: every
habit of the Soul by its very nature has relation to, and exerts itself upon,
things of the same kind as those by which it is naturally deteriorated or
improved: now such habits do come to be vicious by reason of pleasures
and pains, that is, by men pursuing or avoiding respectively, either such as
they ought not, or at wrong times, or in wrong manner, and so forth (for
which reason, by the way, some people define the Virtues as certain states
of impassibility and utter quietude, but they are wrong because they speak
without modification, instead of adding “as they ought,” “as they ought
not,” and “when,” and so on). Virtue then is assumed to be that habit which
is such, in relation to pleasures and pains, as to effect the best results, and
Vice the contrary.

The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear light.
There are principally three things moving us to choice and three to
avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and their three
contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: now the good
man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to all these of
course, but most specially with respect to pleasure: because not only is this
common to him with all animals but also it is a concomitant of all those
things which move to choice, since both the honourable and the expedient
give an impression of pleasure.
1105a] Again, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is a hard matter to remove from
ourselves this feeling, engrained as it is into our very life.

Again, we adopt pleasure and pain (some of us more, and some less) as
the measure even of actions: for this cause then our whole business must be
with them, since to receive right or wrong impressions of pleasure and pain
is a thing of no little importance in respect of the actions. Once more; it is
harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against pleasure than against anger: now
it is about that which is more than commonly difficult that art comes into
being, and virtue too, because in that which is difficult the good is of a
higher order: and so for this reason too both virtue and moral philosophy
generally must wholly busy themselves respecting pleasures and pains,
because he that uses these well will be good, he that does so ill will be bad.
Let us then be understood to have stated, that Virtue has for its objectmatter pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased or marred by the
same circumstances (differently used) by which it is originally generated,
and that it exerts itself on the same circumstances out of which it was
generated.
Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our
statement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of selfmastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; “for,” he would say, “if men
are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already, just as men
are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of either art.” May
we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the case of the arts referred
to: because a man may produce something grammatical either by chance or
the suggestion of another; but then only will he be a grammarian when he

not only produces something grammatical but does so grammarian-wise,
i.e. in virtue of the grammatical knowledge he himself possesses.
Again, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: because those
things which are produced by the arts have their excellence in themselves,
and it is sufficient therefore [Sidenote: 1105b] that these when produced
should be in a certain state: but those which are produced in the way of the
virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certain kind (say of Justice or
perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if in themselves they are in a certain
state but if also he who does them does them being himself in a certain
state, first if knowing what he is doing, next if with deliberate preference,
and with such preference for the things’ own sake; and thirdly if being
himself stable and unapt to change. Now to constitute possession of the arts
these requisites are not reckoned in, excepting the one point of knowledge:
whereas for possession of the virtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but
the other requisites avail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, and these
requisites as a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing the actions of
Justice and perfected Self-Mastery.
The facts, it is true, are called by the names of these habits when they are
such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but he is not in
possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but he who also so
does them as the just and self-mastering do them.
We are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man by his
doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone, would be
even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do not
perform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter themselves they
are philosophising, and that they will so be good men: acting in truth very
like those sick people who listen to the doctor with great attention but do
nothing that he tells them: just as these then cannot be well bodily under
such a course of treatment, so neither can those be mentally by such
philosophising.
V] Next, we must examine what Virtue is. Well, since the things which come to be in the mind
are, in all, of three kinds, Feelings, Capacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of the
three classes.

By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy,
friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such as are

followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of which we are
said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of which we are able to
have been made angry, or grieved, or to have compassionated; by States,
those in right of which we are in a certain relation good or bad to the
aforementioned feelings; to having been made angry, for instance, we are in
a wrong relation if in our anger we were too violent or too slack, but if we
were in the happy medium we are in a right relation to the feeling. And so
on of the rest.
Now Feelings neither the virtues nor vices are, because in right of the
Feelings we are not denominated either good or bad, but in right of the
virtues and vices we are.
1106a] Again, in right of the Feelings we are neither praised nor blamed (for a man is not
commended for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed for being angry merely but for being so
in a particular way), but in right of the virtues and vices we are.

Again, both anger and fear we feel without moral choice, whereas the
virtues are acts of moral choice, or at least certainly not independent of it.
Moreover, in right of the Feelings we are said to be moved, but in right of
the virtues and vices not to be moved, but disposed, in a certain way.
And for these same reasons they are not Capacities, for we are not called
good or bad merely because we are able to feel, nor are we praised or
blamed.
And again, Capacities we have by nature, but we do not come to be good
or bad by nature, as we have said before.
Since then the virtues are neither Feelings nor Capacities, it remains that
they must be States.
VI] Now what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but we must not merely speak of it thus, that
it is a state but say also what kind of a state it is. We must observe then that all excellence makes
that whereof it is the excellence both to be itself in a good state and to perform its work well. The
excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good and its work also: for by the
excellence of the eye we see well. So too the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and
good in speed, and in carrying his rider, and standing up against the enemy. If then this is
universally the case, the excellence of Man, i.e. Virtue, must be a state whereby Man comes to be
good and whereby he will perform well his proper work. Now how this shall be it is true we have
said already, but still perhaps it may throw light on the subject to see what is its characteristic
nature.

In all quantity then, whether continuous or discrete, one may take the
greater part, the less, or the exactly equal, and these either with reference to
the thing itself, or relatively to us: and the exactly equal is a mean between
excess and defect. Now by the mean of the thing, i.e. absolute mean, I
denote that which is equidistant from either extreme (which of course is one
and the same to all), and by the mean relatively to ourselves, that which is
neither too much nor too little for the particular individual. This of course is
not one nor the same to all: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two
too little, people take six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the
smaller sum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and
this mean is according to arithmetical proportion.
1106b] But the mean relatively to ourselves must not be so found ; for it does not follow,
supposing ten minæ is too large a quantity to eat and two too small, that the trainer will order
his man six; because for the person who is to take it this also may be too much or too little: for
Milo it would be too little, but for a man just commencing his athletic exercises too much:
similarly too of the exercises themselves, as running or wrestling.

So then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect,
but seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute but the relative.
Now if all skill thus accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye on the
mean, and bringing the works to this point (whence it is common enough to
say of such works as are in a good state, “one cannot add to or take ought
from them,” under the notion of excess or defect destroying goodness but
the mean state preserving it), and good artisans, as we say, work with their
eye on this, and excellence, like nature, is more exact and better than any art
in the world, it must have an aptitude to aim at the mean.
It is moral excellence, i.e. Virtue, of course which I mean, because this it
is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these there can be
excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for instance, to feel the
emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, and pleasure and pain
generally, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly; but to feel them
when we ought, on what occasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should
do, is the mean, or in other words the best state, and this is the property of
Virtue.
In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and
defect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in

which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is praised
and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue. Virtue then is
in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an aptitude for aiming at the
mean.
Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the
Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good of the
finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult;
easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for these reasons, therefore,
both the excess and defect belong to Vice, and the mean state to Virtue; for,
as the poet has it,
“Men may be bad in many ways,
But good in one alone.”
Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the
relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom
would determine.”

It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one
side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty
states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right,
both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when
found adopts, the mean.
And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is a
mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it is the
highest state possible.
But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is capable
of subsisting in this mean state, because some there are which are so named
as immediately to convey the notion of badness, as malevolence,
shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery, theft, homicide; for
all these and suchlike are blamed because they are in themselves bad, not
the having too much or too little of them.
In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in
such does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper person,
time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing any one
soever of those things is being wrong.

You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state,
an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly, or
giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will be of excess
and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect, defect.
But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess and
defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest possible state,
so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean state, excess, or defect,
but howsoever done they are wrong: you cannot, in short, have of excess
and defect a mean state, nor of a mean state excess and defect.

VII
It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also
apply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct
general statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into detail
one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in detail, and the
general statements, to be worth anything, must hold good here.
We must take these details then from the Table.
I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness:
1107b

The Mean state is Courage: men may exceed, of course, either in absence
of fear or in positive confidence: the former has no name (which is a
common case), the latter is called rash: again, the man who has too much
fear and too little confidence is called a coward.
II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer pains
than pleasures):
The Mean state here is perfected Self-Mastery, the defect total absence of
Self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, there are really no people
who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really no name for such
characters, but, as they are conceivable, we will give them one and call
them insensible.
III. In respect of giving and taking wealth (a):

The mean state is Liberality, the excess Prodigality, the defect Stinginess:
here each of the extremes involves really an excess and defect contrary to
each other: I mean, the prodigal gives out too much and takes in too little,
while the stingy man takes in too much and gives out too little. (It must be
understood that we are now giving merely an outline and summary,
intentionally: and we will, in a later part of the treatise, draw out the
distinctions with greater exactness.)
IV. In respect of wealth (b):
There are other dispositions besides these just mentioned; a mean state
called Munificence (for the munificent man differs from the liberal, the
former having necessarily to do with great wealth, the latter with but small);
the excess called by the names either of Want of taste or Vulgar Profusion,
and the defect Paltriness (these also differ from the extremes connected
with liberality, and the manner of their difference shall also be spoken of
later).
V. In respect of honour and dishonour (a):
The mean state Greatness of Soul, the excess which may be called
braggadocio, and the defect Littleness of Soul.
VI. In respect of honour and dishonour (b):
1108a

Now there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul as we
said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the difference that is of
being about a small amount of the same thing: this state having reference to
small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour; a man may, of course,
grasp at honour either more than he should or less; now he that exceeds in
his grasping at it is called ambitious, he that falls short unambitious, he that
is just as he should be has no proper name: nor in fact have the states,
except that the disposition of the ambitious man is called ambition. For this
reason those who are in either extreme lay claim to the mean as a
debateable land, and we call the virtuous character sometimes by the name
ambitious, sometimes by that of unambitious, and we commend sometimes
the one and sometimes the other. Why we do it shall be said in the

subsequent part of the treatise; but now we will go on with the rest of the
virtues after the plan we have laid down.
VII. In respect of anger:
Here too there is excess, defect, and a mean state; but since they may be
said to have really no proper names, as we call the virtuous character Meek,
we will call the mean state Meekness, and of the extremes, let the man who
is excessive be denominated Passionate, and the faulty state Passionateness,
and him who is deficient Angerless, and the defect Angerlessness.
There are also three other mean states, having some mutual resemblance,
but still with differences; they are alike in that they all have for their objectmatter intercourse of words and deeds, and they differ in that one has
respect to truth herein, the other two to what is pleasant; and this in two
ways, the one in relaxation and amusement, the other in all things which
occur in daily life. We must say a word or two about these also, that we may
the better see that in all matters the mean is praiseworthy, while the
extremes are neither right nor worthy of praise but of blame.
Now of these, it is true, the majority have really no proper names, but
still we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the sake of
clearness and intelligibleness.
I. In respect of truth: The man who is in the mean state we will call
Truthful, and his state Truthfulness, and as to the disguise of truth, if it be
on the side of exaggeration, Braggadocia, and him that has it a
Braggadocio; if on that of diminution, Reserve and Reserved shall be the
terms.
II. In respect of what is pleasant in the way of relaxation or amusement:
The mean state shall be called Easy-pleasantry, and the character
accordingly a man of Easy-pleasantry; the excess Buffoonery, and the man
a Buffoon; the man deficient herein a Clown, and his state Clownishness.
III. In respect of what is pleasant in daily life: He that is as he should be
may be called Friendly, and his mean state Friendliness: he that exceeds, if
it be without any interested motive, somewhat too Complaisant, if with such
motive, a Flatterer: he that is deficient and in all instances unpleasant,
Quarrelsome and Cross.

There are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them.
Shamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised for being
shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in the mean
state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for instance, who is
overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the man who is in the
defect, i.e. who has no shame at all in his composition, is called Shameless:
but the right character Shamefaced.
Indignation against successful vice, again, is a state in the mean between
Envy and Malevolence: they all three have respect to pleasure and pain
produced by what happens to one’s neighbour: for the man who has this
right feeling is annoyed at undeserved success of others, while the envious
man goes beyond him and is annoyed at all success of others, and the
malevolent falls so far short of feeling annoyance that he even rejoices [at
misfortune of others].
But for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity, as
of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So after
this we will go accurately into each and say how they are mean states: and
in like manner also with respect to the Intellectual Excellences.
Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the way of
excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of course all are in
a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for instance, not only to the
mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes: for just as the
half is greater if compared with the less portion, and less if compared with
the greater, so the mean states, compared with the defects, exceed, whether
in feelings or actions, and vice versa. The brave man, for instance, shows as
rash when compared with the coward, and cowardly when compared with
the rash; similarly too the man of perfected self-mastery, viewed in
comparison with the man destitute of all perception, shows like a man of no
self-control, but in comparison with the man who really has no self-control,
he looks like one destitute of all perception: and the liberal man compared
with the stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.
And so the extreme characters push away, so to speak, towards each other
the man in the mean state; the brave man is called a rash man by the
coward, and a coward by the rash man, and in the other cases accordingly.

And there being this mutual opposition, the contrariety between the
extremes is greater than between either and the mean, because they are
further from one another than from the mean, just as the greater or less
portion differ more from each other than either from the exact half.
Again, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean;
rashness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality; but between
the extremes there is the greatest dissimilarity. Now things which are
furthest from one another are defined to be contrary, and so the further off
the more contrary will they be.
1109a] Further: of the extremes in some cases the excess, and in others the defect, is most
opposed to the mean: to courage, for instance, not rashness which is the excess, but cowardice
which is the defect; whereas to perfected self-mastery not insensibility which is the defect but
absence of all self-control which is the excess.

And for this there are two reasons to be given; one from the nature of the
thing itself, because from the one extreme being nearer and more like the
mean, we do not put this against it, but the other; as, for instance, since
rashness is thought to be nearer to courage than cowardice is, and to
resemble it more, we put cowardice against courage rather than rashness,
because those things which are further from the mean are thought to be
more contrary to it. This then is one reason arising from the thing itself;
there is another arising from our own constitution and make: for in each
man’s own case those things give the impression of being more contrary to
the mean to which we individually have a natural bias. Thus we have a
natural bias towards pleasures, for which reason we are much more inclined
to the rejection of all self-control, than to self-discipline.
These things then to which the bias is, we call more contrary, and so total
want of self-control (the excess) is more contrary than the defect is to
perfected self-mastery.

IX
Now that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it lies
between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in the way
of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aim at the mean both
in feelings and actions, all this has been set forth fully and sufficiently.

And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to find
the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is not what any
man can do, but only he who knows how: just so to be angry, to give
money, and be expensive, is what any man can do, and easy: but to do these
to the right person, in due proportion, at the right time, with a right object,
and in the right manner, this is not as before what any man can do, nor is it
easy; and for this cause goodness is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble.
Therefore he who aims at the mean should make it his first care to keep
away from that extreme which is more contrary than the other to the mean;
just as Calypso in Homer advises Ulysses,
“Clear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;”

because of the two extremes the one is always more, and the other less,
erroneous; and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean is difficult, one
must take the least of the evils as the safest plan; and this a man will be
doing, if he follows this method.
1109b] We ought also to take into consideration our own natural bias; which varies in each
man’s case, and will be ascertained from the pleasure and pain arising in us. Furthermore, we
should force ourselves off in the contrary direction, because we shall find ourselves in the mean
after we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side, exactly as men do in straightening
bent timber.

But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant,
and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it.
We ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellors
towards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence; for so by
sending it away from us, we shall err the less.
Well, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting which
we shall be best able to attain the mean.
Still, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and specially in the
particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determine exactly in what
manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for what length of time,
one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves sometimes praise those who are
defective in this feeling, and we call them meek; at another, we term the
hot-tempered manly and spirited.

Then, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be it on
the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makes a
considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what point or
degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to determine
exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which are matter of
perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters of detail, and the
decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.
At all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all things
praiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towards
excess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest method of
hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.

BOOK III
I Now since Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and
actions, and praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while for the
involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is excited, it is
perhaps a necessary task for those who are investigating the nature of Virtue
to draw out the distinction between what is voluntary and what involuntary;
and it is certainly useful for legislators, with respect to the assigning of
honours and punishments.

III
Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done either
on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is, properly speaking,
compulsory, when the origination is external to the agent, being such that in
it the agent (perhaps we may more properly say the patient) contributes
nothing; as if a wind were to convey you anywhere, or men having power
over your person.
But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from some
honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit some
base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his power, and
they were to be saved upon your compliance or die upon your refusal, in
such cases there is room for a question whether the actions are voluntary or
involuntary.
A similar question arises with respect to cases of throwing goods
overboard in a storm: abstractedly no man throws away his property
willingly, but with a view to his own and his shipmates’ safety any one
would who had any sense.
The truth is, such actions are of a mixed kind, but are most like voluntary
actions; for they are choiceworthy at the time when they are being done,
and the end or object of the action must be taken with reference to the
actual occasion. Further, we must denominate an action voluntary or

involuntary at the time of doing it: now in the given case the man acts
voluntarily, because the originating of the motion of his limbs in such
actions rests with himself; and where the origination is in himself it rests
with himself to do or not to do.
Such actions then are voluntary, though in the abstract perhaps
involuntary because no one would choose any of such things in and by
itself.
But for such actions men sometimes are even praised, as when they
endure any disgrace or pain to secure great and honourable equivalents; if
vice versâ, then they are blamed, because it shows a base mind to endure
things very disgraceful for no honourable object, or for a trifling one.
For some again no praise is given, but allowance is made; as where a
man does what he should not by reason of such things as overstrain the
powers of human nature, or pass the limits of human endurance.
Some acts perhaps there are for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, but
a man should rather suffer the worst and die; how absurd, for instance, are
the pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play excuses
his matricide!
But it is difficult sometimes to decide what kind of thing should be
chosen instead of what, or what endured in preference to what, and much
moreso to abide by one’s decisions: for in general the alternatives are
painful, and the actions required are base, and so praise or blame is awarded
according as persons have been compelled or no.
1110b What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? may we
say, simply and abstractedly whenever the cause is external and the agent
contributes nothing; and that where the acts are in themselves such as one
would not wish but choiceworthy at the present time and in preference to
such and such things, and where the origination rests with the agent, the
actions are in themselves involuntary but at the given time and in
preference to such and such things voluntary; and they are more like
voluntary than involuntary, because the actions consist of little details, and
these are voluntary.

But what kind of things one ought to choose instead of what, it is not
easy to settle, for there are many differences in particular instances.
But suppose a person should say, things pleasant and honourable exert a
compulsive force (for that they are external and do compel); at that rate
every action is on compulsion, because these are universal motives of
action.
Again, they who act on compulsion and against their will do so with
pain; but they who act by reason of what is pleasant or honourable act with
pleasure.
It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external things
instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by them; or, again, to
ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base ones to pleasure.
So then that seems to be compulsory “whose origination is from without,
the party compelled contributing nothing.” Now every action of which
ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but that only is involuntary which is
attended with pain and remorse; for clearly the man who has done anything
by reason of ignorance, but is not annoyed at his own action, cannot be said
to have done it with his will because he did not know he was doing it, nor
again against his will because he is not sorry for it.
So then of the class “acting by reason of ignorance,” he who feels regret
afterwards is thought to be an involuntary agent, and him that has no such
feeling, since he certainly is different from the other, we will call a notvoluntary agent; for as there is a real difference it is better to have a proper
name.
Again, there seems to be a difference between acting because of
ignorance and acting with ignorance: for instance, we do not usually assign
ignorance as the cause of the actions of the drunken or angry man, but
either the drunkenness or the anger, yet they act not knowingly but with
ignorance.
Again, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave
undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.

1111a] Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant of his own
true interest; because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not
involuntariness: nor does any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed) but
ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and wherewith it is concerned, for in
these there is both compassion and allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them
acts in a proper sense involuntarily.

It may be as well, therefore, to define these particular details; what they
are, and how many; viz. who acts, what he is doing, with respect to what or
in what, sometimes with what, as with what instrument, and with what
result (as that of preservation, for instance), and how, as whether softly or
violently.
All these particulars, in one and the same case, no man in his senses
could be ignorant of; plainly not of the agent, being himself. But what he is
doing a man may be ignorant, as men in speaking say a thing escaped them
unawares; or as Aeschylus did with respect to the Mysteries, that he was not
aware that it was unlawful to speak of them; or as in the case of that
catapult accident the other day the man said he discharged it merely to
display its operation. Or a person might suppose a son to be an enemy, as
Merope did; or that the spear really pointed was rounded off; or that the
stone was a pumice; or in striking with a view to save might kill; or might
strike when merely wishing to show another, as people do in sham-fighting.
Now since ignorance is possible in respect to all these details in which
the action consists, he that acted in ignorance of any of them is thought to
have acted involuntarily, and he most so who was in ignorance as regards
the most important, which are thought to be those in which the action
consists, and the result.
Further, not only must the ignorance be of this kind, to constitute an
action involuntary, but it must be also understood that the action is followed
by pain and regret.
Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason
of ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be “that whose origination is
in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the action
consists.”
For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions involuntary,
which are done by reason of Anger or Lust.

Because, in the first place, if this be so no other animal but man, and not
even children, can be said to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant that we never
act voluntarily when we act from Lust or Anger, or that we act voluntarily
in doing what is right and involuntarily in doing what is discreditable? The
latter supposition is absurd, since the cause is one and the same. Then as to
the former, it is a strange thing to maintain actions to be involuntary which
we are bound to grasp at: now there are occasions on which anger is a duty,
and there are things which we are bound to lust after, health, for instance,
and learning.
Again, whereas actions strictly involuntary are thought to be attended
with pain, those which are done to gratify lust are thought to be pleasant.
Again: how does the involuntariness make any difference between wrong
actions done from deliberate calculation, and those done by reason of
anger? for both ought to be avoided, and the irrational feelings are thought
to be just as natural to man as reason, and so of course must be such actions
of the individual as are done from Anger and Lust. It is absurd then to class
these actions among the involuntary.

II
Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
action our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice, because
this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a more decisive
test of moral character than a man’s acts are.
Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive,
voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all
other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice; and next,
sudden actions we call voluntary but do not ascribe them to Moral Choice.
Nor do they appear to be right who say it is lust or anger, or wish, or
opinion of a certain kind; because, in the first place, Moral Choice is not
shared by the irrational animals while Lust and Anger are. Next; the man
who fails of self-control acts from Lust but not from Moral Choice; the man
of self-control, on the contrary, from Moral Choice, not from Lust. Again:
whereas Lust is frequently opposed to Moral Choice, Lust is not to Lust.

Lastly: the object-matter of Lust is the pleasant and the painful, but of
Moral Choice neither the one nor the other. Still less can it be Anger,
because actions done from Anger are thought generally to be least of all
consequent on Moral Choice.
Nor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connected with it;
because, in the first place, Moral Choice has not for its objects
impossibilities, and if a man were to say he chose them he would be thought
to be a fool; but Wish may have impossible things for its objects,
immortality for instance.
Wish again may be exercised on things in the accomplishment of which
one’s self could have nothing to do, as the success of any particular actor or
athlete; but no man chooses things of this nature, only such as he believes
he may himself be instrumental in procuring.
Further: Wish has for its object the End rather, but Moral Choice the
means to the End; for instance, we wish to be healthy but we choose the
means which will make us so; or happiness again we wish for, and
commonly say so, but to say we choose is not an appropriate term, because,
in short, the province of Moral Choice seems to be those things which are in
our own power.
Neither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to be unlimited in its
range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal and
impossible as on those which are in our own power: again, Opinion is
logically divided into true and false, not into good and bad as Moral Choice
is.
However, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinion simply; but
it is not the same with opinion of any kind, because by choosing good and
bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by having opinions
on them we are not.
Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing
is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take or
avoid.
Further, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object than
for being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance with truth.

Again, we choose such things as we pretty well know to be good, but we
form opinions respecting such as we do not know at all.
And it is not thought that choosing and opining best always go together,
but that some opine the better course and yet by reason of viciousness
choose not the things which they should.
It may be urged, that Opinion always precedes or accompanies Moral
Choice; be it so, this makes no difference, for this is not the point in
question, but whether Moral Choice is the same as Opinion of a certain
kind.
Since then it is none of the aforementioned things, what is it, or how is it
characterised? Voluntary it plainly is, but not all voluntary action is an
object of Moral Choice. May we not say then, it is “that voluntary which
has passed through a stage of previous deliberation?” because Moral Choice
is attended with reasoning and intellectual process. The etymology of its
Greek name seems to give a hint of it, being when analysed “chosen in
preference to somewhat else.”

III
Well then; do men deliberate about everything, and is anything soever the
object of Deliberation, or are there some matters with respect to which there
is none? (It may be as well perhaps to say, that by “object of Deliberation”
is meant such matter as a sensible man would deliberate upon, not what any
fool or madman might.)
Well: about eternal things no one deliberates; as, for instance, the
universe, or the incommensurability of the diameter and side of a square.
Nor again about things which are in motion but which always happen in
the same way either necessarily, or naturally, or from some other cause, as
the solstices or the sunrise.
Nor about those which are variable, as drought and rains; nor fortuitous
matters, as finding of treasure.

Nor in fact even about all human affairs; no Lacedæmonian, for instance,
deliberates as to the best course for the Scythian government to adopt;
because in such cases we have no power over the result.
But we do deliberate respecting such practical matters as are in our own
power (which are what are left after all our exclusions).
I have adopted this division because causes seem to be divisible into
nature, necessity, chance, and moreover intellect, and all human powers.
And as man in general deliberates about what man in general can effect,
so individuals do about such practical things as can be effected through
their own instrumentality.
1112b] Again, we do not deliberate respecting such arts or sciences as are exact and
independent: as, for instance, about written characters, because we have no doubt how they
should be formed; but we do deliberate on all buch things as are usually done through our own
instrumentality, but not invariably in the same way; as, for instance, about matters connected
with the healing art, or with money-making; and, again, more about piloting ships than
gymnastic exercises, because the former has been less exactly determined, and so forth; and
more about arts than sciences, because we more frequently doubt respecting the former.

So then Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general
laws, but still uncertain how in any given case they will issue, i.e. in which
there is some indefiniteness; and for great matters we associate coadjutors
in counsel, distrusting our ability to settle them alone.
Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means to Ends. No physician,
for instance, deliberates whether he will cure, nor orator whether he will
persuade, nor statesman whether he will produce a good constitution, nor in
fact any man in any other function about his particular End; but having set
before them a certain End they look how and through what means it may be
accomplished: if there is a choice of means, they examine further which are
easiest and most creditable; or, if there is but one means of accomplishing
the object, then how it may be through this, this again through what, till
they come to the first cause; and this will be the last found; for a man
engaged in a process of deliberation seems to seek and analyse, as a man, to
solve a problem, analyses the figure given him. And plainly not every
search is Deliberation, those in mathematics to wit, but every Deliberation
is a search, and the last step in the analysis is the first in the constructive
process. And if in the course of their search men come upon an

impossibility, they give it up; if money, for instance, be necessary, but
cannot be got: but if the thing appears possible they then attempt to do it.
And by possible I mean what may be done through our own
instrumentality (of course what may be done through our friends is through
our own instrumentality in a certain sense, because the origination in such
cases rests with us). And the object of search is sometimes the necessary
instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and similarly in the rest
sometimes through what, and sometimes how or through what.
So it seems, as has been said, that Man is the originator of his actions;
and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done through one’s
own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to other things; and so
it is, not the End, but the Means to Ends on which Deliberation is
employed.
III3a

Nor, again, is it employed on matters of detail, as whether the substance
before me is bread, or has been properly cooked; for these come under the
province of sense, and if a man is to be always deliberating, he may go on
ad infinitum.
Further, exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation and
Moral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is
thenceforward separated off and definite, because by object of Moral
Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been preferred to
something else: for each man leaves off searching how he shall do a thing
when he has brought the origination up to himself, i.e. to the governing
principle in himself, because it is this which makes the choice. A good
illustration of this is furnished by the old regal constitutions which Homer
drew from, in which the Kings would announce to the commonalty what
they had determined before.
Now since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our
own power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the Will,
Moral Choice must be “a grasping after something in our own power
consequent upon Deliberation:” because after having deliberated we decide,
and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our deliberation.

Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral Choice,
that object being “Means to Ends.”
IV] That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been already stated; but there are two
opinions respecting it; some thinking that its object is real good, others whatever impresses the
mind with a notion of good.

Now those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset by
this difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly is not
really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an object of wish,
it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed, evil). Those who maintain,
on the contrary, that that which impresses the mind with a notion of good is
properly the object of Wish, have to meet this difficulty, that there is
nothing naturally an object of Wish but to each individual whatever seems
good to him; now different people have different notions, and it may chance
contrary ones.
But, if these opinions do not satisfy us, may we not say that, abstractedly
and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the object of Wish, but
to each individual whatever impresses his mind with the notion of good.
And so to the good man that is an object of Wish which is really and truly
so, but to the bad man anything may be; just as physically those things are
wholesome to the healthy which are really so, but other things to the sick.
And so too of bitter and sweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good
man judges in every instance correctly, and in every instance the notion
conveyed to his mind is the true one.
For there are fair and pleasant things peculiar to, and so varying with,
each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the good
man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, in fact, the rule and
measure of these matters.
The multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because
though it is not really a good it impresses their minds with the notion of
goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as an evil.
Now since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of
Deliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters must be
in the way of Moral Choice, i.e. voluntary: but the acts of working out the
virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in our power.

And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is also in
our power to forbear doing, and vice versâ: therefore if the doing (being in a
given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the forbearing (which is in
the same case discreditable), and vice versâ.
But if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable or
the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or bad, then
the being good or vicious characters is in our power.
As for the well-known saying, “No man voluntarily is wicked or
involuntarily happy,” it is partly true, partly false; for no man is happy
against his will, of course, but wickedness is voluntary. Or must we dispute
the statements lately made, and not say that Man is the originator or
generator of his actions as much as of his children?
But if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannot refer our
actions to any other originations beside those in our own power, those
things must be in our own power, and so voluntary, the originations of
which are in ourselves.
Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both privately
by individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they chastise and punish those
who do wrong (unless they do so on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance
which is not self-caused), while they honour those who act rightly, under
the notion of being likely to encourage the latter and restrain the former.
But such things as are not in our own power, i.e. not voluntary, no one
thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it to be of no avail for one to have
been persuaded not to be hot (for instance), or feel pain, or be hungry, and
so forth, because we shall have those sensations all the same.
And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for the very
fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the drunken, for
instance, penalties are double, because the origination in such case lies in a
man’s own self: for he might have helped getting drunk, and this is the
cause of his ignorance.
III4a] Again, those also who are ignorant of legal regulations which they are bound to know,
and which are not hard to know, they chastise; and similarly in all other cases where neglect is
thought to be the cause of the ignorance, under the notion that it was in their power to prevent
their ignorance, because they might have paid attention.

But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such
things: still men are themselves the causes of having become such
characters by living carelessly, and also of being unjust or destitute of selfcontrol, the former by doing evil actions, the latter by spending their time in
drinking and such-like; because the particular acts of working form
corresponding characters, as is shown by those who are practising for any
contest or particular course of action, for such men persevere in the acts of
working.
As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced from
separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of excessive
stupidity.
Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts unjustly
or dissolutely does not wish to attain the habits of these vices: for if a man
wittingly does those things whereby he must become unjust he is to all
intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish cease to
be unjust and become just. For, to take the analogous case, the sick man
cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he is voluntarily
ill because he has produced his sickness by living intemperately and
disregarding his physicians. There was a time then when he might have
helped being ill, but now he has let himself go he cannot any longer; just as
he who has let a stone out of his hand cannot recall it, and yet it rested with
him to aim and throw it, because the origination was in his power. Just so
the unjust man, and he who has lost all self-control, might originally have
helped being what they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but
now that they are become so they no longer have the power of being
otherwise.
And not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodily are so in some
men, whom we accordingly blame: for such as are naturally deformed no
one blames, only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and neglect:
and so too of weakness and maiming: no one would think of upbraiding, but
would rather compassionate, a man who is blind by nature, or from disease,
or from an accident; but every one would blame him who was so from
excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance. It seems, then, that in
respect of bodily diseases, those which depend on ourselves are censured,

those which do not are not censured; and if so, then in the case of the
mental disorders, those which are censured must depend upon ourselves.
III4b] But suppose a man to say, “that (by our own admission) all men aim at that which
conveys to their minds an impression of good, and that men have no control over this
impression, but that the End impresses each with a notion correspondent to his own individual
character; that to be sure if each man is in a way the cause of his own moral state, so he will be
also of the kind of impression he receives: whereas, if this is not so, no one is the cause to
himself of doing evil actions, but he does them by reason of ignorance of the true End,
supposing that through their means he will secure the chief good. Further, that this aiming at
the End is no matter of one’s own choice, but one must be born with a power of mental vision, so
to speak, whereby to judge fairly and choose that which is really good; and he is blessed by
nature who has this naturally well: because it is the most important thing and the fairest, and
what a man cannot get or learn from another but will have such as nature has given it; and for
this to be so given well and fairly would be excellence of nature in the highest and truest sense.”

If all this be true, how will Virtue be a whit more voluntary than Vice?
Alike to the good man and the bad, the End gives its impression and is fixed
by nature or howsoever you like to say, and they act so and so, referring
everything else to this End.
Whether then we suppose that the End impresses each man’s mind with
certain notions not merely by nature, but that there is somewhat also
dependent on himself; or that the End is given by nature, and yet Virtue is
voluntary because the good man does all the rest voluntarily, Vice must be
equally so; because his own agency equally attaches to the bad man in the
actions, even if not in the selection of the End.
If then, as is commonly said, the Virtues are voluntary (because we at
least co-operate in producing our moral states, and we assume the End to be
of a certain kind according as we are ourselves of certain characters), the
Vices must be voluntary also, because the cases are exactly similar.
Well now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the
genus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are habits, and
how they are formed, and that they are of themselves calculated to act upon
the circumstances out of which they were formed, and that they are in our
own power and voluntary, and are to be done so as right Reason may direct.
III5a] But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same sense; for of the
actions we are masters from beginning to end (supposing of course a knowledge of the
particular details), but only of the origination of the habits, the addition by small particular

accessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with sicknesses): still they are voluntary because
it rested with us to use our circumstances this way or that.

Here we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues, and
say what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand
respectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby shown.
First, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect of fear and
boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our fears are
obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement, evils; which
accounts for the common definition of fear, viz. “expectation of evil.”
Of course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty,
disease, desolateness, death; but not all these seem to be the object-matter
of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear is right and noble,
and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example, since he who fears this is a
good man and has a sense of honour, and he who does not fear it is
shameless (though there are those who call him Brave by analogy, because
he somewhat resembles the Brave man who agrees with him in being free
from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or disease, and in fact whatever does not
proceed from viciousness, nor is attributable to his own fault, a man ought
not to fear: still, being fearless in respect of these would not constitute a
man Brave in the proper sense of the term.
Yet we do apply the term in right of the similarity of the cases; for there
are men who, though timid in the dangers of war, are liberal men and are
stout enough to face loss of wealth.
And, again, a man is not a coward for fearing insult to his wife or
children, or envy, or any such thing; nor is he a Brave man for being bold
when going to be scourged.
What kind of fearful things then do constitute the object-matter of the
Brave man? first of all, must they not be the greatest, since no man is more
apt to withstand what is dreadful. Now the object of the greatest dread is
death, because it is the end of all things, and the dead man is thought to be
capable neither of good nor evil. Still it would seem that the Brave man has
not for his object-matter even death in every circumstance; on the sea, for
example, or in sickness: in what circumstances then? must it not be in the
most honourable? now such is death in war, because it is death in the

greatest and most honourable danger; and this is confirmed by the honours
awarded in communities, and by monarchs.
He then may be most properly denominated Brave who is fearless in
respect of honourable death and such sudden emergencies as threaten death;
now such specially are those which arise in the course of war.
1115b] It is not meant but that the Brave man will be fearless also on the sea (and in sickness),
but not in the same way as sea-faring men; for these are light-hearted and hopeful by reason of
their experience, while landsmen though Brave are apt to give themselves up for lost and
shudder at the notion of such a death: to which it should be added that Courage is exerted in
circumstances which admit of doing something to help one’s self, or in which death would be
honourable; now neither of these requisites attach to destruction by drowning or sickness.

VII
Again, fearful is a term of relation, the same thing not being so to all, and
there is according to common parlance somewhat so fearful as to be beyond
human endurance: this of course would be fearful to every man of sense,
but those objects which are level to the capacity of man differ in magnitude
and admit of degrees, so too the objects of confidence or boldness.
Now the Brave man cannot be frighted from his propriety (but of course
only so far as he is man); fear such things indeed he will, but he will stand
up against them as he ought and as right reason may direct, with a view to
what is honourable, because this is the end of the virtue.
Now it is possible to fear these things too much, or too little, or again to
fear what is not really fearful as if it were such. So the errors come to be
either that a man fears when he ought not to fear at all, or that he fears in an
improper way, or at a wrong time, and so forth; and so too in respect of
things inspiring confidence. He is Brave then who withstands, and fears,
and is bold, in respect of right objects, from a right motive, in right manner,
and at right times: since the Brave man suffers or acts as he ought and as
right reason may direct.
Now the end of every separate act of working is that which accords with
the habit, and so to the Brave man Courage; which is honourable; therefore
such is also the End, since the character of each is determined by the End.
So honour is the motive from which the Brave man withstands things
fearful and performs the acts which accord with Courage.
Of the characters on the side of Excess, he who exceeds in utter absence
of fear has no appropriate name (I observed before that many states have
none), but he would be a madman or inaccessible to pain if he feared
nothing, neither earthquake, nor the billows, as they tell of the Celts.
He again who exceeds in confidence in respect of things fearful is rash.
He is thought moreover to be a braggart, and to advance unfounded claims
to the character of Brave: the relation which the Brave man really bears to
objects of fear this man wishes to appear to bear, and so imitates him in

whatever points he can; for this reason most of them exhibit a curious
mixture of rashness and cowardice; because, affecting rashness in these
circumstances, they do not withstand what is truly fearful.
III6a] The man moreover who exceeds in feeling fear is a coward, since there attach to him the
circumstances of fearing wrong objects, in wrong ways, and so forth. He is deficient also in
feeling confidence, but he is most clearly seen as exceeding in the case of pains; he is a
fainthearted kind of man, for he fears all things: the Brave man is just the contrary, for boldness
is the property of the light-hearted and hopeful.

So the coward, the rash, and the Brave man have exactly the same objectmatter, but stand differently related to it: the two first-mentioned
respectively exceed and are deficient, the last is in a mean state and as he
ought to be. The rash again are precipitate, and, being eager before danger,
when actually in it fall away, while the Brave are quick and sharp in action,
but before are quiet and composed.
Well then, as has been said, Courage is a mean state in respect of objects
inspiring boldness or fear, in the circumstances which have been stated, and
the Brave man chooses his line and withstands danger either because to do
so is honourable, or because not to do so is base. But dying to escape from
poverty, or the pangs of love, or anything that is simply painful, is the act
not of a Brave man but of a coward; because it is mere softness to fly from
what is toilsome, and the suicide braves the terrors of death not because it is
honourable but to get out of the reach of evil.

VIII
Courage proper is somewhat of the kind I have described, but there are
dispositions, differing in five ways, which also bear in common parlance
the name of Courage.
We will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the
Courage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought to
actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the penalties
and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the dignities conferred
on the Brave; which is thought to be the reason why those are the bravest
people among whom cowards are visited with disgrace and the Brave held
in honour.

Such is the kind of Courage Homer exhibits in his characters; Diomed
and Hector for example. The latter says,
“Polydamas will be the first to fix
Disgrace upon me.”

Diomed again,
“For Hector surely will hereafter say,
Speaking in Troy, Tydides by my hand”—

This I say most nearly resembles the Courage before spoken of, because
it arises from virtue, from a feeling of shame, and a desire of what is noble
(that is, of honour), and avoidance of disgrace which is base. In the same
rank one would be inclined to place those also who act under compulsion
from their commanders; yet are they really lower, because not a sense of
honour but fear is the motive from which they act, and what they seek to
avoid is not that which is base but that which is simply painful:
commanders do in fact compel their men sometimes, as Hector says (to
quote Homer again),
“But whomsoever I shall find cowering afar from the fight,
The teeth of dogs he shall by no means escape.”

III6h] Those commanders who station staunch troops by doubtful ones, or who beat their men if
they flinch, or who draw their troops up in line with the trenches, or other similar obstacles, in
their rear, do in effect the same as Hector, for they all use compulsion.

But a man is to be Brave, not on compulsion, but from a sense of honour.
In the next place, Experience and Skill in the various particulars is
thought to be a species of Courage: whence Socrates also thought that
Courage was knowledge.
This quality is exhibited of course by different men under different
circumstances, but in warlike matters, with which we are now concerned, it
is exhibited by the soldiers (“the regulars”): for there are, it would seem,
many things in war of no real importance which these have been constantly
used to see; so they have a show of Courage because other people are not
aware of the real nature of these things. Then again by reason of their skill
they are better able than any others to inflict without suffering themselves,
because they are able to use their arms and have such as are most
serviceable both with a view to offence and defence: so that their case is

parallel to that of armed men fighting with unarmed or trained athletes with
amateurs, since in contests of this kind those are the best fighters, not who
are the bravest men, but who are the strongest and are in the best condition.
In fact, the regular troops come to be cowards whenever the danger is
greater than their means of meeting it; supposing, for example, that they are
inferior in numbers and resources: then they are the first to fly, but the mere
militia stand and fall on the ground (which as you know really happened at
the Hermæum), for in the eyes of these flight was disgraceful and death
preferable to safety bought at such a price: while “the regulars” originally
went into the danger under a notion of their own superiority, but on
discovering their error they took to flight, having greater fear of death than
of disgrace; but this is not the feeling of the Brave man.
Thirdly, mere Animal Spirit is sometimes brought under the term
Courage: they are thought to be Brave who are carried on by mere Animal
Spirit, as are wild beasts against those who have wounded them, because in
fact the really Brave have much Spirit, there being nothing like it for going
at danger of any kind; whence those frequent expressions in Homer,
“infused strength into his spirit,” “roused his strength and spirit,” or again,
“and keen strength in his nostrils,” “his blood boiled:” for all these seem to
denote the arousing and impetuosity of the Animal Spirit.
III7a] Now they that are truly Brave act from a sense of honour, and this Animal Spirit cooperates with them; but wild beasts from pain, that is because they have been wounded, or are
frightened; since if they are quietly in their own haunts, forest or marsh, they do not attack men.
Surely they are not Brave because they rush into danger when goaded on by pain and mere
Spirit, without any view of the danger: else would asses be Brave when they are hungry, for
though beaten they will not then leave their pasture: profligate men besides do many bold
actions by reason of their lust. We may conclude then that they are not Brave who are goaded on
to meet danger by pain and mere Spirit; but still this temper which arises from Animal Spirit
appears to be most natural, and would be Courage of the true kind if it could have added to it
moral choice and the proper motive. So men also are pained by a feeling of anger, and take
pleasure in revenge; but they who fight from these causes may be good fighters, but they are not
truly Brave (in that they do not act from a sense of honour, nor as reason directs, but merely
from the present feeling), still they bear some resemblance to that character.

Nor, again, are the Sanguine and Hopeful therefore Brave: since their
boldness in dangers arises from their frequent victories over numerous foes.
The two characters are alike, however, in that both are confident; but then
the Brave are so from the afore-mentioned causes, whereas these are so
from a settled conviction of their being superior and not likely to suffer

anything in return (they who are intoxicated do much the same, for they
become hopeful when in that state); but when the event disappoints their
expectations they run away: now it was said to be the character of a Brave
man to withstand things which are fearful to man or produce that
impression, because it is honourable so to do and the contrary is
dishonourable.
For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be
fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under that
which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a fixed
habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a man might
take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in those which are
sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of mind.
Fifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show of
Courage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are inferior
inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the others have,
and therefore stay and contest a field for some little time; but they who have
been deceived fly the moment they know things to be otherwise than they
supposed, which the Argives experienced when they fell on the
Lacedæmonians, taking them for the men of Sicyon. We have described
then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they who are thought to be,
but are not really, Brave.
IX

It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its objectmatter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects of fear much
more than the former; for he that under pressure of these is undisturbed and
stands related to them as he ought is better entitled to the name of Brave
than he who is properly affected towards objects of confidence. So then
men are termed Brave for withstanding painful things.
It follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it is a
harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain from such
as are pleasant.
1117b

It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is pleasant,
but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which happens also in
the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant with a view to which
they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but the receiving the blows
they do is painful and annoying to flesh and blood, and so is all the labour
they have to undergo; and, as these drawbacks are many, the object in view
being small appears to have no pleasantness in it.
If then we may say the same of Courage, of course death and wounds
must be painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures these
because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable not to do so.
And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so much the more will
he be pained at the notion of death: since to such a man as he is it is best
worth while to live, and he with full consciousness is deprived of the
greatest goods by death, and this is a painful idea. But he is not the less
Brave for feeling it to be so, nay rather it may be he is shown to be more so
because he chooses the honour that may be reaped in war in preference to
retaining safe possession of these other goods. The fact is that to act with
pleasure does not belong to all the virtues, except so far as a man realises
the End of his actions.
But there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best
soldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to care
for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives against small
gain.
Let thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the
true nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at least, from what
has been said.
X

Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the
next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the Irrational
part of the Soul.
That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we have
already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less degree and
dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of self-control has plainly the

same object-matter; the next thing then is to determine what kind of
Pleasures.
Let Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:
instances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being plain
that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which he has a
tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather his intellect.
Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or wholly destitute of selfcontrol in respect of pleasures of this class: nor in fact in respect of any
which are not bodily; those for example who love to tell long stories, and
are prosy, and spend their days about mere chance matters, we call gossips
but not wholly destitute of self-control, nor again those who are pained at
the loss of money or friends.
1118a

It is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected SelfMastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they who take
pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and forms, and
painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery, or wholly
destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may take pleasure
even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively, or too little.
So too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the
terms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased with
musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as they ought.
Nor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense of
Smell, except incidentally: I mean, we do not say men have no self-control
because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or flowers, or incense, but
rather when they do so in the smells of unguents and sauces: since men
destitute of self-control take pleasure herein, because hereby the objects of
their lusts are recalled to their imagination (you may also see other men
take pleasure in the smell of food when they are hungry): but to take
pleasure in such is a mark of the character before named since these are
objects of desire to him.
Now not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except
incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares’ flesh but the eating it which

dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is caused by the sense
of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox but eating him which the
lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness the lion is made sensible by the
lowing, and so he appears to take pleasure in this. In like manner, he has no
pleasure in merely seeing or finding a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect
of a meal.
The habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control
have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share in, for
which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are Touch and Taste.
But even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense of
Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact, who are
testing the quality of wines or seasoning “made dishes.”
But men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those whom
we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual enjoyment
which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in eating or in
drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish said to have been
expressed once by a great glutton, “that his throat had been formed longer
than a crane’s neck,” implying that his pleasure was derived from the
Touch.
1118b] The sense then with which is connected the habit of absence of self-control is the most
common of all the senses, and this habit would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it
attaches to us not in so far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed it is brutish to
take pleasure in such things and to like them best of all; for the most respectable of the
pleasures arising from the touch have been set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the
course of gymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the touch of the
man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of any part of the body but only of particular
parts.

XI
Now of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others peculiar
and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one who really
needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both (and, as Homer
says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires intercourse with the
other sex); but when we come to this or that particular kind, then neither is
the desire universal nor in all men is it directed to the same objects. And

therefore the conceiving of such desires plainly attaches to us as
individuals. It must be admitted, however, that there is something natural in
it: because different things are pleasant to different men and a preference of
some particular objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case of
the desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong and all
in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to eat and drink of
such food as happens to be on the table till one is overfilled is exceeding in
quantity the natural limit, since the natural desire is simply a supply of a
real deficiency. For this reason these men are called belly-mad, as filling it
beyond what they ought, and it is the slavish who become of this character.
But in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many
different ways; for whereas the term “fond of so and so” implies either
taking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as the
mass of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all self-control
exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take pleasure in some things in
which they ought not to do so (because they are properly objects of
detestation), and in such as it is right to take pleasure in they do so more
than they ought and as the mass of men do.
Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of self-control,
and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on the side of pains, we
find that a man is not said to have the virtue for withstanding them (as in
the case of Courage), nor the vice for not withstanding them; but the man
destitute of self-control is such, because he is pained more than he ought to
be at not obtaining things which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure
produces pain to him), and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in
virtue of not being pained by their absence, that is, by having to abstain
from what is pleasant.
II9a] Now the man destitute of self-control desires either all pleasant things indiscriminately or
those which are specially pleasant, and he is impelled by his desire to choose these things in
preference to all others; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment of his
objects but, in the very desiring them, since all desire is accompanied by pain. Surely it is a
strange case this, being pained by reason of pleasure.

As for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take less
pleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary characters,
because such absence of sensual perception is not natural to man: for even
the other animals distinguish between different kinds of food, and like some

kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man be found who takes no
pleasure in anything and to whom all things are alike, he would be far from
being human at all: there is no name for such a character because it is
simply imaginary.
But the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to
these objects: that is to say, he neither takes pleasure in the things which
delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor at all in
improper objects; nor to any great degree in any object of the class; nor is
he pained at their absence; nor does he desire them; or, if he does, only in
moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at improper times, and so
forth; but such things as are conducive to health and good condition of
body, being also pleasant, these he will grasp at in moderation and as he
ought to do, and also such other pleasant things as do not hinder these
objects, and are not unseemly or disproportionate to his means; because he
that should grasp at such would be liking such pleasures more than is
proper; but the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is not of this character, but
regulates his desires by the dictates of right reason.

XII
Now the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more truly
voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the former and
pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice, pain of avoidance.
And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural disposition of its victim,
whereas pleasure has no such effect and is more voluntary and therefore
more justly open to reproach.
It is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured by habit
to resist the objects of pleasure, there being many things of this kind in life
and the process of habituation being unaccompanied by danger; whereas the
case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear.
Again, Cowardice as a confirmed habit would seem to be voluntary in a
different way from the particular instances which form the habit; because it
is painless, but these derange the man by reason of pain so that he throws
away his arms and otherwise behaves himself unseemly, for which reason
they are even thought by some to exercise a power of compulsion.

But to the man destitute of Self-Control the particular instances are on
the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct exertion of
the will, but the general result is less voluntary: since no man desires to
form the habit.
1119b

The name of this vice (which signifies etymologically unchastened-ness)
we apply also to the faults of children, there being a certain resemblance
between the cases: to which the name is primarily applied, and to which
secondarily or derivatively, is not relevant to the present subject, but it is
evident that the later in point of time must get the name from the earlier.
And the metaphor seems to be a very good one; for whatever grasps after
base things, and is liable to great increase, ought to be chastened; and to this
description desire and the child answer most truly, in that children also live
under the direction of desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most
prominently seen in these.
Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing
principle it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after what is
pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting out of the
desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are great and violent in
degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore they ought to be moderate
and few, and in no respect to be opposed to Reason. Now when the appetite
is in such a state we denominate it obedient and chastened.
In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders of its
educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to those of Reason.
So then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitive principle
must be accordant with Reason: for what is right is the mark at which both
principles aim: that is to say, the man of perfected self-mastery desires what
he ought in right manner and at right times, which is exactly what Reason
directs. Let this be taken for our account of Perfected Self-Mastery.

BOOK IV
I
We will next speak of Liberality. Now this is thought to be the mean
state, having for its object-matter Wealth: I mean, the Liberal man is praised
not in the circumstances of war, nor in those which constitute the character
of perfected self-mastery, nor again in judicial decisions, but in respect of
giving and receiving Wealth, chiefly the former. By the term Wealth I mean
“all those things whose worth is measured by money.”
Now the states of excess and defect in regard of Wealth are respectively
Prodigality and Stinginess: the latter of these terms we attach invariably to
those who are over careful about Wealth, but the former we apply
sometimes with a complex notion; that is to say, we give the name to those
who fail of self-control and spend money on the unrestrained gratification
of their passions; and this is why they are thought to be most base, because
they have many vices at once.
1120a

It must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of the
term, since its natural etymological meaning is to denote him who has one
particular evil, viz. the wasting his substance: he is unsaved (as the term
literally denotes) who is wasting away by his own fault; and this he really
may be said to be; the destruction of his substance is thought to be a kind of
wasting of himself, since these things are the means of living. Well, this is
our acceptation of the term Prodigality.
Again. Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and Wealth
belongs to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the virtue
to whose province it belongs: so that he will use Wealth best who has the
virtue respecting Wealth, that is to say, the Liberal man. Expenditure and
giving are thought to be the using of money, but receiving and keeping one
would rather call the possessing of it. And so the giving to proper persons is
more characteristic of the Liberal man, than the receiving from proper

quarters and forbearing to receive from the contrary. In fact generally, doing
well by others is more characteristic of virtue than being done well by, and
doing things positively honourable than forbearing to do things
dishonourable; and any one may see that the doing well by others and doing
things positively honourable attaches to the act of giving, but to that of
receiving only the being done well by or forbearing to do what is
dishonourable.
Besides, thanks are given to him who gives, not to him who merely
forbears to receive, and praise even more. Again, forbearing to receive is
easier than giving, the case of being too little freehanded with one’s own
being commoner than taking that which is not one’s own.
And again, it is they who give that are denominated Liberal, while they
who forbear to receive are commended, not on the score of Liberality but of
just dealing, while for receiving men are not, in fact, praised at all.
And the Liberal are liked almost best of all virtuous characters, because
they are profitable to others, and this their profitableness consists in their
giving.
Furthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are
honourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man,
therefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly; I mean,
to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and whatever is
included in the term “right giving:” and this too with positive pleasure, or at
least without pain, since whatever is done in accordance with virtue is
pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most certainly not attended with positive
pain.
But the man who gives to improper people, or not from a motive of
honour but from some other cause, shall be called not Liberal but something
else. Neither shall he be so [Sidenote:1120b] denominated who does it with
pain: this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the honourable
action, and this is no part of the Liberal man’s character; neither will such
an one receive from improper sources, because the so receiving is not
characteristic of one who values not wealth: nor again will he be apt to ask,
because one who does kindnesses to others does not usually receive them
willingly; but from proper sources (his own property, for instance) he will

receive, doing this not as honourable but as necessary, that he may have
somewhat to give: neither will he be careless of his own, since it is his wish
through these to help others in need: nor will he give to chance people, that
he may have wherewith to give to those to whom he ought, at right times,
and on occasions when it is honourable so to do.
Again, it is a trait in the Liberal man’s character even to exceed very
much in giving so as to leave too little for himself, it being characteristic of
such an one not to have a thought of self.
Now Liberality is a term of relation to a man’s means, for the Liberalness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the moral state of
the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There is then no reason
why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives the less amount, if
he has less to give out of.
Again, they are thought to be more Liberal who have inherited, not
acquired for themselves, their means; because, in the first place, they have
never experienced want, and next, all people love most their own works,
just as parents do and poets.
It is not easy for the Liberal man to be rich, since he is neither apt to
receive nor to keep but to lavish, and values not wealth for its own sake but
with a view to giving it away. Hence it is commonly charged upon fortune
that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet this happens
reasonably enough; it is impossible he should have wealth who does not
take any care to have it, just as in any similar case.
Yet he will not give to improper people, nor at wrong times, and so on:
because he would not then be acting in accordance with Liberality, and if he
spent upon such objects, would have nothing to spend on those on which he
ought: for, as I have said before, he is Liberal who spends in proportion to
his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so in excess is
prodigal (this is the reason why we never call despots prodigal, because it
does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts and expenditure to go
beyond their immense possessions).
To sum up then. Since Liberality is a mean state in respect of the giving
and receiving of wealth, the Liberal man will give and spend on proper

objects, and in proper proportion, in great things and in small alike, and all
this with pleasure to himself; also he will receive from right sources, and in
right proportion: because, as the virtue is a mean state in respect of both, he
will do both as he ought, and, in fact, upon proper giving follows the
correspondent receiving, while that which is not such is contrary to it. (Now
those which follow one another come to co-exist in the same person, those
which are contraries plainly do not.)
121a] Again, should it happen to him to spend money beyond what is needful, or otherwise than
is well, he will be vexed, but only moderately and as he ought; for feeling pleasure and pain at
right objects, and in right manner, is a property of Virtue.

The Liberal man is also a good man to have for a partner in respect of
wealth: for he can easily be wronged, since he values not wealth, and is
more vexed at not spending where he ought to have done so than at
spending where he ought not, and he relishes not the maxim of Simonides.
But the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither
pleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will
become more plain as we proceed. We have said already that Prodigality
and Stinginess are respectively states of excess and defect, and this in two
things, giving and receiving (expenditure of course we class under giving).
Well now, Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is
deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in giving and exceeds in
receiving, but it is in small things.
The two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together; it
is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none, because private
individuals thus giving will soon find their means run short, and such are in
fact thought to be prodigal. He that should combine both would seem to be
no little superior to the Stingy man: for he may be easily cured, both by
advancing in years, and also by the want of means, and he may come thus
to the mean: he has, you see, already the facts of the Liberal man, he gives
and forbears to receive, only he does neither in right manner or well. So if
he could be wrought upon by habituation in this respect, or change in any
other way, he would be a real Liberal man, for he will give to those to
whom he should, and will forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is
the reason too why he is thought not to be low in moral character, because

to exceed in giving and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness or
meanness, but only of folly.
121b] Well then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is thought far superior to the Stingy man for
the aforementioned reasons, and also because he does good to many, but the Stingy man to no
one, not even to himself. But most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with their other faults
that of receiving from improper sources, and on this point are Stingy: and they become
grasping, because they wish to spend and cannot do this easily, since their means soon run short
and they are necessitated to get from some other quarter; and then again, because they care not
for what is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from all sources indifferently, because they
desire to give but care not how or whence. And for this reason their givings are not Liberal,
inasmuch as they are not honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right fashion; but
they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to those who are quiet respectable kind
of people they will give nothing, but to flatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any
way, they will give much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid of self-restraint; for as
they are open-handed they are liberal in expenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their
passions, and turn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to what is
honourable.

Thus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if he
could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what is
right.
Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and
incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is more
congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being fond of
money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has many phases,
the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as it consists of two
things, defect of giving and excess of receiving, everybody does not have it
entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one class of persons exceed in
receiving, the other are deficient in giving. I mean those who are designated
by such appellations as sparing, close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in
giving; but other men’s property they neither desire nor are willing to
receive, in some instances from a real moderation and shrinking from what
is base.
There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for
keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do anything
dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every one of similar
character, so named from the excess of not-giving. Others again decline to
receive their neighbour’s goods from a motive of fear; their notion being

that it is not easy to take other people’s things yourself without their taking
yours: so they are content neither to receive nor give.
122a] The other class again who are Stingy in respect of receiving exceed in that they receive
anything from any source; such as they who work at illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and
such-like, and usurers who lend small sums at large interest: for all these receive from improper
sources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic is base-gaining, since they all
submit to disgrace for the sake of gain and that small; because those who receive great things
neither whence they ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack cities and
plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust, but not Stingy.

Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of
the Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and submit
to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the greatest dangers
for the sake of their booty, while the others make gain of their friends to
whom they ought to be giving.
So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are
given to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good reason
is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it is a greater
evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this direction than in
that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as properly and completely
such.
Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and
the contrary vices.

II
Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this
being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its object-matter
Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all transactions in respect of
Wealth, but only applies to such as are expensive, and in these
circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect of magnitude, because it is
(what the very name in Greek hints at) fitting expense on a large scale: this
term is of course relative: I mean, the expenditure of equipping and
commanding a trireme is not the same as that of giving a public spectacle:
“fitting” of course also is relative to the individual, and the matter wherein
and upon which he has to spend. And a man is not denominated

Magnificent for spending as he should do in small or ordinary things, as, for
instance,
“Oft to the wandering beggar did I give,”

but for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man is
liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling short of such a
state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar Profusion, Want of Taste,
and so on; which are faulty, not because they are on an excessive scale in
respect of right objects but, because they show off in improper objects, and
in improper manner: of these we will speak presently. The Magnificent man
is like a man of skill, because he can see what is fitting, and can spend
largely in good taste; for, as we said at the commencement, [Sidenote:
1122b] the confirmed habit is determined by the separate acts of working,
and by its object-matter.
Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such also
are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not great merely,
but befitting the work). So then the work is to be proportionate to the
expense, and this again to the work, or even above it: and the Magnificent
man will incur such expenses from the motive of honour, this being
common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it with pleasure and
lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being Mean. He will consider
also how a thing may be done most beautifully and fittingly, rather, than for
how much it may be done, and how at the least expense.
So the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal
man will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the Great,
that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the Magnificent man,
the object-matter of liberality being the same, and without spending more
money than another man he will make the work more magnificent. I mean,
the excellence of a possession and of a work is not the same: as a piece of
property that thing is most valuable which is worth most, gold for instance;
but as a work that which is great and beautiful, because the contemplation
of such an object is admirable, and so is that which is Magnificent. So the
excellence of a work is Magnificence on a large scale. There are cases of
expenditure which we call honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to
the gods, and the furnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner
everything that has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are

objects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it is
their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out and
maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.
Now in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to the
rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they should be
proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also the doer of the
work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a Magnificent man, since he has
not means wherewith to spend largely and yet becomingly; and if he
attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is out of proportion and contrary to
propriety, whereas to be in accordance with virtue a thing must be done
rightly.
Such expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things
previously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors or
people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people of
high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and
reputation.
So then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him, and
Magnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the greatest
and most honourable: [Sidenote:1123a] and of private ones such as come
but once for all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and any occasion
which engages the interest of the community in general, or of those who are
in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching strangers; and gifts,
and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man is not apt to spend upon
himself but on the public good, and gifts are pretty much in the same case
as dedicatory offerings.
It is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house
suitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and again, to
spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these being most
honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the same things are
not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a tomb. And again, in the
case of expenditures, each must be great of its kind, and great expense on a
great object is most magnificent, that is in any case what is great in these
particular things.

There is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of
expenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent as a
present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost mean. Therefore
it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do magnificently whatever he
is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot be easily surpassed, and bears a
proper proportion to the expenditure.
Such then is the Magnificent man.
The man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion, is
in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in cases
requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of taste;
giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to furnish a
chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the first scene, as
did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not with a view to that
which is really honourable, but to display his wealth, and because he thinks
he shall be admired for these things; and he will spend little where he ought
to spend much, and much where he should spend little.
The Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has
spent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle; he is
procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend the least,
and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and thinking that
he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.
Of course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve disgrace
because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.

III
The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its
object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes no
difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the abstract or as
exemplified in an individual.
1123b] Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly and at the same
time justly, because he that does so without grounds is foolish, and no virtuous character is
foolish or senseless. Well, the character I have described is Great-minded. The man who
estimates himself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but not Great-minded, since this

latter quality implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large bodily conformation while small
people are neat and well made but not beautiful.

Again, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain man:
though the name must not be applied to every case of unduly high selfestimation. He that values himself below his real worth is Small-minded,
and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his own estimate falls
below it. And he is the strongest case of this error who is really a man of
great worth, for what would he have done had his worth been less?
The Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at the
summit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he estimates
himself at his real value (the other characters respectively are in excess and
defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a high, or rather at the
highest possible rate, his character will have respect specially to one thing:
this term “rate” has reference of course to external goods: and of these we
should assume that to be the greatest which we attribute to the gods, and
which is the special object of desire to those who are in power, and which is
the prize proposed to the most honourable actions: now honour answers to
these descriptions, being the greatest of external goods. So the Greatminded man bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour.
In fact, without need of words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for
their object-matter: since honour is what the great consider themselves
specially worthy of, and according to a certain rate.
The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as
regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in excess
as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded man. Now the
Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the greatest things,
must be of the highest excellence, since the better a man is the more is he
worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it follows then, that to be truly
Great-minded a man must be good, and whatever is great in each virtue
would seem to belong to the Great-minded. It would no way correspond
with the character of the Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all
abroad; nor to injure any one; for with what object in view will he do what
is base, in whose eyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into
particulars, the Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he
were a good man: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a
bad man, honour being the prize of virtue and given to the good.

This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament of
all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be without
them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and truly Greatminded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and nobleness of
character.
124a] Honour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man: and
at such as is great, and given by good men, he will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or
perhaps somewhat less for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he will
accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such as is given by ordinary
people and on trifling grounds he will entirely despise, because these do not come up to his
deserts: and dishonour likewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it.

Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of the
Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of wealth and
power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear himself with
moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in prosperity will he be
overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly pained. For not even in respect
of honour does he so bear himself; and yet it is the greatest of all such
objects, since it is the cause of power and wealth being choiceworthy, for
certainly they who have them desire to receive honour through them. So to
whom honour even is a small thing to him will all other things also be so;
and this is why such men are thought to be supercilious.
It seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this character
of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of influence, or the
wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for they are in a position of
eminence and whatever is eminent by good is more entitled to honour: and
this is why such circumstances dispose men rather to Great-mindedness,
because they receive honour at the hands of some men.
Now really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if a
man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is thought
to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without also having
virtue are not justified in their high estimate of themselves, nor are they
rightly denominated Great-minded; since perfect virtue is one of the
indispensable conditions to such & character.
124b] Further, such men become supercilious and insolent, it not being easy to bear prosperity
well without goodness; and not being able to bear it, and possessed with an idea of their own
superiority to others, they despise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they

mimic the Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they do this in such points as
they can, so without doing the actions which can only flow from real goodness they despise
others. Whereas the Great-minded man despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions
truly), but the mass of men do it at random.

Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court danger,
because there are but few things he has a value for; but he will incur great
dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of his life as knowing that
there are terms on which it is not worth his while to live. He is the sort of
man to do kindnesses, but he is ashamed to receive them; the former putting
a man in the position of superiority, the latter in that of inferiority;
accordingly he will greatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the
original actor will thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the
party benefited. Such men seem likewise to remember those they have done
kindnesses to, but not those from whom they have received them: because
he who has received is inferior to him who has done the kindness and our
friend wishes to be superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of his own
kind acts but not of those done to himself (and this is why, in Homer, Thetis
does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done him, nor did the
Lacedæmonians to the Athenians but only the benefits they had received).
Further, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours not at
all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and to bear himself
loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards people of middle station
affably; because to be above the former is difficult and so a grand thing, but
to be above the latter is easy; and to be high and mighty towards the former
is not ignoble, but to do it towards those of humble station would be low
and vulgar; it would be like parading strength against the weak.
And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where
others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the case of
some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things, and those
great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open, both in his dislikes
and his likings, because concealment is a consequent of fear. Likewise to be
careful for reality rather than appearance, and talk and act openly (for his
contempt for others makes him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt
to speak the truth, except where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be
reserved towards the generality of men.

II25a] And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend; because doing so is
servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither
is his admiration easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear malice,
since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of Great-mindedness, but rather
overlooking them; nor does he talk of other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of
any other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others blamed; nor again does he
praise freely, and for this reason he is not apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show
contempt and insolence.

And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be
helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus
disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real anxiety
about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is beautiful and
unproductive rather than what is productive and profitable: this being rather
the part of an independent man. Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and
deliberate style of speech, are thought to be characteristic of the Greatminded man: for he who is earnest about few things is not likely to be in a
hurry, nor he who esteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones
and quickness are the result of these.
This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the
defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.
However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed, these
extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken, for they
do no harm.
The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good
deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from
not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from selfignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what he really
is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are not thought to be
foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an opinion of themselves
seems to have a deteriorating effect on the character: because in all cases
men’s aims are regulated by their supposed desert, and thus these men,
under a notion of their own want of desert, stand aloof from honourable
actions and courses, and similarly from external goods.
But the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because
they attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then they
are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and carriage, and such-

like things, and desire that their good circumstances may be seen, and they
talk of them under the notion of receiving honour thereby. Smallmindedness rather than Vanity is opposed to Great-mindedness, because it
is more commonly met with and is worse.
125b] Well, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object great Honour, as we have said: and
there seems to be a virtue having Honour also for its object (as we stated in the former book),
which may seem to bear to Great-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does to
Magnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is great but dispose us as we
ought to be disposed towards moderate and small matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of
wealth there is a mean state, an excess, and a defect, so likewise in grasping after Honour there
is the more or less than is right, and also the doing so from right sources and in right manner.

For we blame the lover of Honour as aiming at Honour more than he
ought, and from wrong sources; and him who is destitute of a love of
Honour as not choosing to be honoured even for what is noble. Sometimes
again we praise the lover of Honour as manly and having a love for what is
noble, and him who has no love for it as being moderate and modest (as we
noticed also in the former discussion of these virtues).
It is clear then that since “Lover of so and so” is a term capable of several
meanings, we do not always denote the same quality by the term “Lover of
Honour;” but when we use it as a term of commendation we denote more
than the mass of men are; when for blame more than a man should be.
And the mean state having no proper name the extremes seem to dispute
for it as unoccupied ground: but of course where there is excess and defect
there must be also the mean. And in point of fact, men do grasp at Honour
more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they ought; for
instance, this state is praised, being a mean state in regard of Honour, but
without any appropriate name. Compared with what is called Ambition it
shows like a want of love for Honour, and compared with this it shows like
Ambition, or compared with both, like both faults: nor is this a singular case
among the virtues. Here the extreme characters appear to be opposed,
because the mean has no name appropriated to it.

V
Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as the
character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same of the

extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the defect,
which has no name either) to the character in the mean.
The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is
Anger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry at
what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time, and
for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek since
Meekness is praised. For the notion represented by the term Meek man is
the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but being
angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of time, which
Reason may direct. This character however is thought to err rather on
[Sidenote:1126a] the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to take
revenge but rather to make allowances and forgive. And the defect, call it
Angerlessness or what you will, is blamed: I mean, they who are not angry
at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be foolish, and they
who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time, nor with those with
whom they ought; for a man who labours under this defect is thought to
have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have no tendency to avenge
himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger: now to bear with scurrility in one’s
own person, and patiently see one’s own friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.
As for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those with
whom, and at things with which, they ought not to be, and more than they
ought, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time. I do not mean,
however, that these are combined in any one person: that would in fact be
impossible, because the evil destroys itself, and if it is developed in its full
force it becomes unbearable.
Now those whom we term the Passionate are soon angry, and with people
with whom and at things at which they ought not, and in an excessive
degree, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them. And
this results from their not repressing their anger, but repaying their enemies
(in that they show their feeings by reason of their vehemence), and then
they have done with it.
The Choleric again are excessively vehement, and are angry at
everything, and on every occasion; whence comes their Greek name
signifying that their choler lies high.

The Bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile and keep their anger for a long
while, because they repress the feeling: but when they have revenged
themselves then comes a lull; for the vengeance destroys their anger by
producing pleasure in lieu of pain. But if this does not happen they keep the
weight on their minds: because, as it does not show itself, no one attempts
to reason it away, and digesting anger within one’s self takes time. Such
men are very great nuisances to themselves and to their best friends.
Again, we call those Cross-grained who are angry at wrong objects, and
in excessive degree, and for too long a time, and who are not appeased
without vengeance or at least punishing the offender.
To Meekness we oppose the excess rather than the defect, because it is of
more common occurrence: for human nature is more disposed to take than
to forgo revenge. And the Cross-grained are worse to live with [than they
who are too phlegmatic].
Now, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said
before. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons,
and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to
what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that transgresses the strict
rule only a little, whether on the side of too much or too little, is not
blamed: sometimes we praise those who
126b] are deficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the irritable Spirited as
being well qualified for government. So it is not easy to lay down, in so many words, for what
degree or kind of transgression a man is blameable: because the decision is in particulars, and
rests therefore with the Moral Sense. Thus much, however, is plain, that the mean state is
praiseworthy, in virtue of which we are angry with those with whom, and at those things with
which, we ought to be angry, and in right manner, and so on; while the excesses and defects are
blameable, slightly so if only slight, more so if greater, and when considerable very blameable.

It is clear, therefore, that the mean state is what we are to hold to.
This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states which
have Anger for their object-matter.

VI
Next, as regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts,
some men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to

giving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their line is
to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the other hand,
are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the contrary line to
these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at all whether they give
pain or not.
Now it is quite clear of course, that the states I have named are
blameable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of
which a man will let pass what he ought as he ought, and also will object in
like manner. However, this state has no name appropriated, but it is most
like Friendship; since the man who exhibits it is just the kind of man whom
we would call the amiable friend, with the addition of strong earnest
affection; but then this is the very point in which it differs from Friendship,
that it is quite independent of any feeling or strong affection for those
among whom the man mixes: I mean, that he takes everything as he ought,
not from any feeling of love or hatred, but simply because his natural
disposition leads him to do so; he will do it alike to those whom he does
know and those whom he does not, and those with whom he is intimate and
those with whom he is not; only in each case as propriety requires, because
it is not fitting to care alike for intimates and strangers, nor again to pain
them alike.
It has been stated in a general way that his social intercourse will be
regulated by propriety, and his aim will be to avoid giving pain and to
contribute to pleasure, but with a constant reference to what is noble and
expedient.
His proper object-matter seems to be the pleasures and pains which arise
out of social intercourse, but whenever it is not honourable or even hurtful
to him to contribute to pleasure, in these instances he will run counter and
prefer to give pain.
Or if the things in question involve unseemliness to the doer, and this not
inconsiderable, or any harm, whereas his opposition will cause some little
pain, here he will not agree but will run counter.
127a] Again, he will regulate differently his intercourse with great men and with ordinary men,
and with all people according to the knowledge he has of them; and in like manner, taking in
any other differences which may exist, giving to each his due, and in itself preferring to give

pleasure and cautious not to give pain, but still guided by the results, I mean by what is noble
and expedient according as they preponderate.

Again, he will inflict trifling pain with a view to consequent pleasure.
Well, the man bearing the mean character is pretty well such as I have
described him, but he has no name appropriated to him: of those who try to
give pleasure, the man who simply and disinterestedly tries to be agreeable
is called Over-Complaisant, he who does it with a view to secure some
profit in the way of wealth, or those things which wealth may procure, is a
Flatterer: I have said before, that the man who is “always non-content” is
Cross and Contentious. Here the extremes have the appearance of being
opposed to one another, because the mean has no appropriate name.

VII
The mean state which steers clear of Exaggeration has pretty much the
same object-matter as the last we described, and likewise has no name
appropriated to it. Still it may be as well to go over these states: because, in
the first place, by a particular discussion of each we shall be better
acquainted with the general subject of moral character, and next we shall be
the more convinced that the virtues are mean states by seeing that this is
universally the case.
In respect then of living in society, those who carry on this intercourse
with a view to pleasure and pain have been already spoken of; we will now
go on to speak of those who are True or False, alike in their words and
deeds and in the claims which they advance.
Now the Exaggerator is thought to have a tendency to lay claim to things
reflecting credit on him, both when they do not belong to him at all and also
in greater degree than that in which they really do: whereas the Reserved
man, on the contrary, denies those which really belong to him or else
depreciates them, while the mean character being a Plain-matter-of-fact
person is Truthful in life and word, admitting the existence of what does
really belong to him and making it neither greater nor less than the truth.
It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or without
some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live, each

according to his particular character and disposition, unless indeed a man is
acting from any special motive.
Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is noble
and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also in the mean)
is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth are both
blameable, but especially the Exaggerator.
We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him
Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his
agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this would
come within the [Sidenote:1127b] province of a different virtue), but, in
such as do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are
describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain moral
state.
And he that is such must be judged to be a good man: for he that has a
love for Truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent, will be so
likewise even more in such as are not indifferent; for surely he will have a
dread of falsehood as base, since he shunned it even in itself: and he that is
of such a character is praiseworthy, yet he leans rather to that which is
below the truth, this having an appearance of being in better taste because
exaggerations are so annoying.
As for the man who lays claim to things above what really belongs to
him without any special motive, he is like a base man because he would not
otherwise have taken pleasure in falsehood, but he shows as a fool rather
than as a knave. But if a man does this with a special motive, suppose for
honour or glory, as the Braggart does, then he is not so very blameworthy,
but if, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary considerations, he is more
unseemly.
Now the Braggart is such not by his power but by his purpose, that is to
say, in virtue of his moral state, and because he is a man of a certain kind;
just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood for its own sake while
others lie from a desire of glory or gain. They who exaggerate with a view
to glory pretend to such qualities as are followed by praise or highest
congratulation; they who do it with a view to gain assume those which their
neighbours can avail themselves of, and the absence of which can be

concealed, as a man’s being a skilful soothsayer or physician; and
accordingly most men pretend to such things and exaggerate in this
direction, because the faults I have mentioned are in them.
The Reserved, who depreciate their own qualities, have the appearance of
being more refined in their characters, because they are not thought to speak
with a view to gain but to avoid grandeur: one very common trait in such
characters is their denying common current opinions, as Socrates used to
do. There are people who lay claim falsely to small things and things the
falsity of their pretensions to which is obvious; these are called Factotums
and are very despicable.
This very Reserve sometimes shows like Exaggeration; take, for instance,
the excessive plainness of dress affected by the Lacedaemonians: in fact,
both excess and the extreme of deficiency partake of the nature of
Exaggeration. But they who practise Reserve in moderation, and in cases in
which the truth is not very obvious and plain, give an impression of
refinement. Here it is the Exaggerator (as being the worst character) who
appears to be opposed to the Truthful Man.

VIII
I28a] Next, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined with Jocularity, it is
thought that in this respect also there is a kind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be
prescribed as to the kind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in
respect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the saying and hearing such
and such things). It is plain that in regard to these things also there will be an excess and defect
and a mean.

Now they who exceed in the ridiculous are judged to be Buffoons and
Vulgar, catching at it in any and every way and at any cost, and aiming
rather at raising laughter than at saying what is seemly and at avoiding to
pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who would not for the
world make a joke themselves and are displeased with such as do are
thought to be Clownish and Stern. But they who are Jocular in good taste
are denominated by a Greek term expressing properly ease of movement,
because such are thought to be, as one may say, motions of the moral
character; and as bodies are judged of by their motions so too are moral
characters.
Now as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take
more pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons too
get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike; but that
they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from what has been
said.
One quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is characteristic of
a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are fit for a good man and a
gentleman to say and listen to: for there are things which are becoming for
such a one to say and listen to in the way of Jocularity, and there is a
difference between the Jocularity of the Gentleman and that of the
Vulgarian; and again, between that of the educated and uneducated man.
This you may see from a comparison of the Old and New Comedy: in the
former obscene talk made the fun; in the latter it is rather innuendo: and this
is no slight difference as regards decency.
Well then, are we to characterise him who jests well by his saying what is
becoming a gentleman, or by his avoiding to pain the object of his wit, or

even by his giving him pleasure? or will not such a definition be vague,
since different things are hateful and pleasant to different men?
Be this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to,
since it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear: this
must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he will hear:
because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are some points of
scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of jesting should have
been also so forbidden. So then the refined and gentlemanlike man will bear
himself thus as being a law to himself. Such is the mean character, whether
denominated the man of Tact or of Easy Pleasantry.
But the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself nor
any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of such kind as
no man of refinement would say and some which he would not even
tolerate if said by others in his hearing. [Sidenote:1128b] The Clownish
man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as contributing
nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do.
Yet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be
indispensable.
The three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and the
object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They differ, in that
one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two with the pleasurable:
and of these two again, the one is conversant with the jocosities of life, the
other with all other points of social intercourse.

IX
To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like a
feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be “a kind of fear of
disgrace,” and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they
who feel Shame grow red and they who fear death turn pale. So both are
evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling
rather than a moral state.
Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth: we
do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they live at

the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and Shame acts on
them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are Shamefaced, but
no one would ever praise an old man for being given to it, inasmuch as we
hold that he ought not to do things which cause Shame; for Shame, since it
arises at low bad actions, does not at all belong to the good man, because
such ought not to be done at all: nor does it make any difference to allege
that some things are disgraceful really, others only because they are thought
so; for neither should be done, so that a man ought not to be in the position
of feeling Shame. In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is
the part of a faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel
Shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this
constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at voluntary
actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.
True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a man
should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues are good
in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted that
impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is base, it
does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such things and feel
Shame.
Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state: however,
all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.

BOOK V
129a] Now the points for our inquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are, what kind of actions
are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean state Justice is, and between what points the
abstract principle of it, i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our inquiry shall be, if you please, conducted
in the same method as we have observed in the foregoing parts of this treatise.

We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state such that
in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just, and
actually do it, and wish it: similarly also with respect to Injustice, a moral
state such that in consequence of it men do unjustly and wish what is
unjust: let us also be content then with these as a ground-work sketched out.
I mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to States
whether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I mean
that whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embraces
contraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not the contrary acts
are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walks healthily when he
walks as the healthy man would.
However, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known
from the other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if it be
seen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen what a bad
state is, and from the things which belong to a good state of body the good
state itself is seen, and vice versa. If, for instance, the good state is firmness
of flesh it follows that the bad state is flabbiness of flesh; and whatever
causes firmness of flesh is connected with the good state. It follows
moreover in general, that if of two contrary terms the one is used in many
senses so also will the other be; as, for instance, if “the Just,” then also “the
Unjust.” Now Justice and Injustice do seem to be used respectively in many
senses, but, because the line of demarcation between these is very fine and
minute, it commonly escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not
plain and manifest as where the various significations of terms are widely
different for in these last the visible difference is great, for instance, the
word [Greek: klehis] is used equivocally to denote the bone which is under
the neck of animals and the instrument with which people close doors.

Let it be ascertained then in how many senses the term “Unjust man” is
used. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, and the
unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the Just man
will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man “The Just”
then will be the lawful and the equal, and “the Unjust” the unlawful and the
unequal.
129b] Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of course, with respect to
good things, but not of every kind, only those which are the subject-matter of good and bad
fortune and which are in themselves always good but not always to the individual. Yet men pray
for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that things which are in the
abstract good may be so also to them, and choose what is good for themselves.

But the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part, but
even sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply evil: still,
since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good and the grasping is
after good, therefore even in this case he is thought to be a grasping man,
i.e. one who strives for more good than fairly falls to his share: of course he
is also an unequal man, this being an inclusive and common term.
We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law
Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just, because
by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the legislative power
and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give directions on all points,
aiming either at the common good of all, or that of the best, or that of those
in power (taking for the standard real goodness or adopting some other
estimate); in one way we mean by Just, those things which are apt to
produce and preserve happiness and its ingredients for the social
community.
Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave
man (as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one’s arms),
but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from
adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from
striking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in respect of
the other virtues and vices commanding some things and forbidding others,
rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat inferior if it is one
extemporised.

Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as
exercised towards one’s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is thought
oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and
“neither Hesper nor the Morning-star
So worthy of our admiration:”

and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
“All virtue is in Justice comprehended.”

And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice of
perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to practise his
virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I mean, there are
many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their own personal
conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with
130a] their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is thought to be a good one,
“Rule will show what a man is;”

for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a
community. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is
thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to some
other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous to
another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest of men
who practises vice not only in his own person but towards his friends also;
but he the best who practises virtue not merely in his own person but
towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some difficulty.
However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is co-extensive
with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a part of Vice but coextensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this sense differs from Virtue
appears from what has been said: it is the same really, but the point of view
is not the same: in so far as it has respect to one’s neighbour it is Justice, in
so far as it is such and such a moral state it is simply Virtue.

II
But the object of our inquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a part of
Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and likewise with
respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of this last the following

consideration is a proof: there are many vices by practising which a man
acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp at more than his share of good;
if, for instance, by reason of cowardice he throws away his shield, or by
reason of ill-temper he uses abusive language, or by reason of stinginess
does not give a friend pecuniary assistance; but whenever he does a
grasping action, it is often in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in
all of them, still in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in
the way of Injustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from that
co-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and some
“Unjust” related to that which is co-extensive with violation of the law as a
part to a whole.
Again, suppose one man seduces a man’s wife with a view to gain and
actually gets some advantage by it, and another does the same from impulse
of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will be thought to be
rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, and the former Unjust
but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainly because of his gaining.
Again, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particular depravity, as,
if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to his passions; if he deserts his
comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes another, to anger: but if he gains by the
act to no other vice than to Injustice.
131b] Thus it is clear that there is a kind of Injustice different from and besides that which
includes all Vice, having the same name because the definition is in the same genus; for both
have their force in dealings with others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth, or safety, or by
whatever one name we can include all these things, and is actuated by pleasure attendant on
gain, while the other acts upon all things which constitute the sphere of the good man’s action.

Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one
which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with, Virtue, is
plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its characteristics.
Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal, and
the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the aforementioned
Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the unequal and the more are
not the same, but differing as part to whole (because all more is unequal,
but not all unequal more), so the Unjust and the Injustice we are now in
search of are not the same with, but other than, those before mentioned, the
one being the parts, the other the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a

part of the Injustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the
Justice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of is
the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular Just and
Unjust.
Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice ranking
as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in all its bearings
towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice (being similarly the practice
of Vice). It is clear too, that we must separate off the Just and the Unjust
involved in these: because one may pretty well say that most lawful things
are those which naturally result in action from Virtue in its fullest sense,
because the law enjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and
forbids living in accordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of
Virtue in all its bearings are those enactments which have been made
respecting education for society.
By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is
simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of
[Greek: politikhae] or some other science we must determine at a future
time: for it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good
citizen in every case.
Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species is
that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth, or such
other things as are to be shared among the members of the social
community (because in these one man as compared with another may have
either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which is
Corrective in the various transactions between man and man.
1131a] And of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some are voluntary and
some involuntary; voluntary, such as follow; selling, buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit,
hiring: and this class is called voluntary because the origination of these transactions is
voluntary.

The involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft, adultery,
poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination, false witness; or
accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds, death, plundering,
maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.

III

Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract “Unjust”
unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal, that is to
say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action there is the greater
and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the exact half). If then the Unjust is
unequal the Just is equal, which all must allow without further proof: and as
the equal is a mean the Just must be also a mean. Now the equal implies
two terms at least: it follows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and
these to certain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things
(that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal, between two, and
in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons. The Just then must imply four
terms at least, for those to which it is just are two, and the terms
representing the things are two.
And there will be the same equality between the terms representing the
persons, as between those representing the things: because as the latter are
to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not equal they must
not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source of all the quarrelling
and wrangling in the world, when either they who are equal have and get
awarded to them things not equal, or being not equal those things which are
equal. Again, the necessity of this equality of ratios is shown by the
common phrase “according to rate,” for all agree that the Just in
distributions ought to be according to some rate: but what that rate is to be,
all do not agree; the democrats are for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others
for nobleness of birth, and the aristocratic party for virtue.
The Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does not
apply merely to number in the abstract, but to number generally, since it is
equality of ratios, and implies four terms at least (that this is the case in
what may be called discrete proportion is plain and obvious, but it is true
also in continual proportion, for this uses the one [Sidenote: 1131b] term as
two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C may be expressed A:B::B:C. In the
first, B is named twice; and so, if, as in the second, B is actually written
twice, the proportionals will be four): and the Just likewise implies four
terms at the least, and the ratio between the two pair of terms is the same,
because the persons and the things are divided similarly. It will stand then
thus, A:B::C:D, and then permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and
D to represent the things) A+C:B+D::A:B. The distribution in fact
consisting in putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together

so as to preserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together justly.
So then the joining together of the first and third and second and fourth
proportionals is the Just in the distribution, and this Just is the mean
relatively to that which violates the proportionate, for the proportionate is a
mean and the Just is proportionate. Now mathematicians call this kind of
proportion geometrical: for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the
whole as each part to each part. Furthermore this proportion is not
continual, because the person and thing do not make up one term.
The Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violates the
proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less: which in
fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who acts unjustly has the
greater share and he who is treated unjustly has the less of what is good: but
in the case of what is bad this is reversed: for the less evil compared with
the greater comes to be reckoned for good, because the less evil is more
choiceworthy than the greater, and what is choiceworthy is good, and the
more so the greater good.
This then is the one species of the Just.

IV
And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as
well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form from the
aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of common
property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I mean that,
if the division is made out of common property, the shares will bear the
same proportion to one another as the original contributions did: and the
Unjust which is opposite to this Just is that which violates the proportionate.
But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a
certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that
proportion but of arithmetical. [Sidenote: 1132a ] Because it makes no
difference whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a
bad or by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has
committed adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the
injury and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the
other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm. And so

this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to equality
again, because really when the one party has been wounded and the other
has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the suffering and the
doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the judge tries to restore
equality by penalty, thereby taking from the gain.
For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though perhaps
the term in some particular instance may not be strictly proper, as gain, for
instance, to the man who has given a blow, and loss to him who has
received it: still, when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called
loss and the other gain.
And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which
represent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good and
the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is loss):
between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we say is
Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss and gain.
And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have recourse to the
judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just, for the judge is meant
to be the personification of the Just. And men seek a judge as one in the
mean, which is expressed in a name given by some to judges ([Greek:
mesidioi], or middle-men) under the notion that if they can hit on the mean
they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then surely a mean since the judge is
also.
So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as it were,
having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part that by which
it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And when the whole is
divided into two exactly equal portions then men say they have their own,
when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is a mean between the
greater and the less according to arithmetical equality.
This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in
Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; ([Greek: dikaion] quasi [Greek:
dichaion], that is in two parts, and [Greek: dikastaes] quasi [Greek:
dichastaes], he who divides into two parts). For when from one of two equal
magnitudes somewhat has been taken and added to the other, this latter
exceeds the former by twice that portion: if it had been merely taken from

the former and not added to the latter, then the latter would
[Sidenote:1132b] have exceeded the former only by that one portion; but in
the other case, the greater exceeds the mean by one, and the mean exceeds
also by one that magnitude from which the portion was taken. By this
illustration, then, we obtain a rule to determine what one ought to take from
him who has the greater, and what to add to him who has the less. The
excess of the mean over the less must be added to the less, and the excess of
the greater over the mean be taken from the greater.
Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one of
them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The whole line
thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line, by twice the
portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that portion. And
these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary exchange: that is to
say, the having more than what was one’s own is called gaining, and the
having less than one’s original stock is called losing; for instance, in buying
or selling, or any other transactions which are guaranteed by law: but when
the result is neither more nor less, but exactly the same as there was
originally, people say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain.
So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and
gain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the same
after the transaction as one had before it took place.
V] There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just, as the Pythagoreans
said: for they defined the Just simply and without qualification as “That which reciprocates with
another.” But this simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just, or the
Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the Rhadamanthian rule of Just, If a
man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be straightforward justice”), for in
many cases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in authority has struck a man, he is
not to be struck in turn; or if a man has struck one in authority, he must not only be struck but
punished also. And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions makes a great
difference.
II33a] But in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this Reciprocation forms the
bond of union, but then it must be Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality,
because by proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held together, For either
Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of
things: or else Reciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no admission to
participation which is the very bond of their union.

And this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces ([Greek:
charites]) in the public streets; to impress the notion that there may be

requital, this being peculiar to [Greek: charis] because a man ought to
requite with a good turn the man who has done him a favour and then to
become himself the originator of another [Greek: charis], by doing him a
favour.
Now the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be represented by
the diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which the parties and
their wares are so placed that the side connecting the parties be opposite to
that connecting the wares, and each party be connected by one side with his
own ware, as in the accompanying diagram.
The builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to give him
of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, and then the
Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just result which we are
speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will the connection stand: for
there is no reason why the ware of the one may not be better than that of the
other, and therefore before the exchange is made they must have been
equalised. And this is so also in the other arts: for they would have been
destroyed entirely if there were not a correspondence in point of quantity
and quality between the producer and the consumer. For, we must
remember, no dealing arises between two of the same kind, two physicians,
for instance; but say between a physician and agriculturist, or, to state it
generally, between those who are different and not equal, but these of
course must have been equalised before the exchange can take place.
It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged
should be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has come in,
and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and so
likewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal to a
house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to the shoemaker, so
many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of a builder an
agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there is this proportion
there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this proportion cannot be unless
the terms are in some way equal; hence the need, as was stated above, of
some one measure of all things. Now this is really and truly the Demand for
them, which is the common bond of all such dealings. For if the parties
were not in want at all or not similarly of one another’s wares, there would
either not be any exchange, or at least not the same.

And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of
Demand: and the account of its Greek name [Greek: nomisma] is this, that
it is what it is not naturally but by custom or law ([Greek: nomos]), and it
rests with us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.
1113b] Very well then, there will be Reciprocation when the terms have been equalised so as to
stand in this proportion; Agriculturist : Shoemaker : : wares of Shoemaker : wares of
Agriculturist; but you must bring them to this form of proportion when they exchange,
otherwise the one extreme will combine both exceedings of the mean: but when they have
exactly their own then they are equal and have dealings, because the same equality can come to
be in their case. Let A represent an agriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised
with A’s. Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; now Reciprocation will be practicable,
if it were not, there would have been no dealing.

Now that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being
some one thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not want the
other or neither want one another, they do not exchange at all: whereas they
do when one wants what the other man has, wine for instance, giving in
return corn for exportation.
And further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange at
some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shall have
it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one brings it one
can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is liable to
depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the same, but still it is
of a more permanent nature than the commodities it represents. And this is
the reason why all things should have a price set upon them, because thus
there may be exchange at any time, and if exchange then dealing. So
money, like a measure, making all things commensurable equalises them:
for if there was not exchange there would not have been dealing, nor
exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not the
capacity of being commensurate: it is impossible that things so greatly
different should be really commensurate, but we can approximate
sufficiently for all practical purposes in reference to Demand. The common
measure must be some one thing, and also from agreement (for which
reason it is called [Greek: nomisma]), for this makes all things
commensurable: in fact, all things are measured by money. Let B represent
ten minæ, A a house worth five minæ, or in other words half B, C a bed
worth 1/10th of B: it is clear then how many beds are equal to one house,
namely, five.

It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the existence
of money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a house five beds
or the price of five beds. We have now said then what the abstract Just and
Unjust are, and these having been defined it is plain that just acting is a
mean between acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former
being equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less.
But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same
manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing the
mean, while Injustice occupies both the extremes.
1134a] And Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said to have the aptitude
for practising the Just in the way of moral choice, and for making division between, himself and
another, or between two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to his neighbour
the less share of what is choiceworthy and contrariwise of what is hurtful, but what is
proportionably equal, and in like manner when adjudging the rights of two other men.

Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust is
excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in violation of the
proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and defect because it aims
at producing excess and defect; excess, that is, in a man’s own case of what
is simply advantageous, and defect of what is hurtful: and in the case of
other men in like manner generally speaking, only that the proportionate is
violated not always in one direction as before but whichever way it happens
in the given case. And of the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly
towards, and the greater the acting unjustly towards others.
Let this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, and
likewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.
VI] Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a character of injustice, the
question arises whether a man is unjust in each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or
adulterer, or robber, by doing acts of a given character.

We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference; a
man may, for instance, have had connection with another’s wife, knowing
well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of deliberate
choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts unjustly, but he
has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that is, he may have stolen
yet not be a thief; or committed an act of adultery but still not be an
adulterer, and so on in other cases which might be enumerated.

Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already
spoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are
investigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in Social
Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in communion
with a view to independence and who are free and equal either
proportionately or numerically.
It follows then that those who are not in this position have not among
themselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling that
other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the possibility
of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing between the Just
and the Unjust.
And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these
there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that injustice
attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting unjustly, since
by the former we mean giving one’s self the larger share of what is
abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly evil.
134b] This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern, but Principle,
because a man governs for himself and comes to be a despot: but the office of a ruler is to be
guardian of the Just and therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar
personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does not allot to himself the
larger share of what is abstractedly good unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which
reason he really governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to one’s self so much
as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore some compensation must be given him, as
there actually is in the shape of honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate
there rulers turn into despots.

But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not
identical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility of
injustice towards those things which are absolutely one’s own; and a slave
or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not separated into an
independent being), is, as it were, part of a man’s self, and no man chooses
to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot be injustice towards one’s
own self: therefore neither is there the social Unjust or Just, which was
stated to be in accordance with law and to exist between those among
whom law naturally exists, and these were said to be they to whom belongs
equality of ruling and being ruled.

Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between
a man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in domestic
relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.
VII] Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and conventional; the former
being that which has everywhere the same force and does not depend upon being received or
not; the latter being that which originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after
enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or the sacrificing a goat
instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as
a hero; in short, all matters of special decree.

But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter kind,
and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is unchangeable
and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance, burns not here only
but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see changed in various places.
Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the gods
perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is somewhat
existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to change, still there
is that which does exist by nature, and that which does not.
Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among
things which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not but is
dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that both are
alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive illustration will apply
to this and other cases; the right hand is naturally the stronger, still some
men may become equally strong in both.
1135a] A parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention and
expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal in all places, but where
men buy they are large, and where these same sell again they are smaller: well, in like manner
the Justs which are not natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for not
even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which by nature would be best in all
places.

Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and
exemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts being many,
but each of the principles only singular because each is an universal. And so
there is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract Unjust, and the
just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a thing is unjust in itself, by nature or
by ordinance; well, when this has been embodied in act, there is an unjust
act, but not till then, only some unjust thing. And similarly of a just act.

(Perhaps [Greek: dikaiopragaema] is more correctly the common or generic
term for just act, the word [Greek: dikaioma], which I have here used,
meaning generally and properly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now as
to each of them, what kinds there are, and how many, and what is their
object-matter, we must examine afterwards.
VIII] For the present we proceed to say that, the Justs and the Unjusts being what have been
mentioned, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when he embodies these abstracts in voluntary
actions, but when in involuntary, then he neither acts unjustly or justly except accidentally; I
mean that the being just or unjust is really only accidental to the agents in such cases.

So both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary or the
contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, then it is
blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, if voluntariness
does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itself unjust but not yet an
unjust action.
By voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in his
own power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as to
the person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result with which
he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes him with, and
with what probable result; and each of these points again, not accidentally
nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to seize his hand and
strike a third person with it, here, of course, the owner of the hand acts not
voluntarily, because it did not rest with him to do or leave undone: or again,
it is conceivable that the person struck may be his father, and he may know
that it is a man, or even one of the present company, whom he is striking,
but not know that it is his father. And let these same distinctions be
supposed to be carried into the case of the result and in fact the whole of
any given action. In fine then, that is involuntary which is done through
ignorance, or which, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent’s
control or is done on compulsion.
I mention these cases, because there are many natural *[Sidenote: 1135b]
things which we do and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either
voluntary or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.
Again, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to the just
acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited with him,
but against his will and from fear of the consequences of a refusal: we must

not say that he either does what is just, or does justly, except accidentally:
and in like manner the man who through compulsion and against his will
fails to restore a deposit, must be said to do unjustly, or to do what is unjust,
accidentally only.
Again, voluntary actions we do either from deliberate choice or without
it; from it, when we act from previous deliberation; without it, when
without any previous deliberation. Since then hurts which may be done in
transactions between man and man are threefold, those mistakes which are
attended with ignorance are, when a man either does a thing not to the man
to whom he meant to do it, or not the thing he meant to do, or not with the
instrument, or not with the result which he intended: either he did not think
he should hit him at all, or not with this, or this is not the man he thought he
should hit, or he did not think this would be the result of the blow but a
result has followed which he did not anticipate; as, for instance, he did it
not to wound but merely to prick him; or it is not the man whom, or the way
in which, he meant.
Now when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable
expectation, it is a Misadventure; when though not contrary to expectation
yet without any viciousness, it is a Mistake; for a man makes a mistake
when the origination of the cause rests with himself, he has a misadventure
when it is external to himself. When again he acts with knowledge, but not
from previous deliberation, it is an unjust action; for instance, whatever
happens to men from anger or other passions which are necessary or
natural: for when doing these hurts or making these mistakes they act
unjustly of course and their actions are unjust, still they are not yet
confirmed unjust or wicked persons by reason of these, because the hurt did
not arise from depravity in the doer of it: but when it does arise from
deliberate choice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depraved man.
And on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not to be
from malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in wrath who is
the originator really but he who caused his wrath. And again, the question at
issue in such cases is not respecting the fact but respecting the justice of the
case, the occasion of anger being a notion of injury. I mean, that the parties
do not dispute about the fact, as in questions of contract (where one of the
two must be a rogue, unless real forgetfulness can be pleaded), but,

admitting the fact, they dispute on which side the justice of the case lies (the
one who plotted against the other, i.e. the real aggressor, of course, cannot
be ignorant), so that the one thinks there is injustice committed while the
other does not.
11364] Well then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt another of deliberate purpose, and he who
commits such acts of injustice is ipso facto an unjust character when they are in violation of the
proportionate or the equal; and in like manner also a man is a just character when he acts justly
of deliberate purpose, and he does act justly if he acts voluntarily.

Then as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as are
excusable or such as are not: under the former head come all errors done
not merely in ignorance but from ignorance; under the latter all that are
done not from ignorance but in ignorance caused by some passion which is
neither natural nor fairly attributable to human infirmity.
IX] Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient distinctness as to
being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly towards others. First, whether the case is possible
which Euripides has put, saying somewhat strangely,

“My mother he hath slain; the tale is short,
Either he willingly did slay her willing,
Or else with her will but against his own.”

I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt with
with his own consent, or must every case of being unjustly dealt with be
against the will of the sufferer as every act of unjust dealing is voluntary?
And next, are cases of being unjustly dealt with to be ruled all one way as
every act of unjust dealing is voluntary? or may we say that some cases are
voluntary and some involuntary?
Similarly also as regards being justly dealt with: all just acting is
voluntary, so that it is fair to suppose that the being dealt with unjustly or
justly must be similarly opposed, as to being either voluntary or
involuntary.
Now as for being justly dealt with, the position that every case of this is
voluntary is a strange one, for some are certainly justly dealt with without
their will. The fact is a man may also fairly raise this question, whether in
every case he who has suffered what is unjust is therefore unjustly dealt
with, or rather that the case is the same with suffering as it is with acting;
namely that in both it is possible to participate in what is just, but only
accidentally. Clearly the case of what is unjust is similar: for doing things in
themselves unjust is not identical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them
the same as being unjustly dealt with. So too of acting justly and being
justly dealt with, since it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless some
one else acts unjustly or to be justly dealt with unless some one else acts
justly.
Now if acting unjustly is simply “hurting another voluntarily” (by which
I mean, knowing whom you are hurting, and wherewith, and how you are
hurting him), and the man who fails of self-control voluntarily hurts
himself, then this will be a case of being voluntarily dealt unjustly with, and
it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself. (This by the way
is one of the questions raised, whether it is possible for a man to deal
unjustly with himself.) Or again, a man may, by reason of failing of selfcontrol, receive hurt from another man acting voluntarily, and so here will
be another case of being unjustly dealt with voluntarily. [Sidenote: 1136]

The solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly dealt with is
not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the knowledge of the
person hurt and the instrument and the manner of hurting him, the fact of its
being against the wish of the man who is hurt.
So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust voluntarily,
but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since no man wishes to
be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who really acts contrary to his
wish: for no man wishes for that which he does not think to be good, and
the man who fails of self-control does not what he thinks he ought to do.
And again, he that gives away his own property (as Homer says Glaucus
gave to Diomed, “armour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxen
for that which was worth but nine”) is not unjustly dealt with, because the
giving rests entirely with himself; but being unjustly dealt with does not,
there must be some other person who is dealing unjustly towards him.
With respect to being unjustly dealt with then, it is clear that it is not
voluntary.
There remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is he
chargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has given the larger share
to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that has the larger share? next,
can a man deal unjustly by himself?
In the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible and it is the
distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the larger share, then
supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than
to himself here is a case of a man dealing unjustly by himself; which, in
fact, moderate men are thought to do, for it is a characteristic of the
equitable man to take less than his due.
Is not this the answer? that the case is not quite fairly stated, because of
some other good, such as credit or the abstract honourable, in the supposed
case the man did get the larger share. And again, the difficulty is solved by
reference to the definition of unjust dealing: for the man suffers nothing
contrary to his own wish, so that, on this score at least, he is not unjustly
dealt with, but, if anything, he is hurt only.

It is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not the
man who has the greater share: because the mere fact of the abstract Unjust
attaching to what a man does, does not constitute unjust action, but the
doing this voluntarily: and voluntariness attaches to that quarter whence is
the origination of the action, which clearly is in the distributor not in the
receiver. And again the term doing is used in several senses; in one sense
inanimate objects kill, or the hand, or the slave by his master’s bidding; so
the man in question does not act unjustly but does things which are in
themselves unjust.
1137a] Again, suppose that a man has made a wrongful award in ignorance; in the eye of the
law he does not act unjustly nor is his awarding unjust, but yet he is in a certain sense: for the
Just according to law and primary or natural Just are not coincident: but, if he knowingly
decided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receiver got the larger share, that is, either of
favour from the receiver or private revenge against the other party: and so the man who decided
unjustly from these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the same sense as a man would who
received part of the actual matter of the unjust action: because in this case the man who
wrongly adjudged, say a field, did not actually get land but money by his unjust decision.

Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves,
and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not really
so; to have connection with a neighbour’s wife, or strike one’s neighbour, or
give the money with one’s hand, is of course easy and rests with one’s self:
but the doing these acts with certain inward dispositions neither is easy nor
rests entirely with one’s self. And in like way, the knowing what is Just and
what Unjust men think no great instance of wisdom because it is not hard to
comprehend those things of which the laws speak. They forget that these
are not Just actions, except accidentally: to be Just they must be done and
distributed in a certain manner: and this is a more difficult task than
knowing what things are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge it is
an easy matter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the
knife, but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to
health, and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a physician.
From this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly is
equally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay even
more, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he may be able
to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the brave man to
throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way or that. True: but
then it is not the mere doing these things which constitutes acts of

cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but the doing them with certain
inward dispositions: just as it is not the mere using or not using the knife,
administering or not administering certain drugs, which constitutes medical
treatment or curing, but doing these things in a certain particular way.
Again the abstract principles of Justice have their province among those
who partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much or too
little of these. Now there are beings who cannot have too much of them, as
perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no particle of them is of
use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all things are hurtful; others
to whom they are useful to a certain degree: for this reason then the
province of Justice is among Men.
1137b] We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of the relations of
Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for when we look into the matter the two do not
appear identical nor yet different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the
man who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly transfer the term also
to other acts instead of the term good, thus showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better
it is: at other times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty, in that the
Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet praiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the
Just is not good or the Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if both are
good then they are identical.

This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these grounds
arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may be reconciled
and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is Just, being also
better than one form of Just, but is not better than the Just as though it were
different from it in kind: Just and Equitable then are identical, and, both
being good, the Equitable is the better of the two.
What causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not the Just
which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a correction of that
kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every law is necessarily
universal while there are some things which it is not possible to speak of
rightly in any universal or general statement. Where then there is a
necessity for general statement, while a general statement cannot apply
rightly to all cases, the law takes the generality of cases, being fully aware
of the error thus involved; and rightly too notwithstanding, because the fault
is not in the law, or in the framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of
the thing, because the matter of all action is necessarily such.

When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case of
exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the lawgiver omits the
case and by reason of his universality of statement is wrong, to set right the
omission by ruling it as the lawgiver himself would rule were he there
present, and would have provided by law had he foreseen the case would
arise. And so the Equitable is Just but better than one form of Just; I do not
mean the abstract Just but the error which arises out of the universality of
statement: and this is the nature of the Equitable, “a correction of Law,
where Law is defective by reason of its universality.”
This is the reason why not all things are according to law, because there
are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law, and so we
want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak generally, the rule
of the undefined must be itself undefined also, just as the rule to measure
Lesbian building is made of lead: for this rule shifts according to the form
of each stone and the special enactment according to the facts of the case in
question.
1138a] It is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that it is Just but better than one form of
Just: and hence it appears too who the Equitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to
choose and carry out these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on the
worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backed by the law: and this moral state
is Equity, being a species of Justice, not a different moral state from Justice.

XI
The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, “whether
it is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself,” is obvious from what
has been already stated. In the first place, one class of Justs is those which
are enforced by law in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense
of the term: for instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and
whatever it does not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary
to the law (unless by way of requital of hurt), voluntarily, i.e. knowing to
whom he does it and wherewith, he acts Unjustly. Now he that from rage
kills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason, which
the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards whom?
towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers with his
own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his own consent),
and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is a certain infamy

is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly towards the
Community.
Next, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a man
is Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for the two
things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as the coward
is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the full extent of the
term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this sense), because if it were so
then it would be possible for the same thing to have been taken away from
and added to the same person: but this is really not possible, the Just and the
Unjust always implying a plurality of persons.
Again, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose,
and aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered and is
merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but here the man
does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.
Again, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with with
one’s own consent.
And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act falling
under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own wife,
commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property. After all,
the general answer to the question is to allege what was settled respecting
being Unjustly dealt with with one’s own consent.
It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing Unjustly
by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the other having
more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of the healthy in the
healing art, and that of good condition in the art of training: but still the
dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of the two, because this involves
wickedness and is blameworthy; wickedness, I mean, either wholly, or
nearly so (for not all voluntary wrong implies injustice), but the being
Unjustly dealt by does not involve wickedness or injustice.
1138b] In itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is the least bad, but accidentally it may be the
greater evil of the two. However, scientific statement cannot take in such considerations; a
pleurisy, for instance, is called a greater physical evil than a bruise: and yet this last may be the
greater accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received in a fall may cause one to be captured
by the enemy and slain.

Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I do
not say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts of his
nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the relation of
master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. For all through this
treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewed as distinct from the
irrational.
Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be a possibility
of injustice towards one’s self, because herein it is possible for men to
suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really their own; and so it is
thought that there is Just of a certain kind between these parts mutually, as
between ruler and ruled.
Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which we
recognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.

BOOK VI
I having stated in a former part of this treatise that men should choose the
mean instead of either the excess or defect, and that the mean is according
to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed to explain this term.
For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in
all the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on which the
man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope; and there is a certain limit
of those mean states which we say are in accordance with Right Reason,
and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on the other.
Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning:
as, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on which
skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course to say that
men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little, but in moderation,
and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a man had he would not be
greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in answer to the question, what are
proper applications to the body, he were to be told, “Oh! of course,
whatever the science of medicine, and in such manner as the physician,
directs.”
And so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that this
should be true which has been already stated, but further that it should be
expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the definition of it.
1139a] Now in our division of the Excellences of the Soul, we said there were two classes, the
Moral and the Intellectual: the former we have already gone through; and we will now proceed
to speak of the others, premising a few words respecting the Soul itself. It was stated before, you
will remember, that the Soul consists of two parts, the Rational, and Irrational: we must now
make a similar division of the Rational.

Let it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul possessed of
Reason; one whereby we realise those existences whose causes cannot be
otherwise than they are, and one whereby we realise those which can be
otherwise than they are (for there must be, answering to things generically
different, generically different parts of the soul naturally adapted to each,

since these parts of the soul possess their knowledge in virtue of a certain
resemblance and appropriateness in themselves to the objects of which they
are percipients); and let us name the former, “that which is apt to know,” the
latter, “that which is apt to calculate” (because deliberating and calculating
are the same, and no one ever deliberates about things which cannot be
otherwise than they are: and so the Calculative will be one part of the
Rational faculty of the soul).
We must discover, then, which is the best state of each of these, because
that will be the Excellence of each; and this again is relative to the work
each has to do.

II
There are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and
truth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite Will.
Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action, as is seen
from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way partakers of moral
action.
[Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual operation
is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and Avoidance, And
so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to exercise Moral Choice and Moral
Choice is Will consequent on deliberation, the Reason must be true and the
Will right, to constitute good Moral Choice, and what the Reason affirms
the Will must pursue. Now this Intellectual operation and this Truth is what
bears upon Moral Action; of course truth and falsehood than the conclusion
such knowledge as he has will be merely accidental.

IV
140a] Let thus much be accepted as a definition of Knowledge. Matter which may exist
otherwise than it actually does in any given case (commonly called Contingent) is of two kinds,
that which is the object of Making, and that which is the object of Doing; now Making and
Doing are two different things (as we show in the exoteric treatise), and so that state of mind,
conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Do, is distinct from that also conjoined with Reason,
which is apt to Make: and for this reason they are not included one by the other, that is, Doing is
not Making, nor Making Doing. Now as Architecture is an Art, and is the same as “a certain
state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make,” and as there is no Art which is not

such a state, nor any such state which is not an Art, Art, in its strict and proper sense, must be
“a state of mind, conjoined with true Reason, apt to Make.”

Now all Art has to do with production, and contrivance, and seeing how
any of those things may be produced which may either be or not be, and the
origination of which rests with the maker and not with the thing made.
And, so neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor
things in the way of nature, come under the province of Art, because these
are self-originating. And since Making and Doing are distinct, Art must be
concerned with the former and not the latter. And in a certain sense Art and
Fortune are concerned with the same things, as, Agathon says by the way,
“Art Fortune loves, and is of her beloved.”

So Art, as has been stated, is “a certain state of mind, apt to Make,
conjoined with true Reason;” its absence, on the contrary, is the same state
conjoined with false Reason, and both are employed upon Contingent
matter.

V
As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to
what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.
1140b] It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be able to deliberate
well respecting what is good and expedient for himself, not in any definite line, as what is
conducive to health or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call men Wise
in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some good end in a case where there is no
definite rule. And so, in a general way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be
Practically Wise. Now no man deliberates respecting things which cannot be otherwise than they
are, nor such as lie not within the range of his own action: and so, since Knowledge requires
strict demonstrative reasoning, of which Contingent matter does not admit (I say Contingent
matter, because all matters of deliberation must be Contingent and deliberation cannot take
place with respect to things which are Necessarily), Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge nor
Art; nor the former, because what falls under the province of Doing must be Contingent; not the
latter, because Doing and Making are different in kind.

It remains then that it must be “a state of mind true, conjoined with
Reason, and apt to Do, having for its object those things which are good or
bad for Man:” because of Making something beyond itself is always the
object, but cannot be of Doing because the very well-doing is in itself an
End.

For this reason we think Pericles and men of that stamp to be Practically
Wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and for men in
general, and we also think those to be such who are skilled in domestic
management or civil government. In fact, this is the reason why we call the
habit of perfected self-mastery by the name which in Greek it bears,
etymologically signifying “that which preserves the Practical Wisdom:” for
what it does preserve is the Notion I have mentioned, i.e. of one’s own true
interest, For it is not every kind of Notion which the pleasant and the
painful corrupt and pervert, as, for instance, that “the three angles of every
rectilineal triangle are equal to two right angles,” but only those bearing on
moral action.
For the Principles of the matters of moral action are the final cause of
them: now to the man who has been corrupted by reason of pleasure or pain
the Principle immediately becomes obscured, nor does he see that it is his
duty to choose and act in each instance with a view to this final cause and
by reason of it: for viciousness has a tendency to destroy the moral
Principle: and so Practical Wisdom must be “a state conjoined with reason,
true, having human good for its object, and apt to do.”
Then again Art admits of degrees of excellence, but Practical Wisdom
does not: and in Art he who goes wrong purposely is preferable to him who
does so unwittingly, but not so in respect of Practical Wisdom or the other
Virtues. It plainly is then an Excellence of a certain kind, and not an Art.
Now as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be the
Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative or
deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are exercised
upon Contingent matter. And further, it is not simply a state conjoined with
Reason, as is proved by the fact that such a state may be forgotten and so
lost while Practical Wisdom cannot.

VI
Now Knowledge is a conception concerning universals and Necessary
matter, and there are of course certain First Principles in all trains of
demonstrative reasoning (that is of all Knowledge because this is connected
with reasoning): that faculty, then, which takes in the first principles of that

which comes under the range of Knowledge, cannot be either Knowledge,
or Art, or Practical Wisdom: not Knowledge, because what is the object of
Knowledge must be derived from demonstrative reasoning; not either of the
other two, because they are exercised upon Contingent matter only.
[Sidenote: 1141a] Nor can it be Science which takes in these, because the
Scientific Man must in some cases depend on demonstrative Reasoning.
It comes then to this: since the faculties whereby we always attain truth
and are never deceived when dealing with matter Necessary or even
Contingent are Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition, and
the faculty which takes in First Principles cannot be any of the three first;
the last, namely Intuition, must be it which performs this function.

VII
Science is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first place, in
the Arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the highest accuracy;
Phidias, for instance, we call a Scientific or cunning sculptor; Polycleitus a
Scientific or cunning statuary; meaning, in this instance, nothing else by
Science than an excellence of art: in the other sense, we think some to be
Scientific in a general way, not in any particular line or in any particular
thing, just as Homer says of a man in his Margites; “Him the Gods made
neither a digger of the ground, nor ploughman, nor in any other way
Scientific.”
So it is plain that Science must mean the most accurate of all Knowledge;
but if so, then the Scientific man must not merely know the deductions from
the First Principles but be in possession of truth respecting the First
Principles. So that Science must be equivalent to Intuition and Knowledge;
it is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most precious objects, with a head on.
I say of the most precious things, because it is absurd to suppose [Greek:
politikae], or Practical Wisdom, to be the highest, unless it can be shown
that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the Universe. Now if
“healthy” and “good” are relative terms, differing when applied to men or
to fish, but “white” and “straight” are the same always, men must allow that
the Scientific is the same always, but the Practically Wise varies: for
whatever provides all things well for itself, to this they would apply the

term Practically Wise, and commit these matters to it; which is the reason,
by the way, that they call some brutes Practically Wise, such that is as
plainly have a faculty of forethought respecting their own subsistence.
And it is quite plain that Science and [Greek: politikae] cannot be
identical: because if men give the name of Science to that faculty which is
employed upon what is expedient for themselves, there will be many
instead of one, because there is not one and the same faculty employed on
the good of all animals collectively, unless in the same sense as you may
say there is one art of healing with respect to all living beings.
1141b] If it is urged that man is superior to all other animals, that makes no difference: for
there are many other things more Godlike in their nature than Man, as, most obviously, the
elements of which the Universe is composed.

It is plain then that Science is the union of Knowledge and Intuition, and
has for its objects those things which are most precious in their nature.
Accordingly, Anexagoras, Thales, and men of that stamp, people call
Scientific, but not Practically Wise because they see them ignorant of what
concerns themselves; and they say that what they know is quite out of the
common run certainly, and wonderful, and hard, and very fine no doubt, but
still useless because they do not seek after what is good for them as men.
But Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are
objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most peculiarly
the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man deliberates
about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor about any save
those that have some definite End and this End good resulting from Moral
Action; and the man to whom we should give the name of Good in Counsel,
simply and without modification, is he who in the way of calculation has a
capacity for attaining that of practical goods which is the best for Man. Nor
again does Practical Wisdom consist in a knowledge of general principles
only, but it is necessary that one should know also the particular details,
because it is apt to act, and action is concerned with details: for which
reason sometimes men who have not much knowledge are more practical
than others who have; among others, they who derive all they know from
actual experience: suppose a man to know, for instance, that light meats are
easy of digestion and wholesome, but not what kinds of meat are light, he
will not produce a healthy state; that man will have a much better chance of

doing so, who knows that the flesh of birds is light and wholesome. Since
then Practical Wisdom is apt to act, one ought to have both kinds of
knowledge, or, if only one, the knowledge of details rather than of
Principles. So there will be in respect of Practical Wisdom the distinction of
supreme and subordinate.

VIII
Further: [Greek: politikhae] and Practical Wisdom are the same mental
state, but the point of view is not the same.
Of Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call
the Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is
concerned with the details, generally has the common name [Greek:
politikhae], and its functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular
enactment is a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of
Practical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men
alone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling the
same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a master).
Again, that is thought to be Practical Wisdom in the most proper sense
which has for its object the interest of the Individual: and this usually
appropriates the common name: the others are called respectively Domestic
Management, Legislation, Executive Government divided into two
branches, Deliberative and Judicial. Now of course, knowledge for one’s
self is one kind of knowledge, but it admits of many shades of difference:
and it is a common notion that the man [Sidenote:1142a] who knows and
busies himself about his own concerns merely is the man of Practical
Wisdom, while they who extend their solicitude to society at large are
considered meddlesome.
Euripides has thus embodied this sentiment; “How,” says one of his
Characters, “How foolish am I, who whereas I might have shared equally,
idly numbered among the multitude of the army ... for them that are busy
and meddlesome [Jove hates],” because the generality of mankind seek
their own good and hold that this is their proper business. It is then from
this opinion that the notion has arisen that such men are the PracticallyWise. And yet it is just possible that the good of the individual cannot be

secured independently of connection with a family or a community. And
again, how a man should manage his own affairs is sometimes not quite
plain, and must be made a matter of inquiry.
A corroboration of what I have said is the fact, that the young come to be
geometricians, and mathematicians, and Scientific in such matters, but it is
not thought that a young man can come to be possessed of Practical
Wisdom: now the reason is, that this Wisdom has for its object particular
facts, which come to be known from experience, which a young man has
not because it is produced only by length of time.
By the way, a person might also inquire why a boy may be made a
mathematician but not Scientific or a natural philosopher. Is not this the
reason? that mathematics are taken in by the process of abstraction, but the
principles of Science and natural philosophy must be gained by experiment;
and the latter young men talk of but do not realise, while the nature of the
former is plain and clear.
Again, in matter of practice, error attaches either to the general rule, in
the process of deliberation, or to the particular fact: for instance, this would
be a general rule, “All water of a certain gravity is bad;” the particular fact,
“this water is of that gravity.”
And that Practical Wisdom is not knowledge is plain, for it has to do with
the ultimate issue, as has been said, because every object of action is of this
nature.
To Intuition it is opposed, for this takes in those principles which cannot
be proved by reasoning, while Practical Wisdom is concerned with the
ultimate particular fact which cannot be realised by Knowledge but by
Sense; I do not mean one of the five senses, but the same by which we take
in the mathematical fact, that no rectilineal figure can be contained by less
than three lines, i.e. that a triangle is the ultimate figure, because here also
is a stopping point.
This however is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom, which is of another
kind.

IX

Now the acts of inquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating is a
kind of inquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel likewise what
it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy Conjecture, or
some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is not, because men do
not inquire about what they know, and Good Counsel is a kind of
deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is inquiring and calculating.
[Sidenote:1142b]
Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of reasoning,
and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and it is a common
saying that one should execute speedily what has been resolved upon in
deliberation, but deliberate slowly.
Quick perception of causes again is a different faculty from good
counsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel
Opinion of any kind.
Well then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who
deliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is rightness of
some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion: for Knowledge cannot be
called right because it cannot be wrong, and Rightness of Opinion is Truth:
and again, all which is the object of opinion is definitely marked out.
Still, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it
remain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply, because
this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to Opinion was that
it is not a process of inquiry but already a definite assertion; whereas
whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is engaged in inquiry and
calculation.
Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first
question must regard the nature and objects of deliberation. Now remember
Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean Rightness of any
kind whatever; the [Greek: akrataes], for instance, or the bad man, will
obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an object, and so he
may be said to have deliberated rightly in one sense, but will have attained a
great evil. Whereas to have deliberated well is thought to be a good,
because Good Counsel is Rightness of deliberation of such a nature as is apt
to attain good.

But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the right
effect though not through right means, your middle term being fallacious:
and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence of which you
get what you ought but not through proper means.
Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another
quickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but the
Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must have a
proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.
Once more. One may deliberate well either generally or towards some
particular End. Good counsel in the general then is that which goes right
towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration; in
particular, that which does so towards some particular End.
Since then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical
Wisdom, Good Counsel must be “Rightness in respect of what conduces to
a given End, of which Practical Wisdom is the true conception.” [Sidenote:
X 1143a] There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in
virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.
Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or
Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one specific
science, as medical science whose object matter is things wholesome; or
geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not for its object
things which always exist and are immutable, nor of those things which
come into being just any which may chance; but those in respect of which a
man might doubt and deliberate.
And so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two
faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity for
commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is “what one should do or
not do:” but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon suggestions (though
we do in Greek put “well” on to the faculty and its concrete noun, these
really mean exactly the same as the plain words), and Judiciousness is
neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining it: but just as learning is
termed [Greek: sunievai] when a man uses his knowledge, so judiciousness
consists in employing the Opinionative faculty in judging concerning those
things which come within the province of Practical Wisdom, when another

enunciates them; and not judging merely, but judging well (for [Greek: eu]
and [Greek: kalos] mean exactly the same thing). And the Greek name of
this faculty is derived from the use of the term [Greek: suvievai] in
learning: [Greek: mavthaveiv] and [Greek: suvievai] being often used as
synonymous.
XI] The faculty called [Greek: gvomh], in right of which we call men [Greek: euyvomoves], or
say they have [Greek: gvomh], is “the right judgment of the equitable man.” A proof of which is
that we most commonly say that the equitable man has a tendency to make allowance, and the
making allowance in certain cases is equitable. And [Greek: sungvomae] (the word denoting
allowance) is right [Greek: gvomh] having a capacity of making equitable decisions, By “right”
I mean that which attains the True. Now all these mental states tend to the same object, as
indeed common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of [Greek: gnomae],
Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing the possession of [Greek:
gnomae] and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals whom we denominate Practically-Wise
and Judicious: because all these faculties are employed upon the extremes, i.e. on particular
details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which come within the province
of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious and possessed of good [Greek: gnomae]; i.e. he is
disposed to make allowance, for considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike
in transactions with their fellows.

And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars,
otherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know
them, and Judiciousness and [Greek: gnomae] are concerned with matters
of Moral Actions, which are extremes.
143b] Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends: I mean, the first and last terms
must be taken in not by reasoning but by Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds],
and that which belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e. Necessary,
first terms; while that which is employed in practical matters takes in the extreme, the
Contingent, and the minor Premiss: for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause,
Universals being made up out of Particulars. To take in these, of course, we must have Sense,
i.e. in other words Practical Intuition. And for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of
nature; and whereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought to have
[Greek: gnomae], and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition: a proof of which is that we think
these faculties are a consequence even of particular ages, and this given age has Practical
Intuition and [Greek: gnomae], we say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause. And thus
Intuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based upon the one kind of
extremes and concern the other.

And so one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions of the
skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those which are
based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having gained their
power of moral vision from experience.

XII
Well, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and
Science respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of the
Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility. “Science,” he
would say, “concerns itself with none of the causes of human happiness (for
it has nothing to do with producing anything): Practical Wisdom has this
recommendation, I grant, but where is the need of it, since its province is
those things which are just and honourable, and good for man, and these are
the things which the good man as such does; but we are not a bit the more
apt to do them because we know them, since the Moral Virtues are Habits;
just as we are not more apt to be healthy or in good condition from mere
knowledge of what relates to these (I mean, of course, things so called not
from their producing health, etc., but from their evidencing it in a particular
subject), for we are not more apt to be healthy and in good condition merely
from knowing the art of medicine or training.
“If it be urged that knowing what is good does not by itself make a
Practically-Wise man but becoming good; still this Wisdom will be no use
either to those that are good, and so have it already, or to those who have it
not; because it will make no difference to them whether they have it
themselves or put themselves under the guidance of others who have; and
we might be contented to be in respect of this as in respect of health: for
though we wish to be healthy still we do not set about learning the art of
healing.
“Furthermore, it would seem to be strange that, though lower in the scale
than Science, it is to be its master; which it is, because whatever produces
results takes the rule and directs in each matter.”
This then is what we are to talk about, for these are the only points now
raised.
144a] Now first we say that being respectively Excellences of different parts of the Soul they
must be choiceworthy, even on the supposition that they neither of them produce results.

In the next place we say that they do produce results; that Science makes
Happiness, not as the medical art but as healthiness makes health: because,

being a part of Virtue in its most extensive sense, it makes a man happy by
being possessed and by working.
Next, Man’s work as Man is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom
and Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the former
the right means to its attainment; but of the fourth part of the Soul, the mere
nutritive principle, there is no such Excellence, because nothing is in its
power to do or leave undone.
As to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by reason of
possessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little higher up, taking this
for our starting-point. As we say that men may do things in themselves just
and yet not be just men; for instance, when men do what the laws require of
them, either against their will, or by reason of ignorance or something else,
at all events not for the sake of the things themselves; and yet they do what
they ought and all that the good man should do; so it seems that to be a
good man one must do each act in a particular frame of mind, I mean from
Moral Choice and for the sake of the things themselves which are done.
Now it is Virtue which makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is
naturally required to carry out that Choice comes under the province not of
Virtue but of a different faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak
more clearly on these points.
There is then a certain faculty, commonly named Cleverness, of such a
nature as to be able to do and attain whatever conduces to any given
purpose: now if that purpose be a good one the faculty is praiseworthy; if
otherwise, it goes by a name which, denoting strictly the ability, implies the
willingness to do anything; we accordingly call the Practically-Wise Clever,
and also those who can and will do anything.
Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it without
this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul (as we may
call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness, as we have said
before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms into which Moral
Action may be analysed have for their Major Premiss, “since —————is
the End and the Chief Good” (fill up the blank with just anything you
please, for we merely want to exhibit the Form, so that anything will do),
but how this blank should be filled is seen only by the good man: because

Vice distorts the moral vision and causes men to be deceived in respect of
practical principles.
It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise, without
being a good, man.

XIII
144b] We must inquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided into Natural Virtue and
Matured, which two bear to each other a relation similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears
to Cleverness, one not of identity but resemblance. I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold
that each of the moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature: we have dispositions
towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for instance, immediately from our birth: but still we
seek Goodness in its highest sense as something distinct from these, and that these dispositions
should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion. Children and brutes have these natural
states, but then they are plainly hurtful unless combined with an intellectual element: at least
thus much is matter of actual experience and observation, that as a strong body destitute of sight
must, if set in motion, fall violently because it has not sight, so it is also in the case we are
considering: but if it can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting. Just so the Natural
State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will then be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is
combined with the intellectual element.

So that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty, there are two forms,
Cleverness and Practical Wisdom; so also in the case of the Moral there are
two, Natural Virtue and Matured; and of these the latter cannot be formed
without Practical Wisdom.
This leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely intellectual
Practical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly right in his inquiry and partly
wrong: wrong in that he thought all the Virtues were merely intellectual
Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not independent of that faculty.
A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the “state”
[mentioning also to what standard it has reference, namely that] “which is
accordant with Right Reason:” now “right” means in accordance with
Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to have an instinctive notion that that
state which is in accordance with Practical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we
must make a slight change in their statement, because that state is Virtue,
not merely which is in accordance with but which implies the possession of
Right Reason; which, upon such matters, is Practical Wisdom. The
difference between us and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were

reasoning processes (i.e. that they were all instances of Knowledge in its
strict sense), but we say they imply the possession of Reason.
From what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be, strictly
speaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without
moral goodness.
And by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can meet
the reasoning by which it might be argued “that the Virtues are separable
because the same man is not by nature most inclined to all at once so that he
will have acquired this one before he has that other:” we would reply that
this is possible with respect to the Natural Virtues but not with respect to
those in right of which a man is denominated simply good: because they
will all belong to him together with the one faculty of Practical Wisdom.
[Sidenote:1145a]
It is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should have needed
it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the Soul; and that the moral
choice cannot be right independently of Practical Wisdom and Moral
Goodness; because this gives the right End, that causes the doing these
things which conduce to the End.
Then again, it is not Master of Science (i.e. of the superior part of the
Soul), just as neither is the healing art Master of health; for it does not make
use of it, but looks how it may come to be: so it commands for the sake of it
but does not command it.
The objection is, in fact, about as valid as if a man should say [Greek:
politikae] governs the gods because it gives orders about all things in the
communty.
APPENDIX
On [Greek: epistaemae], from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii.
(Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.)
All teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of
previous knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The

Mathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions in
this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or induction: for
both teach through what is previously known, the former assuming the
premisses as from wise men, the latter proving universals from the
evidentness of the particulars. In like manner too rhetoricians persuade,
either through examples (which amounts to induction), or through
enthymemes (which amounts to syllogism).
Well, we suppose that we know things (in the strict and proper sense of
the word) when we suppose ourselves to know the cause by reason of which
the thing is to be the cause of it; and that this cannot be otherwise. It is plain
that the idea intended to be conveyed by the term knowing is something of
this kind; because they who do not really know suppose themselves thus
related to the matter in hand and they who do know really are so that of
whatsoever there is properly speaking Knowledge this cannot be otherwise
than it is Whether or no there is another way of knowing we will say
afterwards, but we do say that we know through demonstration, by which I
mean a syllogism apt to produce Knowledge, i.e. in right of which through
having it, we know.
If Knowledge then is such as we have described it, the Knowledge
produced by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn from premisses true
and first, and incapable of syllogistic proof, and better known, and prior in
order of time, and causes of the conclusion, for so the principles will be
akin to the conclusion demonstrated.
(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses, but it will not
be demonstration because it will not produce knowledge).
True, they must be, because it is impossible to know that which is not.
First, that is indemonstrable, because, if demonstrable, he cannot be said
to know them who has no demonstration of them for knowing such things as
are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration of them.
Causes they must be, and better known, and prior in time, causes,
because we then know when we are acquainted with the cause, and prior, if
causes, and known beforehand, not merely comprehended in idea but
known to exist (The terms prior, and better known, bear two senses for

prior by nature and prior relatively to ourselves are not the same, nor better
known by nature, and better known to us I mean, by prior and better known
relatively to ourselves, such things as are nearer to sensation, but
abstractedly so such as are further Those are furthest which are most
universal those nearest which are particulars, and these are mutually
opposed) And by first, I mean principles akin to the conclusion, for
principle means the same as first And the principle or first step in
demonstration is a proposition incapable of syllogistic proof, i. e. one to
which there is none prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I call that a
[Greek: thxsis] which you cannot demonstrate, and which is unnecessary
with a view to learning something else. That which is necessary in order to
learn something else is an Axiom.
Further, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a syllogism
of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes it to be such is the
nature of the premisses, it is necessary not merely to know before, but to
know better than the conclusion, either all or at least some of, the
principles, because that which is the cause of a quality inhering in
something else always inheres itself more as the cause of our loving is itself
more lovable. So, since the principles are the cause of our knowing and
behoving we know and believe them more, because by reason of them we
know also the conclusion following.
Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through
demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better than
he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly than the
contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary fallacy may be
constructed: since he who knows, is to be simply and absolutely infallible.

BOOK VII
I
Next we must take a different point to start from, and observe that of
what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three forms;
Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two former it is plain
what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, the other Self-Control;
and as answering to Brutishness it will be most suitable to assign
Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, in Homer, Priam says of
Hector “that he was very excellent, nor was he like the offspring of mortal
man, but of a god.” and so, if, as is commonly said, men are raised to the
position of gods by reason of very high excellence in Virtue, the state
opposed to the Brutish will plainly be of this nature: because as brutes are
not virtuous or vicious so neither are gods; but the state of these is
something more precious than Virtue, of the former something different in
kind from Vice.
And as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (a term
the Lacedaemonians are accustomed to use when they admire a man
exceedingly; [Greek:seios anhæp] they call him), so the brutish man is rare;
the character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of it are
caused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice all ordinary
measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term. Well, we must in
a subsequent place make some mention of this disposition, and Vice has
been spoken of before: for the present we must speak of Imperfect SelfControl and its kindred faults of Softness and Luxury, on the one hand, and
of Self-Control and Endurance on the other; since we are to conceive of
them, not as being the same states exactly as Virtue and Vice respectively,
nor again as differing in kind. [Sidenote:1145b] And we should adopt the
same course as before, i.e. state the phenomena, and, after raising and
discussing difficulties which suggest themselves, then exhibit, if possible,
all the opinions afloat respecting these affections of the moral character; or,
if not all, the greater part and the most important: for we may consider we

have illustrated the matter sufficiently when the difficulties have been
solved, and such theories as are most approved are left as a residuum.
The chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,
I. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things good and
praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong to that of
things low and blameworthy.
II. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt to
abide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with him
who is apt to depart from his resolution.
III. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at the instigation
of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man of Self-Control,
knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influence of reason, to follow
their suggestions.
IV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities of SelfControl and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites these is a
man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.
V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has no SelfControl, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control, while others distinguish
between them.
VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a
man of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically
Wise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.
VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply but
with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of honour, and
gain.
These then are pretty well the common statements.

II
Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception
in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.

That he can so fail when knowing in the strict sense what is right some
say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought, that while
Knowledge is present in his mind something else should master him and
drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended generally against the
theory, maintaining there is no such state as that of Imperfect Self-Control,
for that no one acts contrary to what is best conceiving it to be best but by
reason of ignorance what is best.
With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at variance
with plain facts, and we must inquire with respect to the affection, if it be
caused by ignorance what is the nature of the ignorance: for that the man so
failing does not suppose his acts to be right before he is under the influence
of passion is quite plain.
There are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: that
nothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man acts in
contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree; and so
they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which the man in
question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.
146a] But then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that is it the opposing conception be not
strong but only mild (as in the case of real doubt), the not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts
would be excusable: but wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything which deserves blame.

Well then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition: for
that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, for we shall have
the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control, and
surely no single person would maintain that it is consistent with the
character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily what is very wrong; and
besides we have shown before that the very mark of a man of this character
is aptitude to act, as distinguished from mere knowledge of what is right;
because he is a man conversant with particular details, and possessed of all
the other virtues.
Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of the
man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the man of
Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad ones does
not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the man of SelfControl must have such: for suppose them good; then the moral state which
should hinder a man from following their suggestions must be bad, and so

Self-Control would not be in all cases good: suppose them on the other
hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be nothing grand; nor anything
great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.
Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without
exception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and if
Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without
exception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of
Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be
praised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because he
was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
Or again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for because
men wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever when they
succeed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a difficulty: for the
intellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to abide by the conclusion
because it does not please his judgment, but unable to advance because he
cannot disentangle the web of sophistical reasoning.
Or again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined with
Imperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for by
reason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way which
contradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good is bad and
ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is good and not
what is bad.
Again, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction
pursues and chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a
better man than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational conviction
but of Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to cure by reason of
the possibility of his receiving a contrary conviction. But to the man of
Imperfect Self-Control would apply the proverb, “when water chokes, what
should a man drink then?” for had he never been convinced at all in respect
of [Sidenote: 1146b] what he does, then by a conviction in a contrary
direction he might have stopped in his course; but now though he has had
convictions he notwithstanding acts against them.
Again, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect and
Perfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply?

because no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some men
are so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are so.
Well, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have described them,
and of these theories we must remove some and leave others as established;
because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act of establishing something
as true.

III
Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act
with a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge, in
what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of the man
of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I mean, whether
pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones; and as to Self-Control
and Endurance, whether these are designations of the same character or
different. And in like manner we must go into all questions which are
connected with the present.
But the real starting point of the inquiry is, whether the two characters of
Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguished by their objectmatter, or their respective relations to it. I mean, whether the man of
Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue of having such and such
object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being related to it in such and such
a way, or by virtue of both: next, whether Self-Control and Imperfect SelfControl are unlimited in their object-matter: because he who is designated
without any addition a man of Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his
object-matter, but has exactly the same as the man who has lost all SelfControl: nor is he so designated because of his relation to this object-matter
merely (for then his character would be identical with that just mentioned,
loss of all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being such and
such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with deliberate
moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure as it rises: while
the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think that he ought to pursue it,
but does pursue it all the same.
Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in
contravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference to

the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have no
doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge; if
then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than men
who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as having
but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not differ in this
respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own Opinions no
less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge: Heraclitus is a case in
point.
Rather the following is the account of it: the term knowing has two
senses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does,
are said to know: there will be a difference between a man’s acting wrongly,
who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into operation, and his
doing so who has it and actually exercises it: the latter is a strange case, but
the mere having, if not exercising, presents no anomaly.
147a] Again, as there are two kinds of propositions affecting action, universal and particular,
there is no reason why a man may not act against his Knowledge, having both propositions in
his mind, using the universal but not the particular, for the particulars are the objects of moral
action.

There is a difference also in universal propositions; a universal
proposition may relate partly to a man’s self and partly to the thing in
question: take the following for instance; “dry food is good for every man,”
this may have the two minor premisses, “this is a man,” and “so and so is
dry food;” but whether a given substance is so and so a man either has not
the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to these different senses
there will be an immense difference, so that for a man to know in the one
sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothing strange, but in any of the other
senses it would be a matter for wonder.
Again, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those
which have been now stated: for we constantly see a man’s state so
differing by having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense and
also has not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk: well,
men under the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar conditions;
for anger, lust, and some other such-like things, manifestly make changes
even in the body, and in some they even cause madness; it is plain then that

we must say the men of Imperfect Self-Control are in a state similar to
these.
And their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actually
then exercising it, because they who are under the operation of these
passions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles, just as children,
when first learning, string words together, but as yet know nothing of their
meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is a process requiring
time: so that we must suppose these men who fail in Self-Control to say
these moral sayings just as actors do. Furthermore, a man may look at the
account of the phænomenon in the following way, from an examination of
the actual working of the mind: All action may be analysed into a
syllogism, in which the one premiss is an universal maxim and the other
concerns particulars of which Sense [moral or physical, as the case may be]
is cognisant: now when one results from these two, it follows necessarily
that, as far as theory goes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in
practical propositions the man must act accordingly. For instance, let the
universal be, “All that is sweet should be tasted,” the particular, “This is
sweet;” it follows necessarily that he who is able and is not hindered should
not only draw, but put in practice, the conclusion “This is to be tasted.”
When then there is in the mind one universal proposition forbidding to
taste, and the other “All that is sweet is pleasant” with its minor “This is
sweet” (which is the one that really works), and desire happens to be in the
man, the first universal bids him avoid this but the desire leads him on to
taste; for it has the power of moving the various organs: and so it results
that he fails in Self-Control, [Sidenote:1147b] in a certain sense under the
influence of Reason and Opinion not contrary in itself to Reason but only
accidentally so; because it is the desire that is contrary to Right Reason, but
not the Opinion: and so for this reason brutes are not accounted of
Imperfect Self-Control, because they have no power of conceiving
universals but only of receiving and retaining particular impressions.
As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of
Imperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same as
with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this
affection, so physiologists are the right people to apply to. But whereas the
minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an opinion on matter
cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he who is under the

influence of passion either has not this, or so has it that his having does not
amount to knowing but merely saying, as a man when drunk might repeat
Empedocles’ verses; and because the minor term is neither universal, nor is
thought to have the power of producing Knowledge in like manner as the
universal term: and so the result which Socrates was seeking comes out,
that is to say, the affection does not take place in the presence of that which
is thought to be specially and properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged
about by reason of the affection, but in the presence of that Knowledge
which is conveyed by Sense.
Let this account then be accepted of the question respecting the failure in
Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge or not; and, if with knowledge,
with what kind of knowledge such failure is possible.

IV
The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be
designated by the term “of Imperfect Self-Control” simply, or whether all
who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular thing;
and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.
Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of SelfControl and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect Self-Control and
Softness, is plain.
Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objects of
choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily things which
produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which relate to food
and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily things as we assumed were
the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control and of Perfected Self-Mastery.
The other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice in
themselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and such-like
good or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their liking for
such things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which is in their own
breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect Self-Control simply, but with
the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of money, or gain, or honour,
or anger, and not simply; because we consider them as different characters

and only having that title in right of a kind of resemblance (as when we add
to a man’s name “conqueror in the Olympic games” the account of him as
Man differs but little from the account of him as the Man who conquered in
the Olympic games, but still it is different). And a proof of the real
[Sidenote: 1148a] difference between these so designated with an addition
and those simply so called is this, that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not
as an error merely but also as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but
none of these other cases is so blamed.
But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,
which we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected SelfMastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues
excessive pleasures and too much avoids things which are painful (as
hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with touch and
taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral choice and
intellectual conviction, is termed “a man of Imperfect Self-Control,” not
with the addition of any particular object-matter as we do in respect of want
of control of anger but simply.
And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term “Soft” is
used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any of those others.
And for this reason we put into the same rank the man of Imperfect SelfControl, the man who has lost it entirely, the man who has it, and the man
of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of those other characters, because
the former have for their object-matter the same pleasures and pains: but
though they have the same object-matter, they are not related to it in the
same way, but two of them act upon moral choice, two without it. And so
we should say that man is more entirely given up to his passions who
pursues excessive pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, being either not at
all, or at least but little, urged by desire, than the man who does so because
his desire is very strong: because we think what would the former be likely
to do if he had the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain
consequent on the want of those pleasures which we have denominated
necessary?
Well then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are in kind
honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as we said
before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such as are naturally

objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselves indifferent, money,
gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect of all such and those that are
indifferent, men are blamed not merely for being affected by or desiring or
liking them, but for exceeding in any way in these feelings.
And so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by,
that is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they, for
instance, who are more earnest than they should be respecting honour, or
their children or parents; not but what these are good objects and men are
praised for being earnest about them: but still they admit of excess; for
instance, if any one, as Niobe did, should fight even against the gods, or
feel towards his father as Satyrus, who got therefrom the nickname of
[Greek: philophator], [Sidenote: 1148b] because he was thought to be very
foolish.
Now depravity there is none in regard of these things, for the reason
assigned above, that each of them in itself is a thing naturally choiceworthy,
yet the excesses in respect of them are wrong and matter for blame: and
similarly there is no Imperfect Self-Control in respect of these things; that
being not merely a thing that should be avoided but blameworthy.
But because of the resemblance of the affection to the Imperfection of
Self-Control the term is used with the addition in each case of the particular
object-matter, just as men call a man a bad physician, or bad actor, whom
they would not think of calling simply bad. As then in these cases we do not
apply the term simply because each of the states is not a vice, but only like
a vice in the way of analogy, so it is plain that in respect of Imperfect SelfControl and Self-Control we must limit the names to those states which
have the same object-matter as Perfected Self-Mastery and utter loss of
Self-Control, and that we do apply it to the case of anger only in the way of
resemblance: for which reason, with an addition, we designate a man of
Imperfect Self-Control in respect of anger, as of honour or of gain.

V
As there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds;
those, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are so
relatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are others which

are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequence either of
maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one may observe
moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, having respectively
these classes of things for their object-matter.
I mean the Brutish, as in the case of the female who, they say, would rip
up women with child and eat the foetus; or the tastes which are found
among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus, some liking raw flesh,
and some being cannibals, and some lending one another their children to
make feasts of; or what is said of Phalaris. These are instances of Brutish
states, caused in some by disease or madness; take, for instance, the man
who sacrificed and ate his mother, or him who devoured the liver of his
fellow-servant. Instances again of those caused by disease or by custom,
would be, plucking out of hair, or eating one’s nails, or eating coals and
earth. ... Now wherever nature is really the cause no one would think of
calling men of Imperfect Self-Control, ... nor, in like manner, such as are in
a diseased state through custom.
149a] Obviously the having any of these inclinations is something foreign to what is
denominated Vice, just as Brutishness is: and when a man has them his mastering them is not
properly Self-Control, nor his being mastered by them Imperfection of Self-Control in the
proper sense, but only in the way of resemblance; just as we may say a man of ungovernable
wrath fails of Self-Control in respect of anger but not simply fails of Self-Control. For all
excessive folly, cowardice, absence of Self-Control, or irritability, are either Brutish or morbid.
The man, for instance, who is naturally afraid of all things, even if a mouse should stir, is
cowardly after a Brutish sort; there was a man again who, by reason of disease, was afraid of a
cat: and of the fools, they who are naturally destitute of Reason and live only by Sense are
Brutish, as are some tribes of the far-off barbarians, while others who are so by reason of
diseases, epileptic or frantic, are in morbid states.

So then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes merely have one
without yielding to it: I mean, suppose that Phalaris had restrained his
unnatural desire to eat a child: or he may both have and yield to it. As then
Vice when such as belongs to human nature is called Vice simply, while the
other is so called with the addition of “brutish” or “morbid,” but not simply
Vice, so manifestly there is Brutish and Morbid Imperfection of SelfControl, but that alone is entitled to the name without any qualification
which is of the nature of utter absence of Self-Control, as it is found in
Man.

VI

It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and SelfControl is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of Self-Control and
that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is the object-matter of a
different species so named metaphorically and not simply: we will now
examine the position, “that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Anger is
less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts.”
In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason but
mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard the whole
of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark at the slightest
stir, before they have seen whether it be friend or foe; just so Anger, by
reason of its natural heat and quickness, listening to Reason, but without
having heard the command of Reason, rushes to its revenge. That is to say,
Reason or some impression on the mind shows there is insolence or
contempt in the offender, and then Anger, reasoning as it were that one
ought to fight against what is such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if
Reason or Sense, as the case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to
the enjoyment of it: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust
does not and is therefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control
his anger yields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to
Reason at all. [Sidenote:1149b]
Again, a man is more excusable for following such desires as are natural,
just as he is for following such Lusts as are common to all and to that
degree in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability are more
natural than Lusts when in excess and for objects not necessary. (This was
the ground of the defence the man made who beat his father, “My father,”
he said, “used to beat his, and his father his again, and this little fellow
here,” pointing to his child, “will beat me when he is grown a man: it runs
in the family.” And the father, as he was being dragged along, bid his son
leave off beating him at the door, because he had himself been used to drag
his father so far and no farther.)
Again, characters are less unjust in proportion as they involve less
insidiousness. Now the Angry man is not insidious, nor is Anger, but quite
open: but Lust is: as they say of Venus,
“Cyprus-born Goddess, weaver of deceits”

Or Homer of the girdle called the Cestus,
“Persuasiveness cheating e’en the subtlest mind.”

And so since this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust, it is also
more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and is simply Imperfect SelfControl, and Vice in a certain sense. Again, no man feels pain in being
insolent, but every one who acts through Anger does act with pain; and he
who acts insolently does it with pleasure. If then those things are most
unjust with which we have most right to be angry, then Imperfect SelfControl, arising from Lust, is more so than that arising from Anger: because
in Anger there is no insolence.
Well then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Lusts is
more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that the object-matter of
Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodily Lusts and pleasures; but
of these last we must take into account the differences; for, as was said at
the commencement, some are proper to the human race and natural both in
kind and degree, others Brutish, and others caused by maimings and
diseases.
Now the first of these only are the object-matter of Perfected SelfMastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we never attribute
either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically, and whenever any
one kind of animal differs entirely from another in insolence,
mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moral choice or
process of deliberation, but are quite different from that kind of creature just
as are madmen from other men.
1150a] Brutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yet it is to be regarded with more fear:
because it is not that the highest principle has been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the
subject has it not at all.

It is much the same, therefore, as if one should compare an inanimate
with an animate being, which were the worse: for the badness of that which
has no principle of origination is always less harmful; now Intellect is a
principle of origination. A similar case would be the comparing injustice
and an unjust man together: for in different ways each is the worst: a bad
man would produce ten thousand times as much harm as a bad brute.

VII
Now with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man
through Touch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we
determined before to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter
absence of Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so
disposed as to yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or
to be superior to those to which most men would yield: in respect of
pleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of Imperfect SelfControl, and the man of Self-Control; and, in respect of pains, the man of
Softness and the man of Endurance: but the moral state of most men is
something between the two, even though they lean somewhat to the worse
characters.
Again, since of the pleasures indicated some are necessary and some are
not, others are so to a certain degree but not the excess or defect of them,
and similarly also of Lusts and pains, the man who pursues the excess of
pleasant things, or such as are in themselves excess, or from moral choice,
for their own sake, and not for anything else which is to result from them, is
a man utterly void of Self-Control: for he must be incapable of remorse, and
so incurable, because he that has not remorse is incurable. (He that has too
little love of pleasure is the opposite character, and the man of Perfected
Self-Mastery the mean character.) He is of a similar character who avoids
the bodily pains, not because he cannot, but because he chooses not to,
withstand them.
But of the characters who go wrong without choosing so to do, the one is
led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain it would
cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one from the other.
Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing something base
without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight one, than for doing the
same from the impulse of a very strong desire; for striking a man when not
angry than if he did so in wrath: because one naturally says, “What would
he have done had he been under the influence of passion?” (and on this
ground, by the bye, the man utterly void of Self-Control is worse than he
who has it imperfectly). However, of the two characters which have been
mentioned [as included in that of utter absence of Self-Control], the one is
rather Softness, the other properly the man of no Self-Control.

Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that of
Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because Endurance
consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual mastery, and
continued resistance and actual mastery are as different as not being
conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more choiceworthy
than Endurance.
150b] Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of
men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of
Softness): the kind of man, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting
it, and who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched though he is like a
wretched man. So it is too with respect to Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields
to pleasures or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder, but rather for
allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances are, Philoctetes in Theodectes’ drama
when wounded by the viper; or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to
suppress laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you remember, to
Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man yields to and cannot contend against
those pleasures or pains which the common herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure
not to be owing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings are
constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.

Again, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to be
destitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusement is an act
of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character in question is one of
those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.
Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy
and Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have made
resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others are led by
passion because they have never formed any resolutions at all: while there
are some who, like those who by tickling themselves beforehand get rid of
ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the approach of temptation,
and roused up themselves and their resolution, yield not to passion; whether
the temptation be somewhat pleasant or somewhat painful. The Precipitate
form of Imperfect Self-Control they are most liable to who are
constitutionally of a sharp or melancholy temperament: because the one by
reason of the swiftness, the other by reason of the violence, of their
passions, do not wait for Reason, because they are disposed to follow
whatever notion is impressed upon their minds.

VIII

Again, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observed before,
is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character that he abides by his
moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control is almost made up of
remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it before, but the former is
incurable and the latter may be cured: for depravity is like chronic diseases,
dropsy and consumption for instance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like
acute disorders: the former being a continuous evil, the latter not so. And, in
fact, Imperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the
latter being imperceptible to its victim, the former not so.
1151a] But, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control, those are better who are carried off
their feet by a sudden access of temptation than they who have Reason but do not abide by it;
these last being overcome by passion less in degree, and not wholly without premeditation as are
the others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like those who are soon intoxicated and by
little wine and less than the common run of men. Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is
not Confirmed Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in one sense it
is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of it: at all events, in respect of the actions,
the case is much like what Demodocus said of the Miletians. “The people of Miletus are not
fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;” and so they of Imperfect Self-Control are
not unjust, but they do unjust acts.

But to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such a
character as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance of Right
Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas the man
utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction which rests on
his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; the former may be
easily persuaded to a different course, but the latter not: for Virtue and Vice
respectively preserve and corrupt the moral principle; now the motive is the
principle or starting point in moral actions, just as axioms and postulates are
in mathematics: and neither in morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is
apt to teach the principle; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by
custom, in holding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does
this in morals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary
character is the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance of
Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to
prevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as to
make him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after such
pleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect Self- Control,
better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a bad man simply and

without qualification: because in him the highest and best part, i.e.
principle, is preserved: and there is another character opposed to him who is
apt to abide by his resolutions, and not to depart from them; at all events,
not at the instigation of passion. It is evident then from all this, that SelfControl is a good state and the Imperfection of it a bad one.
Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for
abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they may,
or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect Self-Control for not
abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of whatever kind; or,
to put the case we did before, is he such for not abiding by false conclusions
and wrong moral choice?
Is not this the truth, that incidentally it is by conclusions and moral
choice of any kind that the one character abides and the other does not, but
per se true conclusions and right moral choice: to explain what is meant by
incidentally, and per se; suppose a man chooses or pursues this thing for the
sake of that, he is said to pursue and choose that per se, but this only
incidentally. For the term per se we use commonly the word “simply,” and
so, in a way, it is opinion of any kind soever by which the two characters
respectively abide or not, but he is “simply” entitled to the designations
who abides or not by the true opinion.
There are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, own opinions,
who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard to be persuaded,
and whose convictions are not easily changed: now these people bear some
resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just as the prodigal to the
liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they are different in many points.
The man of Self-Control does not change by reason of passion and lust, yet
when occasion so requires he will be easy of persuasion: but the Positive
man changes not at the call of Reason, though many of this class take up
certain desires and are led by their pleasures. Among the class of Positive
are the Opinionated, the Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the
motives of pleasure and pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a
kind of victory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained
when their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they rather
resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of Self-Control.

Again, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason of
any Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in the
Philoctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of his
departure from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort: for to be
truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded by Ulysses to lie.
So it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who is utterly
destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control, only he who
acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.
Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought in
bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of his
Reason, the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the man of
Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to abide by them
because of somewhat too much, the former because of somewhat too little;
while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and never changes by reason
of anything else than such conclusions.
Now of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States must
be bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seen in
few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to be viewed as if
opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just as Perfected Self-Mastery is
thought to be opposed only to utter want of Self-Control.
1152a] Again, as many terms are used in the way of similitude, so people have come to talk of
the Self-Control of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery in the way of similitude: for the man of
Self-Control and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery have this in common, that they do nothing
against Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures, but then the former has bad desires,
the latter not; and the latter is so constituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to his Reason,
the former feels but does not yield to it. Like again are the man of Imperfect Self-Control and he
who is utterly destitute of it, though in reality distinct: both follow bodily pleasures, but the latter
under a notion that it is the proper line for him to take, his former without any such notion.

X
And it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of Practical
Wisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character of Practical
Wisdom includes, as we showed before, goodness of moral character. And
again, it is not knowledge merely, but aptitude for action, which constitutes
Practical Wisdom: and of this aptitude the man of Imperfect Self-Control is

destitute. But there is no reason why the Clever man should not be of
Imperfect Self-Control: and the reason why some men are occasionally
thought to be men of Practical Wisdom, and yet of Imperfect Self-Control,
is this, that Cleverness differs from Practical Wisdom in the way I stated in
a former book, and is very near it so far as the intellectual element is
concerned but differs in respect of the moral choice.
Nor is the man of Imperfect Self-Control like the man who both has and
calls into exercise his knowledge, but like the man who, having it, is
overpowered by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily (because he
knows, in a certain sense, what he does and the result of it), but he is not a
confirmed bad man, for his moral choice is good, so he is at all events only
half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act with deliberate intent: for
of the two chief forms of the character, the one is not apt to abide by his
deliberate resolutions, and the other, the man of constitutional strength of
passion, is not apt to deliberate at all.
So in fact the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like a community which
makes all proper enactments, and has admirable laws, only does not act
on them, verifying the scoff of Anaxandrides,
“That State did will it, which cares nought for laws;”
whereas the bad man is like one which acts upon its laws, but then
unfortunately they are bad ones. Imperfection of Self-Control and
Self-Control, after all, are above the average state of men; because he
of the latter character is more true to his Reason, and the former less
so, than is in the power of most men.

Again, of the two forms of Imperfect Self-Control that is more easily
cured which they have who are constitutionally of strong passions, than that
of those who form resolutions and break them; and they that are so through
habituation than they that are so naturally; since of course custom is easier
to change than nature, because the very resemblance of custom to nature is
what constitutes the difficulty of changing it; as Evenus says,
“Practice, I say, my friend, doth long endure,
And at the last is even very nature.”

We have now said then what Self-Control is, what Imperfection of SelfControl, what Endurance, and what Softness, and how these states are
mutually related.

XI

II52b

To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province of
the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the Master-End
which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely evil or good.
But we may say more: an inquiry into their nature is absolutely
necessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral Vice
are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the greater part
of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure (which by the way
accounts for the word they use, makarioz; chaireiu being the root of that
word).
Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as a
matter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical. Others that
some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad. There is yet a third
view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good cannot
possibly be Pleasure.
In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) it is
urged that:
I. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; but no
such process is akin to the end to be attained: e.g. no process of building to
the completed house.
2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.
3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining
Pleasure.
4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the more
keenly they are felt. An obvious instance will readily occur.
5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art: and yet every good is the result
of some Art.
6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.
In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That there are
some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful: because some

things that are pleasant produce disease.
In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That it is not
an End but a process towards creating an End.
This is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.

XII
But that the reasons alleged do not prove it either to be not-good or the
Chief Good is plain from the following considerations.
First. Good being either absolute or relative, of course the natures and
states embodying it will be so too; therefore also the movements and the
processes of creation. So, of those which are thought to be bad some will be
bad absolutely, but relatively not bad, perhaps even choiceworthy; some not
even choiceworthy relatively to any particular person, only at certain times
or for a short time but not in themselves choiceworthy.
Others again are not even Pleasures at all though they produce that
impression on the mind: all such I mean as imply pain and whose purpose is
cure; those of sick people, for instance.
Next, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those
[Greek: kinaeseis or geneseis] which tend to place us in our natural state are
pleasant incidentally because of that *[Sidenote: 1153a] tendency: but the
active working is really in the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part
of our state or nature: for there are Pleasures which have no connection with
pain or desire: the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance, in which
case there is no deficiency in the nature or state of him who performs the
acts.
A proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce the
sensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up or completed
as when it is already in its normal condition: in this latter case what give the
sensation are things pleasant per se, in the former even those things which
are contrary. I mean, you find people taking pleasure in sharp or bitter
things of which no one is naturally or in itself pleasant; of course not
therefore the Pleasures arising from them, because it is obvious that as is

the classification of pleasant things such must be that of the Pleasures
arising from them.
Next, it does not follow that there must be something else better than any
given pleasure because (as some say) the End must be better than the
process which creates it. For it is not true that all Pleasures are processes or
even attended by any process, but (some are) active workings or even Ends:
in fact they result not from our coming to be something but from our using
our powers. Again, it is not true that the End is, in every case, distinct from
the process: it is true only in the case of such processes as conduce to the
perfecting of the natural state.
For which reason it is wrong to say that Pleasure is “a sensible process of
production.” For “process etc.” should be substituted “active working of the
natural state,” for “sensible” “unimpeded.” The reason of its being thought
to be a “process etc.” is that it is good in the highest sense: people
confusing “active working” and “process,” whereas they really are distinct.
Next, as to the argument that there are bad Pleasures because some things
which are pleasant are also hurtful to health, it is the same as saying that
some healthful things are bad for “business.” In this sense, of course, both
may be said to be bad, but then this does not make them out to be bad
simpliciter: the exercise of the pure Intellect sometimes hurts a man’s
health: but what hinders Practical Wisdom or any state whatever is, not the
Pleasure peculiar to, but some Pleasure foreign to it: the Pleasures arising
from the exercise of the pure Intellect or from learning only promote each.
Next. “No Pleasure is the work of any Art.” What else would you expect?
No active working is the work of any Art, only the faculty of so working.
Still the perfumer’s Art or the cook’s are thought to belong to Pleasure.
Next. “The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.” “The man
of Practical Wisdom aims at escaping Pain rather than at attaining
Pleasure.”
“Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.”
One answer will do for all.

We have already said in what sense all Pleasures are good per se and in
what sense not all are good: it is the latter class that brutes and children
pursue, such as are accompanied by desire and pain, that is the bodily
Pleasures (which answer to this description) and the excesses of them: in
short, those in respect of which the man utterly destitute of Self-Control is
thus utterly destitute. And it is the absence of the pain arising from these
Pleasures that the man of Practical Wisdom aims at. It follows that these
Pleasures are what the man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids: for obviously
he has Pleasures peculiarly his own.
XIII 1153b] Then again, it is allowed that Pain is an evil and a thing to be avoided partly as bad
per se, partly as being a hindrance in some particular way. Now the contrary of that which is to
be avoided, quâ it is to be avoided, i.e. evil, is good. Pleasure then must be a good.

The attempted answer of Speusippus, “that Pleasure may be opposed and
yet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any magnitude is
contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact half,” will not hold: for he
cannot say that Pleasure is identical with evil of any kind. Again. Granting
that some Pleasures are low, there is no reason why some particular
Pleasure may not be very good, just as some particular Science may be
although there are some which are low.
Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working
unimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that of some
one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must be
choiceworthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good may be
Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) low per se.
And for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, and
interweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because
Happiness is perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and
therefore the happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and the
goods external and fortune that in these points he may not be fettered. As
for those who say that he who is being tortured on the wheel, or falls into
great misfortunes is happy provided only he be good, they talk nonsense,
whether they mean to do so or not. On the other hand, because fortune is
needed as an addition, some hold good fortune to be identical with
Happiness: which it is not, for even this in excess is a hindrance, and

perhaps then has no right to be called good fortune since it is good only in
so far as it contributes to Happiness.
The fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, is some
presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;
(“There must be something in what most folks say,”) only as one and the
same nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, so neither do all
pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do. Nay further, what
they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor what they would say they
pursue, but really one and the same: for in all there is some instinct above
themselves. But the bodily Pleasures have received the name exclusively,
because theirs is the most frequent form and that which is universally
partaken of; and so, because to many these alone are known they believe
them to be the only ones which exist.
II54a

It is plain too that, unless Pleasure and its active working be good, it will
not be true that the happy man’s life embodies Pleasure: for why will he
want it on the supposition that it is not good and that he can live even with
Pain? because, assuming that Pleasure is not good, then Pain is neither evil
nor good, and so why should he avoid it?
Besides, the life of the good man is not more pleasurable than any other
unless it be granted that his active workings are so too.

XIV
Some inquiry into the bodily Pleasures is also necessary for those who
say that some Pleasures, to be sure, are highly choiceworthy (the good ones
to wit), but not the bodily Pleasures; that is, those which are the objectmatter of the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
If so, we ask, why are the contrary Pains bad? they cannot be (on their
assumption) because the contrary of bad is good.
May we not say that the necessary bodily Pleasures are good in the sense
in which that which is not-bad is good? or that they are good only up to a
certain point? because such states or movements as cannot have too much

of the better cannot have too much of Pleasure, but those which can of the
former can also of the latter. Now the bodily Pleasures do admit of excess:
in fact the low bad man is such because he pursues the excess of them
instead of those which are necessary (meat, drink, and the objects of other
animal appetites do give pleasure to all, but not in right manner or degree to
all). But his relation to Pain is exactly the contrary: it is not excessive Pain,
but Pain at all, that he avoids [which makes him to be in this way too a bad
low man], because only in the case of him who pursues excessive Pleasure
is Pain contrary to excessive Pleasure.
It is not enough however merely to state the truth, we should also show
how the false view arises; because this strengthens conviction. I mean,
when we have given a probable reason why that impresses people as true
which really is not true, it gives them a stronger conviction of the truth. And
so we must now explain why the bodily Pleasures appear to people to be
more choiceworthy than any others.
The first obvious reason is, that bodily Pleasure drives out Pain; and
because Pain is felt in excess men pursue Pleasure in excess, i.e. generally
bodily Pleasure, under the notion of its being a remedy for that Pain. These
remedies, moreover, come to be violent ones; which is the very reason they
are pursued, since the impression they produce on the mind is owing to
their being looked at side by side with their contrary.
And, as has been said before, there are the two following reasons why
bodily Pleasure is thought to be not-good.
1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whether
congenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.
2. Others are in the nature of cures, cures that is of some deficiency; now
of course it is better to have [the healthy state] originally than that it should
accrue afterwards.
1154b] But some Pleasures result when natural states are being perfected: these therefore are
good as a matter of result.

Again, the very fact of their being violent causes them to be pursued by
such as can relish no others: such men in fact create violent thirsts for
themselves (if harmless ones then we find no fault, if harmful then it is bad

and low) because they have no other things to take pleasure in, and the
neutral state is distasteful to some people constitutionally; for toil of some
kind is inseparable from life, as physiologists testify, telling us that the acts
of seeing or hearing are painful, only that we are used to the pain and do not
find it out.
Similarly in youth the constant growth produces a state much like that of
vinous intoxication, and youth is pleasant. Again, men of the melancholic
temperament constantly need some remedial process (because the body,
from its temperament, is constantly being worried), and they are in a
chronic state of violent desire. But Pleasure drives out Pain; not only such
Pleasure as is directly contrary to Pain but even any Pleasure provided it be
strong: and this is how men come to be utterly destitute of Self-Mastery, i.e.
low and bad.
But those Pleasures which are unconnected with Pains do not admit of
excess: i.e. such as belong to objects which are naturally pleasant and not
merely as a matter of result: by the latter class I mean such as are remedial,
and the reason why these are thought to be pleasant is that the cure results
from the action in some way of that part of the constitution which remains
sound. By “pleasant naturally” I mean such as put into action a nature
which is pleasant.
The reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is that
our nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something different from
itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that one part of this
nature be doing something, this something is, to the other part, unnatural:
but, if there be an equilibrium of the two natures, then whatever is being
done is indifferent. It is obvious that if there be any whose nature is simple
and not complex, to such a being the same course of acting will always be
the most pleasurable.
For this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is always one,
i.e. simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, and Pleasure
resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.
The reason why the Poet’s dictum “change is of all things most pleasant”
is true, is “a baseness in our blood;” for as the bad man is easily changeable,

bad must be also the nature that craves change, i.e. it is neither simple nor
good.
We have now said our say about Self-Control and its opposite; and about
Pleasure and Pain. What each is, and how the one set is good the other bad.
We have yet to speak of Friendship.

BOOK VIII
I 1155a] Next would seem properly to follow a dissertation on Friendship: because, in the first
place, it is either itself a virtue or connected with virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary for
life, since no one would choose to live without friends though he should have all the other good
things in the world: and, in fact, men who are rich or possessed of authority and influence are
thought to have special need of friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there be taken
away the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usual and most commendable
objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without friends? because the greater it is so much
the more slippery and hazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men think
friends to be their only refuge.

Furthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, in
respect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness makes
them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of noble deeds
(“They two together going,” Homer says, you may remember), because they
are thus more able to devise plans and carry them out.
Again, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, in the
parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent (not
merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and most animals), and
in those of the same tribe towards one another, and specially in men of the
same nation; for which reason we commend those men who love their
fellows: and one may see in the course of travel how close of kin and how
friendly man is to man.
Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities,
and legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I
mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly
aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.
Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required; but, on the
other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition, and that
principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of
Friendship.
Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since we
praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friends is

thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that “good
man” and “friend” are terms synonymous.
Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down that
it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another are
friends: whence come the common sayings, “Like will to like,” “Birds of a
feather,” and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all such come under
the maxim, “Two of a trade never agree.”
1155b] Again, some men push their inquiries on these points higher and reason physically: as
Euripides, who says,
“The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain,
And the great heaven, overcharged with rain,
Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth.”

Heraclitus, again, maintains, that “contrariety is expedient, and that the
best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things come into
being in the way of the principle of antagonism.”
Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that
“like aims at like.”
These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they are
foreign to the present inquiry; and we will examine such as are proper to
man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for instance, “Does
Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is it impossible for bad
men to be friends?” and, “Is there but one species of Friendship, or
several?” for they who ground the opinion that there is but one on the fact
that Friendship admits of degrees hold that upon insufficient proof; because
things which are different in species admit likewise of degrees (on this point
we have spoken before).

II
Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained
what is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought that not
everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is the object of
this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable, or useful. Now it
would seem that that is useful through which accrues any good or pleasure,

and so the objects of Friendship, as absolute Ends, are the good and the
pleasurable.
A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is
good to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being
sometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It seems
then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to himself, and
that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object of Friendship, and to
each individual that which is good to each. It comes then to this; that each
individual feels Friendship not for what is but for that which conveys to his
mind the impression of being good to himself. But this will make no real
difference, because that which is truly the object of Friendship will also
convey this impression to the mind.
There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the term
is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate because there is
no requital of the affection nor desire for the good of those objects: it
certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a man fond of wine wishes
well to it: the only sense in which it is true being that he wishes it to be kept
safe and sound for his own use and benefit. But to the friend they say one
should wish all good for his sake. And when men do thus wish good to
another (he not *[Sidenote: 1156a] reciprocating the feeling), people call
them Kindly; because Friendship they describe as being “Kindliness
between persons who reciprocate it.” But must they not add that the feeling
must be mutually known? for many men are kindly disposed towards those
whom they have never seen but whom they conceive to be amiable or
useful: and this notion amounts to the same thing as a real feeling between
them.
Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how
can one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to one
another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite that they
have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another good from
one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelings should be
mutually known.

III

As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective feelings
and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in number equal
to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may be “mutual affection
mutually known.”
Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another’s good
according to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose motive
is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only in so far as
some good arises to them from one another.
And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have
Friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given
character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they whose
motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is good to
themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is pleasurable to
themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend beloved is but in so far
as he is useful or pleasurable. These Friendships then are a matter of result:
since the object is not beloved in that he is the man he is but in that he
furnishes advantage or pleasure as the case may be. Such Friendships are of
course very liable to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean,
that the others cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no
longer pleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to be
permanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive which
made them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since it
existed only relatively to those circumstances.
Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old
(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but what is
profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the young, as are
given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have no intimate
intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not even pleasurable
to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such intercourse unless their
friends are profitable to them, because they are pleasurable only in so far as
they have hopes of advantage. With these Friendships is commonly ranked
that of hospitality.
But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of
pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and generally

pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of the present
moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures.
This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly: since
the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasure
changes quickly.
1156b] The young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great measure, a
matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause they conceive Friendships and
quickly drop them, changing often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate
intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.

That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are
good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish
one another’s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good
they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good to
their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their
own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship between
these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and goodness, we
know, has in it a principle of permanence.
Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his
friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful to
one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all good
men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another, inasmuch as to
each individual those actions are pleasurable which correspond to his
nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men are good these will be
always the same, or at least similar.
Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should
reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite qualifications
of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is based upon good or
pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the person entertaining the
sentiment of Friendship), and results from a similarity of some sort; and to
this kind belong all the aforementioned requisites in the parties themselves,
because in this the parties are similar, and so on: moreover, in it there is the
abstractedly good and the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially
the object-matter of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship is
found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.

Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of this
kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being presupposed, there
is further required time and intimacy: for, as the proverb says, men cannot
know one another “till they have eaten the requisite quantity of salt
together;” nor can they in fact admit one another to intimacy, much less be
friends, till each has appeared to the other and been proved to be a fit object
of Friendship. They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly
actions may be said to wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are
also proper objects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to
say, a desire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.

IV
Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all other
points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each party from
the other; which ought to be the case between friends.
II57a] The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of this, since the good are
sources of pleasure to one another: and that based on utility likewise, the good being also useful
to one another. Between men thus connected Friendships are most permanent when the same
result accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the
same source, as in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and
the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes, but the former
from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the
bloom of youth fades the Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no
pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive the attentions which were
paid before: in many cases, however, people so connected continue friends, if being of similar
tempers they have come from custom to like one another’s disposition.

Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,
the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent: in
fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when the
advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one another but
of the advantage.
So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may
be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral
character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for the sake
of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because bad men have
no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some advantage arises.

And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny; it
not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom they
have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual confidence,
and the feeling that one’s friend would never have done one wrong, and all
other such things as are expected in Friendship really worthy the name; but
in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all such suspicions.
I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of
friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is
justified by political language, for alliances between states are thought to be
contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who are attached to one
another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), we may perhaps also be
allowed to call such persons friends, and say there are several species of
Friendship; primarily and specially that of the good, in that they are good,
and the rest only in the way of resemblance: I mean, people connected
otherwise are friends in that way in which there arises to them somewhat
good and some mutual resemblance (because, we must remember the
pleasurable is good to those who are fond of it).
These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is
to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage and
by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not often
combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds, bad
1157b] men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being their point of resemblance;
while the good are friends for one another’s sake, that is, in so far as they are good.

These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as a
matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these last.

V
Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed
good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts of
working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who live together
take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who are asleep
or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in such a state as
to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance has in itself no direct
effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the acting it out: yet, if the

absence be protracted, it is thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the
Friendship: and hence it has been said, “many and many a Friendship doth
want of intercourse destroy.”
Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for
Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can
spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even not
pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is one of
the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get on with one
another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, are rather like people
having kindly feelings towards one another than friends; nothing being so
characteristic of friends as the living with one another, because the
necessitous desire assistance, and the happy companionship, they being the
last persons in the world for solitary existence: but people cannot spend
their time together unless they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in
the same objects, a quality which is thought to appertain to the Friendship
of companionship.
The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship par
excellence, as has already been frequently said: since that which is
abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship and
choiceworthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and the good
man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now the entertaining the
sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itself like a state: because the
former may have for its object even things inanimate, but requital of
Friendship is attended with moral choice which proceeds from a moral
state: and again, men wish good to the objects of their Friendship for their
sakes, not in the way of a mere feeling but of moral state.).
And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him with
whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good, and
repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the pleasurable: for
equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well, these points belong most to
the Friendship between good men.
But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,
because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in

intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly and
productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly, old
men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless they
take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose. Yet men
of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another: they wish
good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect of their needs,
but they are not quite friends, because they neither spend their time together
nor take pleasure in one another, which circumstances are thought specially
to belong to Friendship.
To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is not
possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is, so to speak,
a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and besides, it is not an
easy thing for one man to be very much pleased with many people at the
same time, nor perhaps to find many really good. Again, a man needs
experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy, which is very difficult.
But it is possible to please many on the score of advantage and pleasure:
because there are many men of the kind, and the services may be rendered
in a very short time.
Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from both
and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such as are the
Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most found in these.
The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting link of shopkeepers.
Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,
but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed, but
continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good itself, if
it were painful to him individually: and so they look out for pleasant
friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also; and good
moreover to themselves individually, because then they will have all the
proper requisites of Friendship.
Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends: for
some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not often
united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine pleasantness

and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable purposes: but with
a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for men of easy-pleasantry;
and again, for men who are clever at executing any business put into their
hands: and these qualifications are not commonly found united in the same
man.
It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend to a
superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this be not the
case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things equal by a
proportionate degree of Friendship. And characters who unite superiority of
station and goodness are not common. Now all the kinds of Friendship
which have been already mentioned exist in a state of equality, inasmuch as
either the same results accrue to both and they wish the same things to one
another, or else they barter one thing against another; pleasure, for instance,
against profit: it has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are
less intense in degree and less permanent.
And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show like
Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue (the
one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, both of which
belong also to the other); and again, they do not show like Friendships by
reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which unlikeness consists
herein, that while that is above calumny and so permanent these quickly
change and differ in many other points.

VII
But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and younger,
husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from another: I
mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the same as
between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towards the son as
the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wife as she towards
him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, of each of these is
different, and different therefore are the causes of their feeling Friendship;
distinct and different therefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.

And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents what
they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons what they
ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such parties will be
permanent and equitable.
Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a stronger
feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling of Friendship
comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certain sense is produced,
which is thought to be a requisite in Friendship.
(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
1159a] And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence of a great
difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are
not any longer friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest illustration is
perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most superior in all good things. It is obvious too,
in the case of kings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be friends to
them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to those of very high excellence or wisdom.
Of course, in such cases it is out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the Friendship last
nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far separated (as a god from men), it cannot
continue any longer.

This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to their
friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods: because, in case
the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them for friends,
nor in fact would they have the good things they had, because friends are
good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friend wishes to his friend
good things for that friend’s sake, it must be understood that he is to remain
such as he now is: that is to say, he will wish the greatest good to him of
which as man he is capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires
good for himself most of all.

VIII

It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather to
be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it themselves
(and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flatterer being a friend
inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather to entertain towards
another the feeling of Friendship than to be himself the object of it), since
the former is thought to be nearly the same as being honoured, which the
mass of men desire. And yet men seem to choose honour, not for its own
sake, but incidentally: I mean, the common run of men delight to be
honoured by those in power because of the hope it raises; that is they think
they shall get from them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they
delight in honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at
honour at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with
their merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they
take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on the
sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of Friendship men
delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being
honoured and Friendship to be in itself choiceworthy. Friendship, moreover,
is thought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, the sentiment
of Friendship, which is proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling:
some there are who give their children to be adopted and brought up by
others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to
have it returned, if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with
seeing them well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them,
even though they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial
regard or love.
Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being the
object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of their friends,
it seems that entertaining—*[Sidenote: II59b]the sentiment is the
Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due proportion
these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent. And in this way
may they who are unequal best be friends, because they may thus be made
equal.
Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially the
similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in themselves, are
also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading services nor render

them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is the part of the good
neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their friends in so doing.
The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they do
not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for a short
time from taking delight in one another’s wickedness. Those connected by
motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat longer: so long, that
is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit mutually.
The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a friend
of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is to say, a man
desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want, gives something else in
exchange for it. To this same class we may refer the lover and beloved, the
beautiful and the ill-favoured. For this reason lovers sometimes show in a
ridiculous light by claiming to be the objects of as intense a feeling as they
themselves entertain: of course if they are equally fit objects of Friendship
they are perhaps entitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it
is ridiculous.
Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its own
sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it being good
for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain the mean, and so of
the hot, etc. However, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact
somewhat foreign to our purpose.

IX
It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same persons:
I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some principle of
Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends, for instance,
those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in like manner also
those who are brought into Communion with them in other ways: and the
Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with the Communion,
This justifies the common proverb, “the goods of friends are common,”
since Friendship rests upon Communion.

[1160a] Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but
other people have their property separate, and some have more in common
and others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too do
the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same between
parents and children as between brothers, nor between companions as
between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the other conceivable
Friendships. Different also are the principles of Injustice as regards these
different grades, and the acts become intensified by being done to friends;
for instance, it is worse to rob your companion than one who is merely a
fellow-citizen; to refuse help to a brother than to a stranger; and to strike
your father than any one else. So then the Justice naturally increases with
the degree of Friendship, as being between the same parties and of equal
extent.
All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,
since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to procure
some of those things which are needful for life; and the great Social
Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to continue
for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which legislators
aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient. All the other
cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points; the crew of a
vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which is undertaken with a
view to making money, or some such object; comrades in war at that which
is to result from the war, grasping either at wealth or victory, or it may be a
political position; and those of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.
Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure’s sake, those, for
instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to Sacrifice
or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the great Social
one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the expediency of the
moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to which the members of
it institute sacrifices and their attendant assemblies, to render honour to the
gods and procure for themselves respite from toil combined with pleasure.
For it appears that sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were
made as a kind of first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at
such seasons they had most leisure.

So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
Communions.

X
Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number are
the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.
The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I give to
it the name of a political constitution because people commonly do so). Of
these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.
II6ob] From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but widely differing
from each other; for the Despot looks to his own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects:
for he is in fact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all good
things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then have to look to his own
advantage but to that of his subjects, for he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected
by lot for the nonce.

But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is most
evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The Transition to
Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a corrupt form of
Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a Despot.
From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of the
Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right proportion; and
giving either all that is good, or the greatest share, to themselves; and the
offices to the same persons always, making wealth their idol; thus a few
bear rule and they bad men in the place of the best.
From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude, and all in
the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least vicious of all,
since herein the form of the constitution undergoes least change.
Well, these are generally the changes to which the various Constitutions
are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to make.

Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his Sons
presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the Father’s care:
and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is intended to be a
paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the Father’s rule is Despotic,
for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The relation of Master to Slaves is of the
nature of Despotism because the point regarded herein is the Master’s
interest): this now strikes me to be as it ought, but the Persian custom to be
mistaken; because for different persons there should be different rules.
[Sidenote: 1161a] Between Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of
Aristocracy, because he rules by right and in such points only as the
Husband should, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the
Husband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an Oligarchy;
because he does it contrary to right and not as being the better of the two. In
some instances the Wives take the reins of government, being heiresses:
here the rule is carried on not in right of goodness but by reason of wealth
and power, as it is in Oligarchies.
Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if they are
very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a fraternal one:
while Democracy is represented specially by families which have no head
(all being there equal), or in which the proper head is weak and so every
member does that which is right in his own eyes.

XI
Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that between a
King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority of benefit,
inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that he is a good king
and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock; whence Homer
(to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd of the people.” And of
this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only that it exceeds the former in
the greatness of the benefits done; because the father is the author of being
(which is esteemed the greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education
(these things are also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by

the law of nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors
over their descendants, and the king over his subjects.
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but according to
proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and the
better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too also is
the principle of Justice between them.
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers are
equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like feelings
and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of a Timocracy,
because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable: rule, therefore,
passes from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal terms: so too is the
Friendship accordingly.
1161b] In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle of Justice is but
small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is
little or no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common
there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as between an artisan and his
tool, or between soul and body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use
them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even towards a
horse or an ox, or a slave quâ slave, because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an
animate tool, a tool an inanimate slave. Quâ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him,
only quâ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of Justice between every man, and
every other who can share in law and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of
Friendship, in so far as he is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice
are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most considerable because they who
are equal have much in common.

XII
Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest the
Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men of
the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly, it would
seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in right of

some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank also the
Friendship of Hospitality,
The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their children
as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as being
themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their offspring
more than these know that they are from the parents, and the source is more
closely bound to that which is produced than that which is produced is to
that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived from one’s self is
proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for instance, a tooth or a hair,
or any other thing whatever to him that has it): but the source to it is in no
degree proper, or in an inferior degree at least.
Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring them only
after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or instinct. These
considerations serve also to show why mothers have greater strength of
affection than fathers.
Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of separation), but
children their parents as being sprung from them. And brothers love one
another from being sprung from the same; that is, their sameness with the
common stock creates a sameness with one another; whence come the
phrases, “same blood,” “root,” and so on. In fact they are the same, in a
sense, even in the separate distinct individuals.
Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are a
great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for
the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
Companions.
162a] And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from these, that is to say,
from their community of origin: and the strength of this bond varies according to their
respective distances from the common ancestor.

Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because

these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are the
causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
educated after they were brought into being.
And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more in the
good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as they are more
closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of affection for one
another to begin with, and as they are more like in disposition who spring
from the same stock and have grown up together and been educated alike:
and besides this they have the greatest opportunities in respect of time for
proving one another, and can therefore depend most securely upon the trial.
The elements of Friendship between other consanguinities will be of course
proportionably similar.
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in
Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and more
absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of procreation
but also with a view to life in general: because in this connection the works
are immediately divided, and some belong to the man, others to the woman:
thus they help one the other, putting what is peculiar to each into the
common stock.
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the profitable
and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if they are good
people; because each has goodness and they may take delight in this quality
in each other. Children too are thought to be a tie: accordingly the childless
sooner separate, for the children are a good common to both and anything
in common is a bond of union.
The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) one
friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is just that they
should: because plainly there is not the same principle of Justice between a

friend and friend, as between strangers, or companions, or mere chance
fellow-travellers.

XIII
162b] There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three kinds of
Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of equality and friends in the relation
of superior and inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends,
and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of advantage people are
friends, either balancing exactly their mutual profitableness or differing from one another
herein. Well then, those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the
degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a footing of inequality by
rendering Friendship in proportion to the superiority of the other party.

Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by reason
of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because this is a
natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are vying with
each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor contention: since
no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the sentiment of Friendship
and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined mind he requites him with
kind actions. And suppose that one of the two exceeds the other, yet as he is
attaining his object he will not find fault with his friend, for good is the
object of each party.
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together then
both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a ridiculous light
who should find fault with another for not pleasing him, since it is in his
power to forbear intercourse with him. But the Friendship because of
advantage is very liable to fault-finding; because, as the parties use one
another with a view to advantage, the requirements are continually
enlarging, and they think they have less than of right belongs to them, and
find fault because though justly entitled they do not get as much as they
want: while they who do the kindnesses, can never come up to the
requirements of those to whom they are being done.
It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal,
so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be called the
Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of complaints is that

parties contract obligations and discharge them not in the same line of
Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions, either purely
tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more gentlemanly as regards
time but still by agreement a quid pro quo.
In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the
friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this reason
in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of
such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit
must be content to abide the issue.
That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he expects to
receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not given but lent: he
also will find fault, because he does not get the obligation discharged in the
same way as it was contracted.
163a] Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at least, wish what is
honourable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly
is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if able, make a
return proportionate to the good received, and do so willingly, because one ought not to make a
disinterested friend of a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought not to have received it,
he being not a friend nor doing the act disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one’s self
of the obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able a man would
engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even the doer of it would not expect it of
him: so that if he is able he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same understanding one
may accept it or not.

A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by which
to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
that they have received from their benefactors such things as were small for
them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others: while
the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best they had, and what
could not have been got from others, and under danger, or in such-like
straits.

May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it is
who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on the
understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance rendered is then
exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver has obtained, and
he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, or even more, this
being more creditable.
In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper standard,
since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.

XIV
Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are unequal
because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share, and of
course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.
The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater share
pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the good man:
and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than that other to
him: “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share equally, for it
comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits of the Friendship are
reaped in proportion to the works done:” their notion being, that as in a
money partnership they who contribute more receive more so should it be
in Friendship likewise.
On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
opposite claim: they urge that “it is the very business of a good friend to
help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good or
powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?”
1163b] Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more out of the
connection than the other, only not more of the same thing: but the superior man should receive
more respect, the needy man more profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence,
profit being the aid of need.

This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he
receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and

honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make money
out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one will put up
with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss as regards money
they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by gifts: since, as
has been stated before, the observing due proportion equalises and
preserves Friendship.
Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who are
unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to his
power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly
due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours paid to the gods
and to parents: no man could ever make the due return in these cases, and
so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect according to his ability.
For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to
disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes is
bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully requite
the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is always a debtor.
But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their debtors: therefore the
father may his son. But at the same time it must perhaps be admitted, that it
seems no father ever would sever himself utterly from a son, except in a
case of exceeding depravity: because, independently of the natural
Friendship, it is like human nature not to put away from one’s self the
assistance which a son might render. But to the son, if depraved, assisting
his father is a thing to be avoided, or at least one which he will not be very
anxious to do; most men being willing enough to receive kindness, but
averse to doing it as unprofitable.
Let thus much suffice on these points.

BOOK IX
I
1164a] Well, in all the Friendships the parties to which are dissimilar it is the proportionate
which equalises and preserves the Friendship, as has been already stated: I mean, in the Social
Friendship the cobbler, for instance, gets an equivalent for his shoes after a certain rate; and the
weaver, and all others in like manner. Now in this case a common measure has been provided in
money, and to this accordingly all things are referred and by this are measured: but in the
Friendship of Love the complaint is sometimes from the lover that, though he loves exceedingly,
his love is not requited; he having perhaps all the time nothing that can be the object of
Friendship: again, oftentimes from the object of love that he who as a suitor promised any and
every thing now performs nothing. These cases occur because the Friendship of the lover for the
beloved object is based upon pleasure, that of the other for him upon utility, and in one of the
parties the requisite quality is not found: for, as these are respectively the grounds of the
Friendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up because the motives to it cease to exist: the
parties loved not one another but qualities in one another which are not permanent, and so
neither are the Friendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character of the
parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as we have already stated.

Quarrels arise also when the parties realise different results and not those
which they desire; for the not attaining one’s special object is all one, in this
case, with getting nothing at all: as in the well-known case where a man
made promises to a musician, rising in proportion to the excellence of his
music; but when, the next morning, the musician claimed the performance
of his promises, he said that he had given him pleasure for pleasure: of
course, if each party had intended this, it would have been all right: but if
the one desires amusement and the other gain, and the one gets his object
but the other not, the dealing cannot be fair: because a man fixes his mind
upon what he happens to want, and will give so and so for that specific
thing.
The question then arises, who is to fix the rate? the man who first gives,
or the man who first takes? because, prima facie, the man who first gives
seems to leave the rate to be fixed by the other party. This, they say, was in
fact the practice of Protagoras: when he taught a man anything he would bid
the learner estimate the worth of the knowledge gained by his own private
opinion; and then he used to take so much from him. In such cases some
people adopt the rule,

“With specified reward a friend should be content.”

They are certainly fairly found fault with who take the money in advance
and then do nothing of what they said they would do, their promises having
been so far beyond their ability; for such men do not perform what they
agreed, The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged to take this course,
because no one would give a sixpence for their knowledge. These then, I
say, are fairly found fault with, because they do not what they have already
taken money for doing.
1164b] In cases where no stipulation as to the respective services is made they who
disinterestedly do the first service will not raise the question (as we have said before), because it
is the nature of Friendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention of the
other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and of goodness.

And it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who are
connected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; for here
the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in fact, an
exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it is sufficient to
do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one’s parents.
But where the original giving is not upon these terms but avowedly for
some return, the most proper course is perhaps for the requital to be such as
both shall allow to be proportionate, and, where this cannot be, then for the
receiver to fix the value would seem to be not only necessary but also fair:
because when the first giver gets that which is equivalent to the advantage
received by the other, or to what he would have given to secure the pleasure
he has had, then he has the value from him: for not only is this seen to be
the course adopted in matters of buying and selling but also in some places
the law does not allow of actions upon voluntary dealings; on the principle
that when one man has trusted another he must be content to have the
obligation discharged in the same spirit as he originally contracted it: that is
to say, it is thought fairer for the trusted, than for the trusting, party, to fix
the value. For, in general, those who have and those who wish to get things
do not set the same value on them: what is their own, and what they give in
each case, appears to them worth a great deal: but yet the return is made
according to the estimate of those who have received first, it should perhaps
be added that the receiver should estimate what he has received, not by the
value he sets upon it now that he has it, but by that which he set upon it
before he obtained it.

II
Questions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one’s
father has an unlimited claim on one’s services and obedience, or whether
the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election of a general, the
warlike qualities of the candidates should be alone regarded?
In like manner whether one should do a service rather to one’s friend or
to a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or give to
one’s companion, supposing that both are not within one’s power?
1165a] Is not the true answer that it is no easy task to determine all such questions accurately,
inasmuch as they involve numerous differences of all kinds, in respect of amount and what is
honourable and what is necessary? It is obvious, of course, that no one person can unite in
himself all claims. Again, the requital of benefits is, in general, a higher duty than doing
unsolicited kindnesses to one’s companion; in other words, the discharging of a debt is more
obligatory upon one than the duty of giving to a companion. And yet this rule may admit of
exceptions; for instance, which is the higher duty? for one who has been ransomed out of the
hands of robbers to ransom in return his ransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his
demand though he has not been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it would
seem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to himself.

Well then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debt should be
discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatly preponderates as
being either honourable or necessary, we must be swayed by these
considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of the obligation
previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for instance, that the original
benefactor has conferred a kindness on a good man, knowing him to be
such, whereas this said good man has to repay it believing him to be a
scoundrel.
And again, in certain cases no obligation lies on a man to lend to one
who has lent to him; suppose, for instance, that a bad man lent to him, as
being a good man, under the notion that he should get repaid, whereas the
said good man has no hope of repayment from him being a bad man. Either
then the case is really as we have supposed it and then the claim is not
equal, or it is not so but supposed to be; and still in so acting people are not
to be thought to act wrongly. In short, as has been oftentimes stated before,
all statements regarding feelings and actions can be definite only in
proportion as their object-matter is so; it is of course quite obvious that all
people have not the same claim upon one, nor are the claims of one’s father

unlimited; just as Jupiter does not claim all kinds of sacrifice without
distinction: and since the claims of parents, brothers, companions, and
benefactors, are all different, we must give to each what belongs to and
befits each.
And this is seen to be the course commonly pursued: to marriages men
commonly invite their relatives, because these are from a common stock
and therefore all the actions in any way pertaining thereto are common also:
and to funerals men think that relatives ought to assemble in preference to
other people, for the same reason.
And it would seem that in respect of maintenance it is our duty to assist
our parents in preference to all others, as being their debtors, and because it
is more honourable to succour in these respects the authors of our existence
than ourselves. Honour likewise we ought to pay to our parents just as to
the gods, but then, not all kinds of honour: not the same, for instance, to a
father as to a mother: nor again to a father the honour due to a scientific
man or to a general but that which is a father’s due, and in like manner to a
mother that which is a mother’s.
To all our elders also the honour befitting their age, by rising up in their
presence, turning out of the way for them, and all similar marks of respect:
to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and free participation in all
we have. And to those of the same family, or tribe, or city, with ourselves,
and all similarly connected with us, we should constantly try to render their
due, and to discriminate what belongs to each in respect of nearness of
connection, or goodness, or intimacy: of course in the case of those of the
same class the discrimination is easier; in that of those who are in different
classes it is a matter of more trouble. This, however, should not be a reason
for giving up the attempt, but we must observe the distinctions so far as it is
practicable to do so.

III
A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or not
dissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain what they
were when the connection was formed.

1165b] Now surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or pleasure there can
be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when they no longer have those qualities;
because they were friends [not of one another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it
is only reasonable to expect that they should cease to entertain the sentiment.

But a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being really attached
to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be so because of his
moral character: in fact, as we said at the commencement, the most
common source of quarrels between friends is their not being friends on the
same grounds as they suppose themselves to be.
Now when a man has been deceived in having supposed himself to excite
the sentiment of Friendship by reason of his moral character, the other party
doing nothing to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when he has been
deceived by the pretence of the other he has a right to find fault with the
man who has so deceived him, aye even more than with utterers of false
coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness of that which is the objectmatter of the villany.
But suppose a man takes up another as being a good man, who turns out,
and is found by him, to be a scoundrel, is he bound still to entertain
Friendship for him? or may we not say at once it is impossible? since it is
not everything which is the object-matter of Friendship, but only that which
is good; and so there is no obligation to be a bad man’s friend, nor, in fact,
ought one to be such: for one ought not to be a lover of evil, nor to be
assimilated to what is base; which would be implied, because we have said
before, like is friendly to like.
Are we then to break with him instantly? not in all cases; only where our
friends are incurably depraved; when there is a chance of amendment we
are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friends even more
than their substance, in proportion as it is better and more closely related to
Friendship. Still he who should break off the connection is not to be judged
to act wrongly, for he never was a friend to such a character as the other
now is, and therefore, since the man is changed and he cannot reduce him to
his original state, he backs out of the connection.
To put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was when
the Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved and

widely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved character to
treat the other as a friend?
May we not say it is impossible? The case of course is clearest where
there is a great difference, as in the Friendships of boys: for suppose that of
two boyish friends the one still continues a boy in mind and the other
becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be friends? since they
neither are pleased with the same objects nor like and dislike the same
things: for these points will not belong to them as regards one another, and
without them it was assumed they cannot be friends because they cannot
live in intimacy: and of the case of those who cannot do so we have spoken
before.
Well then, is the improved party to bear himself towards his former
friend in no way differently to what he would have done had the connection
never existed?
Surely he ought to bear in mind the intimacy of past times, and just as we
think ourselves bound to do favours for our friends in preference to
strangers, so to those who have been friends and are so no longer we should
allow somewhat on the score of previous Friendship, whenever the cause of
severance is not excessive depravity on their part.

IV
II66a] Now the friendly feelings which are exhibited towards our friends, and by which
Friendships are characterised, seem to have sprung out of those which we entertain toward
ourselves. I mean, people define a friend to be “one who intends and does what is good (or what
he believes to be good) to another for that other’s sake,” or “one who wishes his friend to be and
to live for that friend’s own sake” (which is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of
friends who have come into collision). Others again, “one who lives with another and chooses
the same objects,” or “one who sympathises with his friend in his sorrows and in his joys” (this
too is especially the case with mothers).

Well, by some one of these marks people generally characterise
Friendship: and each of these the good man has towards himself, and all
others have them in so far as they suppose themselves to be good. (For, as
has been said before, goodness, that is the good man, seems to be a measure
to every one else.)
For he is at unity in himself, and with every part of his soul he desires the
same objects; and he wishes for himself both what is, and what he believes
to be, good; and he does it (it being characteristic of the good man to work
at what is good), and for the sake of himself, inasmuch as he does it for the
sake of his Intellectual Principle which is generally thought to be a man’s
Self. Again, he wishes himself And specially this Principle whereby he is
an intelligent being, to live and be preserved in life, because existence is a
good to him that is a good man.
But it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, and no man,
conceiving the possibility of his becoming other than he now is, chooses
that that New Self should have all things indiscriminately: a god, for
instance, has at the present moment the Chief Good, but he has it in right of
being whatever he actually now is: and the Intelligent Principle must be
judged to be each man’s Self, or at least eminently so [though other
Principles help, of course, to constitute him the man he is]. Furthermore, the
good man wishes to continue to live with himself; for he can do it with
pleasure, in that his memories of past actions are full of delight and his
anticipations of the future are good and such are pleasurable. Then, again,
he has good store of matter for his Intellect to contemplate, and he most

especially sympathises with his Self in its griefs and joys, because the
objects which give him pain and pleasure are at all times the same, not one
thing to-day and a different one to-morrow: because he is not given to
repentance, if one may so speak. It is then because each of these feelings
are entertained by the good man towards his own Self and a friend feels
towards a friend as towards himself (a friend being in fact another Self),
that Friendship is thought to be some one of these things and they are
accounted friends in whom they are found. Whether or no there can really
be Friendship between a man and his Self is a question we will not at
present entertain: there may be thought to be Friendship, in so far as there
are two or more of the aforesaid requisites, and because the highest degree
of Friendship, in the usual acceptation of that term, resembles the feeling
entertained by a man towards himself.
1166b] But it may be urged that the aforesaid requisites are to all appearance found in the
common run of men, though they are men of a low stamp.

May it not be answered, that they share in them only in so far as they
please themselves, and conceive themselves to be good? for certainly, they
are not either really, or even apparently, found in any one of those who are
very depraved and villainous; we may almost say not even in those who are
bad men at all: for they are at variance with themselves and lust after
different things from those which in cool reason they wish for, just as men
who fail of Self-Control: I mean, they choose things which, though hurtful,
are pleasurable, in preference to those which in their own minds they
believe to be good: others again, from cowardice and indolence, decline to
do what still they are convinced is best for them: while they who from their
depravity have actually done many dreadful actions hate and avoid life, and
accordingly kill themselves: and the wicked seek others in whose company
to spend their time, but fly from themselves because they have many
unpleasant subjects of memory, and can only look forward to others like
them when in solitude but drown their remorse in the company of others:
and as they have nothing to raise the sentiment of Friendship so they never
feel it towards themselves.
Neither, in fact, can they who are of this character sympathise with their
Selves in their joys and sorrows, because their soul is, as it were, rent by
faction, and the one principle, by reason of the depravity in them, is grieved
at abstaining from certain things, while the other and better principle is

pleased thereat; and the one drags them this way and the other that way, as
though actually tearing them asunder. And though it is impossible actually
to have at the same time the sensations of pain and pleasure; yet after a little
time the man is sorry for having been pleased, and he could wish that those
objects had not given him pleasure; for the wicked are full of remorse.
It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a friend
even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which can excite
the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is exceedingly wretched it is
a man’s duty to flee from wickedness with all his might and to strive to be
good, because thus may he be friends with himself and may come to be a
friend to another.
V] Kindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is not identical with it, because it may exist in
reference to those whom we do not know and without the object of it being aware of its
existence, which Friendship cannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.) And further, it
is not even Affection because it does not imply intensity nor yearning, which are both
consequences of Affection. Again Affection requires intimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise
quite suddenly, as happens sometimes in respect of men against whom people are matched in
any way, I mean they come to be kindly disposed to them and sympathise in their wishes, but still
they would not join them in any action, because, as we said, they conceive this feeling of
kindness suddenly and so have but a superficial liking.

What it does seem to be is the starting point of a Friendship; just as
pleasure, received through the sight, is the commencement of Love: for no
one falls in love without being first pleased with the personal appearance of
the beloved object, and yet he who takes pleasure in it does not therefore
necessarily love, but when he wearies for the object in its absence and
desires its presence. Exactly in the same way men cannot be friends without
having passed through the stage of Kindly Feeling, and yet they who are in
that stage do not necessarily advance to Friendship: they merely have an
inert wish for the good of those toward whom they entertain the feeling, but
would not join them in any action, nor put themselves out of the way for
them. So that, in a metaphorical way of speaking, one might say that it is
dormant Friendship, and when it has endured for a space and ripened into
intimacy comes to be real Friendship; but not that whose object is
advantage or pleasure, because such motives cannot produce even Kindly
Feeling.
I mean, he who has received a kindness requites it by Kindly Feeling
towards his benefactor, and is right in so doing: but he who wishes another

to be prosperous, because he has hope of advantage through his
instrumentality, does not seem to be kindly disposed to that person but
rather to himself; just as neither is he his friend if he pays court to him for
any interested purpose.
Kindly Feeling always arises by reason of goodness and a certain
amiability, when one man gives another the notion of being a fine fellow, or
brave man, etc., as we said was the case sometimes with those matched
against one another.
VI] Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and therefore is not the same
as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist even between people unacquainted with one
another.

Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because
they agree in opinion on any point, as, for instance, on points of
astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any connection
with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity of Sentiment
when they agree respecting points of expediency and take the same line and
carry out what has been determined in common consultation.
Thus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of action,
and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, in the case of
single States, common, interest: when, for instance, all agree in the choice
of magistrates, or forming alliance with the Lacedæmonians, or appointing
Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposing he himself was willing). [Sidenote:
1167b] But when each wishes himself to be in power (as the brothers in the
Phoenissæ), they quarrel and form parties: for, plainly, Unity of Sentiment
does not merely imply that each entertains the same idea be it what it may,
but that they do so in respect of the same object, as when both the populace
and the sensible men of a State desire that the best men should be in office,
because then all attain their object.
Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also said to
be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and relating to life.
And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards
themselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the
expression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are steady

and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is just and
expedient and aim at these things in common.
The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they
can be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they do unfair
advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and service for the
common good: and while each man wishes for these things for himself he is
jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do not watch over the
common good it is lost. The result is that they quarrel while they are for
keeping one another to work but are not willing to perform their just share.
VII] Benefactors are commonly held to have more Friendship for the objects of their kindness
than these for them: and the fact is made a subject of discussion and inquiry, as being contrary
to reasonable expectation.

The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one are
debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the case of actual
loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way while the creditors are
anxious for the preservation of their debtors, so those who have done
kindnesses desire the continued existence of the people they have done
them to, under the notion of getting a return of their good offices, while
these are not particularly anxious about requital.
Epicharmus, I suspect, would very probably say that they who give this
solution judge from their own baseness; yet it certainly is like human
nature, for the generality of men have short memories on these points, and
aim rather at receiving than conferring benefits.
But the real cause, it would seem, rests upon nature, and the case is not
parallel to that of creditors; because in this there is no affection to the
persons, but merely a wish for their preservation with a view to the return:
whereas, in point of fact, they who have done kindnesses feel friendship
and love for those to whom they have done them, even though they neither
are, nor can by possibility hereafter be, in a position to serve their
benefactors.
1168a] And this is the case also with artisans; every one, I mean, feels more affection for his
own work than that work possibly could for him if it were animate. It is perhaps specially the
case with poets: for these entertain very great affection for their poems, loving them as their own
children. It is to this kind of thing I should be inclined to compare the case of benefactors: for

the object of their kindness is their own work, and so they love this more than this loves its
creator.

And the account of this is that existence is to all a thing choiceworthy
and an object of affection; now we exist by acts of working, that is, by
living and acting; he then that has created a given work exists, it may be
said, by his act of working: therefore he loves his work because he loves
existence. And this is natural, for the work produced displays in act what
existed before potentially.
Then again, the benefactor has a sense of honour in right of his action, so
that he may well take pleasure in him in whom this resides; but to him who
has received the benefit there is nothing honourable in respect of his
benefactor, only something advantageous which is both less pleasant and
less the object of Friendship.
Again, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a present
action, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the recollection of a
past one: but the highest pleasure and special object of affection is that
which attends on the actual working. Now the benefactor’s work abides (for
the honourable is enduring), but the advantage of him who has received the
kindness passes away.
Again, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but in
recollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by the way
though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage).
Further, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting on
another; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon.
So then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelings
connected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of a benefaction,
are the superior party.
Once more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in the
production; for instance, people who have themselves made their money are
fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receiving kindness is, it
seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And this is the reason why the
female parents are most fond of their offspring; for their part in producing

them is attended with most labour, and they know more certainly that they
are theirs. This feeling would seem also to belong to benefactors.
VIII] A question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one’s Self best, or some one else:
because men find fault with those who love themselves best, and call them in a disparaging way
lovers of Self; and the bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake merely, and
the more so the more depraved he is; accordingly men reproach him with never doing anything
unselfish: whereas the good man acts from a sense of honour (and the more so the better man
he is), and for his friend’s sake, and is careless of his own interest.
1168b] But with these theories facts are at variance, and not unnaturally: for it is commonly
said also that a man is to love most him who is most his friend, and he is most a friend who
wishes good to him to whom he wishes it for that man’s sake even though no one knows. Now
these conditions, and in fact all the rest by which a friend is characterised, belong specially to
each individual in respect of his Self: for we have said before that all the friendly feelings are
derived to others from those which have Self primarily for their object. And all the current
proverbs support this view; for instance, “one soul,” “the goods of friends are common,”
“equality is a tie of Friendship,” “the knee is nearer than the shin.” For all these things exist
specially with reference to a man’s own Self: he is specially a friend to himself and so he is
bound to love himself the most.

It is with good reason questioned which of the two parties one should
follow, both having plausibility on their side. Perhaps then, in respect of
theories of this kind, the proper course is to distinguish and define how far
each is true, and in what way. If we could ascertain the sense in which each
uses the term “Self-loving,” this point might be cleared up.
Well now, they who use it disparagingly give the name to those who, in
respect of wealth, and honours, and pleasures of the body, give to
themselves the larger share: because the mass of mankind grasp after these
and are earnest about them as being the best things; which is the reason why
they are matters of contention. They who are covetous in regard to these
gratify their lusts and passions in general, that is to say the irrational part of
their soul: now the mass of mankind are so disposed, for which reason the
appellation has taken its rise from that mass which is low and bad. Of
course they are justly reproached who are Self-loving in this sense.
And that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term to
denominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain:
suppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than other men,
acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and, in general,
were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble and honourable,
no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.

Yet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainly
he gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good, and
gratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfully authoritative,
and obeys it in everything: and just as that which possesses the highest
authority is thought to constitute a Community or any other system, so also
in the case of Man: and so he is most truly Self-loving who loves and
gratifies this Principle.
Again, men are said to have, or to fail of having, self-control, according
as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied thereby that this
Principle constitutes each individual; and people are thought to have done
of themselves, and voluntarily, those things specially which are done with
Reason. [Sidenote: 1169a]
It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or specially
constitute the individual man, and that the good man specially loves this.
For this reason then he must be specially Self-loving, in a kind other than
that which is reproached, and as far superior to it as living in accordance
with Reason is to living at the beck and call of passion, and aiming at the
truly noble to aiming at apparent advantage.
Now all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest about
honourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect of the
[Greek: kalhon], and be intent upon doing what is most truly noble and
honourable, society at large would have all that is proper while each
individual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtue being
assumed to be such.
And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is
noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but the
bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his neighbours
by following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad man, what he
ought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good man does what
he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is best for itself and the
good man puts himself under the direction of Intellect.
Of the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for the sake
of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for them, if need
be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the good things which others

fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure to himself the [Greek:
kalhon]: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a tame and enduring one, and
to live nobly for one year rather than ordinarily for many, and one great and
noble action to many trifling ones. And this is perhaps that which befals
men who die for their country and friends; they choose great glory for
themselves: and they will lavish their own money that their friends may
receive more, for hereby the friend gets the money but the man himself the
[Greek: kalhon]; so, in fact he gives to himself the greater good. It is the
same with honours and offices; all these things he will give up to his friend,
because this reflects honour and praise on himself: and so with good reason
is he esteemed a fine character since he chooses the honourable before all
things else. It is possible also to give up the opportunities of action to a
friend; and to have caused a friend’s doing a thing may be more noble than
having done it one’s self.
In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to
himself a larger share of the honourable. [Sidenote: 1169b] In this sense it is
right to be Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of the term it is not.
IX] A question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will want Friends, or no?

Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of
Friends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being independent,
want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend’s office is to be as it
were a second Self and procure for a man what he cannot get by himself:
hence the saying,
“When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?”

On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happy
man all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, after all,
thought to be the greatest of external goods.
Again, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to receive
kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man and to the
character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer kindnesses on friends
than strangers, the good man will need objects for his benefactions. And out
of this last consideration springs a question whether the need of Friends be
greater in prosperity or adversity, since the unfortunate man wants people to

do him kindnesses and they who are fortunate want objects for their kind
acts.
Again, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, because no
man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on the condition
of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed by nature for living
with others: of course the Happy man has this qualification since he has all
those things which are good by nature: and it is obvious that the society of
friends and good men must be preferable to that of strangers and ordinary
people, and we conclude, therefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.
But then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are they
right? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who are
useful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he has all
good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends with a view to
the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; because his life, being
already pleasurable, does not want pleasure imported from without; and so,
since the Happy man does not need Friends of these kinds, he is thought not
to need any at all.
But it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, that Happiness
is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is something that must come
into being, not be already there like a mere piece of property.
1170a] If then the being happy consists in living and working, and the good man’s working is in
itself excellent and pleasurable (as we said at the commencement of the treatise), and if what is
our own reckons among things pleasurable, and if we can view our neighbours better than
ourselves and their actions better than we can our own, then the actions of their Friends who
are good men are pleasurable to the good; inasmuch as they have both the requisites which are
naturally pleasant. So the man in the highest state of happiness will need Friends of this kind,
since he desires to contemplate good actions, and actions of his own, which those of his friend,
being a good man, are. Again, common opinion requires that the Happy man live with pleasure
to himself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, for it is not easy to work continuously
by one’s self, but in company with, and in regard to others, it is easier, and therefore the
working, being pleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should be in respect
of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good takes pleasure in the actions which
accord with Virtue and is annoyed at those which spring from Vice, just as a musical man is
pleased with beautiful music and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says, Virtue itself
may be improved by practice, from living with the good.

And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it will
probably appear that the good friend is naturally choiceworthy to the good
man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is also in itself

good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of living, so far as animals
are concerned, is characterised generally by the power of sentience, in man
it is characterised by that of sentience, or of rationality (the faculty of
course being referred to the actual operation of the faculty, certainly the
main point is the actual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to
consist in the act of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living
is in itself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a definite
totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good), but what is
naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it seems to be
pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life which is depraved
and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which is such is indefinite as
are its inherent qualities: however, what is to be said of pain will be clearer
in what is to follow.)
If then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and this appears
from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who are good and in high
happiness; their course of life being most choiceworthy and their existence
most choiceworthy likewise), then also he that sees perceives that he sees;
and he that hears perceives that he hears; and he that walks perceives that
he walks; and in all the other instances in like manner there is a faculty
which reflects upon and perceives the fact that we are working, so that we
can perceive that we perceive and intellectually know that we intellectually
know: but to perceive that we perceive or that we intellectually know is to
perceive that we exist, since existence was defined to be perceiving or
intellectually knowing.
1170b Now to perceive that one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing naturally
good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of things naturally good being pleasant.

Therefore the fact of living is choiceworthy, and to the good specially so
since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they receive pleasure from
the internal consciousness of that which in itself is good.
But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a name
for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choiceworthy to each so
too, or similarly at least, is his friend’s existence. But the ground of one’s
own existence being choiceworthy is the perceiving of one’s self being
good, any such perception being in itself pleasant. Therefore one ought to
be thoroughly conscious of one’s friend’s existence, which will result from

living with him, that is sharing in his words and thoughts: for this is the
meaning of the term as applied to the human species, not mere feeding
together as in the case of brutes.
If then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itself
choiceworthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend’s
existence, then the friend also must be among things choiceworthy. But
whatever is choiceworthy to a man he should have or else he will be in this
point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion “Happy”
will need good Friends. Are we then to make our friends as numerous as
possible? or, as in respect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well
said “have not thou many acquaintances yet be not without;” so too in
respect of Friendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should
not be without friends, nor again have exceeding many friends?
Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted
will, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the services of
many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be long enough to do
this for them. So that, if more numerous than what will suffice for one’s
own life, they become officious, and are hindrances in respect of living
well: and so we do not want them. And again of those who are to be for
pleasure a few are quite enough, just like sweetening in our food.

X
But of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is there any
measure of the number of friends, as there is of the number to constitute a
Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of ten men, and if
you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is not any longer a
Community. However, the number is not perhaps some one definite number
but any between certain extreme limits.
1171a] Well, of friends likewise there is a limited number, which perhaps may be laid down to be
the greatest number with whom it would be possible to keep up intimacy; this being thought to
be one of the greatest marks of Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it is not possible to be
intimate with many, in other words, to part one’s self among many. And besides it must be
remembered that they also are to be friends to one another if they are all to live together: but it is
a matter of difficulty to find this in many men at once.

It comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one’s self the joys and
sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have to sympathise
at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows of that other.
Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but so
many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not to be
possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and, for the
same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same time: love
being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one object: and all
strong emotions must be limited in the number towards whom they are felt.
And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time
become friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships of
the kind are between two persons: whereas they who have many friends,
and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be friends really to
no one except in the way of general society; I mean the characters
denominated as over-complaisant.
To be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to many
without being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: but one
cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for the persons’ own
sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find even a few such.

XI
Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are
required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help and the
prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to: for they have a
desire to act kindly to some one.
To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this case
useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more honourable,
and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends, it being
preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For the very
presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men when grieved
are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.
And from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it is that
they do in a manner take part of the weight of calamities, or only that their
presence, being pleasurable, and the consciousness of their sympathy, make
the pain of the sufferer less. However, we will not further discuss whether
these which have been suggested or some other causes produce the relief, at
least the effect we speak of is a matter of plain fact.
1171b] But their presence has probably a mixed effect: I mean, not only is the very seeing
friends pleasant, especially to one in misfortune, and actual help towards lessening the grief is
afforded (the natural tendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, being to comfort by look and
word, because he is well acquainted with the sufferer’s temper and disposition and therefore
knows what things give him pleasure and pain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grieved at
his misfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoids being cause of pain to his
friends. And for this reason they who are of a manly nature are cautious not to implicate their
friends in their pain; and unless a man is exceedingly callous to the pain of others he cannot
bear the pain which is thus caused to his friends: in short, he does not admit men to wail with
him, not being given to wail at all: women, it is true, and men who resemble women, like to have
others to groan with them, and love such as friends and sympathisers. But it is plain that it is
our duty in all things to imitate the highest character.

On the other hand, the advantages of friends in our prosperity are the
pleasurable intercourse and the consciousness that they are pleased at our
good fortune.
It would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily on
occasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to
others: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with reluctance; for
we should as little as possible make others share in our ills; on which

principle goes the saying, “I am unfortunate, let that suffice.” The most
proper occasion for calling them in is when with small trouble or annoyance
to themselves they can be of very great use to the person who needs them.
But, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one’s friends in their
misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is the friend’s
office and specially towards those who are in need and who do not demand
it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasant to both); and on
occasion of their good fortune to go readily, if we can forward it in any way
(because men need their friends for this likewise), but to be backward in
sharing it, any great eagerness to receive advantage not being creditable.
One should perhaps be cautious not to present the appearance of
sullenness in declining the sympathy or help of friends, for this happens
occasionally.
It appears then that the presence of friends is, under all circumstances,
choiceworthy.
May we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized by
lovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others because Love

“Is engendered in the eyes,
With gazing fed,”

in like manner intimacy is to friends most choiceworthy, Friendship
being communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend; now
with respect to himself the perception of his own existence is choiceworthy,
therefore is it also in respect of his friend.
And besides, their Friendship is acted out in intimacy, and so with good
reason they desire this. And whatever in each man’s opinion constitutes
existence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they choose life, herein
they wish their friends to join with them; and so some men drink together,
others gamble, others join in gymnastic exercises or hunting, others study
philosophy together: in each case spending their days together in that which
they like best of all things in life, for since they wish to be intimate with
their friends they do and partake in those things whereby they think to attain
this object.
Therefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being
unstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being made like
to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growing with their
intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeated acts, and by mutual
correction, for they receive impress from one another in the points which
give them pleasure; whence says the poet,
“Thou from the good, good things shalt surely learn.”

Here then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thing
is to go into the subject of Pleasure.

BOOK X
Next, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it is
thought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train the
young, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and Pain.
And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most important for
the formation of good moral character: because these feelings extend all
one’s life through, giving a bias towards and exerting an influence on the
side of Virtue and Happiness, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid
what is painful.
Subjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to pass
by, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion. There are
those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who on the
contrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad; some perhaps from a real
conviction that such is the case, others from a notion that it is better, in
reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure as bad, even if it is
not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men have a bias towards it and are
the slaves of their pleasures, it is right to draw them to the contrary, for that
so they may possibly arrive at the mean.
I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting
men’s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts:
whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience, they
not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for instance, who
deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the credit of backsliding
to it as being universally such as he said it was, the mass of men being
incapable of nice distinctions.
Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient, not
with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they are
believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the wise to
live in accordance with them.
But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current
maxims respecting Pleasure.

II Now Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw
all, rational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, since in all
what was the object of choice must be good and what most so the best, the
fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing to be the best for
all: “For each,” he said, “finds what is good for itself just as it does its
proper nourishment, and so that which is good for all, and the object of the
aim of all, is their Chief Good.”
(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, as
because of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be eminently
possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was not thought that he
said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure but that he really was
so convinced.)
And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from
the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance to all the
contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.
Again he urged that that is most choiceworthy which we choose, not by
reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is
confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what purpose
he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choiceworthy.
Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choiceworthy;
as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected self-mastery; and good
can only be increased by itself.
However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to the
class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else: for every
good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than when
taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that Plato proves
that Pleasure is not the Chief Good: “For,” says he, “the life of Pleasure is
more choiceworthy in combination with Practical Wisdom than apart from
it; but, if the compound better then simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief
Good; because the very Chief Good cannot by any addition become
choiceworthy than it is already:” and it is obvious that nothing else can be
the Chief Good, which by combination with any of the things in themselves
good comes to be more choiceworthy.

What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we can
partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).
As for those who object that “what all aim at is not necessarily good,” I
confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all think we say
is. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will not bring
forward things more dependable: because if the argument had rested on the
desires of irrational creatures there might have been something in what he
says, but, since the rational also desire Pleasure, how can his objection be
allowed any weight? and it may be that, even in the lower animals, there is
some natural good principle above themselves which aims at the good
peculiar to them.
Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument
from the contrary: I mean, some people say “it does not follow that Pleasure
must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed to evil, and
both evil and good to what is indifferent:” now what they say is right
enough in itself but does not hold in the present instance. If both Pleasure
and Pain were bad both would have been objects of avoidance; or if neither
then neither would have been, at all events they must have fared alike: but
now men do plainly avoid the one as bad and choose the other as good, and
so there is a complete opposition. III Nor again is Pleasure therefore
excluded from being good because it does not belong to the class of
qualities: the acts of virtue are not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely
both are goods].
Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in that
it admits of degrees.
Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same
thing will apply to justice and all the other virtues, in respect of which
clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such characters
(according to the different virtues), they are more just or more brave, or one
may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.
If, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures themselves
then it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some are unmixed and
others mixed: for just as health being in itself limited, admits of degrees,
why should not Pleasure do so and yet be limited? in the former case we

account for it by the fact that there is not the same adjustment of parts in all
men, nor one and the same always in the same individual: but health,
though relaxed, remains up to a certain point, and differs in degrees; and of
course the same may be the case with Pleasure.
Again, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements and
Generations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement and a
Generation.
Yet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement: for
to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and if not
in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to Pleasure neither of
these belongs: for though one may have got quickly into the state Pleasure,
as into that of anger, one cannot be in the state quickly, nor relatively to the
state of any other person; but we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or
slowly.
Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly or
slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the perception of
Pleasure) quickly, is not possible. And how can it be a Generation? because,
according to notions generally held, not anything is generated from
anything, but a thing resolves itself into that out of which it was generated:
whereas of that of which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.
Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and
Pleasure a supply of it.
But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a supplying
of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure in which the
supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this is not thought to be
so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a person of course will be
pleased when a supply takes place just as he will be pained when he is cut.
This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures
connected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a lack
and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the supply of
their lack.
But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on
mathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and of

such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of Smell;
and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now of what
can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack of anything
to be afterwards supplied.
And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that
these are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because they are
pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they are pleasant except
to them; just as we should not say that those things are really wholesome, or
sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick, or those objects really white which
give that impression to people labouring under ophthalmia.
Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choiceworthy but not as
derived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of treason;
or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however loathsome. Or
again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived from
honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising from
disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the Pleasure of the just
man without being just, or of the musical man without being musical; and
so on of others.
The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer
would seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that there
are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to have good as the
object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only; and this last is reproached,
but the former men praise as having different objects in his intercourse.
1174a

Again, no one would choose to live with a child’s intellect all his life
through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such objects
as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any of the most
disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.
There are many things also about which we should be diligent even
though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,
possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do follow on
these naturally makes no difference, because we should certainly choose
them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.

It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is every
kind of it choiceworthy: and that there are some choiceworthy in
themselves, differing in kind, i.e. in the sources from which they are
derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current maxims
respecting Pleasure and Pain.
IV

Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up
the subject afresh.
An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say, it
lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete its whole
nature.
Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say; and
one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole nature
would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for this reason it is
not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time of certain duration
and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance, the Movement of housebuilding is then only complete when the builder has produced what he
intended, that is, either in the whole time [necessary to complete the whole
design], or in a given portion. But all the subordinate Movements are
incomplete in the parts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole
movement and from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the
stones together is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and
both again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this last is
complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas that of the
basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each is a Movement of
a part merely).
As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you choose
find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in the whole
time requisite.
1174b

And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if motion
be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too there are
different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And not only so, but

there are different kinds even in walking: the where-from and where-to are
not the same in the whole Course as in a portion of it; nor in one portion as
in another; nor is crossing this line the same as crossing that: because a man
is not merely crossing a line but a line in a given place, and this is in a
different place from that.
Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now
therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given moment;
and that most movements are incomplete and specifically different, since
the whence and whither constitute different species.
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is
plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one another,
and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and complete. And
this might appear also from the impossibility of moving except in a definite
time, whereas there is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for
what exists at the very present moment is a kind of “whole.”
From these considerations then it is plain that people are not warranted in
saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation: because these terms
are not applicable to all things, only to such as are divisible and not
“wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is no Generation, nor is there
of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one of these a Movement or a
Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there Movement or Generation,
because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to
it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the
Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I
have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the
Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in
each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the
best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, further, most perfect
and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendant upon every Percipient Faculty,
and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that
is most pleasant which is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the
Working of the best Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within
its range.

And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in the
same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good; just as
health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a healthy state.
And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient
Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are
pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is
most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object
and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of
course an agent and a patient.
1175a

Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an
inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people at their
prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or sensitive
Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which discerns or
realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working: because when
that which has the capacity of being acted on and that which is apt to act are
alike and similarly related, the same result follows naturally.
How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that he
wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting
exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because that
follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which please
when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the same reason:
that at first the mind is roused and works on these Objects with its powers at
full tension; just as they who are gazing stedfastly at anything; but
afterwards the act of Working is not of the kind it was at first, but careless,
and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all
aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at
and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for
instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his
intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the
acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder then that
they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, which is itself
choiceworthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whether we choose

Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for Life’s sake; because these two
plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation; since Pleasure
comes not into being without Working, and again, every Working Pleasure
perfects.)
And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,
because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected by
things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions of Nature
and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, and houses, and
furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts of Working which are
different in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Now Intellectual
Workings differ specifically from those of the Senses, and these last from
one another; therefore so do the Pleasures which perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between
each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the Pleasure
proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who work with
Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a greater degree
of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians who take Pleasure
in geometry, and they apprehend particular points more completely: in like
manner men who are fond of music, or architecture, or anything else,
improve each on his own pursuit, because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus
the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are
proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others
specifically different are themselves also specifically different.
Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the Pleasures
arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for instance,
people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their attention to
conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a flute; because
they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the Working they are at the
time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure attendant on flute-playing
destroys the Working of conversation or discourse. Much the same kind of
thing takes place in other cases, when a person is engaged in two different
Workings at the same time: that is, the pleasanter of the two keeps pushing
out the other, and, if the disparity in pleasantness be great, then more and
more till a man even ceases altogether to work at the other.

This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything
whatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately
pleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for
instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the
performance is indifferent.
Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the
Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while
those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there is a
wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any Working
have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it, which, in fact,
destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes writing, or another
calculation, the one does not write, the other does not calculate; because, in
each case, the Working is attended with some Pain: so then contrary effects
are produced upon the Workings by the Pleasures and Pains proper to them,
by which I mean those which arise upon the Working, in itself,
independently of any other circumstances. As for the Pleasures foreign to a
Working, we have said already that they produce a similar effect to the Pain
proper to it; that is they destroy the Working, only not in like way.
Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness,
some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in their
nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its own proper
Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a good Working
is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires for what is noble are
praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.
Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely
connected with them even than the desires after them: for these last are
separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the Workings,
and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether the Working and
the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem to be an Intellectual
Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because that is absurd; but yet it
gives some the impression of being the same from not being separated from
these.
As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight
differs from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste;

therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual
Pleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of Intellectual
and Sensual from one another.
It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to itself,
as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is attendant on the
Working. And the soundness of this will appear upon particular inspection:
for horse, dog, and man have different Pleasures; as Heraclitus says, an ass
would sooner have hay than gold; in other words, provender is pleasanter to
asses than gold. So then the Pleasures of animals specifically different are
also specifically different, but those of the same, we may reasonably
suppose, are without difference.
Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the very
same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and hateful
to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet
things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in
health: nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same
notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also.
Now in all such cases that is held to be which impresses the good man
with the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim (as it
is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in that he is such, is
the measure of everything, then those must be real Pleasures which gave
him the impression of being so and those things pleasant in which he takes
Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that what are to him unpleasant should
give another person the impression of being pleasant, for men are liable to
many corruptions and marrings; and the things in question are not pleasant
really, only to these particular persons, and to them only as being thus
disposed.
Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those
which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to depraved
tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind, or which, must
we say is The Pleasure of Man? is not the answer plain from considering
the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?
Whether then there be one or several Workings which belong to the
perfect and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must

be said to be specially and properly The Pleasures of Man; and all the rest
in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the Workings are
related to those highest and best ones.

VI
Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and
Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out
Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things: and
we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated before.
1176b] Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were, it might belong to one
who slept all his life through and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities:
and so, if these possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the rank of some kind of
Working (as was also said before), and Workings are of different kinds (some being necessary
and choiceworthy with a view to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain we
must rank Happiness among those choiceworthy for their own sakes and not among those
which are so with a view to something further: because Happiness has no lack of anything but is
self-sufficient.

By choiceworthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is
sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the
actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent is
one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone.
And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not
choose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm than
profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property. Still the
common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such pastimes,
which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such are highly
esteemed among despots; because they make themselves pleasant in those
things which these aim at, and these accordingly want such men.
Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because
men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot argue
from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor Intellect
necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the only sources of
good Workings: nor does it follow that because these men, never having
tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in bodily ones, we are

therefore to believe them to be more choiceworthy: for children too believe
that those things are most excellent which are precious in their eyes.
We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to
what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we have
many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant which seem
so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working is most
choiceworthy which is in accordance with his own state to the good man
that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.
Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is absurd
of the End being amusement, and of one’s toiling and enduring hardness all
one’s life long with a view to amusement: for everything in the world, so to
speak, we choose with some further End in view, except Happiness, for that
is the End comprehending all others. Now to take pains and to labour with a
view to amusement is plainly foolish and very childish: but to amuse one’s
self with a view to steady employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is
thought to be right: for amusement is like rest, and men want rest because
unable to labour continuously.
Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to
Working afterwards.
1177a] Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of Excellence, and this is
accompanied by earnestness and stands not in amusement. Moreover those things which are
done in earnest, we say, are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and
we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more earnest; and the Working
of the better is at once better and more capable of Happiness.

Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a slave,
might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but Happiness no one
supposes a slave to share except so far as it is implied in life: because
Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in the Workings in the way of
Excellence, as has also been stated before.

VII
Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that
Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best
Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some other which

is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of noble and divine
things, whether being in its own nature divine or the most divine of all our
internal Principles, the Working of this in accordance with its own proper
Excellence must be the perfect Happiness.
That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem to
be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the first place,
this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect is the highest of our
internal Principles and the subjects with which it is conversant the highest
of all which fall within the range of our knowledge.
Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate
than to do anything else whatever, continuously.
Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in
Happiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in the
way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit of Science
is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and it
is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to those who
have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking for, it.
And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to the
Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are needed
alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other characters;
but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the just man needs
people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to practise his justice;
and in like manner the man of perfected self-mastery, and the brave man,
and so on of the rest; whereas the man of science can contemplate and
speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves the
appellation the more able is he to do so: it may be he can do better for
having fellow-workers but still he is certainly most Self-Sufficient.
1177b] Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since nothing results from
it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas from all things which are objects of moral
action we do mean to get something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.

Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest; for we toil that we
may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the Practical Virtues
require either society or war for their Working, and the actions regarding
these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely, because no one

chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war’s sake: he would indeed be
thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemies of his friends to
secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. The Working also of the
statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, beside the actual work of
government, seeks for power and dignities or at least Happiness for the man
himself and his fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct the national Happiness
which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.
If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those of
policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these are
restless, and aim at some further End and are not choiceworthy for their
own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for contemplation, is
thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End beyond itself and to
have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase the Working, and if the
attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of rest, and unweariedness (as
far as is compatible with the infirmity of human nature), and all other
attributes of the highest Happiness, plainly belong to this Working, this
must be perfect Happiness, if attaining a complete duration of life, which
condition is added because none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.
But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man
will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in him a
divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite
nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any
other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with
human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine
compared with man’s ordinary life.
1178a] Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s affairs, or as
mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a
view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in
power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.

In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man’s “Self,” since it
is supreme and above all others in goodness it would be absurd then for a
man not to choose his own life but that of some other.
And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper
to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man the life

in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is most truly Man),
and if so, then it is also the happiest.

VIII
And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in
accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in
accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of justice,
courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in contracts, services of
different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and feelings too, by observing
what is befitting for each: and all these plainly are proper to man. Further,
the Excellence of the Moral character is thought to result in some points
from physical circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected
with the passions.
Again, Practical Wisdom and Excellence of the Moral character are very
closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in accordance
with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord with Practical
Wisdom.
These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the
composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite nature
are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and Happiness which is
in accordance with them. But that of the Pure Intellect is separate and
distinct: and let this suffice upon the subject, since great exactness is
beyond our purpose,
It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small
degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as necessaries
of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to need them equally
(though, in point of fact, the man who lives in society does take more pains
about his person and all that kind of thing; there will really be some little
difference), but when we come to consider their Workings there will be
found a great difference.
I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,
and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are
uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of wishing to do

justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform any of the
actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the man of perfected
self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else how shall he or any
of the others display his real character?
1178b

(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice or
the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both: it is plain
that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but for the actions many
things are required, and the greater and more numerous they are the more.)
But as for the man engaged in Contemplative Speculation, not only are such
things unnecessary for his Working, but, so to speak, they are even
hindrances: as regards the Contemplation at least; because of course in so
far as he is Man and lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires,
and so he will need such things for maintaining his character as Man though
not as a speculative philosopher.
And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working
may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the
gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of Moral
actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will they not be
set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming contracts, and restoring
deposits, and so on? well then, shall we picture them performing brave
actions, withstanding objects of fear and meeting dangers, because it is
noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to whom shall they be giving? and
further, it is absurd to think they have money or anything of the kind. And
as for actions of perfected self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be
a degrading praise that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed
the subject into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral
actions would appear trivial and unworthy of gods.
Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work
because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion:
now if from a living being you take away Action, still more if Creation,
what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the Gods,
eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative Speculation; and
of all human Workings that will have the greatest capacity for Happiness
which is nearest akin to this.

A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do not
partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such Working.
To the gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as there is in
it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none is happy
because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.
Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and
in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they also
the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative
Speculation because it is in itself precious.
So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it
is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,
because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but there must
be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds.
1179a] However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man cannot enjoy
high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for
neither Self-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without
being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may act in accordance with
Virtue.

And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thought to
act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even more: it will be
quite enough that just so much should belong to a man as is necessary, for
his life will be happy who works in accordance with Virtue.
Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they
are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved
the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect selfmastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act as they
ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either
rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted a
strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by outward
circumstances of which alone they have any perception.
And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account
of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in matters

of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for herein rests
the decision. So what we should do is to examine the preceding statements
by referring them to facts and to actual life, and when they harmonise with
facts we may accept them, when they are at variance with them conceive of
them as mere theories.
Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure
Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of mind
and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is bestowed on
human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to think that they take
pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (and this must be the
Pure Intellect); and that they requite with kindness those who love and
honour this most, as paying observance to what is dear to them, and as
acting rightly and nobly. And it is quite obvious that the man of Science
chiefly combines all these: he is therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is
probable that he is at the same time most Happy.
Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.

IX
Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these
subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure; are
we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not rather
acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral action mere
Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather Practice: and if
so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge enough; we must further
strive to have and exert it, and take whatever other means there are of
becoming good.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men
good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and
great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in point of
fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate the generous
among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle any noble and
truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless to guide the
mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is not their nature to be
amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear; nor to abstain from what is

low and mean because it is disgraceful to do it but because of the
punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live at the beck and call of
passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means of securing
them, and they avoid the contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly
pleasurable they have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted
of it.
Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is
either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter by words
what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and, it may be, it is
a ground for contentment if with all the means and appliances for goodness
in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to
Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature’s part, be it what it may,
obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest sense
are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,
Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not avail with
all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to have been
previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought; just as the soil
must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in obedience to passion
cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if he heard,
understand: now him that is thus how can one reform? in fact, generally,
passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to brute force. So then there
must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity to Virtue in the disposition; which
must cleave to what is honourable and loath what is disgraceful. But to get
right guidance towards Virtue from the earliest youth is not easy unless one
is brought up under laws of such kind; because living with self-mastery and
endurance is not pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the
young. For this reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be
the subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will
not be disagreeable.
1180a] Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right food and tendance,
but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after
they have attained to man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine,
respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to compulsion rather than
Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense of honour.

And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the
sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion that
they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they should
impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are of less
promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the good man
and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason; and
the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in check, like beasts of
burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the pains should be such as are
most contrary to the pleasures which are liked.
As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought
up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good institutions,
and never do what is low and mean, either against or with his will. Now
these objects can be attained only by men living in accordance with some
guiding Intellect and right order, with power to back them.
As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory
power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or some
one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a declaration
emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people feel enmity
towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however rightly they
may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of hatred, though
enforcing right rules.
The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the
Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food
and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are entirely
neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife and children
Cyclops-Fashion.
Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public
System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a public
matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to devolve upon
each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with his own children
and friends, or at least to make this his aim and purpose: and this, it would
seem, from what has been said, he will be best able to do by making a
Legislator of himself: since all public *[Sidenote: 1180b] systems, it is
plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and those are good which

are formed by that of good laws: whether they are written or unwritten,
whether they are applied to the training of one or many, will not, it seems,
make any difference, just as it does not in music, gymnastics, or any other
such accomplishments, which are gained by practice.
For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families
the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in the
latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred: for there
you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are naturally
obedient to the authority which controls them.
Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in the
case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who is in a
fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case, perhaps, this
may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration, the boxer will not use
the same way of fighting with all antagonists.
It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to
under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what is
expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or gymnastics,
or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better for being
acquainted with general rules; as, “that so and so is good for all, or for men
in such and such cases:” because general maxims are not only said to be but
are the object-matter of sciences: still this is no reason against the
possibility of a man’s taking excellent care of some one case, though he
possesses no scientific knowledge but from experience is exactly
acquainted with what happens in each point; just as some people are
thought to doctor themselves best though they would be wholly unable to
administer relief to others. Yet it may seem to be necessary nevertheless, for
one who wishes to become a real artist and well acquainted with the theory
of his profession, to have recourse to general principles and ascertain all
their capacities: for we have already stated that these are the object-matter
of sciences.
If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality
of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care
and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat skilfully
just any one who may be put before you is not what any ordinary person

can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in the healing art, and all
others which involve careful practice and skill.
1181a] Will not then our next business be to inquire from what sources, or how one may acquire
this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to
learn from, since this faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not admit
that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and
faculties? I mean, that while in all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves
exert them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of Statesmanship the
Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them practises it, that being left to those actually
engaged in it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack and by
mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they neither write nor speak on these
matters (though it might be more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the
assembly), nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.

One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,
seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their
communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their dearest
friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.
Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition; merely
breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made Statesmen of
them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would acquire a
knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.
But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way off
from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature and
objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same footing with
Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have conceived it to be “an
easy matter to legislate by simply collecting such laws as are famous
because of course one could select the best,” as though the selection were
not a matter of skill, and the judging aright a very great matter, as in Music:
for they alone, who have practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the
performances rightly or understand with what means and in what way they
are accomplished, and what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be
content with being able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in
painting.
1181b] Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of Political Science; how
then can a man acquire from these the faculty of Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see
men made physicians by compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only
the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in each case, dividing the
various bodily habits. Well, these are thought to be useful to professional men, but to the

unprofessional useless. In like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions
would be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and judge what is well,
and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with what others: but they who without this
qualification should go through such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by
instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.

Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the
subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate it
ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what we may
call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there may
be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities we have
collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy Communities,
and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some are well and
others ill managed, for after such inquiry, we shall be the better able to take
a concentrated view as to what kind of Constitution is best, what kind of
regulations are best for each, and what laws and customs.
To this let us now proceed.

NOTES
P 2, l. 16. For this term, as here employed, our language contains no
equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in which it
is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The science of
Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all upon the wellbeing of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt homines nostri est
farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is fairly denominated most
commanding and inclusive.
The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral
Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric (1 2)
[Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti prosagoreuen
politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise the moral training of
the Individual, the branch of the Science of Society which we call Ethics
Proper, bearing the same relation to the larger Science as the hewing and
squaring of the stones to the building of the Temple, or the drill of the
Recruit to the manoeuvres of the field. Greek Philosophy viewed men
principally as constituent parts of a [Greek: polis], considering this function
to be the real End of each, and this state as that in which the Individual
attained his highest and most complete development.
The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle
expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
P 3, l. 23. Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some
definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the best judge
who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in the latter, the
man whose powers have been developed and matured by education. A lame
horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and wisest man of one’s
acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a difficult case of conduct.
Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.

P 3, l. 35. In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is said of
the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable, but indiscriminate
in its objects, [Greek: pantachothen].
P 4, l. 30. [Greek: ‘Archae] is a word used in this treatise in various
significations. The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs
through all its various uses.
“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative
being a property of Rule.
“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most
characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting-point.”
Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve ([Greek: ou eneka]), and
that of Action ([Greek: othen ae kenaesis]). I desire praise of men this then
is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I
resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning of Action.
The beginnings of Resolve, ‘[Greek: Archai] or Motives, when formally
stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the [Greek:
sullagismoi ton prakton], i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be
analysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the
Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:
[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.

The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and
this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
P. 5, l 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the
signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima
aplos]
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as
denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is [Greek:
gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually

realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] which
we have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of
good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good
training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us
capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere
intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his
parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very
texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as
morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which
he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he
should ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.
10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so
denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed
before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just
actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the
concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the
particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,
which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume
principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must
begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either
particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and
hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of
course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if
this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in
addition”
The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs
immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.

P 6, l. 1. Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,
[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported by a
passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai eidoton

oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri auton
chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton krisei]
P 6, l. 11. [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by
any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean
any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
P 6, l. 13. A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because
containing miscellaneous questions.
P 6, l. 15. It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers to
this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest happiness
because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the reason of thus
deferring the statement being that till the lower, that is the moral, nature has
been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria] cannot have place, though,
had it been held out from the first, men would have been for making the
experiment at once, without the trouble of self-discipline.
P 6, l. 22. Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on
them.”
P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus—
[Greek:
to peras
to perisson
to en
to dexion
to arren
]

to
to
to
to
to

apeiron
artion
plethos
aristeron
thelu

|
|
|
|
|

to
to
to
to
to

euthu
phos
tetragonon
aeremoun
agathon

P 8, l. 2. Plato’s sister’s son.
P 9, l. 9. This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being
eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not
necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling
unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts,
and leads to no action.
P. 10, l. 34. i.e. the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
P. 11, l. 11. i.e. without the capability of addition.

P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the
Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief
Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an
eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]
P. 12, l. 9. i.e. as working or as quiescent.
P. 13, 1. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the
Topics, I. chap. ix.
P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses.
“Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the latter.
P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this
word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of
[Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage we
commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.
P. 14, l. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this
passage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend
grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however, that
[Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also the
comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems
more completely brought out.
P. 15 l. 16. “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to
goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure in the
Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception
meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly
pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love
of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure
continually result.
P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external
circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that
Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical
with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in
fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].

P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he
considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift
from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline
and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore that it is no
depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to come partly at least
from ourselves, and he then goes on with other reasons why we should
think with him.
P. 16, l. 26. This term is important, what has been maimed was once
perfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born
incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.
P. 17, l. 3. But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to
do?
P. 18, l. 6. The supposed pair of ancestors.
P. 18, l. 12. Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must
mean either, The man when dead is happy (a), or, The man when dead may
be said to have been happy (b). If the former, does he mean positive
happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness ([Greek: B])? We cannot
allow (a), Men’s opinions disallow ([Greek: B]), We revert now to the
consideration of (b).
P. 18, l. 36. The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion
commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive
that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is
changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have
therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
P. 20, l. 12. The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of
course, dressed his actors for their parts; not according to their fancies or
his own.
Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable
paraphrase on this.
“Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by
proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth.
External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to

have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than
huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do
not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the
world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater
personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who
have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they
have no more.”
P. 20, l. 18. Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one
stay.”
P. 20, l. 11. The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be
in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be true,
of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are
the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable? add then the
difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small
residuum of joy or sorrow.
P. 21, l. 18. This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are
either so in esse or in posse.
If in esse, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Those in
posse, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric
is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support
villainy. Money in like way.
P. 22, l. 4. Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards
adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the
Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.
P. 22, l. 13. See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
P. 24, l. 23. The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
P. 24, l. 29. The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here
used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who
has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them
under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail over
his reason and previous good resolutions.

By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in
which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:
sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the
remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are
silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the man in it
[Greek: akolastos].
P. 25, l. 2. This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein
logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for
one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected selfmastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other
phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the
mental furniture, i.e. knowing them.
P 25, l. 16. [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian],
and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and
Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the
latter, but only for exerting and using the former.
P. 26, l. 2. Which we call simply virtue.
P. 26, l. 4. For nature must of course supply the capacity.
P. 26, l. 18. Or “as a simple result of nature.”
P. 28, l. 12. This is done in the Sixth Book.
P. 28, l. 21. It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of
practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed,
that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the
character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. P. 29, l. 32. The words
[Greek: akolastos] and [Greek: deilos] are not used here in their strict
significations to denote confirmed states of vice the [Greek: enkrates]
necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which
are a real part of his nature, though this pain will grow less and less as he
nears the point of [Greek: sophrosyne] or perfected Self-Mastery, which
being attained the pain will then, and then only, cease entirely. So a certain
degree of fear is necessary to the formation of true courage. All that is
meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be
matured, until pain altogether vanishes.

P. 30, l. 18. Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the parts of our
nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their
proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a
perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained
by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive
impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If
musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them
into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the
positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted
out, Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I
know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to
fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,
Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. See on this point Bishop Butler’s
fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first
part of his Analogy.
P. 32, l. 16. I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our
word act is so commonly interchanged with action. [Greek: Praxis] (action)
properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance.
[Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the
former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices.
Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be good though the [Greek: pragma] be
wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been
right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how
far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the
[Greek: praxis] right. No repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a
habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral
Discipline, quoted above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging
to the body,” etc.
P. 32, l. 32. Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,
Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
P. 33, l. 15. That is, not for merely having them, because we did not make
ourselves.
See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular
propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the

Preface to the Sermons. P. 34, l. 14. This refers to the division of quantity
([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle
Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line,
surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as
numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.
P. 34, l. 27. Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called
progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference thus,
2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or vice versa, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4
= 2.
P. 36, l. 3. The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be
perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may
suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide, but
when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of
himself for direction.
P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that
this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a viva voce lecture than a set
formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out
and exhibited to the audience.
P. 37,1. 23. Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured
by money”
P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by
Horace’s use of the term hiatus:
A P 138] “Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a
promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek:
chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning hiatus; the transference to the present subject is easy.

P. 38, l. 22. In like manner we talk of laudable ambition, implying of
course there may be that which is not laudable.
P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly
to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be
generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto
genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.

P. 42, l. 22. “[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on
the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch
as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then:
preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage.
P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the recoil."Naturam expellas
furca tamen usque recurret.”
P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines
entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding
pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen
comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no
difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such
suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring
not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with
Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris
would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as
Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all
the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its
charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he
“feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.”
P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an analogous noun, to
denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same
function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth
while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same
analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a
“nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”
P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because
“particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of
them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the
allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek:
eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and
raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary

behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one
part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of
defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For
by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen,
since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and
of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase,
since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both
which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the
chapter on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this
disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter
of this Book.
P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral
Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in
Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two
principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and
these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)
P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of
the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of i.e.
incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been
depraved, i.e. shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to
be impaired.
P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and
effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are
[Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results
from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,
these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but
designed causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final
cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own Motive
of action.

When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel
between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka
ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka]
that is to say, the King’s death was in fact the result, but could not have
been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot
was at a venture.
P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settled deliberate
anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of
moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using
[Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his
argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word
lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he that lusteth to
live?”
P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown upon the
person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a prima facie case. The
whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from
[Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81
ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a mere
petitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the
comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as
applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to
restrict them to the last argument.
P. 50, l ii. i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the
same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute
character, opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to
be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.
“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”

P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere
useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek:
peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise
is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.

P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the
three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice,
the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of
Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so
distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one
chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the
one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the
Preface to the Sermons.
P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin],
contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first
step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it
has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means
to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation,
the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards
the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full
meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after”
now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the
mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses,
and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite
movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are
recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into
[Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the
Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and
execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be
taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move
[Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind
mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two
means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both
lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this
decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to
throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the
Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that
consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond

the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is
useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no
Choice.
P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d
hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho
einai agathon)]
P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is
then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled
or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation
operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and
misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for
repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy, First
Part, chap 11.
P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain
circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances
we will have to act under.
P. 59, 1. 19. “Moral Courage” is our phrase.
P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except
by a paraphrase.
“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with
the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of
bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with
Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that
the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to
their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is
honour.”
P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger.
2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be
found to fail in one or other, or both.
P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch,
which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the
sense given above, which seems more forcible.

P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen
oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent
confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So
Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in vanos tumultus gens.
P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being
betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the
[Greek: politika] Coroneans.
P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two
things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into
the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.
P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as
here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia
todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata
sumbebaekos de to proteron].
P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps “things which reflect credit on them” as on page 95.
P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.
P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of Justice,
men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two
senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap.
XIII. 5.
P. 102, 1. 6. Things are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name
in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is
close therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no
English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a
term and not to its various significates.
P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei
kai tagatha k.t.l.]

P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as
confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to
touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue
to his own person.
P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon],
yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but
only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the
unequal :: universal Injustice the particular i.e. as whole to part. There is a
reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly
affects the gist of the passage.
P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not
necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out
the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so
therefore pro tanto is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does
the facts of a good man but for the perfection of his own individual
character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his
social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the
distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap.
xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.
P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.
P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50,
etc, by [Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be
divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be
settled); then,
A • B . 400 600.
A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to
make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).

A+400 : B+600 : : A • B. This represents the actual distribution; its
fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
P. 109, 1. 10. i.e. Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtraction from
the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.
P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty’s “Justices.”
P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of
place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely
that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give
Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they
made the best sense.
P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not
pretend to be able to get it out of the words.
P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not
really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck
wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in
the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two
offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another
against the office.
P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:——] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a
gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a
generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only
had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have.
Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most
valuable, and vice versa.
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at
[Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before
Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares
as between the persons, i.e. the ratio of equality.
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring
into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk

ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the
same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off
the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek:
uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1
house.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr.
——- ——100 pr. shoes
: 1 house—wrong.

shoes
: 1 house—wrong.
: 1 house—right ——- ——-

10 (100 pr. shoes)

P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a
violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the
former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.
P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e. numerically,
equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British
subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully
secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou
mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally
variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not
affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to
mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], i.e. “we admit there is no Just
which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s,
[Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only does but naturally may vary.”
P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by
enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads
is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust.
Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on
page 32, l. 16.
P. 121, l. 13. “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on
Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as
quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The
Paraphrast gives it as follows:

“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself
to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the
other does not.”
P. 122, l.18. As when a man is “justified at the Grass Market,” i.e. hung.
P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes
more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is
infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.
P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law
views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but
now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the
wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but one party.
P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos
archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai
despotikaev. Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a
system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the
supremacy of Conscience.
P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of
lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in
a building.
P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent
matter.
P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in
common language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i e something in his
mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the
bump denoting this aptitude.
P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is
the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.”
See the description of apetae II. 5.
P. 131, 1. 33. praxis is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which
Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act

accordingly.
The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will is only
moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always Aye or
No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and
retracted in the later.
So far as what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong, the
Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good
Moral Choice, i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it
ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect
but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the
direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in
accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out
of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.
P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself
([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]).
If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically
([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the
second, either with a view to act ([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to
make ([Greek: techne]).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If
necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or
Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),
Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)
P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to
clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his
industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his
production is subordinate to Moral Action.
P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have
varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference

is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to
(note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be
given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague
desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice.
Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes
that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would
be [Greek: orektikos nous].
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite
nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves
do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly
described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and
the First upon Compassion.
P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior.
Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major
term in the middle (i.e. proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1)
through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure
with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an
universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His
doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same
term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one
and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus
coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by
[Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take
Aldrich’s instance. All Magnets attract iron \ A B C are Magnets |
Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. / from an universal.
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive
faculty)
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by
taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)

Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C
attract iron.
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the
term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in
the same place that for this reason we must conceive ([Greek: noehin]) the
term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of
all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it
would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple
Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in
the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It
is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends entirely upon
the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has
always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is
Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically,
but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss
literally false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction
as the term is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I.
1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
P 133 1 32. The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is
impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a
perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the
nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its
conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic
proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See
the appendix to this Book.)
P 134 1 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that the membra
dividentia shall be opposed, i.e. not included the one by the other. P. 134, l.
13. The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is
made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek:
epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek:
sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so,
therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove

that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and
then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical
definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi.
P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular
sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho
kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi
tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.
P. 135, l. 5. Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta
pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.
P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as
claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of
being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are
the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and
“Conscience and Self-Love, if we understand our true happiness, always
lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
And again:
“If by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the
whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue
or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this
Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in
our nature. So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.”
From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part
I chap. v.
P. 136, l. 6. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the
following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to ommati
touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.] vii. 9.—[Greek: ae
gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7 ad finem. [Greek: ei de tis
legoi. k.t.l.]
P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not
admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular
language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist” really

denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical
Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous epainous di
anaphoras]. I. 12.
P. 136, l. 17. He would be a better Chymist who should poison
intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that
“Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.” P. 137, l.
13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old
Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought
Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put
wisdom and understanding to know how to work all manner of work for the
service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.
P. 137 l. 27. [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is
used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole
function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict
reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It
is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition
and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist
independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two together,
the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:——]. There
are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:
——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the nearest English
term, but we have none really equivalent.
P 137, l. 29. [Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense,
[Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument.
P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].
P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom
is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them,
but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations
of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of
Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular
functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there
are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but

here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the
object of Practical Wisdom.
P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.”
(Chalmers.)
P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self,
(which is [Greek:——] proper) or not-Self, i.e. either one’s family=[Greek:
——], or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and
subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:
——] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of
justice.
P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community? see
Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction
from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also
Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s
first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in
fact of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence i.e. love of others. Compare
also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek:
autarkeia].
P. 140, l. 17. More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results
from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because
suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book
1. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last
arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term
applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at
the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this
sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the

other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly
unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take
much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a
happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the
rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All that receives
light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun. The moon receives
light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side next the sun. The [Greek:
anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed
fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental
act.
P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in
this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there
are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of
all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the
subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to
the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative [Greek: on] might be
referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already
divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one
of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros
to telos aplos].
P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning
of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which
connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.
[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and
nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is
[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness

informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not
actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper
names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?
he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of
others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he
admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying
general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos]
or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject
without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all
reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply
matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within
the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which
attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of
fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is
wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by
[Greek: ethismos]).

All that is pleasant is to be done,
This is pleasant,
This is to be done

By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of
[Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle
says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that
it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites,
[Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek:
akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion)
shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation
is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in
place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The consequentia is
this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of
reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What
makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and
therefore, etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek:
euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the
Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],
{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].

Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
Medicine is the efficient.

See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros
homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify
the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in
obiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.

P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the
abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything”
is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to
a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
“This particular action is———.”
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei
prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap.
xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio
Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as
governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single
Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X.
[Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used
throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of
Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element
of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents
rather what men may be than what they are. In this book we take a practical
view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This illustrates the expression, “Deceits of the Flesh.”
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of
the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had
been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting
on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——]

P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular,
others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red
Gauntlet.”
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor
premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this
is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to
the major i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to
a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be
avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——] tells him “This glass is excess.”
As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion
“This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he
would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:——], being a simple tendency
towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is
excess,” its own premise “This is sweet,” this again suggests the selfindulgent maxim or principle (‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be
tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be
tasted.”
The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that
[Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the
suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily
defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation,
would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted”
to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo
Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes
disquirite

Verum hic impransi mecum

Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it
is red,” etc. P. 160, l. 2. [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word
(Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the
account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is
really indicated by it.

P. 161, l. 16. The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is
not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for
translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei
tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy,
Part I chap v sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4 Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on
[Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on
Resentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the
concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,

[Footnote: [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from
which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the
Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
Actions of Lust are more unjust

P. 168, l. 3. [Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of
opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation
which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all
difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae
proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,
because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:
malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not
[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
The [Greek: akolastos] deliberately pursues pleasure and declines pain if
there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek:
malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite
properly.

Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts
caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of
course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be fitly
given respectively.
P. 169, l. 29. “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we
should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who
knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a
mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms
of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men
(Sermon xii.)
P. 170, 1. 6. Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes
his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful
strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act in
accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are
therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and note on page 128.
P. 171, 1. 17. Let a man be punctual on principle to any one engagement
in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their
due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of
being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
P. 172, 1. 21. Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action,
which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of
note on p. 129.
P. 179, 1. 4. Abandoning Bekker’s punctuation and reading [Greek: mae
agathon], yields a better sense.
“Why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good? He can live
even with Pain because,” etc.
P. 179, 1. 25. [Greek: pheugei] may be taken perhaps as equivalent to
[Greek: pheugouoi] and so balance [Greek: chairouoi]. But compare
Chapter VIII (Bekker).

P. 183, 1. 6. “Owe no man anything, but to love one another for he that
loveth another hath fulfilled the Law.” Romans XIII. 8.
P. 183, I. 20. [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from
Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
P. 184, I. 33. In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she
“two stone bottles found,
To hold the liquor that she loved,
And keep it safe and sound.”

P. 187, 1. 24. Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa]
is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.
P. 192, 1. 34. The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship
than he bestows, but the Good man can feel Friendship only for, and in
proportion to, the goodness of the other.
P. 195, 1. 12. See note on page 68, 1. 8.
P. 202, 1. 28. See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek:
tauton].
P. 203, 1. 35. “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one
ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.” P. 206, 1. 10.
Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the
obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
P. 217, 1. 10. “Neither the Son of man, that He should repent.” Numbers
xxiii. 19.
“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of
a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately,
Logic, iii. 10.
P. 218, 1. 17. “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is
that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many
guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him
to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed,
and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go
downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please

them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay soul by nature, not only a
servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the
table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands
me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well
contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad
Times. Mix’t Contemplations, viii.)
P. 235, 1. 14. See note, p. 43.
P. 235, 1. 24. See Book II. chap. ix.
P. 237, 1. 3. See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
P. 238, 1. 2. The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is
no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and therefore
whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that.
P. 238, 1. 9. See note on page 136, 1. 15.
P.
238,
1.
24.
Movement
is,
according
to
Aristotle,
of
six
kinds:
[sidenote:Categories, chap xi.]From not being to being
. . . .
Generation
From being to not being
. . . .
Destruction
From being to being more
. . . .
Increase
From being to being less
. . . .
Diminution
From being here to being there
. .
Change of Place
From being in this way to being in that Alteration

P. 238, 1 31. A may go to sleep quicker than B, but cannot do more sleep
in a given time.
P. 239, 1. 3. Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton
somaton, k. t. l.]
P. 241, 1. 6. Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
P. 241, 1. 9. That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the
whole Movement is. P. 242, 1. 7. Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation,
that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued
Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the
appearance of a stream, of light.
P. 245, 1. 18. A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the
[Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia
lupae] of gout in the feet.

P. 249, 1. 12. I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to
hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the
depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect an
earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
P. 250, 1. 12. Bishop Butler, contra (Sermon XV.).
“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least
attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which
is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may however be
reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the pursuit
of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the minor
hindrances which attend on learning.
Footnote P. 250, 1. 30. The clause immediately following indicates that
Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having
been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the
statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.
P. 251, 1. 7. That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy
aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of
Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
P. 252, 1. 22. See note, page 146, 1. 17.
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INTRODUCTION.
In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words:
'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men
harm than to do them good;' and Socrates was anticipating another
opportunity of talking with him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting his
trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the
world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter
touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really
have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and
soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.
This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of
the King Archon. (Compare Theaet.) Both have legal business in hand.
Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought
against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself to
have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an
action for murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter
has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of the family
had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was
bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who
sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done
with him. Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from
hunger and exposure.
This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against
his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the
responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed
of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety
himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who
will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an
unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is
piety?
Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to
undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do,

prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the
gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.
Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this
dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. 'Are they
really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some
more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more
satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as I do, charging
a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be
regarded as a general definition.
Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is
what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of opinion, as
among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil,
which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences
which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may
not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious;
e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to
Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not
equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their
sons).
Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among
gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins
Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the
point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you
able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are
agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow
that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last,
however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all
the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro
agrees.
Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows
that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being carried,
loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and therefore that
which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first loved of
them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is
loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying,
that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here then appears to be a

contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety
only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his
explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving
figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art
to his descendants.
Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of
Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?'
'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?'
Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the
gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what is
the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when applied
to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better.
But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro
explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes;
but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have
an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to
accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be
resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is
knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and
sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science of asking and
giving'—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode
of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers
of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give
them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is
pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been already
disproved.
Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro,
remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety,
or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he
will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot
stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is
prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is
carried on to the end.
The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety
and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular
conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any

definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an
answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character,
refuses to answer himself.
Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same
person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds'
Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and selfconfidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father
has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of
framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His
wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are
characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument
may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode
Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar
sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very
willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves
him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus,
who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in
religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly
confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more
than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father,
who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from
blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty,
whoever may be the criminal.
Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the
narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion
which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing as I do'
is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do
not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily
persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other
nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their
religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them
is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting.
Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental
homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases
is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the
lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not
banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus

more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities
in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the
gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike
of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety.
Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,'
suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do
not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other
men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be
said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at
Athens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the
controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of
verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be
referred.
The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is
shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act,
corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle
(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb
(philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the
energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved is preceded by
the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being
pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of
being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is
working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to
say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attribute only, and not the
essence of piety.
Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus
far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is
seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great
poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and
which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the
ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by
Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety
is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like.
Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare
Symp.; Republic; Politicus.) But when we expect him to go on and show
that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the cooperation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a

lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and
which every one must learn for himself.
There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue:
(1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true
and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence
of Socrates.
The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back
of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other
Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and
play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing
that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the
popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II.
The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the
Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic
IV. The figure of Daedalus has occurred in the Meno; that of Proteus in the
Euthydemus and Io. The kingly science has already appeared in the
Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither
from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less
from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid
Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date
be obtained.

EUTHYPHRO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.
SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.
EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are
you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be
concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?
SOCRATES: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which
the Athenians use.
EUTHYPHRO: What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting
you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
SOCRATES: Certainly not.
EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
SOCRATES: Yes.
EUTHYPHRO: And who is he?
SOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly
know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps
you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair,
and a beard which is ill grown.
EUTHYPHRO: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the
charge which he brings against you?
SOCRATES: What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which
shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is
certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted
and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing
that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to
accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state
is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to
me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a
good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears
away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will

afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun,
he will be a very great public benefactor.
EUTHYPHRO: I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the
opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he
is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does
he say that you corrupt the young?
SOCRATES: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first
hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that
I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of
his indictment.
EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the
familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that
you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for
this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I
myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine
things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a
madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all;
and we must be brave and go at them.
SOCRATES: Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect,
do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his
wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say,
from jealousy, they are angry.
EUTHYPHRO: I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
SOCRATES: I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and
seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out
myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that
the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they
would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might
pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then
what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.
EUTHYPHRO: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates,
and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or
the defendant?

EUTHYPHRO: I am the pursuer.
SOCRATES: Of whom?
EUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you.
SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
SOCRATES: Who is he?
EUTHYPHRO: My father.
SOCRATES: Your father! my good man?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And of what is he accused?
EUTHYPHRO: Of murder, Socrates.
SOCRATES: By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common
herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary
man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his
way to bring such an action.
EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, Socrates, he must.
SOCRATES: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one
of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would
never have thought of prosecuting him.
EUTHYPHRO: I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction
between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the
pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the
murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against
him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If
justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if
the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table,
proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of
mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one
day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our
domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and
threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he
should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care
about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great
harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened.

For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before
the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and
family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and
prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did,
the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for
that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how
little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.
SOCRATES: Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of
religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the
circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may
be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?
EUTHYPHRO: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,
Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What
should I be good for without it?
SOCRATES: Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your
disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him,
and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and
now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I
have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him,
acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions;
and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me
into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is
my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is
to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he
admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will
go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better
than repeat this challenge in the court.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I
am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal
more to say to him than to me.
SOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of
becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—
not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he
has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the
nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of
murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety

in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the
opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one
notion which includes whatever is impious?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting
any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—
whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no
difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider,
Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a
proof which I have already given to others:—of the principle, I mean, that
the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not
men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and yet they
admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his
sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar
reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father,
they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking
when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged
with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and
therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well
informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your
superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know
nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really
believe that they are true.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which
the world is in ignorance.
SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one
another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as
you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full
of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the
Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these
tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you
would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would
quite amaze you.

SOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time
when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more
precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question,
What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging
your father with murder.
EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are
many other pious acts?
EUTHYPHRO: There are.
SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious
things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made
the impious impious, and the pious pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I remember.
SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have
a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions,
whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that
such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.
SOCRATES: I should very much like.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety
is that which is not dear to them.
SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of
answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as
yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your
words.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That
thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person
which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme
opposites of one another. Was not that said?
EUTHYPHRO: It was.
SOCRATES: And well said?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.

SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have
enmities and hatreds and differences?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.
SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?
Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number;
do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one
another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a
sum?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not
quickly end the differences by measuring?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by
resorting to a weighing machine?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.
SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus
decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one
another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and
therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of
difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and
dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about
which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I
and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel? (Compare Alcib.)
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which
we quarrel is such as you describe.
SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they
occur, are of a like nature?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good
and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have
been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would
there now?
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.

SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and
just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just
and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and
fightings among them.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by
the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be
pious and also impious?
EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell
me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what
is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in
thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable
to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to
Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who
have similar differences of opinion.
EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed
as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of
opinion about that.
SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear
any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which
they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of
crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own
defence.
SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that
they ought not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.

SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to
say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he
did and when?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they
quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that
injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever
venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.
SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men
alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called
in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust.
Is not that true?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my
better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion
of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the
master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who
bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do
with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to
proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show
that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that
they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter
very clear indeed to you.
SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the
act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.

SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a
good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were
speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me
that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know
anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this
action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately
defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been
shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do
not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods
condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so
far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious
or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither.
Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro,
there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist
you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to
consider.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and
holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or
simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of
others? What do you say?
EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will
stand the test of enquiry.
SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The
point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is
beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the
gods.
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we
speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You
know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what
the difference lies?
EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.

SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which
loves?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state
of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason.
SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being
led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of
this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and
my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or
passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of
becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state
of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not
agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming
or suffering?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state
of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,
according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.
SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is
in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,
nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to
be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it
is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same
with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that
which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if
that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that
which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you
see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one
another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and
the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you
appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to
offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by
all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And
therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell
me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or
not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is
impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I
mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest
them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.
SOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my
ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you
might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where
they are placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these
notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as
you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

EUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus
who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or
go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
SOCRATES: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he
only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as
well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the
wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them
and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I
will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature
of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then—Is
not that which is pious necessarily just?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as
you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your
wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real
difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an
illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—
'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell: for
where there is fear there is also reverence.'
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
EUTHYPHRO: By all means.
SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the
like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a
feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there
is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also

fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more
extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of
number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that
you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite well.
SOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I
asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and
whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the
more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right.
SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for
instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of
number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number
which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.
SOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is
piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice,
or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the
nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part
of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice
which attends to men.
SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about
which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of
'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied
to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to
require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a
person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is
the art of attending to dogs?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the
gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit
of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may
observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and
improved, are they not?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the
oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for
their good and not for their hurt?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt.
SOCRATES: But for their good?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be
the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say
that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you
the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did
not.
EUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of
attention which I mean.
SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
which is called piety?

EUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in
view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder
with a view to the attainment of some result?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with
a view to the building of a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which
ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you
must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is
best instructed in religion.
EUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the
gods do by the help of our ministrations?
EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief
of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of
them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I
am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the
earth?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is
the chief or principal one?
EUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these
things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or
holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers

and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the
impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
SOCRATES: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words
the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see
plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why,
when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me
I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as
the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he
leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is
piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and
sacrificing?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking
of the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and
giving?
EUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will
be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this
service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to
them?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return
what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to
any one that which he does not want.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have
of doing business with one another?
EUTHYPHRO: That is an expression which you may use, if you like.

SOCRATES: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I
wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods
from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no
good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to
them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and
we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very
greatly the advantage of them.
EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues
to the gods from our gifts?
SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which
are conferred by us upon the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
saying, what pleases them?
SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or
dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I should say that nothing could be dearer.
SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear
to the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not
standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus
who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far
greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is
yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same
point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that
which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?
EUTHYPHRO: I quite remember.
SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is
holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if
we were right then, we are wrong now.
EUTHYPHRO: One of the two must be true.

SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is
an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and
I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell
me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain
you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of
piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf,
have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a
risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too
much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know
the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do
not hide your knowledge.
EUTHYPHRO: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go
now.
SOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I
was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety;
and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I
would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had
given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only
through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
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INTRODUCTION.
In what relation the Apology of Plato stands to the real defence of
Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in tone and
character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the Memorabilia
that Socrates might have been acquitted 'if in any moderate degree he would
have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;' and who informs us in another
passage, on the testimony of Hermogenes, the friend of Socrates, that he
had no wish to live; and that the divine sign refused to allow him to prepare
a defence, and also that Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on
the ground that all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For
the speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, (ut non supplex aut reus
sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum', Cic. de Orat.); and the
loose and desultory style is an imitation of the 'accustomed manner' in
which Socrates spoke in 'the agora and among the tables of the moneychangers.' The allusion in the Crito may, perhaps, be adduced as a further
evidence of the literal accuracy of some parts. But in the main it must be
regarded as the ideal of Socrates, according to Plato's conception of him,
appearing in the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height
of his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is
greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of tragic
pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed up, and the
features of his character are brought out as if by accident in the course of
the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming want of arrangement,
the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a perfect work of art, which is
the portrait of Socrates.
Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the
recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his disciple. The
Apology of Plato may be compared generally with those speeches of
Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the lofty character
and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same time furnish a
commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of view of the
historian. So in the Apology there is an ideal rather than a literal truth;
much is said which was not said, and is only Plato's view of the situation.

Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in
any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to
be supplemented from the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who
belongs to an entirely different class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not
the report of what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as
much so in fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge
in the fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the
Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in any
case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and
some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is significant that
Plato is said to have been present at the defence (Apol.), as he is also said to
have been absent at the last scene in the Phaedo. Is it fanciful to suppose
that he meant to give the stamp of authenticity to the one and not to the
other?—especially when we consider that these two passages are the only
ones in which Plato makes mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato
was to be one of his sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed
has the appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates
received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining the
world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been famous
before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell), and the story is of
a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the whole we arrive at
the conclusion that the Apology is true to the character of Socrates, but we
cannot show that any single sentence in it was actually spoken by him. It
breathes the spirit of Socrates, but has been cast anew in the mould of Plato.
There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with
the Apology. The same recollection of his master may have been present to
the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the Republic.
The Crito may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to the Apology, in
which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is nevertheless represented as
scrupulously obedient to the laws. The idealization of the sufferer is carried
still further in the Gorgias, in which the thesis is maintained, that 'to suffer
is better than to do evil;' and the art of rhetoric is described as only useful
for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur in the socalled Apology of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because the writing in
which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The statements of the
Memorabilia respecting the trial and death of Socrates agree generally with

Plato; but they have lost the flavour of Socratic irony in the narrative of
Xenophon.
The Apology or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three parts:
1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in mitigation
of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and exhortation.
The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he is,
as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no rhetoric but
truth; he will not falsify his character by making a speech. Then he
proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes; first, there is the nameless
accuser—public opinion. All the world from their earliest years had heard
that he was a corrupter of youth, and had seen him caricatured in the Clouds
of Aristophanes. Secondly, there are the professed accusers, who are but the
mouth-piece of the others. The accusations of both might be summed up in
a formula. The first say, 'Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person,
searching into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the
worse appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.' The second,
'Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not receive
the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new divinities.'
These last words appear to have been the actual indictment (compare Xen.
Mem.); and the previous formula, which is a summary of public opinion,
assumes the same legal style.
The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of
the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, he had been identified
with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists. But this was an
error. For both of them he professes a respect in the open court, which
contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in other places. (Compare
for Anaxagoras, Phaedo, Laws; for the Sophists, Meno, Republic, Tim.,
Theaet., Soph., etc.) But at the same time he shows that he is not one of
them. Of natural philosophy he knows nothing; not that he despises such
pursuits, but the fact is that he is ignorant of them, and never says a word
about them. Nor is he paid for giving instruction—that is another mistaken
notion:—he has nothing to teach. But he commends Evenus for teaching
virtue at such a 'moderate' rate as five minae. Something of the 'accustomed
irony,' which may perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude,
is lurking here.

He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name.
That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon himself.
The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in anticipation of the answer which
he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if there was any man
wiser than Socrates; and the answer was, that there was no man wiser. What
could be the meaning of this—that he who knew nothing, and knew that he
knew nothing, should be declared by the oracle to be the wisest of men?
Reflecting upon the answer, he determined to refute it by finding 'a wiser;'
and first he went to the politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the
craftsmen, but always with the same result—he found that they knew
nothing, or hardly anything more than himself; and that the little advantage
which in some cases they possessed was more than counter-balanced by
their conceit of knowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew
nothing: they knew little or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things.
Thus he had passed his life as a sort of missionary in detecting the
pretended wisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him
and taken him away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the
richer sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, 'which was not
unamusing.' And hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of
knowledge had revenged themselves by calling him a villainous corrupter
of youth, and by repeating the commonplaces about atheism and
materialism and sophistry, which are the stock-accusations against all
philosophers when there is nothing else to be said of them.
The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present
and can be interrogated. 'If he is the corrupter, who is the improver of the
citizens?' (Compare Meno.) 'All men everywhere.' But how absurd, how
contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should make the
citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely cannot be
intentional; and if unintentional, he ought to have been instructed by
Meletus, and not accused in the court.
But there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches men
not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new gods. 'Is
that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?' 'Yes, it is.' 'Has
he only new gods, or none at all?' 'None at all.' 'What, not even the sun and
moon?' 'No; why, he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth.' That,
replies Socrates, is the old confusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian
people are not so ignorant as to attribute to the influence of Socrates notions

which have found their way into the drama, and may be learned at the
theatre. Socrates undertakes to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has
been compounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: 'There are no
gods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which is
absurd.'
Leaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns
to the original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist
in following a profession which leads him to death? Why?—because he
must remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at
Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him.
Besides, he is not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether death is
a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his duty is an evil.
Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never have indicted him if
they meant to let him go. For he will certainly obey God rather than man;
and will continue to preach to all men of all ages the necessity of virtue and
improvement; and if they refuse to listen to him he will still persevere and
reprove them. This is his way of corrupting the youth, which he will not
cease to follow in obedience to the god, even if a thousand deaths await
him.
He is desirous that they should let him live—not for his own sake, but for
theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never have such
another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, he is the gadfly who stirs
the generous steed into motion. Why then has he never taken part in public
affairs? Because the familiar divine voice has hindered him; if he had been
a public man, and had fought for the right, as he would certainly have
fought against the many, he would not have lived, and could therefore have
done no good. Twice in public matters he has risked his life for the sake of
justice—once at the trial of the generals; and again in resistance to the
tyrannical commands of the Thirty.
But, though not a public man, he has passed his days in instructing the
citizens without fee or reward—this was his mission. Whether his disciples
have turned out well or ill, he cannot justly be charged with the result, for
he never promised to teach them anything. They might come if they liked,
and they might stay away if they liked: and they did come, because they
found an amusement in hearing the pretenders to wisdom detected. If they
have been corrupted, their elder relatives (if not themselves) might surely

come into court and witness against him, and there is an opportunity still for
them to appear. But their fathers and brothers all appear in court (including
'this' Plato), to witness on his behalf; and if their relatives are corrupted, at
least they are uncorrupted; 'and they are my witnesses. For they know that I
am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.'
This is about all that he has to say. He will not entreat the judges to spare
his life; neither will he present a spectacle of weeping children, although he,
too, is not made of 'rock or oak.' Some of the judges themselves may have
complied with this practice on similar occasions, and he trusts that they will
not be angry with him for not following their example. But he feels that
such conduct brings discredit on the name of Athens: he feels too, that the
judge has sworn not to give away justice; and he cannot be guilty of the
impiety of asking the judge to break his oath, when he is himself being tried
for impiety.
As he expected, and probably intended, he is convicted. And now the
tone of the speech, instead of being more conciliatory, becomes more lofty
and commanding. Anytus proposes death as the penalty: and what counterproposition shall he make? He, the benefactor of the Athenian people,
whose whole life has been spent in doing them good, should at least have
the Olympic victor's reward of maintenance in the Prytaneum. Or why
should he propose any counter-penalty when he does not know whether
death, which Anytus proposes, is a good or an evil? And he is certain that
imprisonment is an evil, exile is an evil. Loss of money might be an evil,
but then he has none to give; perhaps he can make up a mina. Let that be
the penalty, or, if his friends wish, thirty minae; for which they will be
excellent securities.
(He is condemned to death.)
He is an old man already, and the Athenians will gain nothing but
disgrace by depriving him of a few years of life. Perhaps he could have
escaped, if he had chosen to throw down his arms and entreat for his life.
But he does not at all repent of the manner of his defence; he would rather
die in his own fashion than live in theirs. For the penalty of unrighteousness
is swifter than death; that penalty has already overtaken his accusers as
death will soon overtake him.
And now, as one who is about to die, he will prophesy to them. They
have put him to death in order to escape the necessity of giving an account

of their lives. But his death 'will be the seed' of many disciples who will
convince them of their evil ways, and will come forth to reprove them in
harsher terms, because they are younger and more inconsiderate.
He would like to say a few words, while there is time, to those who
would have acquitted him. He wishes them to know that the divine sign
never interrupted him in the course of his defence; the reason of which, as
he conjectures, is that the death to which he is going is a good and not an
evil. For either death is a long sleep, the best of sleeps, or a journey to
another world in which the souls of the dead are gathered together, and in
which there may be a hope of seeing the heroes of old—in which, too, there
are just judges; and as all are immortal, there can be no fear of any one
suffering death for his opinions.
Nothing evil can happen to the good man either in life or death, and his
own death has been permitted by the gods, because it was better for him to
depart; and therefore he forgives his judges because they have done him no
harm, although they never meant to do him any good.
He has a last request to make to them—that they will trouble his sons as
he has troubled them, if they appear to prefer riches to virtue, or to think
themselves something when they are nothing.
'Few persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended
himself otherwise,'—if, as we must add, his defence was that with which
Plato has provided him. But leaving this question, which does not admit of
a precise solution, we may go on to ask what was the impression which
Plato in the Apology intended to give of the character and conduct of his
master in the last great scene? Did he intend to represent him (1) as
employing sophistries; (2) as designedly irritating the judges? Or are these
sophistries to be regarded as belonging to the age in which he lived and to
his personal character, and this apparent haughtiness as flowing from the
natural elevation of his position?
For example, when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is
the corrupter and all the rest of the world the improvers of the youth; or,
when he argues that he never could have corrupted the men with whom he
had to live; or, when he proves his belief in the gods because he believes in
the sons of gods, is he serious or jesting? It may be observed that these
sophisms all occur in his cross-examination of Meletus, who is easily foiled

and mastered in the hands of the great dialectician. Perhaps he regarded
these answers as good enough for his accuser, of whom he makes very light.
Also there is a touch of irony in them, which takes them out of the category
of sophistry. (Compare Euthyph.)
That the manner in which he defends himself about the lives of his
disciples is not satisfactory, can hardly be denied. Fresh in the memory of
the Athenians, and detestable as they deserved to be to the newly restored
democracy, were the names of Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides. It is
obviously not a sufficient answer that Socrates had never professed to teach
them anything, and is therefore not justly chargeable with their crimes. Yet
the defence, when taken out of this ironical form, is doubtless sound: that
his teaching had nothing to do with their evil lives. Here, then, the sophistry
is rather in form than in substance, though we might desire that to such a
serious charge Socrates had given a more serious answer.
Truly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which may
also be regarded as sophistical. He says that 'if he has corrupted the youth,
he must have corrupted them involuntarily.' But if, as Socrates argues, all
evil is involuntary, then all criminals ought to be admonished and not
punished. In these words the Socratic doctrine of the involuntariness of evil
is clearly intended to be conveyed. Here again, as in the former instance,
the defence of Socrates is untrue practically, but may be true in some ideal
or transcendental sense. The commonplace reply, that if he had been guilty
of corrupting the youth their relations would surely have witnessed against
him, with which he concludes this part of his defence, is more satisfactory.
Again, when Socrates argues that he must believe in the gods because he
believes in the sons of gods, we must remember that this is a refutation not
of the original indictment, which is consistent enough—'Socrates does not
receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new divinities'—but
of the interpretation put upon the words by Meletus, who has affirmed that
he is a downright atheist. To this Socrates fairly answers, in accordance
with the ideas of the time, that a downright atheist cannot believe in the
sons of gods or in divine things. The notion that demons or lesser divinities
are the sons of gods is not to be regarded as ironical or sceptical. He is
arguing 'ad hominem' according to the notions of mythology current in his
age. Yet he abstains from saying that he believed in the gods whom the
State approved. He does not defend himself, as Xenophon has defended

him, by appealing to his practice of religion. Probably he neither wholly
believed, nor disbelieved, in the existence of the popular gods; he had no
means of knowing about them. According to Plato (compare Phaedo;
Symp.), as well as Xenophon (Memor.), he was punctual in the performance
of the least religious duties; and he must have believed in his own oracular
sign, of which he seemed to have an internal witness. But the existence of
Apollo or Zeus, or the other gods whom the State approves, would have
appeared to him both uncertain and unimportant in comparison of the duty
of self-examination, and of those principles of truth and right which he
deemed to be the foundation of religion. (Compare Phaedr.; Euthyph.;
Republic.)
The second question, whether Plato meant to represent Socrates as
braving or irritating his judges, must also be answered in the negative. His
irony, his superiority, his audacity, 'regarding not the person of man,'
necessarily flow out of the loftiness of his situation. He is not acting a part
upon a great occasion, but he is what he has been all his life long, 'a king of
men.' He would rather not appear insolent, if he could avoid it (ouch os
authadizomenos touto lego). Neither is he desirous of hastening his own
end, for life and death are simply indifferent to him. But such a defence as
would be acceptable to his judges and might procure an acquittal, it is not in
his nature to make. He will not say or do anything that might pervert the
course of justice; he cannot have his tongue bound even 'in the throat of
death.' With his accusers he will only fence and play, as he had fenced with
other 'improvers of youth,' answering the Sophist according to his sophistry
all his life long. He is serious when he is speaking of his own mission,
which seems to distinguish him from all other reformers of mankind, and
originates in an accident. The dedication of himself to the improvement of
his fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as the ironical spirit in which he
goes about doing good only in vindication of the credit of the oracle, and in
the vain hope of finding a wiser man than himself. Yet this singular and
almost accidental character of his mission agrees with the divine sign
which, according to our notions, is equally accidental and irrational, and is
nevertheless accepted by him as the guiding principle of his life. Socrates is
nowhere represented to us as a freethinker or sceptic. There is no reason to
doubt his sincerity when he speculates on the possibility of seeing and
knowing the heroes of the Trojan war in another world. On the other hand,
his hope of immortality is uncertain;—he also conceives of death as a long

sleep (in this respect differing from the Phaedo), and at last falls back on
resignation to the divine will, and the certainty that no evil can happen to
the good man either in life or death. His absolute truthfulness seems to
hinder him from asserting positively more than this; and he makes no
attempt to veil his ignorance in mythology and figures of speech. The
gentleness of the first part of the speech contrasts with the aggravated,
almost threatening, tone of the conclusion. He characteristically remarks
that he will not speak as a rhetorician, that is to say, he will not make a
regular defence such as Lysias or one of the orators might have composed
for him, or, according to some accounts, did compose for him. But he first
procures himself a hearing by conciliatory words. He does not attack the
Sophists; for they were open to the same charges as himself; they were
equally ridiculed by the Comic poets, and almost equally hateful to Anytus
and Meletus. Yet incidentally the antagonism between Socrates and the
Sophists is allowed to appear. He is poor and they are rich; his profession
that he teaches nothing is opposed to their readiness to teach all things; his
talking in the marketplace to their private instructions; his tarry-at-home life
to their wandering from city to city. The tone which he assumes towards
them is one of real friendliness, but also of concealed irony. Towards
Anaxagoras, who had disappointed him in his hopes of learning about mind
and nature, he shows a less kindly feeling, which is also the feeling of Plato
in other passages (Laws). But Anaxagoras had been dead thirty years, and
was beyond the reach of persecution.
It has been remarked that the prophecy of a new generation of teachers
who would rebuke and exhort the Athenian people in harsher and more
violent terms was, as far as we know, never fulfilled. No inference can be
drawn from this circumstance as to the probability of the words attributed to
him having been actually uttered. They express the aspiration of the first
martyr of philosophy, that he would leave behind him many followers,
accompanied by the not unnatural feeling that they would be fiercer and
more inconsiderate in their words when emancipated from his control.
The above remarks must be understood as applying with any degree of
certainty to the Platonic Socrates only. For, although these or similar words
may have been spoken by Socrates himself, we cannot exclude the
possibility, that like so much else, e.g. the wisdom of Critias, the poem of
Solon, the virtues of Charmides, they may have been due only to the
imagination of Plato. The arguments of those who maintain that the

Apology was composed during the process, resting on no evidence, do not
require a serious refutation. Nor are the reasonings of Schleiermacher, who
argues that the Platonic defence is an exact or nearly exact reproduction of
the words of Socrates, partly because Plato would not have been guilty of
the impiety of altering them, and also because many points of the defence
might have been improved and strengthened, at all more conclusive. (See
English Translation.) What effect the death of Socrates produced on the
mind of Plato, we cannot certainly determine; nor can we say how he would
or must have written under the circumstances. We observe that the enmity
of Aristophanes to Socrates does not prevent Plato from introducing them
together in the Symposium engaged in friendly intercourse. Nor is there any
trace in the Dialogues of an attempt to make Anytus or Meletus personally
odious in the eyes of the Athenian public.

APOLOGY
How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell;
but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively did
they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the
many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me;—I
mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow
yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, when
they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved
myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most
shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth;
for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different
a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the
truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however,
delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words
and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which
occur to me at the moment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause
(Or, I am certain that I am right in taking this course.): at my time of life I
ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of
a juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to
grant me a favour:—If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you
hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the
agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask
you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am
more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a
court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and
therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom
you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of
his country:—Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the
manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my
words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge
decide justly.
And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers,
and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many accusers,

who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more
afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in
their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began when you
were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods,
telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven
above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the
better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread;
for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the
existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are
of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when you were
more impressible than you are now—in childhood, or it may have been in
youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to
answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my
accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from envy and
malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced
themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I
cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must
simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no
one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was saying,
that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I
hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for
these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.
Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear away in a
short time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to
succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The
task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving
the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.
I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has
given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to proof
this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my
prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an
evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth
and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he
teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such is the nature of the
accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of
Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who has introduced a man whom he
calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking a

deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know
either much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any one
who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus
could bring so grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is, O
Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many
of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal.
Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any
of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such
matters...You hear their answer. And from what they say of this part of the
charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.
As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take
money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although, if a
man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving
instruction would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. There is Gorgias of
Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of
the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own
citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them
whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay
them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of
whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way:—I came across
a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of
Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: 'Callias,' I said, 'if
your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding
some one to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer
probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue
and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of
placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political
virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there
any one?' 'There is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of what country? and
what does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,' he replied; 'he is the man, and his
charge is five minae.' Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this
wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I should
have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no
knowledge of the kind.
I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates,
but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you;
there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All

these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had
been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should
be sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I
will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have
such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may
think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of
Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which
I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may
perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I
am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman
wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he
who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And
here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to
say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I
will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the
God of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of
what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of
mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the
people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very
impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the
oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt
—he asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and
the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon
is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of
what I am saying.
Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have
such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the
god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I
have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I
am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be
against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying
the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself,
then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him,
'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.'
Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed
him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for
examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him,

I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was
thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to
explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the
consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several
who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went
away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything
really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,—for he knows nothing,
and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter
particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went
to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion
was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of
many others besides him.
Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the
enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was
laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first.
And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the
meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!
—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I
found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that
others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of
my wanderings and of the 'Herculean' labours, as I may call them, which I
endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I
went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to
myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are
more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most
elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning
of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe
me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is
hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry
than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write
poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or
soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the
meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case;
and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed
themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not
wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same
reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at all,
as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I
was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant,
and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even
the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they were
good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters,
and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked
myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither
having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I
made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.
This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and
most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And
I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the
wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens,
that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the
wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he
is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is
the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth
nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and
make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who
appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I
show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I
have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern
of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.
There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not
much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the
pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine
others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that
they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who
are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry
with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of
youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise
or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not
appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used
against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under
the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has

been detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious
and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues,
they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this
is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have
set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets;
Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the
rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of
such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the
truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled
nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me,
and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence
has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will
find out either in this or in any future enquiry.
I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I
turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and
true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must try
to make a defence:—Let their affidavit be read: it contains something of
this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and
who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of
his own. Such is the charge; and now let us examine the particular counts.
He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of
Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest
when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a
pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the
smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.
Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great
deal about the improvement of youth?
Yes, I do.
Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you
have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing
me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is.—
Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not
this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying,
that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who
their improver is.
The laws.

But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person
is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.
The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and
improve youth?
Certainly they are.
What, all of them, or some only and not others?
All of them.
By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers,
then. And what do you say of the audience,—do they improve them?
Yes, they do.
And the senators?
Yes, the senators improve them.
But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—or do they too
improve them?
They improve them.
Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception
of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?
That is what I stoutly affirm.
I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question:
How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is
not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at
least not many;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and
others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true,
Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether
you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of
youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their
improvers. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a
thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about
the very things which you bring against me.
And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question—by Zeus I will:
Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer,
friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the
good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?

Certainly.
And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those
who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer
—does any one like to be injured?
Certainly not.
And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do
you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?
Intentionally, I say.
But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and
the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has
recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and
ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is
corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt
him, and intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I nor any other
human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not
corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the
case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of
unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned
and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off
doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; but you would
have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me
up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.
It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has
no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to
know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you
mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge
the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or
spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the
youth, as you say.
Yes, that I say emphatically.
Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the
court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet
understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some
gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist—
this you do not lay to my charge,—but only you say that they are not the

same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different
gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?
I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist.
What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you
mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other
men?
I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is stone,
and the moon earth.
Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you
have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a
degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of
Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, the
youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not
unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (Probably in allusion to
Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed the notions
of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.) (price of admission one
drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, and laugh at
Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so,
Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?
I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.
Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not
believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is
reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of
mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle,
thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I shall see whether the wise
Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able
to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to
contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is
guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this is
not like a person who is in earnest.
I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I
conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must
remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance
if I speak in my accustomed manner:

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not
of human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be
always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in
horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in fluteplayers? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse
to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to
answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine
agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
He cannot.
How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the
court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in
divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I
believe in spiritual agencies,—so you say and swear in the affidavit; and yet
if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or
demigods;—must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that
your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? Are they not
either gods or the sons of gods?
Certainly they are.
But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods
or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then
again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the
demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by
any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons—what human
being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods?
You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses
and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you
to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had
nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of
understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe
in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and
demigods and heroes.
I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate
defence is unnecessary, but I know only too well how many are the enmities
which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction if I am
destroyed;—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the

world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be
the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.
Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of
life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly
answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not
to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether
in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man
or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not
good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised
danger in comparison with disgrace; and when he was so eager to slay
Hector, his goddess mother said to him, that if he avenged his companion
Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself—'Fate,' she said, in these
or the like words, 'waits for you next after Hector;' he, receiving this
warning, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them,
feared rather to live in dishonour, and not to avenge his friend. 'Let me die
forthwith,' he replies, 'and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here
by the beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.' Had
Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is,
whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed
by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should
not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of
Athens, is a true saying.
Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when
I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea
and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any
other man, facing death—if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God
orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and
other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear;
that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for
denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was
afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear
of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a
pretence of knowing the unknown; and no one knows whether death, which
men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest
good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the
conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I
believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be

wiser than they are:—that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do
not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a
better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear
or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let
me go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had
been prosecuted I must be put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have
been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly
ruined by listening to my words—if you say to me, Socrates, this time we
will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that
you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you
are caught doing so again you shall die;—if this was the condition on which
you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I
shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall
never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one
whom I meet and saying to him after my manner: You, my friend,—a
citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens,—are you not
ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honour and
reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest
improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And if the
person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave
him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and
cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says
that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing
the less. And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet,
young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as
they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I
believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service
to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young
alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and
chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that
virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every
other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this
is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if
any one says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth.
Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as
Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand
that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an understanding
between us that you should hear me to the end: I have something more to
say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I believe that to hear me
will be good for you, and therefore I beg that you will not cry out. I would
have you know, that if you kill such an one as I am, you will injure
yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not
Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to
injure a better than himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps, kill
him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may
imagine, and others may imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon
him: but there I do not agree. For the evil of doing as he is doing—the evil
of unjustly taking away the life of another—is greater far.
And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you
may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by
condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not
easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of
speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a
great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size,
and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached
to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon
you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find
another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say
that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened
from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus
advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless
God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given
to you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been like other
men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the
neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming
to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard
virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained
anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some
sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the
impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought
pay of any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness
to the truth of what I say—my poverty.

Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and
busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come
forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard
me speak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which
comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment.
This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a
child; it always forbids but never commands me to do anything which I am
going to do. This is what deters me from being a politician. And rightly, as I
think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I
should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself.
And do not be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is, that no
man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly striving
against the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state,
will save his life; he who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a
brief space, must have a private station and not a public one.
I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but
what you value far more—actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my
own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to
injustice from any fear of death, and that 'as I should have refused to yield' I
must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very
interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I
ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which
is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken
up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to
try them in a body, contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the
time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality,
and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach
and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would
run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your
injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the
days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power,
they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon
the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to death. This was
a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with
the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I
showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such
an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care

was lest I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of
that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we
came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon,
but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the
power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will
witness to my words.
Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I
had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always
maintained the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No
indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been always
the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I
yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my
disciples, or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any
one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he
be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who
pay; but any one, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and
listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one,
neither result can be justly imputed to me; for I never taught or professed to
teach him anything. And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard
anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, let me tell
you that he is lying.
But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing
with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this
matter: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom;
there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining other men has
been imposed upon me by God; and has been signified to me by oracles,
visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever
intimated to any one. This is true, O Athenians, or, if not true, would be
soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth, those of them who
are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in
the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take their
revenge; or if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives,
fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families have
suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court.
There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself,
and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is
Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and

also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there
are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is
Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now
Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to
stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother
Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is
present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also
see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should
have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still
produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him
say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay,
Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness
on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and
Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a
motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too
support me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth
and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that
Meletus is a liar.
Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to
offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at
me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or even a less
serious occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how
he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together
with a host of relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger
of my life, will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind,
and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at
me on this account. Now if there be such a person among you,—mind, I do
not say that there is,—to him I may fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and
like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not 'of wood or stone,' as
Homer says; and I have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in
number, one almost a man, and two others who are still young; and yet I
will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal.
And why not? Not from any self-assertion or want of respect for you.
Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will
not now speak. But, having regard to public opinion, I feel that such
conduct would be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole
state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom,

ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or
not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior
to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in
wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way,
how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they
have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to
fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and
that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think
that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would
have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the
Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than
women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who
have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you
ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man
who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous, than him who
holds his peace.
But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be
something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an
acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to
make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he
will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good
pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow
yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety
in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and
impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on
the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion
and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to
believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict
myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so—far
otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than
that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I
commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.
There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the
vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes
are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would
have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I

should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have escaped
Meletus. I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon,
any one may see that he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the
law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand
drachmae.
And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my
part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due?
What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle
during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care for—
wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the
assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was
really too honest a man to be a politician and live, I did not go where I
could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest
good privately to every one of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade
every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and
wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before
he looks to the interests of the state; and that this should be the order which
he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one? Doubtless
some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the good
should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a
poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure that he may
instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the
Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the
citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race,
whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in
want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of
happiness, and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty
fairly, I should say that maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.
Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in
what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak
rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one,
although I cannot convince you—the time has been too short; if there were
a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be
decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I
cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I
never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of
myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I?

because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When
I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a
penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And
why should I live in prison, and be the slave of the magistrates of the year
—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the
fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for
money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may
possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by
the love of life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my
own citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them
so grievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are likely
to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a
life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, ever changing my
place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that
wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock to me; and if I drive
them away, their elders will drive me out at their request; and if I let them
come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and
then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you?
Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this.
For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God,
and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am
serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those
other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the
greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you
are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of
which it is hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been
accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might
have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been
much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to
proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and
therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus,
my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sureties. Let
thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample security to
you.
Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name
which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you
killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even although I am
not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while,
your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far
advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am
speaking now not to all of you, but only to those who have condemned me
to death. And I have another thing to say to them: you think that I was
convicted because I had no words of the sort which would have procured
my acquittal—I mean, if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or
unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words
—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to
address you as you would have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and
lamenting, and saying and doing many things which you have been
accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of
me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean
when in danger: nor do I now repent of the style of my defence; I would
rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and

live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way
of escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will
throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may
escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if
a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to
avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I
am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my
accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness,
has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer
the penalty of death,—they too go their ways condemned by the truth to
suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award—let
them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated,
—and I think that they are well.
And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to
you; for I am about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with
prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that
immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have
inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you
wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But
that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be
more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have
restrained: and as they are younger they will be more inconsiderate with
you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing
men you can prevent some one from censuring your evil lives, you are
mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honourable;
the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but to be
improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my
departure to the judges who have condemned me.
Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you
about the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are busy, and
before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as
well talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I
should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to
me. O my judges—for you I may truly call judges—I should like to tell you
of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the
internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me
even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and

now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is
generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no
sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or
when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything
which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle
of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching the matter in
hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of
this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me
is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error.
For the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to
evil and not to good.
Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to
hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state of
nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and
migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that
there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is
undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a
person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by
dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life,
and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the
course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any
man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many
such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of
such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single
night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all
the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than
this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered
from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who
are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and
Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life,
that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he
might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if
this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, shall have a
wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing with Palamedes, and
Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death
through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think,
in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able

to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so
also in the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be
wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to
examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus,
or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would
there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another
world they do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not.
For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said
is true.
Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a
certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death.
He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end
happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when
it was better for me to die and be released from trouble; wherefore the
oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my
condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me no harm, although
they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.
Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would
ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them,
as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more
than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really
nothing,—then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about
that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something
when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will
have received justice at your hands.
The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you
to live. Which is better God only knows.
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INTRODUCTION
The Crito seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one
light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and
trusting in the will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who
having been unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in
obedience to the laws of the state . . .
The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship has
been seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and
contemporary Crito, who visits him before the dawn has broken; he
himself has been warned in a dream that on the third day he must
depart. Time is precious, and Crito has come early in order to gain
his consent to a plan of escape. This can be easily accomplished by
his friends, who will incur no danger in making the attempt to save
him, but will be disgraced for ever if they allow him to perish. He
should think of his duty to his children, and not play into the hands
of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as by
Simmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends
in Thessaly and other places.
Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the
opinions of the many; whereas, all his life long he has followed the
dictates of reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled
man. There was a time when Crito himself had allowed the
propriety of this. And although someone will say ‘the many can kill
us,’ that makes no difference; but a good life, in other words, a just
and honourable life, is alone to be valued. All considerations of loss
of reputation or injury to his children should be dismissed: the only
question is whether he would be right in attempting to escape. Crito,
who is a disinterested person not having the fear of death before his
eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned they had
often held discussions, in which they agreed that no man should
either do evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these

principles to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are
altered? Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape
consistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or
unwilling to reply.
Socrates proceeds:—Suppose the Laws of Athens to come and
remonstrate with him: they will ask, ‘Why does he seek to overturn
them?’ and if he replies, ‘They have injured him,’ will not the Laws
answer, ‘Yes, but was that the agreement? Has he any objection to
make to them which would justify him in overturning them? Was he
not brought into the world and educated by their help, and are they
not his parents? He might have left Athens and gone where he
pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantly
than any other citizen.’ Thus he has clearly shown that he
acknowledged the agreement, which he cannot now break without
dishonour to himself and danger to his friends. Even in the course of
the trial he might have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he
declared that he preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct
his footsteps? In any well-ordered state the Laws will consider him
as an enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be
welcomed at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape will be
regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he offends
them he will have to learn another sort of lesson. Will he continue to
give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent. And how will
his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly, and
deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind,
does he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friends
because he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them
equally whether he is alive or dead?
Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and
children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a
sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and
returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and
their brethren the Laws of the world below will receive him as an
enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his
ears.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made
against him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in
later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who
had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now
restored democracy. The fact that he had been neutral in the deathstruggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate popular good-will.
Plato, writing probably in the next generation, undertakes the
defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to the
Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.
Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of
Crito and the proposal of escape is uncertain; Plato could easily
have invented far more than that; 1 and in the selection of Crito, the
aged friend, as the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates,
we seem to recognize the hand of the artist. Whether anyone who
has been subjected by the laws of his country to an unjust judgment
is right in attempting to escape, is a thesis about which casuists
might disagree. Shelley 2 is of opinion that Socrates ‘did well to
die,’ but not for the ‘sophistical’ reasons which Plato has put into
his mouth. And there would be no difficulty in arguing that Socrates
should have lived and preferred to a glorious death the good which
he might still be able to perform. ‘A rhetorician would have had
much to say upon that point.’ It may be observed however that Plato
never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to
exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in
order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master maintaining in
death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not ‘the
world,’ but the ‘one wise man,’ is still the paradox of Socrates in his
last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions
may be fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the wicked can
do neither good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he
means, of moral evil; in his own words, ‘they cannot make a man
wise or foolish.’
This little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which
granting the ‘common principle,’ there is no escaping from the
conclusion. It is anticipated at the beginning by the dream of

Socrates and the parody of Homer. The personification of the Laws,
and of their brethren the Laws in the world below, is one of the
noblest and boldest figures of speech which occur in Plato.

CRITO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Crito.
SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.

SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must
be quite early?
CRITO: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: What is the exact time?
CRITO: The dawn is breaking.
SOCRATES: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let
you in.
CRITO: He knows me, because I often come, Socrates;
moreover, I have done him a kindness.
SOCRATES: And are you only just arrived?
CRITO: No, I came some time ago.
SOCRATES: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of
at once awakening me?
CRITO: I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such
great trouble and unrest as you are—indeed I should not: I have

been watching with amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that
reason I did not awake you, because I wished to minimize the pain. I
have always thought you to be of a happy disposition; but never did
I see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear this
calamity.
SOCRATES: Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he
ought not to be repining at the approach of death.
CRITO: And yet other old men find themselves in similar
misfortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.
SOCRATES: That is true. But you have not told me why you
come at this early hour.
CRITO: I come to bring you a message which is sad and
painful; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your
friends, and saddest of all to me.
SOCRATES: What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the
arrival of which I am to die?
CRITO: No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will
probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium
tell me that they have left her there; and therefore to-morrow,
Socrates, will be the last day of your life.
SOCRATES: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am
willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.
CRITO: Why do you think so?
SOCRATES: I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the
arrival of the ship?
CRITO: Yes; that is what the authorities say.
SOCRATES: But I do not think that the ship will be here until
to-morrow; this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather

only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.
CRITO: And what was the nature of the vision?
SOCRATES: There appeared to me the likeness of a woman,
fair and comely, clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and
said: O Socrates,
‘The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go.’ 3
CRITO: What a singular dream, Socrates!
SOCRATES: There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito,
I think.
CRITO: Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my
beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice
and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can
never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know
you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been
willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a
worse disgrace than this—that I should be thought to value money
more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded
that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.
SOCRATES: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the
opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who
are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they
occurred.
CRITO: But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many
must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do
the greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.
SOCRATES: I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many
could do the greatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the
greatest good—and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality

they can do neither; for they cannot make a man either wise or
foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.
CRITO: Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me,
Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your
other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we
may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away,
and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even
a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if you fear on our account, be
at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this, or even
a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.
SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention,
but by no means the only one.
CRITO: Fear not—there are persons who are willing to get you
out of prison at no great cost; and as for the informers, they are far
from being exorbitant in their demands—a little money will satisfy
them. My means, which are certainly ample, are at your service, and
if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers
who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the
Theban, has brought a large sum of money for this very purpose;
and Cebes and many others are prepared to spend their money in
helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not hesitate on our
account, and do not say, as you did in the court 4 that you will have a
difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself anywhere else. For
men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in
Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go
to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give
you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified,
Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in
acting thus you are playing into the hands of your enemies, who are
hurrying on your destruction. And further I should say that you are
deserting your own children; for you might bring them up and
educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and
they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the
usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man

should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere
to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be
choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would
have been more becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in
all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of
you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that the whole
business will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial
need never have come on, or might have been managed differently;
and this last act, or crowning folly, will seem to have occurred
through our negligence and cowardice, who might have saved you,
if we had been good for anything; and you might have saved
yourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how
sad and discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you.
Make up your mind then, or rather have your mind already made up,
for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be
done, which must be done this very night, and, if we delay at all,
will be no longer practicable or possible; I beseech you therefore,
Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do as I say.
SOCRATES: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one;
but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and
therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you
say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must
be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon
reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this chance has
befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words: the principles which
I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we
can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree
with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict
many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like
children with hobgoblin terrors. 5 What will be the fairest way of
considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about
the opinions of men?—we were saying that some of them are to be
regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this
before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once
good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking—mere childish
nonsense? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito:—

whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to
be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or
disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by
many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was saying, that
the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not
to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—at
least, there is no human probability of this—and therefore you are
disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in
which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying
that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be
valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are
not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the
opinions of the unwise are evil?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the
pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to
attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one
man only—his physician or trainer, whoever he may be?
CRITO: Of one man only.
SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome
the praise of that one only, and not of the many?
CRITO: Clearly so.
SOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink
in the way which seems good to his single master who has

understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men
put together?
CRITO: True.
SOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion
and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who
have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?
CRITO: Certainly he will.
SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and
what affecting, in the disobedient person?
CRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed
by the evil.
SOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other
things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just
and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of
our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the
many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has
understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than
all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not destroy
and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be
improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice—there is such a
principle?
CRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:—if, acting under the
advice of those who have no understanding, we destroy that which
is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be
worth having? And that which has been destroyed is—the body?
CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted
body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part
of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by
injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man,
which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: More honourable than the body?
CRITO: Far more.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the
many say of us; but what he, the one man who has understanding of
just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore
you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the
opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil,
honourable and dishonourable.—‘Well,’ someone will say, ‘but the
many can kill us.’
CRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
SOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the
old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know
whether I may say the same of another proposition—that not life,
but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?
CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.
SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and
honourable one—that holds also?
CRITO: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: From these premises I proceed to argue the
question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the
consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then
I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other
considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character
and the duty of educating one’s children, are, I fear, only the
doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore people
to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—and with
as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed,
the only question which remains to be considered is whether we
shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our
escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality
we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other
calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be
allowed to enter into the calculation.
CRITO: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we
proceed?
SOCRATES: Let us consider the matter together, and do you
either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease,
my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against
the wishes of the Athenians: for I highly value your attempts to
persuade me to do so, but I may not be persuaded against my own
better judgment. And now please to consider my first position, and
try how you can best answer me.
CRITO: I will.
SOCRATES: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to
do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought
not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonourable,
as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by
us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few
days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly
discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that
we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion of the
many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall

we insist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always
an evil and dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or
not?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then we must do no wrong?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Nor, when injured, injure in return, as the many
imagine; for we must injure no one at all? 6
CRITO: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Again, Crito, may we do evil?
CRITO: Surely not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which
is the morality of the many—is that just or not?
CRITO: Not just.
SOCRATES: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring
him?
CRITO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for
evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I
would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you
are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be
held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are
agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no
common ground, and can only despise one another when they see
how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and
assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor
warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise

of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I
have ever thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another
opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain
of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.
CRITO: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.
SOCRATES: Then I will go on to the next point, which may be
put in the form of a question:—Ought a man to do what he admits to
be right, or ought he to betray the right?
CRITO: He ought to do what he thinks right.
SOCRATES: But if this is true, what is the application? In
leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any?
or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I
not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just
—what do you say?
CRITO: I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.
SOCRATES: Then consider the matter in this way:—Imagine
that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any
name which you like), and the laws and the government come and
interrogate me: ‘Tell us, Socrates,’ they say; ‘what are you about?
are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws, and
the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state
can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law
have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals?’
What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words?
Anyone, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say
on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He
will argue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply,
‘Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.’
Suppose I say that?
CRITO: Very good, Socrates.

SOCRATES: ‘And was that our agreement with you?’ the law
would answer; ‘or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?’
And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law
would probably add: ‘Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your
eyes—you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell
us,—What complaint have you to make against us which justifies
you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did
we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother
by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to
urge against those of us who regulate marriage?’ None, I should
reply. ‘Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture
and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not
the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding
your father to train you in music and gymnastic?’ Right, I should
reply. ‘Well then, since you were brought into the world and
nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you
are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this
is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that
you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you
have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father
or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or
reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? You would
not say this. And because we think right to destroy you, do you
think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your
country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue,
pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you
failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher
and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be
regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also
to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even
more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if not persuaded,
to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with
imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence;
and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as
is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but
whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must
do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their

view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or
mother, much less may he do violence to his country.’ What answer
shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they
not?
CRITO: I think that they do.
SOCRATES: Then the laws will say: ‘Consider, Socrates, if we
are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do
us an injury. For, having brought you into the world, and nurtured
and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in
every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to any
Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if he does not like
us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and
made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his
goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with
him. Anyone who does not like us and the city, and who wants to
emigrate to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes,
retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in
which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains,
has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command
him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first,
because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly,
because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has
made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands;
and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are
unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the
alternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and
he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we
were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your
intentions; you, above all other Athenians.’
Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they will
justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged
the agreement. ‘There is clear proof,’ they will say, ‘Socrates, that
we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you
have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never

leave, you may be supposed to love. 7 For you never went out of the
city either to see the games, except once when you went to the
Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military
service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any
curiosity to know other states or their laws: your affections did not
go beyond us and our state; we were your especial favourites, and
you acquiesced in our government of you; and here in this city you
begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover,
you might in the course of the trial, if you had liked, have fixed the
penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to let you go now
would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred
death to exile, 8 and that you were not unwilling to die. And now
you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us
the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a
miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon
the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first
of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you
agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word
only? Is that true or not?’ How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not
assent?
CRITO: We cannot help it, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then will they not say: ‘You, Socrates, are
breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at
your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception,
but after you have had seventy years to think of them, during which
time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your
mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your
choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, both
which states are often praised by you for their good government, or
to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, above all
other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other
words, of us, her laws (and who would care about a state which has
no laws?), that you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the
maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now
you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you

will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping
out of the city.
‘For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way,
what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That
your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or
will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you
fly to one of the neighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or
Megara, both of which are well governed, will come to them as an
enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all
patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the
laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of
their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the
laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young and foolish
portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and
virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will
you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And
what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and
justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men?
Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from
well-governed states to Crito’s friends in Thessaly, where there is
great disorder and licence, they will be charmed to hear the tale of
your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the
manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other
disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of runaways; but will
there be no one to remind you that in your old age you were not
ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of
a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper;
but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things;
you will live, but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant
of all men; and doing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly,
having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where
will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue? Say that you
wish to live for the sake of your children—you want to bring them
up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive
them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the benefit which you will
confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be

better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although
absent from them; for your friends will take care of them? Do you
fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of
them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will
not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends
are good for anything, they will—to be sure they will.
‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think
not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice
first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world
below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or
holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito
bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil;
a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning
evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and
agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those
whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your
friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you
live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you
as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to
destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.’
This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring
in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that
voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing
any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will
be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.
CRITO: I have nothing to say, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God,
and to follow whither he leads.
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INTRODUCTION.
This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks,
'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet know
what virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot have
met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has
a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his
own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O
yes—nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old
man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, all of
which may be easily described.'
Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and
not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second
attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this,
again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as
well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly
or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is virtue:
'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, such as
courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and black and
white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other colours. Let
Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to define them.' Meno
confesses his inability, and after a process of interrogation, in which
Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates himself
defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' But some one may object
that he does not know the meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a candid
friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a
simpler and more philosophical definition, into which no disputed word is
allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists
that he must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows; and at
length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of form,
sensible, and in due proportion to the sight.' This definition is exactly suited
to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and
Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialectical
definition of figure is far better.

Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general
definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words
of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to have the
power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet made
to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or popular
morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, 'that the
honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the good, the point
of the definition is contained in the words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And
they must be got justly or with justice.' The definition will then stand thus:
'Virtue is the power of getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of
virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The
definition repeats the word defined.
Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a
torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty
to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him.
Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because he
is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, asks
Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not
know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves a
great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real
difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a reply.
The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:—
He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an
immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of
existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of ancient
crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and under world,
and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by association out of
one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of one kindred; and every
soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into all knowledge. The
existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by the interrogation of
one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of Socrates, is made to
acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical figures. The
theorem that the square of the diagonal is double the square of the side—
that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in honour of which the
legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a hecatomb—is elicited
from him. The first step in the process of teaching has made him conscious
of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the

better for the operation. But whence had the uneducated man this
knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born
with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he
always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. (Compare
Phaedo.)
After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the
original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he
professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to argue
the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume
that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was the stage of
the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.)
Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that
goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge.
Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where are the
teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging.
Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows
that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable.
In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-todo citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, who happens to
be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be
taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall Meno
go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman—to the great Athenian
statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (Laches, Prot.),
that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, had sons to whom they
would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted their own political
wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs were remarkable for
anything except riding and wrestling and similar accomplishments. Anytus
is angry at the imputation which is cast on his favourite statesmen, and on a
class to which he supposes himself to belong; he breaks off with a
significant hint. The mention of another opportunity of talking with him,
and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian people a service by
pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial of Socrates.
Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is
teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of it:
(for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not profess to
teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, and in which

Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This is the
nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance of right
opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for practical purposes
as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, and is also liable,
like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' because not bound by the tie of
the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who
are not wise or knowing persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher
virtue, which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the statesman
had this knowledge, and could teach what he knew, he would be like
Tiresias in the world below,—'he alone has wisdom, but the rest flit like
shadows.'
This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught?
No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in
the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a
general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of courage,
liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this ideal was
attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of the
teachableness of virtue could be resolved.
The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems
rather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge,
and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in
this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The
teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their
pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only produce
out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire into what
you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates replies by his
theory of reminiscence.
To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly
tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found
than it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and
where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of
systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be
attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a
single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word;
that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their
pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready-

made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is desirous of
deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the paradox that
there are no educators. This paradox, though different in form, is not really
different from the remark which is often made in modern times by those
who would depreciate either the methods of education commonly
employed, or the standard attained—that 'there is no true education among
us.'
There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if
there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of
education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or
divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to
others. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the
circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons.
Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or
philosophers, but they are inspired and divine.
There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms
the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean
to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life. To
him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the most
divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that 'probability is
the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);' and he is at the same time desirous of
contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a higher wisdom.
There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of the human mind
which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always
be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent experience
which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach others, because he
has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas. He
has practice, but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of
psychology, which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from
saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be
regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet or
man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the virtue based
upon ideas.
Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an
unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has
knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a

sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is no
reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding the
phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of oracles in the
Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the daemonium of
Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the
higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his
philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence
of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it.
This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of
reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight,
even slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had abstract
ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls
therefore must have always existed. For they must always have been either
men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And Socrates
himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds immediately
afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not altogether confident.'
(Compare Phaedo.) It may be observed, however, that the fanciful notion of
pre-existence is combined with a true but partial view of the origin and
unity of knowledge, and of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to
any particular knowledge, and exists not in the previous state of the
individual, but of the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be
appropriated by strenuous exertion.
The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in
the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of
justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything but
the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained more in
accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the affinities of nature
(ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern philosophy says that all
things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient philosopher had
the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that out of one thing all
the rest may be recovered. The subjective was converted by him into an
objective; the mental phenomenon of the association of ideas (compare
Phaedo) became a real chain of existences. The germs of two valuable
principles of education may also be gathered from the 'words of priests and
priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare
Aristotle's theory of episteme); and (2) that the process of learning consists
not in what is brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him.

Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute
observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished
with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) the shrewd
reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to
ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this must
surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could get a
living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or (3) the remark
conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of
thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos). Characteristic also of
the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the
teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the
mathematicians; and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which
occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a
colour to all of them—that mankind only desire evil through ignorance; (6)
the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which
is latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for knowing his
ignorance.
The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual
circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten
thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about
the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious—a
spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the great
king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of knowledge, and
is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be
regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as Hippocrates in the
Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on
whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, just as in the Charmides,
the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of a
similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner
suited to his character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand
the process to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant of
the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed to instruct
their disciple. His definition of virtue as 'the power and desire of attaining
things honourable,' like the first definition of justice in the Republic, is
taken from a poet. His answers have a sophistical ring, and at the same time
show the sophistical incapacity to grasp a general notion.

Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is
indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true
philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions,
whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is of
the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of a different variety; the
immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles are not attributed to him. The
moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the accuser of
Socrates, as is apparently indicated by his parting words. Perhaps Plato may
have been desirous of showing that the accusation of Socrates was not to be
attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to a tendency in men's
minds. Or he may have been regardless of the historical truth of the
characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno and Critias. Like
Chaerephon (Apol.) the real Anytus was a democrat, and had joined
Thrasybulus in the conflict with the thirty.
The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if 'virtue
is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates himself offered
an example of the manner in which the true teacher may draw out the mind
of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies of the Sophists. In the
Meno the subject is more developed; the foundations of the enquiry are laid
deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. There is a
progression by antagonism of two opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the
moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes
out of our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of knowledge is
irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed the profession
of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide. There is another sort of
progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is
friendship?' 'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the Lysis,
Charmides, Laches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second
stage of his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior
and future state of existence.
The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and
in all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as well as
in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but in stronger
opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have a divine
insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and good
speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine of the
immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the foundation

not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards and
punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is
described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The
existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher
or philosophical sense is admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again
introduced in the Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on
the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the tie of
the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is given up as
hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at different times
of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new stages of thought
attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in order to take away the
appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him hidden meanings or
remote allusions.
There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the
Meno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato
were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be
one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the
allusion of Anytus.
We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has
done, of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already
seen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in Plato
are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The repulsive
picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon, where he also
appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having lovers,' has no
other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato.
The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal
evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the 'general
definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. The
problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in the Lysis, Laches,
Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about knowing and learning has
already appeared in the Euthydemus. The doctrines of immortality and preexistence are carried further in the Phaedrus and Phaedo; the distinction
between opinion and knowledge is more fully developed in the Theaetetus.
The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously calls his master, are still
running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the later Platonic Dialogues, the
Meno arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are led to place the Dialogue at

some point of time later than the Protagoras, and earlier than the Phaedrus
and Gorgias. The place which is assigned to it in this work is due mainly to
the desire to bring together in a single volume all the Dialogues which
contain allusions to the trial and death of Socrates.

ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO.
Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and
definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular
account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his Dialogues
interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It is due also to the
misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; and the erroneous
notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed by the realism of
the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas may be summed up
in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists not in particulars, but
in universals, which have a place in the mind of God, or in some far-off
heaven. These were revealed to men in a former state of existence, and are
recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or association from sensible things.
The sensible things are not realities, but shadows only, in relation to the
truth.' These unmeaning propositions are hardly suspected to be a caricature
of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato in various ways and under
many figures of speech is seeking to unfold. Poetry has been converted into
dogma; and it is not remarked that the Platonic ideas are to be found only in
about a third of Plato's writings and are not confined to him. The forms
which they assume are numerous, and if taken literally, inconsistent with
one another. At one time we are in the clouds of mythology, at another
among the abstractions of mathematics or metaphysics; we pass
imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and fancy are mingled in the
same passage. The ideas are sometimes described as many, coextensive
with the universals of sense and also with the first principles of ethics; or
again they are absorbed into the single idea of good, and subordinated to it.
They are not more certain than facts, but they are equally certain (Phaedo).
They are both personal and impersonal. They are abstract terms: they are
also the causes of things; and they are even transformed into the demons or
spirits by whose help God made the world. And the idea of good (Republic)
may without violence be converted into the Supreme Being, who 'because
He was good' created all things (Tim.).
It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of
thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct meaning.

They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, aspirations after
an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep religious and
contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of curious mental
phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous philosophies,
which they put together in a new form. Their great diversity shows the
tentative character of early endeavours to think. They have not yet settled
down into a single system. Plato uses them, though he also criticises them;
he acknowledges that both he and others are always talking about them,
especially about the Idea of Good; and that they are not peculiar to himself
(Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in his later writings he seems to have laid
aside the old forms of them. As he proceeds he makes for himself new
modes of expression more akin to the Aristotelian logic.
Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common meaning
or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he treats of the
ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is the spirit of
idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many names and taken
many forms, and has in a measure influenced those who seemed to be most
averse to it. It has often been charged with inconsistency and fancifulness,
and yet has had an elevating effect on human nature, and has exercised a
wonderful charm and interest over a few spirits who have been lost in the
thought of it. It has been banished again and again, but has always returned.
It has attempted to leave the earth and soar heavenwards, but soon has
found that only in experience could any solid foundation of knowledge be
laid. It has degenerated into pantheism, but has again emerged. No other
knowledge has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It is the science of
sciences, which are also ideas, and under either aspect require to be defined.
They can only be thought of in due proportion when conceived in relation
to one another. They are the glasses through which the kingdoms of science
are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest minds, except when living in an
age of reaction against them, have unconsciously fallen under their power.
The account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and
clearest, and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first and then
comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, e.g. in the
Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the criticism of them
in the Parmenides, the personal form which is attributed to them in the
Timaeus, the logical character which they assume in the Sophist and

Philebus, and the allusion to them in the Laws. In the Cratylus they dawn
upon him with the freshness of a newly-discovered thought.
The Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and
suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them until
their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to earth. This is a
tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets bear witness. The
souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent memory of ideas, which
were known to them in a former state. The recollection is awakened into
life and consciousness by the sight of the things which resemble them on
earth. The soul evidently possesses such innate ideas before she has had
time to acquire them. This is proved by an experiment tried on one of
Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits truths of arithmetic and
geometry, which he had never learned in this world. He must therefore have
brought them with him from another.
The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses of
Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural answer
to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of evil?' and
prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into Hellas probably
through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and mysteries. It was
easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has really
existed for the race though not for the individual, and all men come into the
world, if not 'trailing clouds of glory,' at any rate able to enter into the
inheritance of the past. In the Phaedrus, as well as in the Meno, it is this
former rather than a future life on which Plato is disposed to dwell. There
the Gods, and men following in their train, go forth to contemplate the
heavens, and are borne round in the revolutions of them. There they see the
divine forms of justice, temperance, and the like, in their unchangeable
beauty, but not without an effort more than human. The soul of man is
likened to a charioteer and two steeds, one mortal, the other immortal. The
charioteer and the mortal steed are in fierce conflict; at length the animal
principle is finally overpowered, though not extinguished, by the combined
energies of the passionate and rational elements. This is one of those
passages in Plato which, partaking both of a philosophical and poetical
character, is necessarily indistinct and inconsistent. The magnificent figure
under which the nature of the soul is described has not much to do with the
popular doctrine of the ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the description
which shows that they are present to Plato's mind, namely, the remark that

the soul, which had seen truths in the form of the universal, cannot again
return to the nature of an animal.
In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a
previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been
acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from
another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of
association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person recalls
another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any part of
knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued that ideas,
or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of existence because
they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them which are given by
experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine of ideas is subordinate to the
proof of the immortality of the soul. 'If the soul existed in a previous state,
then it will exist in a future state, for a law of alternation pervades all
things.' And, 'If the ideas exist, then the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be
observed, both in the Meno and the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself
with diffidence. He speaks in the Phaedo of the words with which he has
comforted himself and his friends, and will not be too confident that the
description which he has given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true,
but he 'ventures to think that something of the kind is true.' And in the
Meno, after dwelling upon the immortality of the soul, he adds, 'Of some
things which I have said I am not altogether confident' (compare Apology;
Gorgias). From this class of uncertainties he exempts the difference
between truth and appearance, of which he is absolutely convinced.
In the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not
contradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as the
genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name are
contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, the
picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing in nature
of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds are only the
shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or explanations are put
forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition of Plato's theory of ideas,
but with a view of showing that poetry and the mimetic arts are concerned
with an inferior part of the soul and a lower kind of knowledge. On the
other hand, in the 6th and 7th books of the Republic we reach the highest
and most perfect conception, which Plato is able to attain, of the nature of
knowledge. The ideas are now finally seen to be one as well as many,

causes as well as ideas, and to have a unity which is the idea of good and
the cause of all the rest. They seem, however, to have lost their first aspect
of universals under which individuals are contained, and to have been
converted into forms of another kind, which are inconsistently regarded
from the one side as images or ideals of justice, temperance, holiness and
the like; from the other as hypotheses, or mathematical truths or principles.
In the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows
the Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention
occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical ratios
furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But though the
conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or laid aside, the
distinction of the visible and intellectual is as firmly maintained as ever.
The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is superseded by the conception
of a personal God, who works according to a final cause or principle of
goodness which he himself is. No doubt is expressed by Plato, either in the
Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of the truths which he conceives to be the
first and highest. It is not the existence of God or the idea of good which he
approaches in a tentative or hesitating manner, but the investigations of
physiology. These he regards, not seriously, as a part of philosophy, but as
an innocent recreation (Tim.).
Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition
or defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is put
into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to
Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is assailed
takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the dialectical
difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that there are ideas of
all things, but the manner in which individuals partake of them, whether of
the whole or of the part, and in which they become like them, or how ideas
can be either within or without the sphere of human knowledge, or how the
human and divine can have any relation to each other, is held to be
incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what
becomes of philosophy? (Parmenides.) In the Sophist the theory of ideas is
spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by another sect of
philosophers, called 'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the Megarians, who
were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him (Sophist). Nor in what
may be termed Plato's abridgement of the history of philosophy (Soph.), is
any mention made such as we find in the first book of Aristotle's

Metaphysics, of the derivation of such a theory or of any part of it from the
Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even from Socrates. In the
Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic Dialogues, the
conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed under the figure
of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is retained. The one and
many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working in the mind of Plato,
and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' but of 'some with some,' is
asserted and explained. But they are spoken of in a different manner, and
are not supposed to be recovered from a former state of existence. The
metaphysical conception of truth passes into a psychological one, which is
continued in the Laws, and is the final form of the Platonic philosophy, so
far as can be gathered from his own writings (see especially Laws). In the
Laws he harps once more on the old string, and returns to general notions:
—these he acknowledges to be many, and yet he insists that they are also
one. The guardian must be made to recognize the truth, for which he has
contended long ago in the Protagoras, that the virtues are four, but they are
also in some sense one (Laws; compare Protagoras).
So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the
statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to
harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system,
but the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of
Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and general
meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass from the
subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven (jenseits) without
regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy have made between
them. They are also intended to supplement or explain each other. They
relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have said that 'he was not
confident of the precise form of his own statements, but was strong in the
belief that something of the kind was true.' It is the spirit, not the letter, in
which they agree—the spirit which places the divine above the human, the
spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the mind before the
body.
The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times
widens into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear after
many ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new conditions, at
first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally spreading over
the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with ancient philosophy.

There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is inspired by ancient.
There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born out of due time; and
before men were capable of understanding it. To the fathers of modern
philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new and original, but they
carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, coming back by
recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers of the seventeenth
century, who to themselves appeared to be working out independently the
enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood in a new relation to
theology and natural philosophy, and for a time maintained towards both an
attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the similarities between modern and
ancient thought are greater far than the differences. All philosophy, even
that part of it which is said to be based upon experience, is really ideal; and
ideas are not only derived from facts, but they are also prior to them and
extend far beyond them, just as the mind is prior to the senses.
Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in the
single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having arrived
at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from
philosophy to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to
be the real meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin of
knowledge, will always continue to be one of the first problems of
philosophy.
Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of logic—
arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They were the
late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only part of it which
has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. Philosophies come
and go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing of definitions, the
invention of methods still continue to be the main elements of the reasoning
process.
Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. It
is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as a quickening
into life of old words and notions latent in the semi-barbarous Latin, and
putting a new meaning into them. Unlike ancient philosophy, it has been
unaffected by impressions derived from outward nature: it arose within the
limits of the mind itself. From the time of Descartes to Hume and Kant it
has had little or nothing to do with facts of science. On the other hand, the
ancient and mediaeval logic retained a continuous influence over it, and a

form like that of mathematics was easily impressed upon it; the principle of
ancient philosophy which is most apparent in it is scepticism; we must
doubt nearly every traditional or received notion, that we may hold fast one
or two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal form was a mental
necessity to the first thinkers of modern times: from this alone all other
ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure presentiment of
'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The Eleatic notion that
being and thought were the same was revived in a new form by Descartes.
But now it gave birth to consciousness and self-reflection: it awakened the
'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and abstract has no other certainty
but the conviction of its own existence. 'I think, therefore I am;' and this
thought is God thinking in me, who has also communicated to the reason of
man his own attributes of thought and extension—these are truly imparted
to him because God is true (compare Republic). It has been often remarked
that Descartes, having begun by dismissing all presuppositions, introduces
several: he passes almost at once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more
important for the illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists
that God is true and incapable of deception (Republic)—that he proceeds
from general ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in
him. A certain influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of
their philosophy is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest
opposition between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato, supposes
them to be reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by a special
divine act (compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all the parts of the
human body to meet in the pineal gland, that alone affording a principle of
unity in the material frame of man. It is characteristic of the first period of
modern philosophy, that having begun (like the Presocratics) with a few
general notions, Descartes first falls absolutely under their influence, and
then quickly discards them. At the same time he is less able to observe
facts, because they are too much magnified by the glasses through which
they are seen. The common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the
comprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say
of abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them, the less
are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete natures.
Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy is
his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The system of
Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that of Descartes. In this

respect the difference between them is like that between Xenophanes and
Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be described generally as the
Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction and taking the form of the Eleatic
philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is overpowered and intoxicated with the
idea of Being or God. The greatness of both philosophies consists in the
immensity of a thought which excludes all other thoughts; their weakness is
the necessary separation of this thought from actual existence and from
practical life. In neither of them is there any clear opposition between the
inward and outward world. The substance of Spinoza has two attributes,
which alone are cognizable by man, thought and extension; these are in
extreme opposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. They
may be regarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or
substance is unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the
Eleatic philosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio
est negatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's
Sophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the
spectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with another
famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie eternitatis.'
According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they are conditioned by
what is alien to them, and by one another. Human beings are included in the
number of them. Hence there is no reality in human action and no place for
right and wrong. Individuality is accident. The boasted freedom of the will
is only a consciousness of necessity. Truth, he says, is the direction of the
reason towards the infinite, in which all things repose; and herein lies the
secret of man's well-being. In the exaltation of the reason or intellect, in the
denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; Laws) Spinoza approaches
nearer to Plato than in his conception of an infinite substance. As Socrates
said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained that
knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to knowledge useful. Both
are equally far from any real experience or observation of nature. And the
same difficulty is found in both when we seek to apply their ideas to life
and practice. There is a gulf fixed between the infinite substance and finite
objects or individuals of Spinoza, just as there is between the ideas of Plato
and the world of sense.
Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher
Leibnitz, who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between
mind and matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare

again Phaedrus). To him all the particles of matter are living beings which
reflect on one another, and in the least of them the whole is contained. Here
we catch a reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or similar particles of
Anaxagoras, and of the world-animal of the Timaeus.
In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of
man is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by
observation and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of
experience, rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is
a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us.
The Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon
of Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons
which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some
of them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in the
'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of Plato
in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much insisted
upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the illusions of
language, and are constantly crying out against them, as against other idols.
Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more
than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him
experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and
construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic of the
mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the transposition
of two words. For objects of sense he would substitute sensations. He
imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human mind towards
God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has drawn the
imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. He has
annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed by the
same laws and described under the same names.
A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central
principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would deprive
men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but he seems not to
have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and does not in any
degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he remark that he was
arguing from the necessary imperfection of language against the most
certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel with the ancients. He
goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did in their idealism. Like the

ancient Sophists, he relegates the more important principles of ethics to
custom and probability. But crude and unmeaning as this philosophy is, it
exercised a great influence on his successors, not unlike that which Locke
exercised upon Berkeley and Berkeley upon Hume himself. All three were
both sceptical and ideal in almost equal degrees. Neither they nor their
predecessors had any true conception of language or of the history of
philosophy. Hume's paradox has been forgotten by the world, and did not
any more than the scepticism of the ancients require to be seriously refuted.
Like some other philosophical paradoxes, it would have been better left to
die out. It certainly could not be refuted by a philosophy such as Kant's, in
which, no less than in the previously mentioned systems, the history of the
human mind and the nature of language are almost wholly ignored, and the
certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject; while
absolute truth is reduced to a figment, more abstract and narrow than Plato's
ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to which, if we reason strictly, no predicate can be
applied.
The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of
ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no
longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know it;
there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, in
mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may
attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every
sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They
are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our lives,
and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them express
relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in rerum natura
corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of them as we
sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete possession
of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce them, and
have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least explained and
were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away by a word to
which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions such as
'authority,'
'equality,'
'utility,'
'liberty,'
'pleasure,'
'experience,'
'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' and a heap of other
metaphysical and theological terms, are the source of quite as much error
and illusion and have as little relation to actual facts as the ideas of Plato.
Few students of theology or philosophy have sufficiently reflected how

quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes away; or how hard it is for one
age to understand the writings of another; or how nice a judgment is
required of those who are seeking to express the philosophy of one age in
the terms of another. The 'eternal truths' of which metaphysicians speak
have hardly ever lasted more than a generation. In our own day schools or
systems of philosophy which have once been famous have died before the
founders of them. We are still, as in Plato's age, groping about for a new
method more comprehensive than any of those which now prevail; and also
more permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the promise of such a
method, which can hardly be any other than the method of idealized
experience, having roots which strike far down into the history of
philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the past,
or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, or theory from
fact, or the divine from the human, or one science from another, but labours
to connect them. Along such a road we have proceeded a few steps,
sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the want of method which prevails
in our own day. In another age, all the branches of knowledge, whether
relating to God or man or nature, will become the knowledge of 'the
revelation of a single science' (Symp.), and all things, like the stars in
heaven, will shed their light upon one another.

MENO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno
(Boy), Anytus.
MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching
or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it
comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were
famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but
now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom,
especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And
this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae,
among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the
Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit
of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who
know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any
Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear
Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom
seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask
any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in
your face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you
think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what
virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I
myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest
of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about
virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know the
'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or
the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you
think that I could?
MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you
do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to
Thessaly?

SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I
have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.
MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
SOCRATES: Yes, I have.
MENO: And did you not think that he knew?
SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot
now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know,
and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he
said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you
and he think much alike.
MENO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me:
By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for
I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and
Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying
that I have never found anybody who had.
MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.
Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the
state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his
enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's
virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her
duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband.
Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or
free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of
definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of
us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare
Arist. Pol.).
SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue,
you present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your
keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you,
What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of
bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and
different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some
other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer
me?

MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know,
Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all
alike;—would you be able to answer?
MENO: I should.
SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they
may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on
this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to
have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the
question as I could wish.
SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man,
another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to
virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is
the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.
SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is
strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same
strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that
strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any
difference?
MENO: I think not.
SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a
child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the
others.
SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was
to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
MENO: I did say so.
SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered
without temperance and without justice?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or
justly order them with temperance and justice?

MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and
women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if
they are intemperate and unjust?
MENO: They cannot.
SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by
participation in the same virtues?
MENO: Such is the inference.
SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same
way, unless their virtue had been the same?
MENO: They would not.
SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven,
try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?
SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.
MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what
to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is
virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his
father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a
slave?
MENO: I think not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once
more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but
do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?
MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?
MENO: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for
example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode
of speaking, because there are other figures.
MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that
there are other virtues as well as justice.
SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell
you the names of the other figures if you asked me.
MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are
virtues; and there are many others.
SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching
after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before;
but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through
them all.
MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the
attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you
know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one
asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is
figure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way
of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a
figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And for this reason—that there are other figures?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there?
you would have told him.
MENO: I should.
SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered
whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is
colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other
colours as well.
MENO: I should.
SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?—you would
have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.

MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way,
he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not
what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say
that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that
common nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as
well as round, and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode
of speaking?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the
round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than
round?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure
than the straight, or the straight than the round?
MENO: Very true.
SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and
answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about
figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you
want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and
say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And
then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is
that 'simile in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only
round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question,
Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a
view to the answer about virtue.
MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
MENO: By all means.
SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
MENO: I will.
SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do
you say to this answer?—Figure is the only thing which always follows
colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you
would let me have a similar definition of virtue?
MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.
SOCRATES: Why simple?
MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows
colour.
(SOCRATES: Granted.)
MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is,
any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given
him?
SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a
philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You
have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the
argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you
and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's
vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use
of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And
this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will
acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or
termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense,
although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but
still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is
all which I am saying—not anything very difficult.
MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.
SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for
example in geometry.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my
definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or,
more concisely, the limit of solid.
MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?

SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man
to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering
what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking,
and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
MENO: Why do you think so?
SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all
beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I
suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore
to humour you I must answer.
MENO: Please do.
SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of
Gorgias, which is familiar to you?
MENO: I should like nothing better.
SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are
certain effluences of existence?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences
pass?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some
of them are too small or too large?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'—colour is an
effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.
SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have
been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect,
that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of
many other similar phenomena.

MENO: Quite true.
SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and
therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that
the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same
opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as
you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.
MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.
SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do
my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many
as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me
what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as
the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole
and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the
pattern.
MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires
the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say
too—
'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining
them.'
SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the
good?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who
desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
MENO: I think not.
SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to
be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
MENO: Both, I think.
SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils
to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

MENO: Certainly I do.
SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?
MENO: Yes, of possession.
SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who
possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and
others who know that they will do them harm.
SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do
them good know that they are evils?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although
they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be
goods they really desire goods?
MENO: Yes, in that case.
SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think
that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt
by them?
MENO: They must know it.
SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are
miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
MENO: How can it be otherwise?
SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?
MENO: Yes, indeed.
SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?
MENO: I should say not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is
no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and
possession of evil?
MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
desires evil.
SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the
desire and power of attaining good?

MENO: Yes, I did say so.
SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common
to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good,
he must be better in the power of attaining it?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to
be the power of attaining good?
MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now
view this matter.
SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another
point of view; for very likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be
the power of attaining goods?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and
wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour
in the state—those are what you would call goods?
MENO: Yes, I should include all those.
SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of
the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you
add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no
consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest,
equally to be deemed virtue?
MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part
of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be
equally virtue?
MENO: True.

SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than
the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by
justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.
MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance,
and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.
MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands
whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were
to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that
virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you
acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is
doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by
you to be parts of virtue.
MENO: What of that?
SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature
of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare
every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you
had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when
frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I
must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for
otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is
virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with
justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one
who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?
MENO: No; I do not say that he can.
SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we
rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or
unadmitted?
MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.

SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to
any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over
again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?
MENO: I believe that you are.
SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you
and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were
always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting
your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and
am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem
to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like
the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him,
as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really
torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been
delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to
many persons—and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this
moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise
in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as
you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me.
MENO: Why?
SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I
know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
them—as well they may—but I shall not return the compliment. As to my
being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in
others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others,
not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now
I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although
you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no
objection to join with you in the enquiry.
MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not
know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find

what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did
not know?
SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome
dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either
about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he
knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not
know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post.
Anal.).
MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
SOCRATES: I think not.
MENO: Why not?
SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and
women who spoke of things divine that—
MENO: What did they say?
SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.
MENO: What was it? and who were they?
SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied
how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been
poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many
others who were inspired. And they say—mark, now, and see whether their
words are true—they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time
has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is
never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in
perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those
from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from
beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become
noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly
heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been
born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this
world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder
that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about
virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has
learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say
learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and
does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And

therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the
impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the
sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that
confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.
MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not
learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can
you teach me how this is?
SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now
you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching,
but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a
contradiction.
MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only
asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say
is true, I wish that you would.
SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the
utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous
attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.
MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy.
SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.
SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe
whether he learns of me or only remembers.
MENO: I will.
SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a
square?
BOY: I do.
SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines
equal?
BOY: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of
the square are also equal?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: A square may be of any size?

BOY: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other
side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one
direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot,
the whole would be of two feet taken once?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two
feet?
BOY: There are.
SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.
BOY: Four, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as
this, and having like this the lines equal?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?
BOY: Of eight feet.
SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms
the side of that double square: this is two feet—what will that be?
BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy
anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows
how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square
feet; does he not?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And does he really know?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line
is double.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To
the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a

double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure
equal every way, and twice the size of this—that is to say of eight feet; and
I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from
double line?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another
such line here?
BOY: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight
feet?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is
the figure of eight feet?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of
which is equal to the figure of four feet?
BOY: True.
SOCRATES: And is not that four times four?
BOY: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And four times is not double?
BOY: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: But how much?
BOY: Four times as much.
SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice,
but four times as much.
BOY: True.
SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen—are they not?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this
gives one of sixteen feet;—do you see?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?

BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this,
and half the size of the other?
BOY: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than
this one, and less than that one?
BOY: Yes; I think so.
SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now
tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be
more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
BOY: It ought.
SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.
BOY: Three feet.
SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the
line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are
two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way,
the whole space will be three times three feet?
BOY: That is evident.
SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?
BOY: Nine.
SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?
BOY: Eight.
SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?
BOY: No.
SOCRATES: But from what line?—tell me exactly; and if you would
rather not reckon, try and show me the line.
BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his
power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now,
what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew,
and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a
difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
MENO: I think that he is.
SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's
shock,' have we done him any harm?
MENO: I think not.
SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some
degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his
ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and
again that the double space should have a double side.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into
or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it,
until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and
had desired to know?
MENO: I think not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?
MENO: I think so.
SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him,
and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you
watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead
of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I
have drawn?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?
BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?
BOY: Very good.
SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?
BOY: Four times.
SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.
BOY: True.
SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner,
bisect each of these spaces?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this
space?
BOY: There are.
SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is.
BOY: I do not understand.
SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?
BOY: Yes.
SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?
BOY: Four.
SOCRATES: And how many in this?
BOY: Two.
SOCRATES: And four is how many times two?
BOY: Twice.
SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?
BOY: Of eight feet.
SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?
BOY: From this.
SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner
of the figure of four feet?
BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal.
And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to
affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?
BOY: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers
given out of his own head?
MENO: Yes, they were all his own.
SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his—had he not?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of
that which he does not know?
MENO: He has.
SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in
him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in
different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?
MENO: I dare say.
SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his
knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is
recollection?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either
have acquired or always possessed?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would
always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have
acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be
made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of
knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know
about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.
SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?
MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.
SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he
must have had and learned it at some other time?
MENO: Clearly he must.
SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at
the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened
into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always
possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?
MENO: Obviously.
SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then
the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what
you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.
MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.
SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have
said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and
braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we
should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing
and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;—that is a theme upon
which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.
MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.
SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that
which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together
into the nature of virtue?
MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to
my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard
it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some
other way?
SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I
would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until
we had first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me

who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,—such being your
notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And
therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do
not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and
allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other
way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked
whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or,
whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain
circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis
which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that when
you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply it to the given
line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the given area of the triangle
falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced (Or, similar to the
area so applied.), then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible
then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell
you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle':—that is
a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and
qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a
hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be
taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,
—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying,
'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue
taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is
taught?
MENO: I agree.
SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if
virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of
another species?
MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.
SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis
which is not set aside.

MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from
knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good,
then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good
things are profitable?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
MENO: That is the only inference.
SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally
profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of
these, we call profitable?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm:
would you not think so?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them
profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used,
and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are
temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory,
magnanimity, and the like?
MENO: Surely.
SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another
sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example,
courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man
has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
MENO: True.

SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable,
but when done without sense they are hurtful?
MENO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when
under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the
guidance of folly, in the opposite?
MENO: That appears to be true.
SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be
profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the
soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made
profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if
virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
MENO: I quite agree.
SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which
we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil,
do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides
and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are
benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul
wrongly.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other
things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon
wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which
profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either
wholly or partly wisdom?
MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.
SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?
MENO: I think not.

SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been
discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great
men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had
got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm,
and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that
no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have
been useful to the state?
MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.
SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good
by instruction?
MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the
supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is
taught.
SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?
MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right.
SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should
stand firm not only just now, but always.
MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that
knowledge is virtue?
SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the
assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have
some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and
say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not
have teachers and disciples?
MENO: Surely.
SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers
nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?
MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?
SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and
taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have
assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the
most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately
have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make
enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a

wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by
accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself
as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a wellconditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying;
moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian
people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest
offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn
whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus,
to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the
teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good
physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the
physicians?
ANYTUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not
send him to the cobblers?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so forth?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say
that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him
to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to
those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who
demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who
will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right
in sending him?
ANYTUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the
other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse
to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be
plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed
teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge
which he wishes him to acquire—would not such conduct be the height of
folly?
ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with
me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires
to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the
house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to
send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom
should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous
argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and
avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to
impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?
ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the
people whom mankind call Sophists?
ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or
kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be
so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest
pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.
SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they
know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones
who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are
entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand
money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man,
Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias,
who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that
be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or
clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days
undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more than
forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples
from him worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I
am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of
which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time
he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only
Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before
him, and others who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived
and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them
consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be
the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave
their money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and
guardians who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more
out of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in,
and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.
SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes
you so angry with them?
ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had,
nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.
SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?
ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted.
SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is
good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?
ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these
are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.
SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make
out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with
them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the
teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I
only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him
how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He
is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.
ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?
SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these
things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you
are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom
among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?
ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken
at random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the
Sophists.
SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without
having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others
that which they had never learned themselves?

ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of
gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?
SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there
always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question
is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;—not whether
there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether
virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now,
do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew
how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a
thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another?
That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the
matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a
good man?
ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better.
SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man
ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?
ANYTUS: Yes certainly,—if he wanted to be so.
SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have
desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not
have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to
him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a
famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and
hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything
which could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not
heard from our elders of him?
ANYTUS: I have.
SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of
capacity?
ANYTUS: Very likely not.
SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that
Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father
was?
ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so.
SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father
Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and

allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better
than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled?
ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not.
SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among
the best men of the past. Let us take another,—Aristides, the son of
Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?
ANYTUS: To be sure I should.
SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any
other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But
what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an
acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again,
magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, Paralus
and Xanthippus.
ANYTUS: I know.
SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled
horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of
arts—in these respects they were on a level with the best—and had he no
wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue,
as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the
incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in
number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and
Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he
trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them
he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had
the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you
remember them?
ANYTUS: I have heard of them.
SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children
were taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught
them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could
have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not
many friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great
family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue
could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or
foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not

himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend
Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?
ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men:
and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful.
Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do
them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you
know.
SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be
in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these
gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them
himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and
if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno;
for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?
MENO: Certainly there are.
SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they
profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?
MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear
them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the
reverse.
SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the
possibility of their own vocation?
MENO: I think not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only
professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising
to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them;
but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.
SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?
MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in
doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.
SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians
have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet
says the very same thing?
MENO: Where does he say so?

SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.):
'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to
them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the
bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.'
Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?
MENO: Clearly.
SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.):
'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who
were able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.'
And again:—
'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have
heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad
man into a good one.'
And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.
MENO: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are
affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant
themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to
teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen'
are sometimes saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the
opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas
are in such confusion?
MENO: I should say, certainly not.
SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers,
clearly there can be no other teachers?
MENO: No.
SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?
MENO: Agreed.

SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of
which there are neither teachers nor disciples?
MENO: We have.
SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
MENO: There are not.
SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
MENO: That, I think, is true.
SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?
MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates,
that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into
existence?
SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much,
and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been
of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some
one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I
observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and
good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge
(episteme);—and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can
be any good men at all.
MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable.
Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are
true guides to us of action—there we were also right?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless
he have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.
MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'?
SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or
anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be
a right and good guide?
MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but
had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other
knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who
knows the truth?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as
knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation
about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of
right action; whereas there is also right opinion.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will
always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and
sometimes not.
SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right
opinion, so long as he has right opinion?
MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I
wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they
should ever differ.
SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?
MENO: Do tell me.
SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images
of Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in
your country?
MENO: What have they to do with the question?
SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them,
and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.
MENO: Well, what of that?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if
they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when
fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art.
Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide

with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human
soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until
they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend
Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are
bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the
second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more
honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet
that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me.
There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most
certainly one of them.
MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.
SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading
the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or
less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him
who has knowledge?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to
be useful?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not
only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion,
and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or
acquired by him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?
MENO: Not I.)
SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good
by nature good?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether
virtue is acquired by teaching?
MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought,
it was taught?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there
were no teachers, not?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of
virtue?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not
wisdom?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion
—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not
under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and
knowledge.
MENO: I think so too.
SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.
MENO: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is
knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in
political life.
MENO: I think not.
SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they
were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke
govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others
like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

MENO: That is probably true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which
remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is
in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say
many things truly, but they know not what they say.
MENO: So I believe.
SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who,
having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom
we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole
tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and
illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say
many grand things, not knowing what they say.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine—do they
not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine
man.'
MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely
our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.
SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another
opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the result seems
to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor
acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct
accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among
statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be
such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that
Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are
flitting shades'; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among
shadows.
MENO: That is excellent, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the
virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until,
before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of
virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded

yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated;
if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to the Athenian
people.
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INTRODUCTION.
After an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of
Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to Echecrates
and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.' The Dialogue
necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has to be
described acting as well as speaking. The minutest particulars of the event
are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an equal interest in
them.
During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has
occupied thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred. (Compare
Xen. Mem.) The time has been passed by him in conversation with a select
company of disciples. But now the holy season is over, and the disciples
meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with Socrates for the
last time. Those who were present, and those who might have been
expected to be present, are mentioned by name. There are Simmias and
Cebes (Crito), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates 'by his
enchantments has attracted from Thebes' (Mem.), Crito the aged friend, the
attendant of the prison, who is as good as a friend—these take part in the
conversation. There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon
derived his information about the trial of Socrates (Mem.), the 'madman'
Apollodorus (Symp.), Euclid and Terpsion from Megara (compare Theaet.),
Ctesippus, Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some other less-known members
of the Socratic circle, all of whom are silent auditors. Aristippus,
Cleombrotus, and Plato are noted as absent. Almost as soon as the friends
of Socrates enter the prison Xanthippe and her children are sent home in the
care of one of Crito's servants. Socrates himself has just been released from
chains, and is led by this circumstance to make the natural remark that
'pleasure follows pain.' (Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his
doctrine of the alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have represented
them in a fable as a two-headed creature of the gods.' The mention of Aesop
reminds Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet
(compare Apol.): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had
been putting Aesop into verse?'—'Because several times in his life he had

been warned in dreams that he should practise music; and as he was about
to die and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the
admonition in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as well as
by cultivating philosophy. Tell this to Evenus; and say that I would have
him follow me in death.' 'He is not at all the sort of man to comply with
your request, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a philosopher?' 'Yes.' 'Then he will
be willing to die, although he will not take his own life, for that is held to be
unlawful.'
Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be
accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a
prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away—this is
the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his own property, but
a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with that which
does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a possession of the
gods, should he wish to die and leave them? For he is under their
protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself than they take of
him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring to Socrates, whom they
think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods and his friends.
Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are wise and good, and
perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is ready to defend himself
against the charge of Cebes. The company shall be his judges, and he hopes
that he will be more successful in convincing them than he had been in
convincing the court.
The philosopher desires death—which the wicked world will insinuate
that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which they
are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is, What is
the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the separation of soul
and body—and the philosopher desires such a separation. He would like to
be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the senses, which are
always perturbing his mental vision. He wants to get rid of eyes and ears,
and with the light of the mind only to behold the light of truth. All the evils
and impurities and necessities of men come from the body. And death
separates him from these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay
aside. Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives?
Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through
which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?

Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of
other men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater
dangers, and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he
disdains this balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of
commerce and not of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are regarded
by him only as purifications of the soul. And this was the meaning of the
founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the wand-bearers but
few are the mystics.' (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are called but few are
chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of these mystics, Socrates is now
departing. This is his answer to any one who charges him with indifference
at the prospect of leaving the gods and his friends.
Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish
away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old
Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and that
the living come from them. This he attempts to found on a philosophical
assumption that all opposites—e.g. less, greater; weaker, stronger; sleeping,
waking; life, death—are generated out of each other. Nor can the process of
generation be only a passage from living to dying, for then all would end in
death. The perpetual sleeper (Endymion) would be no longer distinguished
from the rest of mankind. The circle of nature is not complete unless the
living come from the dead as well as pass to them.
The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation
of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded.
One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is derived from the
latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned
person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of
association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from
seeing a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall
the player of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated
with the higher notion of absolute equality. But here observe that material
equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which they
are compared, and which is the measure of them. And the measure or
standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality prior
to the visible equals. And if prior to them, then prior also to the perceptions
of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given before birth or at
birth. But all men have not this knowledge, nor have any without a process
of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not innate or given at birth,

unless indeed it was given and taken away at the same instant. But if not
given to men in birth, it must have been given before birth—this is the only
alternative which remains. And if we had ideas in a former state, then our
souls must have existed and must have had intelligence in a former state.
The pre-existence of the soul stands or falls with the doctrine of ideas.
It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a
former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by
recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living
come from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish into
air (especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet been
charmed away. He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away,
let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to
dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the
changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the latter
and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own pure
thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into the
region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: in this
respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. And in
every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and immortality, and
the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the body is liable to speedy
dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite indissoluble. (Compare Tim.) Yet
even the body may be preserved for ages by the embalmer's art: how
unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and be dissipated into air while on
her way to the good and wise God! She has been gathered into herself,
holding aloof from the body, and practising death all her life long, and she
is now finally released from the errors and follies and passions of men, and
for ever dwells in the company of the gods.
But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no
eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily appetites,
cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world below she lingers
about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which she loved, a ghostly
apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible. At length entering
into some animal of a nature congenial to her former life of sensuality or
violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a kite. And of these earthly
souls the happiest are those who have practised virtue without philosophy;
they are allowed to pass into gentle and social natures, such as bees and
ants. (Compare Republic, Meno.) But only the philosopher who departs

pure is permitted to enter the company of the gods. (Compare Phaedrus.)
This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly lusts, and not because he
fears loss or disgrace, which is the motive of other men. He too has been a
captive, and the willing agent of his own captivity. But philosophy has
spoken to him, and he has heard her voice; she has gently entreated him,
and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and purged away the mists of passion
and the illusions of sense which envelope him; his soul has escaped from
the influence of pleasures and pains, which are like nails fastening her to
the body. To that prison-house she will not return; and therefore she
abstains from bodily pleasures—not from a desire of having more or greater
ones, but because she knows that only when calm and free from the
dominion of the body can she behold the light of truth.
Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise
objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let them
regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of Apollo all
his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. Simmias
acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom.
'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man take the
best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through life.' He
proceeds to state his difficulty: It has been argued that the soul is invisible
and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to the body. But is not
the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she not the same relation
to the body, as the harmony—which like her is invisible—has to the lyre?
And yet the harmony does not survive the lyre. Cebes has also an objection,
which like Simmias he expresses in a figure. He is willing to admit that the
soul is more lasting than the body. But the more lasting nature of the soul
does not prove her immortality; for after having worn out many bodies in a
single life, and many more in successive births and deaths, she may at last
perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the objection, the very act of birth
may be the beginning of her death, and her last body may survive her, just
as the coat of an old weaver is left behind him after he is dead, although a
man is more lasting than his coat. And he who would prove the immortality
of the soul, must prove not only that the soul outlives one or many bodies,
but that she outlives them all.
The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the
feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the enquiry
is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like men, are apt to

be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived become distrustful
both of arguments and of friends. But this unfortunate experience should
not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. The want of health
and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. Socrates, who is about to
die, is sensible of his own weakness; he desires to be impartial, but he
cannot help feeling that he has too great an interest in the truth of the
argument. And therefore he would have his friends examine and refute him,
if they think that he is in error.
At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not go
to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas. Simmias is of opinion
that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the preexistence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with this.
(Compare a parallel difficulty in Theaet.) For a harmony is an effect,
whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows, but the
soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no degrees.
Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul
better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one
harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of degrees, and cannot
therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the soul is often engaged in
resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes Odysseus 'rebuking
his heart.' Could he have written this under the idea that the soul is a
harmony of the body? Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer and
ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?
The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of
Simmias, has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given
to the Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes,
which, as he remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or
causation; about this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience.
When he was young he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired
into the growth and decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last
he began to doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and
drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for such
enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and
number. At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of
greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the like.
But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a contradiction. For
how can one be divided into two? Or two be compounded into one? These

are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer. Of generation and destruction
he knows nothing. But he has a confused notion of another method in which
matters of this sort are to be investigated. (Compare Republic; Charm.)
Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind
is the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause of all
things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best. The new teacher will
show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How great had been his
hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found that his new friend
was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and that he soon
introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. (Compare Arist.
Metaph.) It was as if a person had said that Socrates is sitting here because
he is made up of bones and muscles, instead of telling the true reason—that
he is here because the Athenians have thought good to sentence him to
death, and he has thought good to await his sentence. Had his bones and
muscles been left by him to their own ideas of right, they would long ago
have taken themselves off. But surely there is a great confusion of the cause
and condition in all this. And this confusion also leads people into all sorts
of erroneous theories about the position and motions of the earth. None of
them know how much stronger than any Atlas is the power of the best. But
this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in enquiring after the cause, we can only
hope to attain the second best.
Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as
there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the
precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, or in
a glass. (Compare Laws; Republic.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, 'that I
might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better return to the old
and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say that he who
contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only through a
glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.'
If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that he
will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. He will
only ask for a further admission:—that beauty is the cause of the beautiful,
greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, and so on of other
things. This is a safe and simple answer, which escapes the contradictions
of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is smaller!), of addition
and subtraction, and the other difficulties of relation. These subtleties he is

for leaving to wiser heads than his own; he prefers to test ideas by the
consistency of their consequences, and, if asked to give an account of them,
goes back to some higher idea or hypothesis which appears to him to be the
best, until at last he arrives at a resting-place. (Republic; Phil.)
The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the
Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the
assent of any man of sense. The narrative is continued; Socrates is desirous
of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do not really
co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias may be said to
have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than Socrates and
less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great and also small, but
only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the illustration, says
Socrates, because I want to show you not only that ideal opposites exclude
one another, but also the opposites in us. I, for example, having the attribute
of smallness remain small, and cannot become great: the smallness which is
in me drives out greatness.
One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old
assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies Socrates, was
affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of opposition in
the concrete—not of life and death, but of individuals living and dying.
When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: This doctrine of
the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the opposites
themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them. For example,
cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable from heat, cannot
co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold, with heat.
Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three is an odd
number and four is an even number, and the odd is opposed to the even.
Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple answer.' We
may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the number three,
which participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in like manner, not
only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life is the inseparable
attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life is the inseparable
attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable. If the odd principle were
imperishable, then the number three would not perish but remove, on the
approach of the even principle. But the immortal is imperishable; and
therefore the soul on the approach of death does not perish but removes.

Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the application
has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we
to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. For death is not the
end of all, and the wicked is not released from his evil by death; but every
one carries with him into the world below that which he is or has become,
and that only.
For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has
received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise
soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who
guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul
wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried at last
to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. 'In order that
you may understand this, I must first describe to you the nature and
conformation of the earth.'
Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is
maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the earth
is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and waters and
the thick lower air; but the true earth is above, and is in a finer and subtler
element. And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface of the air, in the same
manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, then we should behold the
true earth and the true heaven and the true stars. Our earth is everywhere
corrupted and corroded; and even the land which is fairer than the sea, for
that is a mere chaos or waste of water and mud and sand, has nothing to
show in comparison of the other world. But the heavenly earth is of divers
colours, sparkling with jewels brighter than gold and whiter than any snow,
having flowers and fruits innumerable. And the inhabitants dwell some on
the shore of the sea of air, others in 'islets of the blest,' and they hold
converse with the gods, and behold the sun, moon and stars as they truly
are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.
The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that
which we inhabit: but all are connected by passages and perforations in the
interior of the earth. And there is one huge chasm or opening called
Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever
flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form seas
and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and exhalation of
the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the depths of the earth and

return again, in their course forming lakes and rivers, but never descending
below the centre of the earth; for on either side the rivers flowing either
way are stopped by a precipice. These rivers are many and mighty, and
there are four principal ones, Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and
Cocytus. Oceanus is the river which encircles the earth; Acheron takes an
opposite direction, and after flowing under the earth through desert places,
at last reaches the Acherusian lake,—this is the river at which the souls of
the dead await their return to earth. Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire,
which coils round the earth and flows into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth
river, Cocytus, is that which is called by the poets the Stygian river, and
passes into and forms the lake Styx, from the waters of which it gains new
and strange powers. This river, too, falls into Tartarus.
The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who
are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out.
Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and
then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have
committed crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into
Tartarus, but are cast forth at the end of a year by way of Pyriphlegethon or
Cocytus, and these carry them as far as the Acherusian lake, where they call
upon their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake. And if
they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease: if not, they are
borne unceasingly into Tartarus and back again, until they at last obtain
mercy. The pure souls also receive their reward, and have their abode in the
upper earth, and a select few in still fairer 'mansions.'
Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this
description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. He who
has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures of
the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose
voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be heard calling all
men.
The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much
remains to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he
refuses to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body. His
friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be
sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the customary
ceremonies of washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of the poison?

In the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he utters in the very
act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. With a sort of irony he
remembers that a trifling religious duty is still unfulfilled, just as above he
desires before he departs to compose a few verses in order to satisfy a
scruple about a dream—unless, indeed, we suppose him to mean, that he
was now restored to health, and made the customary offering to Asclepius
in token of his recovery.
1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into the heart
of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any examination of the
nature or grounds of their belief. They do not like to acknowledge that this,
as well as the other 'eternal ideas; of man, has a history in time, which may
be traced in Greek poetry or philosophy, and also in the Hebrew Scriptures.
They convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a network of dialectics over
that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. In the same temper which
Socrates reproves in himself they are disposed to think that even fallacies
will do no harm, for they will die with them, and while they live they will
gain by the delusion. And when they consider the numberless bad
arguments which have been pressed into the service of theology, they say,
like the companions of Socrates, 'What argument can we ever trust again?'
But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered from the Phaedo, as
well as from the other writings of Plato, which says that first principles
should be most constantly reviewed (Phaedo and Crat.), and that the highest
subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy (Republic); also that we must
not become misologists because arguments are apt to be deceivers.
2. In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned belief in
the immortality of the soul. It was based on the authority of the Church, on
the necessity of such a belief to morality and the order of society, on the
evidence of an historical fact, and also on analogies and figures of speech
which filled up the void or gave an expression in words to a cherished
instinct. The mass of mankind went on their way busy with the affairs of
this life, hardly stopping to think about another. But in our own day the
question has been reopened, and it is doubtful whether the belief which in
the first ages of Christianity was the strongest motive of action can survive
the conflict with a scientific age in which the rules of evidence are stricter
and the mind has become more sensitive to criticism. It has faded into the
distance by a natural process as it was removed further and further from the

historical fact on which it has been supposed to rest. Arguments derived
from material things such as the seed and the ear of corn or transitions in
the life of animals from one state of being to another (the chrysalis and the
butterfly) are not 'in pari materia' with arguments from the visible to the
invisible, and are therefore felt to be no longer applicable. The evidence to
the historical fact seems to be weaker than was once supposed: it is not
consistent with itself, and is based upon documents which are of unknown
origin. The immortality of man must be proved by other arguments than
these if it is again to become a living belief. We must ask ourselves afresh
why we still maintain it, and seek to discover a foundation for it in the
nature of God and in the first principles of morality.
3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We
certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of
fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very
select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in these few
is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the world,
whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a great thing: to
have the reputation of being one, when men have passed out of the sphere
of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of consideration. The memory
of a great man, so far from being immortal, is really limited to his own
generation:—so long as his friends or his disciples are alive, so long as his
books continue to be read, so long as his political or military successes fill a
page in the history of his country. The praises which are bestowed upon him
at his death hardly last longer than the flowers which are strewed upon his
coffin or the 'immortelles' which are laid upon his tomb. Literature makes
the most of its heroes, but the true man is well aware that far from enjoying
an immortality of fame, in a generation or two, or even in a much shorter
time, he will be forgotten and the world will get on without him.
4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is
sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The
perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the
Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of
the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with
the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the ideal
to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the object, or as
the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall we say with
Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an organized living body?

or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is the Pythagorean image of
the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer expression? Is the soul related
to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? (Arist. de
Anim.) And in another state of being is the soul to be conceived of as
vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing an existence which she can call
her own, as in the pantheistic system of Spinoza: or as an individual
informing another body and entering into new relations, but retaining her
own character? (Compare Gorgias.) Or is the opposition of soul and body a
mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union of the
two in the 'I' which is above them? And is death the assertion of this
individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of
the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human
thought? The body and the soul seem to be inseparable, not only in fact, but
in our conceptions of them; and any philosophy which too closely unites
them, or too widely separates them, either in this life or in another, disturbs
the balance of human nature. No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or
been entirely consistent with himself in describing their relation to one
another. Nor can we wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought
should have confused mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal
arguments for real ones.
5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the
question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is it
the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal? Is
it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two? Is it
the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the consciousness of self
which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius which refuses to be
extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is allied to the Author of all
existence, who is because he is perfect, and to whom our ideas of perfection
give us a title to belong? Whatever answer is given by us to these questions,
there still remains the necessity of allowing the permanence of evil, if not
for ever, at any rate for a time, in order that the wicked 'may not have too
good a bargain.' For the annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration
of it, seem to involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the
universe. Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason,
to think of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should
the mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in
any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the light

of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of humanity is a
common one, and that all or none will be partakers of immortality. Reason
does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater claims than others,
and experience may often reveal to us unexpected flashes of the higher
nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the wicked suffer any
more than ourselves? had we been placed in their circumstances should we
have been any better than they? The worst of men are objects of pity rather
than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine
benevolence? Even more than the good they have need of another life; not
that they may be punished, but that they may be educated. These are a few
of the reflections which arise in our minds when we attempt to assign any
form to our conceptions of a future state.
There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we
have no answer to them. What is to become of the animals in a future state?
Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men
who are more stupid and brutal than any animals? Does their life cease at
death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for them? They may be
said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and imperfect moral claims
upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice of God. We cannot think
of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the bird, the inhabitants of the sea
or the desert, as having any place in a future world, and if not all, why
should those who are specially attached to man be deemed worthy of any
exceptional privilege? When we reason about such a subject, almost at once
we degenerate into nonsense. It is a passing thought which has no real hold
on the mind. We may argue for the existence of animals in a future state
from the attributes of God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are not two sparrows
sold for one farthing?' etc.), but the truth is that we are only filling up the
void of another world with our own fancies. Again, we often talk about the
origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians, by which they frighten us
into believing any superstition. What answer can be made to the old
commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he knowingly permitted, but
could have prevented it?' Even if we assume that the inequalities of this life
are rectified by some transposition of human beings in another, still the
existence of the very least evil if it could have been avoided, seems to be at
variance with the love and justice of God. And so we arrive at the
conclusion that we are carrying logic too far, and that the attempt to frame
the world according to a rule of divine perfection is opposed to experience

and had better be given up. The case of the animals is our own. We must
admit that the Divine Being, although perfect himself, has placed us in a
state of life in which we may work together with him for good, but we are
very far from having attained to it.
6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always
prone to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may
serve to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot
reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward.
The progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the
great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the
relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the
ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be
discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest their
belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part of
mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the
existence of a God—also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting
about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this
world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, are
felt to be only approximations in different forms to an expression of the
common sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live again is far more
certain than that we shall take any particular form of life.
7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further
what we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living
being in countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three
years' old child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to see
the furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space really
exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the
thought of them when unlimited us so overwhelming to us as to lose all
distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human
mind, but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time, or an
existence out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal
duration, are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a
hundred or a thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our
employment in eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion
of time; or what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred
or a thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering
torments, or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period

longer than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men? Is the suffering
physical or mental? And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or
of many forms of service? Who are the wicked, and who are the good,
whom we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two
classes should we place ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that
we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine
differences of degree?—putting the whole human race into heaven or hell
for the greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the same time
describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the demands
of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened after a
thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness which
never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains are short in
proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both intense and lasting
we have no experience, and can form no idea. The words or figures of
speech which we use are not consistent with themselves. For are we not
imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or
perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors? And yet to beings constituted
as we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an infliction as
the pains of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them. Where
are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on
the greatest benefactors of mankind? And where are the crimes which
according to Plato's merciful reckoning,—more merciful, at any rate, than
the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,—for every ten years
in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come? We should
be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the sufferings which the
writers of Infernos and Purgatorios have attributed to the damned. Yet these
joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an appreciable influence over the
lives of men. The wicked man when old, is not, as Plato supposes
(Republic), more agitated by the terrors of another world when he is nearer
to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at the joys of which he is soon to be the
partaker. Age numbs the sense of both worlds; and the habit of life is
strongest in death. Even the dying mother is dreaming of her lost children
as they were forty or fifty years before, 'pattering over the boards,' not of
reunion with them in another state of being. Most persons when the last
hour comes are resigned to the order of nature and the will of God. They are
not thinking of Dante's Inferno or Paradiso, or of the Pilgrim's Progress.
Heaven and hell are not realities to them, but words or ideas; the outward

symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what. Many noble poems
and pictures have been suggested by the traditional representations of them,
which have been fixed in forms of art and can no longer be altered. Many
sermons have been filled with descriptions of celestial or infernal mansions.
But hardly even in childhood did the thought of heaven and hell supply the
motives of our actions, or at any time seriously affect the substance of our
belief.
8. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not of
sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of
Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may perhaps
disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which we can form of a
future life is a state of progress or education—a progress from evil to good,
from ignorance to knowledge. To this we are led by the analogy of the
present life, in which we see different races and nations of men, and
different men and women of the same nation, in various states or stages of
cultivation; some more and some less developed, and all of them capable of
improvement under favourable circumstances. There are punishments too of
children when they are growing up inflicted by their parents, of elder
offenders which are imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times
of life, which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of
certain actions. All these punishments are really educational; that is to say,
they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him a lesson.
Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another name for our
ignorance of the laws of nature. There is evil too inseparable from good
(compare Lysis); not always punished here, as good is not always rewarded.
It is capable of being indefinitely diminished; and as knowledge increases,
the element of chance may more and more disappear.
For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this
world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we are
tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet are
due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They have been
produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, in a
comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to imagine the
minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the
completion of our knowledge? May not the science of physiology transform
the world? Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some
moral improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good,

and is capable of becoming better. And these germs of good are often found
to be developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted
to a better soil. The differences between the savage and the civilized man,
or between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely
increased. The first difference is the effect of a few thousand, the second of
a few hundred years. We congratulate ourselves that slavery has become
industry; that law and constitutional government have superseded
despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of
Fetichism. There may yet come a time when the many may be as well off as
the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; when the
necessity of providing for the body will not interfere with mental
improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed;
and the religion of all men may become a reasonable service.
Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies
of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead us to
suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and therefore we
have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindictively in another. The
true argument from analogy is not, 'This life is a mixed state of justice and
injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of disproportionate
punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies, irregularities, injustices
are to be expected in another;' but 'This life is subject to law, and is in a
state of progress, and therefore law and progress may be believed to be the
governing principles of another.' All the analogies of this world would be
against unmeaning punishments inflicted a hundred or a thousand years
after an offence had been committed. Suffering there might be as a part of
education, but not hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression
of individuals or of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan
for the improvement of the whole (compare Laws.)
9. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the
unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, just
as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And we, like
the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our favourite
'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like himself, too, we
may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have anticipated us,
though he expresses them in different language. For we feel that the soul
partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall into the error of
confusing the external circumstances of man with his higher self; or his

origin with his nature. It is as repugnant to us as it was to him to imagine
that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to cerebral forces. The value of
a human soul, like the value of a man's life to himself, is inestimable, and
cannot be reckoned in earthly or material things. The human being alone
has the consciousness of truth and justice and love, which is the
consciousness of God. And the soul becoming more conscious of these,
becomes more conscious of her own immortality.
10. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is the
perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of God does
not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God or an
indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve us.
He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a
succession of existences,—like the animals, without attributing to each soul
an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, he must will that all rational
beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is. In the words of
the Timaeus, he is good, and therefore he desires that all other things should
be as like himself as possible. And the manner in which he accomplishes
this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of good, which are otherwise
called evil. For all progress is good relatively to the past, and yet may be
comparatively evil when regarded in the light of the future. Good and evil
are relative terms, and degrees of evil are merely the negative aspect of
degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of any finite nature we can form
no conception; we are all of us in process of transition from one degree of
good or evil to another. The difficulties which are urged about the origin or
existence of evil are mere dialectical puzzles, standing in the same relation
to Christian philosophy as the puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the
philosophy of Plato. They arise out of the tendency of the human mind to
regard good and evil both as relative and absolute; just as the riddles about
motion are to be explained by the double conception of space or matter,
which the human mind has the power of regarding either as continuous or
discrete.
In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true
and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of evil.
Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love, that he is order,
that he is the very progress of which we were speaking; and that wherever
these qualities are present, whether in the human soul or in the order of
nature, there is God. We might still see him everywhere, if we had not been

mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, instead of in us; away from the
laws of nature, instead of in them. And we become united to him not by
mystical absorption, but by partaking, whether consciously or
unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he himself is.
Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief in
God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of mankind
towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards perfection,
then there is no good and wise God. We cannot suppose that the moral
government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in
ourselves will cease when we pass out of life.
11. Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the uncertainty
of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer our words the
better. At the approach of death there is not much said; good men are too
honest to go out of the world professing more than they know. There is
perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, even religious
people speak so little to one another. In the fulness of life the thought of
death is mostly awakened by the sight or recollection of the death of others
rather than by the prospect of our own. We must also acknowledge that
there are degrees of the belief in immortality, and many forms in which it
presents itself to the mind. Some persons will say no more than that they
trust in God, and that they leave all to Him. It is a great part of true religion
not to pretend to know more than we do. Others when they quit this world
are comforted with the hope 'That they will see and know their friends in
heaven.' But it is better to leave them in the hands of God and to be assured
that 'no evil shall touch them.' There are others again to whom the belief in
a divine personality has ceased to have any longer a meaning; yet they are
satisfied that the end of all is not here, but that something still remains to us,
'and some better thing for the good than for the evil.' They are persuaded, in
spite of their theological nihilism, that the ideas of justice and truth and
holiness and love are realities. They cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the
first principles of morality. Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly,
and in a figure, that the soul is immortal.
But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail
about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in men
at one time of life than at another; it even varies from day to day. It comes
and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded. Other generations

of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of faith,' to us the total
disappearance of it might be compared to the 'sun falling from heaven.' And
we may sometimes have to begin again and acquire the belief for ourselves;
or to win it back again when it is lost. It is really weakest in the hour of
death. For Nature, like a kind mother or nurse, lays us to sleep without
frightening us; physicians, who are the witnesses of such scenes, say that
under ordinary circumstances there is no fear of the future. Often, as Plato
tells us, death is accompanied 'with pleasure.' (Tim.) When the end is still
uncertain, the cry of many a one has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.' The
last thoughts even of the best men depend chiefly on the accidents of their
bodily state. Pain soon overpowers the desire of life; old age, like the child,
is laid to sleep almost in a moment. The long experience of life will often
destroy the interest which mankind have in it. So various are the feelings
with which different persons draw near to death; and still more various the
forms in which imagination clothes it. For this alternation of feeling
compare the Old Testament,—Psalm vi.; Isaiah; Eccles.
12. When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the
imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is
observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the depth
and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very nature of
God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the physical laws to
which we are subject and the higher law which raises us above them and is
yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of becoming the
'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing in our own minds
the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the human mind in all the
higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, notwithstanding some
aberrations, has tended towards such a belief—we have reason to think that
our destiny is different from that of animals; and though we cannot
altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul upon leaving the body may
'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far as the nature of the subject admits,
a hope of immortality with which we comfort ourselves on sufficient
grounds. The denial of the belief takes the heart out of human life; it lowers
men to the level of the material. As Goethe also says, 'He is dead even in
this world who has no belief in another.'
13. It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of thought
under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented to us. It is
clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be described, as in a

picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, half-human, nor in any other
form of sense. The multitude of angels, as in Milton, singing the Almighty's
praises, are a noble image, and may furnish a theme for the poet or the
painter, but they are no longer an adequate expression of the kingdom of
God which is within us. Neither is there any mansion, in this world or
another, in which the departed can be imagined to dwell and carry on their
occupations. When this earthly tabernacle is dissolved, no other habitation
or building can take them in: it is in the language of ideas only that we
speak of them.
First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain; they have
gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world touch
them no more. Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at their best
and brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of duties—selfless,
childlike, unaffected by the world; when the eye was single and the whole
body seemed to be full of light; when the mind was clear and saw into the
purposes of God. Thirdly, we may think of them as possessed by a great
love of God and man, working out His will at a further stage in the
heavenly pilgrimage. And yet we acknowledge that these are the things
which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore it hath not entered into
the heart of man in any sensible manner to conceive them. Fourthly, there
may have been some moments in our own lives when we have risen above
ourselves, or been conscious of our truer selves, in which the will of God
has superseded our wills, and we have entered into communion with Him,
and been partakers for a brief season of the Divine truth and love, in which
like Christ we have been inspired to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and thou in
me, that we may be all made perfect in one.' These precious moments, if we
have ever known them, are the nearest approach which we can make to the
idea of immortality.
14. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is
represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same
questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to materialism;
the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same
doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the same
falling back on moral convictions. In the Phaedo the soul is conscious of
her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has been
commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning in mystery,
Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts to bring the

doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge. In
proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a
more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the form
of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence. His
language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who
speak of eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as an
ever-present quality of the soul. Yet at the conclusion of the Dialogue,
having 'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' (Republic), he replaces
the veil of mythology, and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the
language of the mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly
demand of Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who
acknowledge that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and
yet are always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in the
colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or rhetorician.
15. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks
in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in the
popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting away to
Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the blest; or of an
existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of righteous spirits,
who become guardian angels,—had given place in the mysteries and the
Orphic poets to representations, partly fanciful, of a future state of rewards
and punishments. (Laws.) The reticence of the Greeks on public occasions
and in some part of their literature respecting this 'underground' religion, is
not to be taken as a measure of the diffusion of such beliefs. If Pericles in
the funeral oration is silent on the consolations of immortality, the poet
Pindar and the tragedians on the other hand constantly assume the
continued existence of the dead in an upper or under world. Darius and
Laius are still alive; Antigone will be dear to her brethren after death; the
way to the palace of Cronos is found by those who 'have thrice departed
from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks is not 'rounded' by this life, but is
deeply set in decrees of fate and mysterious workings of powers beneath the
earth. In the caricature of Aristophanes there is also a witness to the
common sentiment. The Ionian and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and
some new elements were added to the popular belief. The individual must
find an expression as well as the world. Either the soul was supposed to
exist in the form of a magnet, or of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or
water; or of a number or of a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the

stars, a principle of motion (Arist. de Anim.). At length Anaxagoras, hardly
distinguishing between life and mind, or between mind human and divine,
attained the pure abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek
philosophy, sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of the
intelligible and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy
which assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were separable
from phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were
eternal, the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As the unity of God
was more distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the human soul
became more developed. The succession, or alternation of life and death,
had occurred to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the
modern thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' The Eastern belief in
transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like
Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of
being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they were
to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' The desire of recognizing a
lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo) was a natural
feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has given distinctness to
the hope of immortality. Nor were ethical considerations wanting, partly
derived from the necessity of punishing the greater sort of criminals, whom
no avenging power of this world could reach. The voice of conscience, too,
was heard reminding the good man that he was not altogether innocent.
(Republic.) To these indistinct longings and fears an expression was given
in the mysteries and Orphic poets: a 'heap of books' (Republic), passing
under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus in Plato's time, were filled with
notions of an under-world.
16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death had
but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the
personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the
reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and
impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to
the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion of
the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself and
his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal being of
the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a clearer denial of
the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek philosophy, and
hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is often remarked

in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For Plato and Aristotle are
not further removed in their teaching about the immortality of the soul than
they are in their theory of knowledge.
17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought,
Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And when
we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it is not
surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early logic is
always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the matter. It is easy
to see that the alternation of opposites is not the same as the generation of
them out of each other; and that the generation of them out of each other,
which is the first argument in the Phaedo, is at variance with their mutual
exclusion of each other, whether in themselves or in us, which is the last.
For even if we admit the distinction which he draws between the opposites
and the things which have the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter
class; and we have to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a
conception of an abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. Such
a conception, which in Plato himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to
us, and relative only to a particular stage in the history of thought. The
doctrine of reminiscence is also a fragment of a former world, which has no
place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of
psychology just opening to him, and he had not the explanation of them
which is supplied by the analysis of language and the history of the human
mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only
answer by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his
crowning argument is purely verbal, and is but the expression of an
instinctive confidence put into a logical form:—'The soul is immortal
because it contains a principle of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself
seem at all to be aware that nothing is added to human knowledge by his
'safe and simple answer,' that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that
he is merely reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean
numbers,' against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The
answer to the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really
the denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system
of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not
explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general notion.
Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be applied to them.
(Republic, and Phaedo.)

18. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far as
possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are eternal, their
souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.' Such an argument
stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and his age, as the argument from
the existence of God to immortality among ourselves. 'If God exists, then
the soul exists after death; and if there is no God, there is no existence of
the soul after death.' For the ideas are to his mind the reality, the truth, the
principle of permanence, as well as of intelligence and order in the world.
When Simmias and Cebes say that they are more strongly persuaded of the
existence of ideas than they are of the immortality of the soul, they
represent fairly enough the order of thought in Greek philosophy. And we
might say in the same way that we are more certain of the existence of God
than we are of the immortality of the soul, and are led by the belief in the
one to a belief in the other. The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not
perfect, but agrees in as far as the mind in either case is regarded as
dependent on something above and beyond herself. The analogy may even
be pressed a step further: 'We are more certain of our ideas of truth and right
than we are of the existence of God, and are led on in the order of thought
from one to the other.' Or more correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is
the existence of God, and can never for a moment be separated from Him.'
19. The main argument of the Phaedo is derived from the existence of
eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the
alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been
wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the
doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that in
what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief.
Such a view can only be elicited from the Phaedo by what may be termed
the transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent
with the Gorgias and the Republic. Those who maintain it are immediately
compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of
words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the immortality
of the soul has collected many elements of proof or persuasion, ethical and
mythological as well as dialectical, which are not easily to be reconciled
with one another; and he is as much in earnest about his doctrine of
retribution, which is repeated in all his more ethical writings, as about his
theory of knowledge. And while we may fairly translate the dialectical into
the language of Hegel, and the religious and mythological into the language

of Dante or Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us still in the same voice, and
appeals to a common feeling.
20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The first
may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of being.
Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking to
withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of the
world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in these aspirations the
foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern times have
argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other from the
progress of the soul towards perfection. In using this argument Plato has
certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the soul of the
good and wise. (Compare Republic.) Such a confusion was natural, and
arose partly out of the antithesis of soul and body. The soul in her own
essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces, were easily
interchanged with one another, because on a subject which passes
expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained.
21. The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the
necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their evil deeds
came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an Archelaus, an
Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their crimes in this world.
The manner in which this retribution is accomplished Plato represents under
the figures of mythology. Doubtless he felt that it was easier to improve
than to invent, and that in religion especially the traditional form was
required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far
more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as 'one
guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which he cleverly
supports by the indications of geology. Not that he insists on the absolute
truth of his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be confident in
such matters; but he will be confident that something of the kind is true.' As
in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins belief for his
fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like Dante or
Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations.
The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of all we
are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators at the time, we
cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and fearless.
He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he has in no

degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the delight of an
argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he should not heat
himself with talking. At such a time he naturally expresses the hope of his
life, that he has been a true mystic and not a mere retainer or wand-bearer:
and he refers to passages of his personal history. To his old enemies the
Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the trial, he alludes playfully; but he
vividly remembers the disappointment which he felt in reading the books of
Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippe and his children indicates that the
philosopher is not 'made of oak or rock.' Some other traits of his character
may be noted; for example, the courteous manner in which he inclines his
head to the last objector, or the ironical touch, 'Me already, as the tragic
poet would say, the voice of fate calls;' or the depreciation of the arguments
with which 'he comforted himself and them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his
references to Homer; or the playful smile with which he 'talks like a book'
about greater and less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another
teacher among barbarous races (compare Polit.); or the mysterious
reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction
for which he is vainly feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is
invested with a sort of sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo
the God of the festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn,
and then like the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the extreme
elevation of Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary interests of
life (compare his jeu d'esprit about his burial, in which for a moment he
puts on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the reader an impression
stronger than could be derived from arguments that such a one has in him 'a
principle which does not admit of death.'
The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads:
(1) private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument.
First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the
Euthydemus and the Crito; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands
in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. He is a man
of the world who is rich and prosperous (compare the jest in the
Euthydemus), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his
commands, in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the
last duty of closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the Euthydemus,
Crito shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor among the
friends of Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been

introduced by Plato in order to show the impression made by the
extraordinary man on the common. The gentle nature of the man is
indicated by his weeping at the announcement of his errand and then
turning away, and also by the words of Socrates to his disciples: 'How
charming the man is! since I have been in prison he has been always
coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.' We are reminded too that
he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of death and violence by the
contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of Socrates and of others
when about to die.
Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the
excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the
narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most
violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may be
termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next to
Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like Apollodorus, takes no
part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak of
Socrates after his death. The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his face
when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the passionate
outcries of the other. At a particular point the argument is described as
falling before the attack of Simmias. A sort of despair is introduced in the
minds of the company. The effect of this is heightened by the description of
Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene, and by the sympathy of
his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think 'that they too can never
trust an argument again.' And the intense interest of the company is
communicated not only to the first auditors, but to us who in a distant
country read the narrative of their emotions after more than two thousand
years have passed away.
The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of
Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described in
the Phaedrus as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes,
although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous of
human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks
why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine of
recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. It is Cebes who
urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the future
existence of the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the weaver and his
coat. Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about harmony and the

lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a Pythagorean disciple. It is
Simmias, too, who first remarks on the uncertainty of human knowledge,
and only at last concedes to the argument such a qualified approval as is
consistent with the feebleness of the human faculties. Cebes is the deeper
and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more superficial and rhetorical;
they are distinguished in much the same manner as Adeimantus and
Glaucon in the Republic.

Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus has
been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes were
present at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to
the Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in the Cratylus. No
inference can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the
omission of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia. The
mention of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and
may, perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to
be taken literally.
The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of ideas
is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the
writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed. Whether
the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is uncertain;
the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of Plato, is an
argument to the contrary. Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon has put language
into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the Phaedo, and may have
been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly urged that the
greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been wholly ignored
by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who
recognized a Divine plan in man and nature. (Xen. Mem.) And the language
of the Apology and of the Crito confirms this view.
The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the
other hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic writings at
which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It belongs rather to the
intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, which roughly corresponds
to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Theaetetus. Without pretending to
determine the real time of their composition, the Symposium, Meno,
Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo may be conveniently read by us in this order
as illustrative of the life of Socrates. Another chain may be formed of the
Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo, in which the immortality of the soul is connected
with the doctrine of ideas. In the Meno the theory of ideas is based on the
ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears again in the Phaedrus as
well as in the Republic and Timaeus, and in all of them is connected with a
doctrine of retribution. In the Phaedrus the immortality of the soul is
supposed to rest on the conception of the soul as a principle of motion,
whereas in the Republic the argument turns on the natural continuance of

the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own proper evil, can hardly be
destroyed by any other. The soul of man in the Timaeus is derived from the
Supreme Creator, and either returns after death to her kindred star, or
descends into the lower life of an animal. The Apology expresses the same
view as the Phaedo, but with less confidence; there the probability of death
being a long sleep is not excluded. The Theaetetus also describes, in a
digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be with God—'and to fly
to him is to be like him.' The Symposium may be observed to resemble as
well as to differ from the Phaedo. While the first notion of immortality is
only in the way of natural procreation or of posthumous fame and glory, the
higher revelation of beauty, like the good in the Republic, is the vision of
the eternal idea. So deeply rooted in Plato's mind is the belief in
immortality; so various are the forms of expression which he employs.
As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo than
appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on previous
philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean alternation
of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and
transmigration; making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a
further step by the help of the nous of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest in
the conviction that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs to the
world of the invisible and unknown. Then, as in the Gorgias or Republic,
the curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the argument.
After the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, and the
acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his narrative
true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from speculation to
practice. He is himself more confident of immortality than he is of his own
arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less strong than that
which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us.
Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo—one kind to be explained
out of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire
solution. (1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in
explaining generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which
proceed from the less general to the more general, and are tested by their
consequences; the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the method of
ideas, which to us appear only abstract terms,—these are to be explained
out of the position of Socrates and Plato in the history of philosophy. They
were living in a twilight between the sensible and the intellectual world, and

saw no way of connecting them. They could neither explain the relation of
ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation to one another. The very idea of
relation or comparison was embarrassing to them. Yet in this intellectual
uncertainty they had a conception of a proof from results, and of a moral
truth, which remained unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy. (2)
The other is a difficulty which is touched upon in the Republic as well as in
the Phaedo, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy. Plato is not
altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas. He wants to
have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and that there is
one mind or design which pervades them all. But this 'power of the best' he
is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge in universal ideas. And are
not we at this day seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly
foresaw?
Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the
Dialogues of Plato. The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the
protagonist and Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to
them in the same relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic.
No Dialogue has a greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly
fulfilled the condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that
scenes of death and suffering should be clothed in beauty. The gathering of
the friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dismissal of
Xanthippe, whose presence would have been out of place at a philosophical
discussion, but who returns again with her children to take a final farewell,
the dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument,
the picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in
which Socrates alone retains his composure—are masterpieces of art. And
the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: 'There
can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.'
'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings
of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their charm is their
simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as if
incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some of the
deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing in any tragedy, ancient or
modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like the last
hours of Socrates in Plato. The master could not be more fitly occupied at
such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the disciples more
divinely consoled. The arguments, taken in the spirit and not in the letter,

are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be even thought to
refute some 'eccentric notions; current in our own age. For there are
philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand how much
stronger is the power of intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or
mechanical force. How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually
uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this
question. And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great work,
than to linger among critical uncertainties.

PHAEDO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius.
Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the
Prison.
SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.
PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius.
ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates
on the day when he drank the poison?
PHAEDO: Yes, Echecrates, I was.
ECHECRATES: I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say
in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no
one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is
a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that
we had no clear account.
PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?
ECHECRATES: Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not
understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death,
not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?
PHAEDO: An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the
Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before
he was tried.
ECHECRATES: What is this ship?
PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition,
Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was
the saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to
Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission
to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the
voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the
stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be
polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary

winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I was
saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the
reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after
he was condemned.
ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was
said or done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the
authorities forbid them to be present—so that he had no friends near him
when he died?
PHAEDO: No; there were several of them with him.
ECHECRATES: If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me
what passed, as exactly as you can.
PHAEDO: I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish.
To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I
speak myself or hear another speak of him.
ECHECRATES: You will have listeners who are of the same mind with
you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.
PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could
hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did
not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and bearing
were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that
in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he
would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there, and therefore I
did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not
the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy
was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there
was also a strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die,
and this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping
by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man?
ECHECRATES: Yes.
PHAEDO: He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly
moved.
ECHECRATES: Who were present?
PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus,
Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines,

Antisthenes; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and
some others; Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.
ECHECRATES: Were there any strangers?
PHAEDO: Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and
Phaedondes; Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara.
ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?
PHAEDO: No, they were said to be in Aegina.
ECHECRATES: Any one else?
PHAEDO: I think that these were nearly all.
ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about?
PHAEDO: I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the
entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of
assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place,
and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one
another until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early);
then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last
morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before
when we quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come
from Delos, and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place.
On our arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us,
came out and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are
now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he
is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On
entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom
you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw
us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the last
time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you.'
Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her home.' Some
of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself.
And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed
his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the thing called
pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be
the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at the same instant,
and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other; their
bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help

thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable
about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he
fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when one comes
the other follows, as I know by my own experience now, when after the
pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.
Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the
name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by
many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the
poet—he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to
have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to
him:—he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of
poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and
also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.
Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of
rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. But I
wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the
meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had
intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came
to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying
the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said the
dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort
and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of
my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do
what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is
bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not
certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense
of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a
respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in
obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And
first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then
considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put
together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I
took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew—
they were the first I came upon—and turned them into verse. Tell this to
Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him
come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely
to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent
companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take
your advice unless he is obliged.
Why, said Socrates,—is not Evenus a philosopher?
I think that he is, said Simmias.
Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to
die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.
Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the
ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.
Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own
life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the
disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.
My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not
repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it is
very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage
which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this
and the setting of the sun?
Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have
certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm
when he was staying with us at Thebes: and there are others who say the
same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.
Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will
understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are
evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the
only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to
be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.
Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native
Boeotian.
I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there
may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in
secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run
away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too

believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of
theirs. Do you not agree?
Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.
And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took
the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no
intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with
him, and would you not punish him if you could?
Certainly, replied Cebes.
Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a
man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is
now summoning me.
Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And
yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our
guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were
just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be
willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the
best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when set
at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A
fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run away from
his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to
run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running
away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than
himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for
upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing
out of life.
The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he,
turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily
convinced by the first thing which he hears.
And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making
does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a
truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better
than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks
that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom
you acknowledge to be our good masters.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think
that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?
We should like you to do so, said Simmias.
Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did
when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes,
that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place
that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as
certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so
sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind;
and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope
that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of
old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.
But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said
Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?—for they are a benefit in which
we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that
will be an answer to the charge against yourself.
I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what
Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you the
poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to
talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with
the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are sometimes
obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give
the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.
I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to
satisfy him.
Never mind him, he said.
And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher
has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death
he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this
may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that
the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men;
they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this
be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time

comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and
desiring?
Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have
made me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when
they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers,
and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers
desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving
of the death which they desire.
And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the
words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either what is
the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he
deserves or desires death. But enough of them:—let us discuss the matter
among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
To be sure, replied Simmias.
Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the
completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the
body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?
Just so, he replied.
There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present
inquiry if you and I can agree about it:—Ought the philosopher to care
about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and
drinking?
Certainly not, answered Simmias.
And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?
By no means.
And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for
example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments
of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise
anything more than nature needs? What do you say?
I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.
Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not
with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body
and to turn to the soul.
Quite true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be
observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of
the body.
Very true.
Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who
has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth
having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.
That is also true.
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the
body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say,
have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are
always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate
and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow
that they are the best of them?
Certainly, he replied.
Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider
anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.
True.
Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
Yes.
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of
these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any
pleasure,—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to
do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true
being?
Certainly.
And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from
his body and desires to be alone and by herself?
That is true.
Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an
absolute justice?
Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.
But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak
not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and
of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever
been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the
nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him
who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of
the essence of each thing which he considers?
Certainly.
And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with
the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or
any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in
her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid,
as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these
being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul
hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who, if not he, is likely to
attain the knowledge of true being?
What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.
And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led
to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the
following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which
seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in
the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire
will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source
of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is
liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true
being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds,
and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power
of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence
but from the body and the lusts of the body? wars are occasioned by the
love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service
of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give
to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake
ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us,

causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we
are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience
that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the
body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we
shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are
lovers, not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the
body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—
either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For
then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in
herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest
approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or
communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but
keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release
us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure
and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light
everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not
permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias,
which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and
thinking. You would agree; would you not?
Undoubtedly, Socrates.
But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, going
whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that
which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way
rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind
has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.
Certainly, replied Simmias.
And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I
was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into
herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone,
as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul
from the chains of the body?
Very true, he said.
And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed
death?
To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the
soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their
especial study?
That is true.
And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in
men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet
repining when it comes upon them.
Clearly.
And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice
of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at
the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body,
and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is
granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined,
instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive,
they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—
and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man
has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing
there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will
he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner
that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death?
Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true
philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only, he
can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd,
as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.
He would, indeed, replied Simmias.
And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not
his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover
of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or
power, or both?
Quite so, he replied.
And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic
of the philosopher?
Certainly.
There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to
consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of

superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only
who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?
Most assuredly.
For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them,
are really a contradiction.
How so?
Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a
great evil.
Very true, he said.
And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet
greater evils?
That is quite true.
Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because
they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and
because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.
Very true.
And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate
because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, but
is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish
temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in
their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they
are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called
by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being
conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense,
they are made temperate through intemperance.
Such appears to be the case.
Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or
pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not
the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for
which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in
exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or
sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the
companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar
goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up

of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with
one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health
or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these
things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are
the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have
had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a
figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the
world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after
initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say
in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—
meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number of
whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability,
to find a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I
have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when
I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I
maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at
parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall
equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do
not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence
better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.
Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say.
But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that
when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very
day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her
release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her
flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into
herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you are
speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say
is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to
show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or
intelligence.
True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of
the probabilities of these things?
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion
about them.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he
were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle
talking about matters in which I have no concern:—If you please, then, we
will proceed with the inquiry.
Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death
are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient
doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and
returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the
living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for
if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive,
if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead;
but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.
Very true, replied Cebes.
Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but
in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which
there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which
have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good
and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which
are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites
there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that
anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.
True.
And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have
become less.
Yes.
And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the
slower.
Very true.
And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more
unjust.
Of course.
And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them
are generated out of opposites?
Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two
intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other
opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an
intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is
said to wax, and that which decays to wane?
Yes, he said.
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition,
cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one
another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always
expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there
is a passing or process from one to the other of them?
Very true, he replied.
Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of
waking?
True, he said.
And what is it?
Death, he answered.
And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and
have there their two intermediate processes also?
Of course.
Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites
which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you
shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking.
The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping
waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of
generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do
you agree?
I entirely agree.
Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner.
Is not death opposed to life?
Yes.
And they are generated one from the other?
Yes.
What is generated from the living?

The dead.
And what from the dead?
I can only say in answer—the living.
Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the
dead?
That is clear, he replied.
Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?
That is true.
And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act
of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.
What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? And
shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign
to death some corresponding process of generation?
Certainly, he replied.
And what is that process?
Return to life.
And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the
world of the living?
Quite true.
Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the
living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this,
if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some
place out of which they come again.
Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of
our previous admissions.
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be
shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and
there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of
elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last
have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no
more generation of them.
What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he
replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking,
the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning,
because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be
distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no
division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again.
And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were
to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not
come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what
other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things,
and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? (But
compare Republic.)
There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems
to be absolutely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not
been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there
truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead,
and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have
a better portion than the evil.
Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply
recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we
have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible
unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man;
here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged
in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment
that I remember them.
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a
question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself,
but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason
already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a
diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.)
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you
whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another
way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is
recollection.

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of
recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has
said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still like to
hear what you were going to say.
This is what I would say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not
mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous
time.
Very true.
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask,
Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived
anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else
which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge,
may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:—The knowledge
of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
True.
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a
garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using?
Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the
youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner
any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless
examples of the same thing.
Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.
And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which
has been already forgotten through time and inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre
remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to
remember Cebes?
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
Quite so.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either
like or unlike?
It may be.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another
consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree
falls short or not of that which is recollected?
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing
as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over
and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?
Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in
life.
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
To be sure, he said.
And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of
material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them
the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will
acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:
—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at
another time unequal?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of
inequality?
Impossible, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality,
you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an

act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall
short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object,
observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but
falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes
this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the
other, although similar, was inferior?
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first
saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to
attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known,
and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some
other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the
same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things
aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must
have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to
that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that
they all aspire, and of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon
as we were born?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous
time?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born
having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the
instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other
ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness,
justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the
dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all
this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
We may.
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we
acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and
shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the
acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting,
Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
Quite true, Socrates.
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at
birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we
previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a
recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be
rightly termed recollection?
Very true.
So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help
of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to
obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it
but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives
follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know

through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and
learning is simply recollection.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge
at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our
birth?
I cannot decide at the moment.
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will
not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?
Certainly, he will.
But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very
matters about which we are speaking?
Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this
time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of
them such as ought to be given.
Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
Certainly not.
They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?
Certainly.
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born
as men?
Certainly not.
And therefore, previously?
Yes.
Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before
they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.
Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at
the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.
Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us
when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of
receiving them, or if not at what other time?
No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there
is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things;
and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state,
we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas
to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had
a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There
is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as
that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the
souls.
Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity
for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the
position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from
the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which
to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of
which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence;
and I am satisfied with the proof.
Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.
I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most
incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the
existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue
to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the
feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when
the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction
of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed
out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body,
why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be
destroyed and come to an end?
Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been
proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:—that the soul
will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the
proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the
demonstration will be complete.
But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said
Socrates, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former
one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if
the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be

born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist,
since she has to be born again?—Surely the proof which you desire has
been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad
to probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear
that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and
scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not
when the sky is calm.
Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of
our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a
child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must
persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.
Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you
have charmed away the fear.
And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you
are gone?
Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and
there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and
wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of
spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you
will not find others better able to make the search.
The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you
please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.
By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?
Very good.
Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we
imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what again
is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to
enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of
soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to
these questions.
Very true, he said.
Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally
capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which
is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.
Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging,
whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.
I agree, he said.
Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence,
which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—
whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I
say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them
always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging
forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?
They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.
And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses
or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and
may be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same
always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost
always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with
one another?
The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.
And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the
unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible
and are not seen?
That is very true, he said.
Well, then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of
existences—one seen, the other unseen.
Let us suppose them.
The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?
That may be also supposed.
And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?
To be sure.
And to which class is the body more alike and akin?
Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not by man, Socrates.

And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not
visible to the eye of man?
Yes, to the eye of man.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not seen.
Unseen then?
Yes.
Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?
That follows necessarily, Socrates.
And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an
instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or
hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the
body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul
too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and
wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a
drunkard, when she touches change?
Very true.
But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other
world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and
unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives,
when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her
erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging.
And this state of the soul is called wisdom?
That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.
And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may
be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?
I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the
argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the
most stupid person will not deny that.
And the body is more like the changing?
Yes.
Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the
body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the
body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the

divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be
that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is
subject and servant?
True.
And which does the soul resemble?
The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no
doubt of that, Socrates.
Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?
—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and
intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the
body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual,
and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be
denied?
It cannot.
But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is
not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?
Certainly.
And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible
part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and
would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not
dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a for some time, nay
even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and
the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and
embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through
infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the
bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:—Do you agree?
Yes.
And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of
the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her
way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to
go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown
away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say?
That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the
soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having
never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is

ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;—and making such abstraction
her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of
philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of
dying? For is not philosophy the practice of death?—
Certainly—
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the
divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and
is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and
all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in
company with the gods (compare Apol.). Is not this true, Cebes?
Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.
But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her
departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in
love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the
body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form,
which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his
lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the
intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can
be attained only by philosophy;—do you suppose that such a soul will
depart pure and unalloyed?

Impossible, he replied.
She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and
constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.
Very true.
And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy,
and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down
again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the
world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which, as they
tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed
pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.
(Compare Milton, Comus:—
'But when lust,
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,
The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose,
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres,
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,
As loath to leave the body that it lov'd,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state.')

That is very likely, Socrates.
Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the
good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in
payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to
wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves
them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be
supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in
their former lives.
What natures do you mean, Socrates?
What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and
wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them,
would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?
I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable.
And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and
violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;—whither else can
we suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question.
And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places
answering to their several natures and propensities?
There is not, he said.
Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in
the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and social
virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit
and attention without philosophy and mind. (Compare Republic.)
Why are they the happiest?
Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind
which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the
form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from
them.
Very likely.
No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at
the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but
the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes,
why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold
out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not because
they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and
the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they
dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.
No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.
No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own
souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say
farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when
philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they
ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.
What do you mean, Socrates?
I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the
soul was simply fastened and glued to the body—until philosophy received
her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in
and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of
ignorance; and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her
own captivity. This was her original state; and then, as I was saying, and as

the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible
was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and
gently comforted her and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye and
the ear and the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her to
retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be
gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her
own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes
to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things are
visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and
invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to
resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and
pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great
joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort
of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or
property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far, which
is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.
What is it, Socrates? said Cebes.
The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, every
soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest
and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight.
Very true.
And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?
How so?
Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and
rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes
that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the
body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits
and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world
below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another
body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the
communion of the divine and pure and simple.
Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.
And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are
temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.
Certainly not.

Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way;
she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she
may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing a
work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her
Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in
the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter
of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while
she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that
which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and
Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits,
will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the
winds and be nowhere and nothing.
When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was
silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what
had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another.
And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and
whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there are many points
still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter
thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no more, but
if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let
us have anything better which you can suggest; and if you think that I can
be of any use, allow me to help you.
Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our
minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question
which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to ask,
fearing that our importunity might be troublesome under present at such a
time.
Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not
very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation
as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now
than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much of
the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that
they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more lustily than
ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god
whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of
death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last,

not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even
the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed
to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any
more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have
the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world,
wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than they ever did before.
And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God,
and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from
my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go
out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only
objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven
magistrates of Athens allow.
Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, and
Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have the same
feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty
about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him
a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or
whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he
should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should
discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would
have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this
be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if
he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry
him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I
shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time
what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the
argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.
Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I
should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient.
In this respect, replied Simmias:—Suppose a person to use the same
argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a
thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is
harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material,
composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the
lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue
as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not

perished—you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the
strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet
that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred,
has perished—perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be
somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can
happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own
mind that such is our conception of the soul; and that when the body is in a
manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and
dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them.
But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or
overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most
divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes
at once, although the material remains of the body may last for a
considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. And if any one
maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is
first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?
Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile:
Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is
better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me.
But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has
to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both
spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if
not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said,
what was the difficulty which troubled you?
Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it
was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am
ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily
form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently
proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment,
unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am
not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the
body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the
body. Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you remain
unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in existence after
the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive
during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider whether the
objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight.

The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and
after his death somebody says:—He is not dead, he must be alive;—see,
there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains
whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is
incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and
wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has
thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more
lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg
you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see that he who talks thus is
talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven
and worn many such coats, outlived several of them, and was outlived by
the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a
coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar
figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is
lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. He may argue in
like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live
many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul
always weaves another garment and repairs the waste. But of course,
whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will
survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show
its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away. I would
therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the
continued existence of the soul after death. For granting even more than you
affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed
before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist
after death, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a
natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times—
nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the
labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths
and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings
destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can
have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is
confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to
prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot
prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason
to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant
feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced
before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and
uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one;
either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds
of belief.
ECHECRATES: There I feel with you—by heaven I do, Phaedo, and
when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question:
What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing
than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the
soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction
for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original
conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which
will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I
implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the
unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack?
And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as
you can.
PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never
more than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing,
but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving
manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his
quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the
readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general
rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and
return to the field of argument.
ECHECRATES: What followed?
PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated
on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He
stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of
playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that
these fair locks of yours will be severed.
Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.
Not so, if you will take my advice.
What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we
cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks; and if I
were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my
ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the
Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and
defeated them.
Yes, I said, but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.
Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes
down.
I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but
as Iolaus might summon Heracles.
That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a
danger.
Of what nature? I said.
Lest we become misologists, he replied, no worse thing can happen to a
man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are
also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause,
which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great
confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether true
and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and
knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several
times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to
be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarreled
with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in
him at all. You must have observed this trait of character?
I have.
And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one
having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of
human nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the
case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are
in the interval between them.
What do you mean? I said.
I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small, that
nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this
applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and

slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you
select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are
in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?
Yes, I said, I have.
And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil,
the worst would be found to be very few?
Yes, that is very likely, I said.
Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments are
unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but
the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in
dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to
be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no
longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last
that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive
the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all
things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in
never-ceasing ebb and flow.
That is quite true, I said.
Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as
truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge—that a man should have
lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then
turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of
wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame
from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards should hate
and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.
Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.
Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of
admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in
any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness
in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain
health of mind—you and all other men having regard to the whole of your
future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at this moment I am
sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am
only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares
nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his

hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the
present moment is merely this—that whereas he seeks to convince his
hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to
convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how
much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be
persuaded of the truth, but if there be nothing after death, still, during the
short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations,
and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm
will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I
approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and
not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or
if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as
myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I
die.
And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have
in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears
and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than
the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first. On
the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than
the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having
worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body
behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body
but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are
not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
They both agreed to this statement of them.
He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding
argument, or of a part only?
Of a part only, they replied.
And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we
said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must
have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the
body?
Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the
argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias
agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of
his ever thinking differently.

But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban
friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is
a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you
will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the
elements which compose it.
Never, Socrates.
But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul
existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of
elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as
you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a
state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first.
And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
Not at all, replied Simmias.
And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of
which harmony is the theme.
There ought, replied Simmias.
But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge
is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you
retain?
I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first
of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter,
which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and
plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too well
that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great
caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in
geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and
recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; and the proof
was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because
to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence.
Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on
sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to
argue that the soul is a harmony.
Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you
imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other
than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?

Certainly not.
Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
He agreed.
Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements
which make up the harmony, but only follows them.
He assented.
For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality
which is opposed to its parts.
That would be impossible, he replied.
And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in
which the elements are harmonized?
I do not understand you, he said.
I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a
harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully
harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less
completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.
True.
But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree
more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
Not in the least.
Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to
be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this
is said truly?
Yes, truly.
But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this
presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another
harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and
herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the
vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?
I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort
would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.
And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another;
which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony,

or more or less completely a harmony?
Quite true.
And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less
harmonized?
True.
And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less
of harmony, but only an equal harmony?
Yes, an equal harmony.
Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is
not more or less harmonized?
Exactly.
And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?
She has not.
And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has
no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?
Not at all more.
Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will
never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has
no part in the inharmonical.
No.
And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?
How can she have, if the previous argument holds?
Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living
creatures will be equally good?
I agree with you, Socrates, he said.
And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the
consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a
harmony?
It cannot be true.
Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature
other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?
Indeed, I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at
variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not
the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against
eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition
of the soul to the things of the body.
Very true.
But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can
never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and
vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed;
she can only follow, she cannot lead them?
It must be so, he replied.
And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite
—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost
always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life,
sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then
again more gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions,
fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee
represents Odysseus doing in the words—
'He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart: Endure, my heart; far
worse hast thou endured!'
Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a
harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather
of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner thing
than any harmony?
Yes, Socrates, I quite think so.
Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a
harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict
ourselves.
True, he said.
Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has
graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband
Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him?
I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am
sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could
never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I

quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was
surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of
yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a
similar fate.
Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye
should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however,
may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric
fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You want to
have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and the
philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and
foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the world below
than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this; and you
say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of
her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her
immortality. Admitting the soul to be longlived, and to have known and
done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and
her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the
beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end
in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body
once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the
fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if
he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality.
This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes; and I
designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you
may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.
But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or
subtract: I mean what you say that I mean.
Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At
length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the
whole nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will
give you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail
towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.
I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.
Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a
prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the
investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and

is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; and I was
always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these:—
Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold
principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which
we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind—but the
brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight
and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may
be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I
went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven
and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely
incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was
fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things
which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I
forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact as that
the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the
digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever
there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes
larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?
Yes, said Cebes, I think so.
Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I
thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and
when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller
than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than
another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two
more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the
double of one.
And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.
I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause
of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when
one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or
that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. I
cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was
one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere
juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming
two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make
two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect,—as in the

former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause
of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be
the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why
one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have
in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit
the other.
Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras,
that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this
notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the
disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the
best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the
generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what
state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a
man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would
also know the worse, since the same science comprehended both. And I
rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of
existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first
whether the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, he would
proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he
would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he
said that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain that this
position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given,
and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on
and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to
me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states,
active and passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could not
imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give
any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I
thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the
cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and
what was good for all. These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of
money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my
eagerness to know the better and the worse.
What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed!
As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any
other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and
other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by

maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but
who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in
detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones
and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which
divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which
have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them;
and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of
the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in
a curved posture—that is what he would say, and he would have a similar
explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and
air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same
sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have
thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and
more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to
think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to
Megara or Boeotia—by the dog they would, if they had been moved only
by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and
nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any
punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of
causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones
and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes.
But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in
which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and
idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from
the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always
mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and
steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the
earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them
as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; and
instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover
another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more
containing than the good;—of the obligatory and containing power of the
good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain
learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover
myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to
you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring
into the cause.

I should very much like to hear, he replied.
Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation
of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul;
as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun
during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the
image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. So in my own
case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at
things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses.
And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek
there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I
am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the
medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly,' any more than
he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was the
method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to
be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with
this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which
disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning
more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me.
No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.
There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only
what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous
discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that
cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those
familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume
that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like;
grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and
to prove the immortality of the soul.
Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this.
Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in
the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other
than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in as
far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say the same of
everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?
Yes, he said, I agree.
He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other
of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the

bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all
that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps
foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing
beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or
manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend
that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to
be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to
this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown,
and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply,
That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with
me?
I do.
And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater,
and by smallness the less become less?
True.
Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B
less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would
stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and
by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason of,
smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is
greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in
both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the
greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be
afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?
Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and
by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you
would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?
-for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.
Very true, he said.
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to
one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly
asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence
except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far
as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is

the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one.
You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser
heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to
start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the
sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not
mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences
which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further
required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume
a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best
of the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences
in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real
existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think
about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with
themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you
are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.
What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at
once.
ECHECRATES: Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting.
Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness
of Socrates' reasoning.
PHAEDO: Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole
company at the time.
ECHECRATES: Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the
company, and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?
PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist,
and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them,
Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:—
This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is
greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias
both greatness and smallness?
Yes, I do.
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the
words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size
which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is

Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has
smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?
True.
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo,
but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is
comparatively smaller?
That is true.
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small,
because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one
by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his
smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that
what I am saying is true.
Simmias assented.
I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only
that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness
in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being
exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater
will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of
the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of
smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted
smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the
same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to
be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become
great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or
become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change.
That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.
Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which
of them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was
admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the
greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; but now
this principle seems to be utterly denied.
Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your
courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there
is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in
the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed,

neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my
friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and
which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent
in them and which give their name to them; and these essential opposites
will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another.
At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted,
Cebes, at our friend's objection?
No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often
disturbed by objections.
Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in
any case be opposed to itself?
To that we are quite agreed, he replied.
Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point
of view, and see whether you agree with me:—There is a thing which you
term heat, and another thing which you term cold?
Certainly.
But are they the same as fire and snow?
Most assuredly not.
Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?
Yes.
And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is
under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the
advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?
Very true, he replied.
And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and
when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as
before, fire and cold.
That is true, he said.
And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in
an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists
only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this
clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called by the name of
odd?
Very true.

But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things
which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not
the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?—that is what I mean
to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of
odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example,
that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is
not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also of
five, and of every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is
odd, and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate
numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you agree?
Of course.
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not only do essential
opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not
in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the
idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it
approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will not the
number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into
an even number, while remaining three?
Very true, said Cebes.
And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number
three?
It is not.
Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but
also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.
Very true, he said.
Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these
are.
By all means.
Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have
possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some
opposite?
What do you mean?
I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that
those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be

three in number, but must also be odd.
Quite true.
And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the
opposite idea will never intrude?
No.
And this impress was given by the odd principle?
Yes.
And to the odd is opposed the even?
True.
Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?
No.
Then three has no part in the even?
None.
Then the triad or number three is uneven?
Very true.
To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and
yet do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although not
opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always
brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive
the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are many more of
them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not
only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings
the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which
it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in
repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more
than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The
double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but
nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2,
nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third,
admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole:
You will agree?
Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.
And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question
in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which

I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred
by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you 'what
that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will reply not heat
(this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior
answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you
'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but from fever; and
instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that
the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say
that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further
examples.
Yes, he said, I quite understand you.
Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body
alive?
The soul, he replied.
And is this always the case?
Yes, he said, of course.
Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
Yes, certainly.
And is there any opposite to life?
There is, he said.
And what is that?
Death.
Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite
of what she brings.
Impossible, replied Cebes.
And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels
the even?
The odd.
And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?
The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.
And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death?
The immortal, he said.
And does the soul admit of death?

No.
Then the soul is immortal?
Yes, he said.
And may we say that this has been proven?
Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.
Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be
imperishable?
Of course.
And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle
came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and
unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and
admitted the heat?
True, he said.
Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire
when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished,
but would have gone away unaffected?
Certainly, he said.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also
imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the
preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be
dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire
or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although the
odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd
perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes this
objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this
has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would
have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the
odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same
argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.
Very true.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also
imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if
not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.

No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is
liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.
Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the
essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.
Yes, all men, he said—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not
mistaken, as well as men.
Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is
immortal, be also imperishable?
Most certainly.
Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be
supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is
preserved safe and sound?
True.
Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable,
and our souls will truly exist in another world!
I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object;
but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to
make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to
what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he
wants to say or to have said.
But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason
for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling
uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and
the feebleness of man.
Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first
principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and
when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating
confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the
argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any
further enquiry.
Very true.
But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care
should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is
called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point

of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of
all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would
have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together
with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal,
there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the
highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world
below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are said
greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of
his journey thither.
For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he
belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered
together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world
below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this
world to the other: and when they have there received their due and
remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many
revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus
says in the Telephus, a single and straight path—if that were so no guide
would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many partings of
the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are
offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The
wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her
surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was
relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the
world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with
violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the
place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done
impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers
of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees
and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone
she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when
they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as
every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and
under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.
Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and
extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority
of one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many
descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like to
know, in which of these you put faith.
And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell
you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my
tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I
fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was
completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the
earth according to my conception of them.
That, said Simmias, will be enough.
Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the
centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar force
to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any
way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise.
For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably
diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in
the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.
Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.
Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the
region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a
small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that
there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere on the
face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which
the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth is pure
and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars also; and it is the
heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, and of which our
own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who
live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling
above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at
the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water,
and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other
stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and
sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard
from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than
his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of
the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call the

heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact is, that owing
to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the
surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take
the wings of a bird and come to the top, then like a fish who puts his head
out of the water and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if
the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this
other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true
earth. For our earth, and the stones, and the entire region which surrounds
us, are spoilt and corroded, as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine,
neither is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, and
an endless slough of mud: and even the shore is not to be compared to the
fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be compared
with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you
a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing.

And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen to you.
The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first place, the earth,
when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of those balls
which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various
colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are in a manner
samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are
brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also
the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any
chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up, and they are
more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen; the very
hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of
their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other
colours, so that the whole presents a single and continuous appearance of
variety in unity. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees, and
flowers, and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are
hills, having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent,
and fairer in colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and
jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there
all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still (compare
Republic). The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious
stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate
among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as
well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which
also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of
day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to
gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a
middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea;
others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent: and in a
word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the
ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their
seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do,
and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater
perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether
than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really
dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are
conscious of them and hold converse with them, and they see the sun,

moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece
with this.
Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around
the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the
globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which
we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some
are shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are
passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with
one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide
of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot
and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid
mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams
which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are
filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the
earth which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:
—There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right
through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the
words,—
'Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;'

and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus.
And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this
chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow.
And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the
watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and
down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water
up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act of
respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and
the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and
irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of
the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions,
and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when they leave
those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and
when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their
way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs.
Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into
many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall
into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they

rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point
from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite side,
and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or
many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but
always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in either direction
can descend only to the centre and no further, for opposite to the rivers is a
precipice.
Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four
principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus,
which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows
Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the
Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the
many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is
to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born
again as animals. The third river passes out between the two, and near the
place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than
the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy
and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the
extremities of the Acherusian Lake, but mingles not with the waters of the
lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a
deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which
throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out
on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region,
which is all of a dark-blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river
which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx,
and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters,
passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes
near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the
water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and
falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as
the poets say, is Cocytus.
Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the
place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they
have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not.
And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river
Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in
them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds,

and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to
others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each
of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by
reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and
terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are
hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come
out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are
not irremediable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done
violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of
their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating
circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are
compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts
them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides
by Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there
they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or
wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come
out into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from
their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from
thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom
they have wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their
judges. Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are
released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above,
and dwell in the purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified
themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in
mansions fairer still which may not be described, and of which the time
would fail me to tell.
Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that
we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope
great!
A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the
description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true.
But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may
venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is
true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with
words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale.
Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having
cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and

working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of
knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her
own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and
truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world
below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men,
will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say,
the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had
better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the
trouble of washing my body after I am dead.
When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for
us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in
which we can serve you?
Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, take
care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me
and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But if you
have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule
which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much
you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no avail.
We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?
In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that
I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:
—I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been
talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates
whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me?
And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when
I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,
—these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have
had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be
surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me:
but let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges
that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not
remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death,
and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would
not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out
Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words
are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of

good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only,
and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best.
When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to
bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind,
talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of
our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we
were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the
bath his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an
elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them
and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed
them and returned to us.
Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed
while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his
bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the
Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:—To you, Socrates, whom I know
to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I
will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me,
when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed,
I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware,
and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what
must needs be—you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned
away and went out.
Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do
as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I
have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he
would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how
generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and
therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the
attendant prepare some.
Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a
one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made
to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do
not hurry—there is time enough.
Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so
acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in
not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain anything

by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous in my own
eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do
as I say, and not to refuse me.
Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out,
and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the
cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in
these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man
answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then
to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to
Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or
change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes,
Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say
about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man
answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I
understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey
from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer.
Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the
poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but
now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the
draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears
were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at
the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor
was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears,
had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been
weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made
cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange
outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not
misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man should die in peace.
Be quiet, then, and have patience. When we heard his words we were
ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his
legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions,
and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and
legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could
feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and
showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said:
When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning
to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had

covered himself up, and said—they were his last words—he said: Crito, I
owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall
be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this
question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants
uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.
Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may
truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the
wisest and justest and best.
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INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
The Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of
the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches
to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the Politicus or
Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the State are more
clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the Symposium and the
Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has the
same largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows an
equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are
new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is
there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery, or more
dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to
interweave life and speculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. The
Republic is the centre around which the other Dialogues may be grouped;
here philosophy reaches the highest point (cp, especially in Books V, VI,
VII) to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks, like
Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of
knowledge, although neither of them always distinguished the bare outline
or form from the substance of truth; and both of them had to be content with
an abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest
metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in him, more than in
any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. The
sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many instruments
of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato.
The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing
in a circle, the distinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or
notion, between means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the
division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements,
or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary—these and other
great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were
probably first invented by Plato. The greatest of all logical truths, and the
one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, the difference
between words and things, has been most strenuously insisted on by him

(cp. Rep.; Polit.; Cratyl. 435, 436 ff), although he has not always avoided
the confusion of them in his own writings (e.g. Rep.). But he does not bind
up truth in logical formulae,—logic is still veiled in metaphysics; and the
science which he imagines to 'contemplate all truth and all existence' is very
unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have
discovered (Soph. Elenchi, 33. 18).
Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still
larger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well
as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Critias has given
birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to the tale of
Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as a fact to have inspired some of
the early navigators of the sixteenth century. This mythical tale, of which
the subject was a history of the wars of the Athenians against the Island of
Atlantis, is supposed to be founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to
which it would have stood in the same relation as the writings of the
logographers to the poems of Homer. It would have told of a struggle for
Liberty (cp. Tim. 25 C), intended to represent the conflict of Persia and
Hellas. We may judge from the noble commencement of the Timaeus, from
the fragment of the Critias itself, and from the third book of the Laws, in
what manner Plato would have treated this high argument. We can only
guess why the great design was abandoned; perhaps because Plato became
sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious history, or because he had lost
his interest in it, or because advancing years forbade the completion of it;
and we may please ourselves with the fancy that had this imaginary
narrative ever been finished, we should have found Plato himself
sympathising with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. Laws, iii.
698 ff.), singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps
making the reflection of Herodotus (v. 78) where he contemplates the
growth of the Athenian empire—'How brave a thing is freedom of speech,
which has made the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in
greatness!' or, more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient good
order of Athens and to the favor of Apollo and Athene (cp. Introd. to
Critias).
Again, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' ('arhchegoz') or leader of a
goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the original of
Cicero's De Republica, of St. Augustine's City of God, of the Utopia of Sir
Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States which are

framed upon the same model. The extent to which Aristotle or the
Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the Politics has been little
recognised, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not made
by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had more in common than they
were conscious of; and probably some elements of Plato remain still
undetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy too, many affinities may be
traced, not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great
original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That
there is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to
herself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been
enthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek
authors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has
had the greatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise
upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean
Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he
has a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed with
the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he exercised a real influence on
theology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics. Even the fragments of
his words when 'repeated at second-hand' (Symp. 215 D) have in all ages
ravished the hearts of men, who have seen reflected in them their own
higher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in
literature. And many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and
statesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality
of the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by him.
The argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of
which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old man—then
discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polemarchus
—then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by Socrates—
reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having become
invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which is
constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education, of
which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only for
an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and
gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of the individual
and the State. We are thus led on to the conception of a higher State, in
which 'no man calls anything his own,' and in which there is neither
'marrying nor giving in marriage,' and 'kings are philosophers' and

'philosophers are kings;' and there is another and higher education,
intellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as of art, and
not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to be
realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds
the government of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again declining
into democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but regular
order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When 'the wheel has
come full circle' we do not begin again with a new period of human life; but
we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end. The subject is
then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy which had been
more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic is now resumed and
fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to be an imitation thrice
removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as the dramatic poets, having
been condemned as an imitator, is sent into banishment along with them.
And the idea of the State is supplemented by the revelation of a future life.
The division into books, like all similar divisions (Cp. Sir G.C. Lewis in
the Classical Museum, vol. ii. p 1.), is probably later than the age of Plato.
The natural divisions are five in number;—(1) Book I and the first half of
Book II down to the paragraph beginning, 'I had always admired the genius
of Glaucon and Adeimantus,' which is introductory; the first book
containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice, and
concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without arriving at any
definite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice
according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the question
—What is justice, stripped of appearances? The second division (2)
includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth
books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State
and the first education. The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and
seventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of
enquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles of communism
and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes
the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4)
the perversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them are
reviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle of
tyranny are further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book (5) is the
conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are

finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has
now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another.
Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first
(Books I - IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in
accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the
second (Books V - X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal
kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions.
These two points of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only
veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic, like the Phaedrus (see
Introduction to Phaedrus), is an imperfect whole; the higher light of
philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at
last fades away into the heavens. Whether this imperfection of structure
arises from an enlargement of the plan; or from the imperfect reconcilement
in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are
now first brought together by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the
work at different times—are questions, like the similar question about the
Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a
distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of
publication, and an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding
to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no
absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time, or
turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would be more
likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all attempts to
determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on internal
evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at one
time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect longer works,
such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter ones. But, on the
other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the Republic may only arise out of
the discordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a
single whole, perhaps without being himself able to recognise the
inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after ages
which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for themselves.
They do not perceive the want of connexion in their own writings, or the
gaps in their systems which are visible enough to those who come after
them. In the beginnings of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of
thought and language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths
of speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely defined.

For consistency, too, is the growth of time; and some of the greatest
creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity. Tried by this test,
several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to
be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at
different times or by different hands. And the supposition that the Republic
was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in some degree
confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the work to another.
The second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the
Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, like the
other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be assumed to
be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition
of justice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of the State is the
principal argument of the work. The answer is, that the two blend in one,
and are two faces of the same truth; for justice is the order of the State, and
the State is the visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human
society. The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of
the State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian
phraseology the state is the reality of which justice is the idea. Or, described
in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, and yet developes into
a Church or external kingdom; 'the house not made with hands, eternal in
the heavens,' is reduced to the proportions of an earthly building. Or, to use
a Platonic image, justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run
through the whole texture. And when the constitution of the State is
completed, the conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under
the same or different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of
the individual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments
in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty
in buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good,
which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the institutions
of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim. 47). The Timaeus,
which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of the Republic, and
is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward world, yet
contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign over the
State, over nature, and over man.
Too much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and
modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of
nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and indeed

in literature generally, there remains often a large element which was not
comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the author's
hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing; he has not worked
out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks to find
some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must necessarily
seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied
with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the Republic, imagines
himself to have found the true argument 'in the representation of human life
in a State perfected by justice, and governed according to the idea of good.'
There may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be
said to express the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may as well
speak of many designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded from the
plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of
ideas, and which does not interfere with the general purpose. What kind or
degree of unity is to be sought after in a building, in the plastic arts, in
poetry, in prose, is a problem which has to be determined relatively to the
subject-matter. To Plato himself, the enquiry 'what was the intention of the
writer,' or 'what was the principal argument of the Republic' would have
been hardly intelligible, and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp.
the Introduction to the Phaedrus).
Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to
Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State?
Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or 'the day of the Lord,'
or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the 'Sun of righteousness with
healing in his wings' only convey, to us at least, their great spiritual ideals,
so through the Greek State Plato reveals to us his own thoughts about divine
perfection, which is the idea of good—like the sun in the visible world;—
about human perfection, which is justice—about education beginning in
youth and continuing in later years—about poets and sophists and tyrants
who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind—about 'the world'
which is the embodiment of them—about a kingdom which exists nowhere
upon earth but is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life.
No such inspired creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of
heaven when the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark,
of truth, and of fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of
philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane; it easily passes
from ideas to myths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech. It is not

prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and ought not to be judged by the
rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his
ideas into an artistic whole; they take possession of him and are too much
for him. We have no need therefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato
has conceived is practicable or not, or whether the outward form or the
inward life came first into the mind of the writer. For the practicability of
his ideas has nothing to do with their truth; and the highest thoughts to
which he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design'—
justice more than the external frame-work of the State, the idea of good
more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the organisation of ideas
has no real content; but is only a type of the method or spirit in which the
higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and all
existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato reaches the
'summit of speculation,' and these, although they fail to satisfy the
requirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as the most
important, as they are also the most original, portions of the work.
It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been
raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation
was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as
any other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, is
notoriously careless of chronology (cp. Rep., Symp., 193 A, etc.), only aims
at general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the Republic
could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have
occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty years later, or to Plato
himself at the time of writing (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one
of his own dramas); and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a
question having no answer 'which is still worth asking,' because the
investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in
Plato; it would be useless therefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched
reconcilements of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties, such,
for example, as the conjecture of C.F. Hermann, that Glaucon and
Adeimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato (cp. Apol. 34 A), or
the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating
the dates at which some of his Dialogues were written.
The principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus,
Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in
the introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument,

and Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The
main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus.
Among the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of
Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides—these
are mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts, where, as
in the Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of
Thrasymachus.
Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in
offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done
with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he
is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around the
memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him,
fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness of a
well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts.
His love of conversation, his affection, his indifference to riches, even his
garrulity, are interesting traits of character. He is not one of those who have
nothing to say, because their whole mind has been absorbed in making
money. Yet he acknowledges that riches have the advantage of placing men
above the temptation to dishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention
shown to him by Socrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the
mission imposed upon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all
men, young and old alike, should also be noted. Who better suited to raise
the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the
expression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by
Cephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not only
of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration
of Cicero in the De Senectute. The evening of life is described by Plato in
the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As
Cicero remarks (Ep. ad Attic. iv. 16), the aged Cephalus would have been
out of place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither
have understood nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety
(cp. Lysimachus in the Laches).
His 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness of
youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will
not 'let him off' on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus, he is
limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial stage of morality
which has rules of life rather than principles; and he quotes Simonides (cp.

Aristoph. Clouds) as his father had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no
more to say; the answers which he makes are only elicited from him by the
dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the
Sophists like Glaucon and Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of
refuting them; he belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is
incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he
does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief,
and that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts. From his brother Lysias
(contra Eratosth.) we learn that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants, but no
allusion is here made to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and
his family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to
Athens.
The 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already
heard in the Phaedrus, is the personification of the Sophists, according to
Plato's conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain
and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an
oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates; but a mere
child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move' (to use a
Platonic expression) will 'shut him up.' He has reached the stage of framing
general notions, and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and
Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and
vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether such
doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by him or
by any other Sophist is uncertain; in the infancy of philosophy serious
errors about morality might easily grow up—they are certainly put into the
mouths of speakers in Thucydides; but we are concerned at present with
Plato's description of him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality
of the contest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The pompous and
empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of
dialectic, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in
him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and
imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of his
assailant. His determination to cram down their throats, or put 'bodily into
their souls' his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of
his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument.
Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been
once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue the discussion with

reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, and he even testifies his
interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks. When attacked by
Glaucon he is humorously protected by Socrates 'as one who has never been
his enemy and is now his friend.' From Cicero and Quintilian and from
Aristotle's Rhetoric we learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so
ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were preserved in later ages.
The play on his name which was made by his contemporary Herodicus
(Aris. Rhet.), 'thou wast ever bold in battle,' seems to show that the
description of him is not devoid of verisimilitude.
When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents,
Glaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy
(cp. Introd. to Phaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two
sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends
Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. But on a nearer examination of them the
similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is
the impetuous youth who can 'just never have enough of fechting' (cp. the
character of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6); the man of pleasure who is
acquainted with the mysteries of love; the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' and
who improves the breed of animals; the lover of art and music who has all
the experiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration,
piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real
difficulty; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and yet
does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may
be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a
state of simplicity is 'a city of pigs,' who is always prepared with a jest
when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to
second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in
the connoisseurs of music, or in the lovers of theatricals, or in the fantastic
behaviour of the citizens of democracy. His weaknesses are several times
alluded to by Socrates, who, however, will not allow him to be attacked by
his brother Adeimantus. He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been
distinguished at the battle of Megara (anno 456?)...The character of
Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the profounder objections are
commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and
generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the argument further.
Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth;
Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In

the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be
considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that
they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their
consequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning
of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is
answered that happiness is not the first but the second thing, not the direct
aim but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State. In the
discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent, but
Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a
lighter tone about music and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is
Adeimantus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the
Socratic method of argument, and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly
over the question of women and children. It is Adeimantus who is the
respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more
imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater
part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the
conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. Glaucon
resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty in
apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits
in the course of the discussion. Once more Adeimantus returns with the
allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State;
in the next book he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end.
Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages
of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who
is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs
and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly
come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical
arguments but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into
the nature of things. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus,
are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the Republic, nor in
any other Dialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated.
The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In
the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in
the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and in the
Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the
Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously.
But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; he

acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corrupters of
the world. He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing
beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas of the real
Socrates. In one passage Plato himself seems to intimate that the time had
now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in philosophy, to
give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the notions of other
men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a
perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he
certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen.
Mem.; Phaedo); and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of
public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family
relations, for which there is also some positive evidence in the Memorabilia
(Mem.) The Socratic method is nominally retained; and every inference is
either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common
discovery of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere form,
of which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The
method of enquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the
help of interlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of
view. The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he
describes himself as a companion who is not good for much in an
investigation, but can see what he is shown, and may, perhaps, give the
answer to a question more fluently than another.
Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the
immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the
Republic (cp. Apol.); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths
or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he would
have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favorite
oath is retained, and a slight mention is made of the daemonium, or internal
sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself.
A real element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the
Republic than in any of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example
and illustration (Greek): 'Let us apply the test of common instances.' 'You,'
says Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, 'are so unaccustomed to
speak in images.' And this use of examples or images, though truly Socratic
in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or
parable, which embodies in the concrete what has been already described,
or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in

Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. The
composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The
noble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of the
relation of the people to the philosophers in the State which has been
described. Other figures, such as the dog, or the marriage of the portionless
maiden, or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form
links of connexion in long passages, or are used to recall previous
discussions.
Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as
'not of this world.' And with this representation of him the ideal state and
the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though they
cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to other
great teachers both philosophical and religious, when they looked upward,
the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The common
sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or has only partially
admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sterner judgement of the
multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men in general
are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with the
philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him is unavoidable: for they
have never seen him as he truly is in his own image; they are only
acquainted with artificial systems possessing no native force of truth—
words which admit of many applications. Their leaders have nothing to
measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their own stature. But they are
to be pitied or laughed at, not to be quarrelled with; they mean well with
their nostrums, if they could only learn that they are cutting off a Hydra's
head. This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most
characteristic features of Socrates in the Republic. In all the different
representations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and amid the
differences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains the character
of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, without which he
would have ceased to be Socrates.
Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic,
and then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal
of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be
read.

BOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene—a festival in
honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is added
the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is
supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small
party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another; this we
learn from the first words of the Timaeus.
When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained,
the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor is the
reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of the
numerous company, three only take any serious part in the discussion; nor
are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or
talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the
conversation has arisen is described as follows:—Socrates and his
companion Glaucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained
by a message from Polemarchus, who speedily appears accompanied by
Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and with playful violence compels
them to remain, promising them not only the torch-race, but the pleasure of
conversation with the young, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction.
They return to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, now in extreme
old age, who is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice.
'You should come to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and
at my time of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for
conversation.' Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the old
man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed to
the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny of
the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world will say,
Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. 'And there is
something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as they imagine—as
Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, "Neither you, if you had been an
Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Seriphian, would ever have been famous," I
might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in
age, nor yet a bad rich man.' Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to
care about riches, a quality which he ascribes to his having inherited, not
acquired them, and would like to know what he considers to be the chief
advantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in the
world below grows upon you, and then to have done justice and never to
have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, and never to have

deceived anyone, are felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who is
evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the
word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or
must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands
of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when
he was in his right mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' says
Polemarchus, 'the definition which has been given has the authority of
Simonides.' Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and
bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the possession of the argument
to his heir, Polemarchus...
The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has
touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of
justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues
respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of the
world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man
is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows,
and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice,
there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is a just man.' The first explanation
has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind
to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts, which
have no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.
...He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he
mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case, not if
the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were to do
what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.' Every act does
something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is
this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is answered
that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way
good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and going to war with the
other.' Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The answer is that
justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but
how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man?
'When you want to have money safely kept and not used.' Then justice will
be useful when money is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice,
like the art of war or any other art, must be of opposites, good at attack as
well as at defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then justice is a
thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero,

who was 'excellent above all men in theft and perjury'—to such a pass have
you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget that the
thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still
there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or
seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our friends to be only the
good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good
to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our seeming and real evil
enemies—good to the good, evil to the evil. But ought we to render evil for
evil at all, when to do so will only make men more evil? Can justice
produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad
horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage or
poet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of some
rich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about
B.C. 398-381)...
Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be
inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set aside,
and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the
Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are applied by
the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning spirit is
stirred within him:—'If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil, what
is the difference between Thee and me?' In this both Plato and Kheyam rise
above the level of many Christian (?) theologians. The first definition of
justice easily passes into the second; for the simple words 'to speak the truth
and pay your debts' is substituted the more abstract 'to do good to your
friends and harm to your enemies.' Either of these explanations gives a
sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both fall short of the precision
of philosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not
only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular cases,
but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to
our fundamental notions of morality. The 'interrogation' of moral ideas; the
appeal to the authority of Homer; the conclusion that the maxim, 'Do good
to your friends and harm to your enemies,' being erroneous, could not have
been the word of any great man, are all of them very characteristic of the
Platonic Socrates.
...Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but
has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause
and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar.

'Socrates,' he says, 'what folly is this?—Why do you agree to be vanquished
by one another in a pretended argument?' He then prohibits all the ordinary
definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that he cannot tell how
many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 x 6, or 3 x 4, or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At
first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but at length, with a promise of
payment on the part of the company and of praise from Socrates, he is
induced to open the game. 'Listen,' he says, 'my answer is that might is
right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me.' Let me understand
you first. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is
stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of
beef is also for our interest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is
indignant at the illustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to
restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers
make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler
or stronger makes a mistake—then the interest of the stronger is not his
interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple
Cleitophon, who introduces the word 'thinks;'—not the actual interest of the
ruler, but what he thinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice. The
contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and
apparent interests may differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will
always remain what he thinks to be his interest.
Of course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new interpretation
accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not disposed to quarrel
about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, his adversary has changed his
mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact withdraw his admission
that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is
infallible. Socrates is quite ready to accept the new position, which he
equally turns against Thrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts.
Every art or science has an interest, but this interest is to be distinguished
from the accidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the
good of the things or persons which come under the art. And justice has an
interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who
come under his sway.
Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he
makes a bold diversion. 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 'have you a nurse?'
What a question! Why do you ask? 'Because, if you have, she neglects you
and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the

shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never
think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, whereas the
truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and subjects alike. And
experience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the loser and
the unjust the gainer, especially where injustice is on the grand scale, which
is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and
robbers of temples. The language of men proves this—our 'gracious' and
'blessed' tyrant and the like—all which tends to show (1) that justice is the
interest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also
stronger than justice.'
Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having
deluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the others will
not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will
not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. 'And what can I do more for
you?' he says; 'would you have me put the words bodily into your souls?'
God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be consistent in the use of
terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and then again
'shepherd' or 'ruler' in an inexact,—if the words are strictly taken, the ruler
and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or flocks and not to
their own: whereas you insist that rulers are solely actuated by love of
office. 'No doubt about it,' replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid?
Is not the reason, that their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is
therefore the concern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the
arts in general, and therefore not identical with any one of them? Nor would
any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear
of punishment;—the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the
necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State (or
Church) were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by
the last motive only; and there would be as much 'nolo episcopari' as there
is at present of the opposite...
The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and
apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There
is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like
being in office, and that therefore they demand pay.
...Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more
important—that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you

and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but if we
try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to decide for us;
we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions of the truth
to one another.
Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than
perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to
admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice vice.
Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one whose only
wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is
weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is
elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an advantage over the
unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust would gain an advantage
over either. Socrates, in order to test this statement, employs once more the
favourite analogy of the arts. The musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort,
does not seek to gain more than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled
(that is to say, he works up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it),
whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls
on the side of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just
is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.
There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day
was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in his
life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was stronger
than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds to the
consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes
to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the judicious hands of
Socrates is soon restored to good-humour: Is there not honour among
thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not
absolute injustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided against
itself cannot stand; two men who quarrel detract from one another's
strength, and he who is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the
gods. Not wickedness therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,—
a remnant of good is needed in order to make union in action possible,—
there is no kingdom of evil in this world.
Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the
happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence or
virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul

happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is
attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable, the
question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has disappeared.
Thrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the
festival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your
kindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not
a good entertainment—but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too many
things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry, and
then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then the
comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that I know
not what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is happy or
not?...
Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to
the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no external
interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to happiness what
the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this the modern reader is
apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing in an age when the
arts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual faculties, were still
undistinguished. Among early enquirers into the nature of human action the
arts helped to fill up the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of
the arts and the virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They
only saw the points of agreement in them and not the points of difference.
Virtue, like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art
and a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a statue;
and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred
from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities; or at
least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The
contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and had not yet fully
realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned
with action, art with production' (Nic. Eth.), or that 'virtue implies intention
and constancy of purpose,' whereas 'art requires knowledge only'. And yet
in the absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy, there seems
to be an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in
the reductio ad absurdum that 'justice is a thief,' and in the dissatisfaction
which Socrates expresses at the final result.

The expression 'an art of pay' which is described as 'common to all the
arts' is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it
employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is
suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to
doing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be
noted in the words 'men who are injured are made more unjust.' For those
who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or illtreated.
The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at excess,'
has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the
good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment, which
may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak of
virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical or
logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and even finds a
mythological expression in the conception of envy (Greek). Ideas of
measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still linger in the writings of
moralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts is better conveyed by such
terms than by superlatives.

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

(King John.)

The harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with one
another, a harmony 'fairer than that of musical notes,' is the true Hellenic
mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.
In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus,
Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and
dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in
modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of
evil. In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine of
an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested by
the arts. The final reconcilement of justice and happiness and the identity of
the individual and the State are also intimated. Socrates reassumes the
character of a 'know-nothing;' at the same time he appears to be not wholly
satisfied with the manner in which the argument has been conducted.
Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as
always, is to enlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application
to human life.
BOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on
continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in
which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question
'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins by dividing goods
into three classes:—first, goods desirable in themselves; secondly, goods
desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly, goods desirable for
their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the three classes he
would place justice. In the second class, replies Socrates, among goods
desirable for themselves and also for their results. 'Then the world in
general are of another mind, for they say that justice belongs to the
troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only.
Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects.
Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of
the charmer, and proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in
themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world
is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and
origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a
necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of
this view.

'To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As the evil
is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the sufferers, who
cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have neither, and this
compact or mean is called justice, but is really the impossibility of doing
injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let
us suppose that the just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges in the
well-known story, which make them invisible, and then no difference will
appear in them, for every one will do evil if he can. And he who abstains
will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in
public out of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts
(Cp. Gorgias.)
'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust
man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting
them; having gifts of money, speech, strength—the greatest villain bearing
the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his nobleness
and simplicity—being, not seeming—without name or reward—clothed in
his justice only—the best of men who is thought to be the worst, and let
him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather put the rest into the
mouth of the panegyrists of injustice—they will tell you) that the just man
will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last
be crucified (literally impaled)—and all this because he ought to have
preferred seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who
clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a
ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help his friends
and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship the gods
better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.'
I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already
unequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had been
omitted:—'Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; parents and
guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other advantages are
promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages and high
offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and heavy
fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the gods
provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture
of another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a
festival, with garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a
paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair

posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a
slough and make them carry water in a sieve: and in this life they attribute
to them the infamy which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just
who are supposed to be unjust.
'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose:
—"Virtue," as Hesiod says, "is honourable but difficult, vice is easy and
profitable." You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the
righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets knock at
rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their
fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games, or with charms
and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a
small charge;—they appeal to books professing to be written by Musaeus
and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and promise to "get
souls out of purgatory;" and if we refuse to listen to them, no one knows
what will happen to us.
'When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his
conclusion? "Will he," in the language of Pindar, "make justice his high
tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?" Justice, he reflects, without
the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the promise of a
glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To
appearance then I will turn,—I will put on the show of virtue and trail
behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that "wickedness
is not easily concealed," to which I reply that "nothing great is easy." Union
and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say that they cannot prevail
over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the
poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why
not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are only
unpunished, still they have no further reward, while the wicked may be
unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the world
below? Nay, says the argument, there are atoning powers who will set that
matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of the gods, tell us; and this is
confirmed by the authority of the State.
'How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good
manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds.
Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of
justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with

others; for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a
man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable of injustice.
'The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets,
instructors of youth, have always asserted "the temporal dispensation," the
honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the power
of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or
divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our guardians, but every
one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what I want you to
show, Socrates;—other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen
the position of Thrasymachus that "might is right;" but from you I expect
better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let the just
be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the
superiority of justice'...
The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by
Glaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachus—not right is the interest
of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the
same premises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;—might
is still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against
the strength of the few.
There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which
have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the
foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or
ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the natural
state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All such theories have
a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with experience. For
human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives of actions
and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent on either
hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular
thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and
sometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and has become a
sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or more
generally of governments, is one of the forms under which this natural
feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some
accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from some
alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended
by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We

know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute
them to the worse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such a
philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue
who assumes all other men to be like himself. And theories of this sort do
not represent the real nature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of
right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable
also of perversion), any more than they describe the origin of society, which
is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man.
Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which cannot be
explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting
element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and
more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious of their own
disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal
will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of
himself and his fellow men.
The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy
when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily
supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to
frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must
always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human
life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but
they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling
influence. An ideal is none the worse because 'some one has made the
discovery' that no such ideal was ever realized. And in a few exceptional
individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of
happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be the state which
the reason deliberately approves, and which the utilitarian as well as every
other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer.
Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with
the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his
own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of
ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or
situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the
Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness' involves some
degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern
philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally
present to his mind.

Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the
happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is the
answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is 'the
homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint
which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show that in the
opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and
reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments
as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of
mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to
man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of
actions is determined by their consequences; and both of them go beyond
the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not
desirable for themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their
results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an
internal principle, and in their condemnation of the poets, they anticipate
him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must
penetrate deeper into the nature of things.
It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and
Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more
truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates,
and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the State,
and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old
question (Protag.), 'whether the virtues are one or many,' viz. that one is the
ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely
internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being,
and he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is
no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his age and country;
there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy,
which, from some other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent.
Plato does not give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor
can he be judged of by our standard.
The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the
sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately
follows:—First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does
not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice,
and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just
man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of the

problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he will
answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal
comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man.
Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will
only look for justice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to
the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this,—that under
favourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will
coincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left
to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when
in the tenth book he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of
justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect
State. And the philosopher 'who retires under the shelter of a wall' can
hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he
maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first,
without asking whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the
inseparable accident which attends him. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God
and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.'
Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character
of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the
individual. First ethics, then politics—this is the order of ideas to us; the
reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does
the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not ONE,
but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he has no
notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed of his
church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert, whenever the
influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the past
becomes too strong for him.
Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual
and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek
speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of influence.
The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of
mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in
danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, whenever we
either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the standard of politics.
The good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State; and
this perfection cannot be attained by legislation acting upon them from
without, but, if at all, by education fashioning them from within.

...Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of the
renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand
how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their
character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He
knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in
the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he
shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller,
that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will then proceed to
the individual. Accordingly he begins to construct the State.
Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second
a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of
satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot;
and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent,
although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman,
secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. Four
or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different
natures, and one man will do one thing better than many; and business waits
for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different
employments; into wholesale and retail trade; into workers, and makers of
workmen's tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all
this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very
large. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate
exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of
purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market
and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet,
and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts at
exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete. And we may
guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the citizens with one another
justice and injustice will appear.
Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days in
houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes
and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and
flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with
each other, and take care not to have too many children. 'But,' said Glaucon,
interposing, 'are they not to have a relish?' Certainly; they will have salt and
olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts to roast at the fire.
''Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied, what do you want more? 'Only

the comforts of life,—sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.' I see; you
want not only a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more
complex frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts
must go to work—every conceivable instrument and ornament of luxury
will be wanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks,
barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for the
animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the source.
To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbour's
land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war, which
may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now
require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a
soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be
forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a
natural aptitude for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who
have this aptitude—dogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong
of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures,
whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. But these spirited natures
are apt to bite and devour one another; the union of gentleness to friends
and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the
guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian?
The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs are gentle to friends and
fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of
knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the
parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers
of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned
without education?
But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned
sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic?
Music includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false.
'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they
learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one
or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very
impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn
when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales,
banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we
may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies
but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as

false, and which should never be spoken of to young persons, or indeed at
all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian
pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to
beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to
quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall
they listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus
sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may
possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of
understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will
answer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down the
principles according to which books are to be written; to write them is the
duty of others.
And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as
the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say
that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of
destinies;—or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or
that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or
that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were
not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men were the better for
being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author, is a wicked,
suicidal fiction which we will allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is
our first and great principle—God is the author of good only.
And the second principle is like unto it:—With God is no variableness or
change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God,
he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another?—but the
best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable
to be changed by any external force. By himself?—but he cannot change for
the better; he will hardly change for the worse. He remains for ever fairest
and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who
tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who
prowl about at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense
with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be
suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable,
may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men
hate the lie in the soul, or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form
of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain
exceptional cases—what need have the gods of this? For they are not

ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor
is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he
changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our
second great principle—God is true. Away with the lying dream of
Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in
Aeschylus...
In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to
trace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in an
imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community
increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate
exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the marketplace to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which Plato
constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of political
economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized State,
the simple naturally comes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau,
in a picture of primitive life—an idea which has indeed often had a
powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he does not
seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (Politicus); nor can
any inference be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart
from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We
should not interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable
in too literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare
the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises
on philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the 'mythus is
more interesting' (Protag.)
Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in
a treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of
Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills and
Bequests; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato's), Value and Demand;
Republic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail
Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the Republic.
But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, and never
seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of
the State and of the world. He would make retail traders only of the inferior
sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he remarks, quaintly enough (Laws),
that 'if only the best men and the best women everywhere were compelled

to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail trade, etc., then we should
knew how pleasant and agreeable all these things are.'
The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous
description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the
afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of the
guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering some almost
unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the
behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches
of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education
Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood
first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is not very different from saying that
children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as
reason; that their minds can only develope gradually, and that there is much
which they must learn without understanding. This is also the substance of
Plato's view, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line
somewhat differently from modern ethical writers, respecting truth and
falsehood. To us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable
unless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the
communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist
that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be
'falsely true,' i.e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true.
But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should
have a good moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood
should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects.
A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question
whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be
conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond
Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not
seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to
suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral.
And so in all religions: the consideration of their morality comes first,
afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the
events natural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times,
and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too
much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have
refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was
discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient or religious

history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are frequently
uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from
them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show
that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is
not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in
placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, generally, in
disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur
in the early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the
traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; and are therefore tolerant of
many things which science and criticism would condemn.
We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said
to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by
Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and here,
as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was rejected by him. That
anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached another
stage of civilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with
universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation; and by a natural
process, which when once discovered was always going on, what could not
be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency
there existed side by side two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or
invented by the poets and the customary worship of the temple; on the other
hand, there was the religion of the philosopher, who was dwelling in the
heaven of ideas, but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius,
or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the
antagonism between the popular and philosophical religion, never so great
among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the
difference between the religion of the educated and uneducated among
ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into the 'royal
mind' of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became the knight-errant and
benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful transformations
were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo-Platonists in the
two or three centuries before and after Christ. The Greek and Roman
religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy; having lost
their ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; and
probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, when their
influence over the world was waning.

A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie
in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that
involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a true
lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest part of
the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering
himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to
Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again,
to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is
becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have been
regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness
of the greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John), 'he
who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect of the state of mind
which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with
the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for the difference between
Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is opposed the lie in words,
which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory
or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation,—which though
useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here
answering the question which he had himself raised about the propriety of
deceiving a madman; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man.
For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to
be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of
religion or education, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old
traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making
for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also
making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at
the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below he alludes to the
'Chronique Scandaleuse' of the gods.
BOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to
banish fear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who
believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world
below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may be
reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must they
be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing words
of Achilles—'I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the dead;'
and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless shadows,
the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth, the soul with a

gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, or the souls of the suitors which
flutter about like bats. The terrors and horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts
and sapless shades, and the rest of their Tartarean nomenclature, must
vanish. Such tales may have their use; but they are not the proper food for
soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric
heroes:—Achilles, the son of Thetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or
pacing up and down the sea-shore in distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the
gods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at the
loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him; and therefore
lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of note; they
should be the concern of inferior persons only, whether women or men. Still
worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods; as when the
goddesses say, 'Alas! my travail!' and worst of all, when the king of heaven
himself laments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending
doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our
young men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be
given to excess of laughter—'Such violent delights' are followed by a
violent re-action. The description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides
at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us. 'Certainly not.'
Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we
were saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine.
But this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state; the
common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the
patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain.
In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists
in self-control and obedience to authority. That is a lesson which Homer
teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess, in
silent awe of their leaders;'—but a very different one in other places: 'O
heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a stag.'
Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the minds of
youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking and
his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he tells of the
rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares
and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard
in the words:—'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.' Nor must we
allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, 'Gifts persuade the gods, gifts
reverend kings;' or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that

he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them; or the
meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his
requiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his
insolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead
Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other
river-god Spercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round
the walls, and slaying the captives at the pyre: such a combination of
meanness and cruelty in Cheiron's pupil is inconceivable. The amatory
exploits of Peirithous and Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these socalled sons of gods were not the sons of gods, or they were not such as the
poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of
evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have
the blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their
example.
Enough of gods and heroes;—what shall we say about men? What the
poets and story-tellers say—that the wicked prosper and the righteous are
afflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Such misrepresentations cannot be
allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of justice, and
had therefore better defer the enquiry.
The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows style.
Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come; and
narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition of
the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. The first scene in Homer
is of the last or mixed kind, being partly description and partly dialogue.
But if you throw the dialogue into the 'oratio obliqua,' the passage will run
thus: The priest came and prayed Apollo that the Achaeans might take Troy
and have a safe return if Agamemnon would only give him back his
daughter; and the other Greeks assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and
so on—The whole then becomes descriptive, and the poet is the only
speaker left; or, if you omit the narrative, the whole becomes dialogue.
These are the three styles—which of them is to be admitted into our State?
'Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted?' Yes, but also
something more—Is it not doubtful whether our guardians are to be
imitators at all? Or rather, has not the question been already answered, for
we have decided that one man cannot in his life play many parts, any more
than he can act both tragedy and comedy, or be rhapsodist and actor at
once? Human nature is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians

have their own business already, which is the care of freedom, they will
have enough to do without imitating. If they imitate they should imitate, not
any meanness or baseness, but the good only; for the mask which the actor
wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to play the parts of
women, quarrelling, weeping, scolding, or boasting against the gods,—least
of all when making love or in labour. They must not represent slaves, or
bullies, or cowards, drunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or neighing
horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, or a raging sea. A good or
wise man will be willing to perform good and wise actions, but he will be
ashamed to play an inferior part which he has never practised; and he will
prefer to employ the descriptive style with as little imitation as possible.
The man who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and
anything; sounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his whole
performance will be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive
style there are few changes, but in the dramatic there are a great many.
Poets and musicians use either, or a compound of both, and this compound
is very attractive to youth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar. But our
State in which one man plays one part only is not adapted for complexity.
And when one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen offers to
exhibit himself and his poetry we will show him every observance of
respect, but at the same time tell him that there is no room for his kind in
our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and will not depart from our
original models (Laws).
Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,—the subject, the
harmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the
first. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the
mixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as
our citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies,
such as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain—the Dorian and Phrygian,
the first for war, the second for peace; the one expressive of courage, the
other of obedience or instruction or religious feeling. And as we reject
varieties of harmony, we shall also reject the many-stringed, variouslyshaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in particular the flute,
which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and the harp may be
permitted in the town, and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a
purgation of music, and will now make a purgation of metres. These should
be like the harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There are four

notes of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre, 3/2, 2/2, 2/1,
which have all their characteristics, and the feet have different
characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must ask
Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a martial
measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms, which he
arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another, assigning to each
the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the general principle that the
style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style; and that the
simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in them all. This
principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the days of his youth,
and may be gathered anywhere, from the creative and constructive arts, as
well as from the forms of plants and animals.
Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or
unseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to
the law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our
city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must grow
up, not amid images of deformity which will gradually poison and corrupt
their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they will drink in from
every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of all these influences
the greatest is the education given by music, which finds a way into the
innermost soul and imparts to it the sense of beauty and of deformity. At
first the effect is unconscious; but when reason arrives, then he who has
been thus trained welcomes her as the friend whom he always knew. As in
learning to read, first we acquire the elements or letters separately, and
afterwards their combinations, and cannot recognize reflections of them
until we know the letters themselves;—in like manner we must first attain
the elements or essential forms of the virtues, and then trace their
combinations in life and experience. There is a music of the soul which
answers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest object of a musical
soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the latter may be
excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of temperance, and
temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough
has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with love.
Next we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the
soul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we
educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and
need only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first

place the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they should be the
last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are
suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy
sort of thing, and if left off suddenly is apt to endanger health. But our
warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, and must also be inured to all
changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a simpler kind of
gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for their diet a rule may be found
in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast meat only, and gives them no fish
although they are living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which involve an
apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he nowhere mentions
sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections and Corinthian
courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian melodies are to
music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and intemperance prevail the
town quickly fills with doctors and pleaders; and law and medicine give
themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an interest in them.
But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than to have to go
abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home? And yet
there IS a worse stage of the same disease—when men have learned to take
a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; not considering how
much better it would be for them so to order their lives as to have no need
of a nodding justice. And there is a like disgrace in employing a physician,
not for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, but because a man has by
laziness and luxury contracted diseases which were unknown in the days of
Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus
after he has been wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a
heating nature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who
gives him the drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that
this modern system of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the
trainer; who, being of a sickly constitution, by a compound of training and
medicine tortured first himself and then a good many other people, and
lived a great deal longer than he had any right. But Asclepius would not
practise this art, because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered State
have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the 'kill or cure' method,
which artisans and labourers employ. 'They must be at their business,' they
say, 'and have no time for coddling: if they recover, well; if they don't, there
is an end of them.' Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who
can afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides—that 'when a man

begins to be rich' (or, perhaps, a little sooner) 'he should practise virtue'?
But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent with an ordinary
occupation, and yet consistent with that practice of virtue which Phocylides
inculcates? When a student imagines that philosophy gives him a headache,
he never does anything; he is always unwell. This was the reason why
Asclepius and his sons practised no such art. They were acting in the
interest of the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives, or raise up
a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly cured; and
if a man was wounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then let him
eat and drink what he liked. But they declined to treat intemperate and
worthless subjects, even though they might have made large fortunes out of
them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a thunderbolt
for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie—following our old rule we must
say either that he did not take bribes, or that he was not the son of a god.
Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best
judges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of
diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two
professions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his
own body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the judge
controls mind by mind; and therefore his mind should not be corrupted by
crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be wise and also
innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by evil-doers,
because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore the judge should
be of a certain age; his youth should have been innocent, and he should
have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of it, but by the
observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge; the criminal turned
detective is wonderfully suspicious, but when in company with good men
who have experience, he is at fault, for he foolishly imagines that every one
is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know virtue.
This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of law which will prevail in our
State; they will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil body will be
left to die by the one, and the evil soul will be put to death by the other. And
the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music which will give
harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which will give health to the
body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really corresponds to
soul and body; for they are both equally concerned with the soul, which is
tamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the other. The two together

supply our guardians with their twofold nature. The passionate disposition
when it has too much gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or
philosophic temper which has too much music becomes enervated. While a
man is allowing music to pour like water through the funnel of his ears, the
edge of his soul gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited
element is melted out of him. Too little spirit is easily exhausted; too much
quickly passes into nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and
training has his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; he is like a wild
beast, ready to do everything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy.
There are two principles in man, reason and passion, and to these, not to the
soul and body, the two arts of music and gymnastic correspond. He who
mingles them in harmonious concord is the true musician,—he shall be the
presiding genius of our State.
The next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule
the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. Now they
will be the best who love their subjects most, and think that they have a
common interest with them in the welfare of the state. These we must
select; but they must be watched at every epoch of life to see whether they
have retained the same opinions and held out against force and
enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure may enchant
a man into a change of purpose, and the force of grief and pain may compel
him. And therefore our guardians must be men who have been tried by
many tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been passed first through
danger, then through pleasure, and at every age have come out of such trials
victorious and without stain, in full command of themselves and their
principles; having all their faculties in harmonious exercise for their
country's good. These shall receive the highest honours both in life and
death. (It would perhaps be better to confine the term 'guardians' to this
select class: the younger men may be called 'auxiliaries.')
And now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we could
train our rulers!—at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of the
world. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend of
Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a story.
The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, lastly to
the people. We will inform them that their youth was a dream, and that
during the time when they seemed to be undergoing their education they
were really being fashioned in the earth, who sent them up when they were

ready; and that they must protect and cherish her whose children they are,
and regard each other as brothers and sisters. 'I do not wonder at your being
ashamed to propound such a fiction.' There is more behind. These brothers
and sisters have different natures, and some of them God framed to rule,
whom he fashioned of gold; others he made of silver, to be auxiliaries;
others again to be husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by
him of brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common stock, a
golden parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son, and
then there must be a change of rank; the son of the rich must descend, and
the child of the artisan rise, in the social scale; for an oracle says 'that the
State will come to an end if governed by a man of brass or iron.' Will our
citizens ever believe all this? 'Not in the present generation, but in the next,
perhaps, Yes.'
Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers,
and look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe
against enemies from without, and likewise against insurrections from
within. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers they are
to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and
luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits and
their dwellings should correspond to their education. They should have no
property; their pay should only meet their expenses; and they should have
common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God,
and this divine gift in their souls they must not alloy with that earthly dross
which passes under the name of gold. They only of the citizens may not
touch it, or be under the same roof with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed
thing. Should they ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they
will become householders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and
tyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and the
rest of the State, will be at hand.
The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter be
considered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more
conveniently noticed in this place.
1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave
irony, Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about ethics
and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to
distinguish the better lesson from the worse, sometimes altering the text

from design; more than once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately,
after the manner of the early logographers turning the Iliad into prose, and
delighting to draw far-fetched inferences from his words, or to make
ludicrous applications of them. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a rage
with Homer and Archilochus (Heracl.), but uses their words and
expressions as vehicles of a higher truth; not on a system like Theagenes of
Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the Stoics, but as fancy may
dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them are sound, although the
premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to
Plato's style, and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on the
follies of Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to himself), although
they take the form of arguments, they are really figures of speech. They
may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have often a
great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is
entirely lost sight of. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from
the Memorabilia of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations.
Great in all ages and countries, in religion as well as in law and literature,
has been the art of interpretation.
2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.'
Notwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises over
us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek poetry
which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought often exceeds
the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus and Pindar; or that rhetoric gets
the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet Euripides. Only perhaps in
Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in him alone do we find a
grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in which there is
nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of single plays or of large
portions of them. The connection in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek
lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic
the poet was unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his
mind, and he had no power of disengaging or arranging them. For there is a
subtle influence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to
poetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by poetry
into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning
(Apol.); for he does not see that the word which is full of associations to his
own mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence
which is clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in

some of our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure; in which there
is no proportion between style and subject, in which any half-expressed
figure, any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any
remote sequence of ideas is admitted; and there is no voice 'coming sweetly
from nature,' or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if
there could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness.
The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of
language and logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be
followed by us; for the use of language ought in every generation to become
clearer and clearer. Like Shakespere, they were great in spite, not in
consequence, of their imperfections of expression. But there is no reason for
returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of
literature. The English poets of the last century were certainly not obscure;
and we have no excuse for losing what they had gained, or for going back
to the earlier or transitional age which preceded them. The thought of our
own times has not out-stripped language; a want of Plato's 'art of measuring'
is the rule cause of the disproportion between them.
3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory
of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as follows:
—True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and ideal,—the
expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or repose. To live
among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple character, or
to listen to such strains, is the best of influences,—the true Greek
atmosphere, in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to create
in them a natural good taste, which will have a feeling of truth and beauty
in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled, still art is recognized
as another aspect of reason—like love in the Symposium, extending over
the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary education, and acting
through the power of habit; and this conception of art is not limited to
strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a
wide kindred in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of
Pericles, has an artistic as well as a political side.
There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or
three passages does he even allude to them (Rep.; Soph.). He is not lost in
rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the Propylea, the
statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract
truth of number or figure as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is hard

to suppose that some influence, such as he hopes to inspire in youth, did not
pass into his own mind from the works of art which he saw around him. We
are living upon the fragments of them, and find in a few broken stones the
standard of truth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no expression; he
nowhere says that beauty is the object of art; he seems to deny that wisdom
can take an external form (Phaedrus); he does not distinguish the fine from
the mechanical arts. Whether or no, like some writers, he felt more than he
expressed, it is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine
arts should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In one very
striking passage he tells us that a work of art, like the State, is a whole; and
this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born mathematical
sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any rate as the
regulating principles of Greek art (Xen. Mem.; and Sophist).
4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better
not be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own
person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he is
to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence, became
acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, according to
Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man according to
Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad, on the other
hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge of virtue. It may be
doubted, however, whether this train of reflection is well founded. In a
remarkable passage of the Laws it is acknowledged that the evil may form a
correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness and courage in Book
ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was afterwards ascertained to be a
truth. And Plato might also have found that the intuition of evil may be
consistent with the abhorrence of it. There is a directness of aim in virtue
which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some
degree a natural sense independent of any special experience of good or
evil.
5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek
and also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the
world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been
enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special
circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit was certainly
recognized as one of the elements on which government was based. The
founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors, who were raised

by their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity; at a later period,
the services of warriors and legislators were held to entitle them and their
descendants to the privileges of citizenship and to the first rank in the state.
And although the existence of an ideal aristocracy is slenderly proven from
the remains of early Greek history, and we have a difficulty in ascribing
such a character, however the idea may be defined, to any actual Hellenic
state—or indeed to any state which has ever existed in the world—still the
rule of the best was certainly the aspiration of philosophers, who probably
accommodated a good deal their views of primitive history to their own
notions of good government. Plato further insists on applying to the
guardians of his state a series of tests by which all those who fell short of a
fixed standard were either removed from the governing body, or not
admitted to it; and this 'academic' discipline did to a certain extent prevail in
Greek states, especially in Sparta. He also indicates that the system of caste,
which existed in a great part of the ancient, and is by no means extinct in
the modern European world, should be set aside from time to time in favour
of merit. He is aware how deeply the greater part of mankind resent any
interference with the order of society, and therefore he proposes his novel
idea in the form of what he himself calls a 'monstrous fiction.' (Compare the
ceremony of preparation for the two 'great waves' in Book v.) Two
principles are indicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of ranks
dependent on circumstances prior to the individual: second, that this
distinction is and ought to be broken through by personal qualities. He
adapts mythology like the Homeric poems to the wants of the state, making
'the Phoenician tale' the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth
respecting its own origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale of
earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told,
and the analogy of Greek tradition, are a sufficient verification of the
'monstrous falsehood.' Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and
brass and iron age succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these
differences in the natures of men to exist together in a single state.
Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be taught (as
Protagoras says, 'the myth is more interesting'), and also enables Plato to
touch lightly on new principles without going into details. In this passage he
shadows forth a general truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the
transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic he
allows the lower ranks to fade into the distance. We do not know whether

they are to carry arms, and whether in the fifth book they are or are not
included in the communistic regulations respecting property and marriage.
Nor is there any use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words, or
from the silence of Plato, or in drawing inferences which were beyond his
vision. Aristotle, in his criticism on the position of the lower classes, does
not perceive that the poetical creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and
cannot be penetrated by the shafts of his logic (Pol.).
6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree
fanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be
found in the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of music, so
much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times,
when the art or science has been far more developed, and has found the
secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly, the indefinite and almost
absolute control which the soul is supposed to exercise over the body.
In the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may also
observe among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the present
day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only, there seems
to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers and
numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. Intervals of sound and
number are to him sacred things which have a law of their own, not
dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above sense, and become a
connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is evident that Plato is
describing what to him appears to be also a fact. The power of a simple and
characteristic melody on the impressible mind of the Greek is more than we
can easily appreciate. The effect of national airs may bear some comparison
with it. And, besides all this, there is a confusion between the harmony of
musical notes and the harmony of soul and body, which is so potently
inspired by them.
The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions—
How far can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of
mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one, and is
either of them the cause of the other? May we not at times drop the
opposition between them, and the mode of describing them, which is so
familiar to us, and yet hardly conveys any precise meaning, and try to view
this composite creature, man, in a more simple manner? Must we not at any
rate admit that there is in human nature a higher and a lower principle,

divided by no distinct line, which at times break asunder and take up arms
against one another? Or again, they are reconciled and move together, either
unconsciously in the ordinary work of life, or consciously in the pursuit of
some noble aim, to be attained not without an effort, and for which every
thought and nerve are strained. And then the body becomes the good friend
or ally, or servant or instrument of the mind. And the mind has often a
wonderful and almost superhuman power of banishing disease and
weakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the
intellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to
form a single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and the
identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most part
unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the appetites, we
acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other. There is a tendency
in us which says 'Drink.' There is another which says, 'Do not drink; it is not
good for you.' And we all of us know which is the rightful superior. We are
also responsible for our health, although into this sphere there enter some
elements of necessity which may be beyond our control. Still even in the
management of health, care and thought, continued over many years, may
make us almost free agents, if we do not exact too much of ourselves, and if
we acknowledge that all human freedom is limited by the laws of nature
and of mind.
We are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation
which he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day,
depreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a definite
character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is afraid of
invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not recognize that
time is the great healer both of mental and bodily disorders; and that
remedies which are gradual and proceed little by little are safer than those
which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither does he see that there is no
way in which the mind can more surely influence the body than by the
control of eating and drinking; or any other action or occasion of human life
on which the higher freedom of the will can be more simple or truly
asserted.
7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked.
(1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing
that he is passing lightly over the subject.

(2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he
proceeds with the construction of the State.
(3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality, and then again as
a work of imagination only; these are the arts by which he sustains the
reader's interest.
(4) Connecting links, or the preparation for the entire expulsion of the
poets in Book X.
(5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the
valetudinarian, the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides, the manner
in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up into the
subject, and the argument from the practice of Asclepius, should not escape
notice.
BOOK IV. Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that
you make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they are
the lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men, lands and
houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are always
mounting guard.' You may add, I replied, that they receive no pay but only
their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a mistress. 'Well,
and what answer do you give?' My answer is, that our guardians may or
may not be the happiest of men,—I should not be surprised to find in the
long-run that they were,—but this is not the aim of our constitution, which
was designed for the good of the whole and not of any one part. If I went to
a sculptor and blamed him for having painted the eye, which is the noblest
feature of the face, not purple but black, he would reply: 'The eye must be
an eye, and you should look at the statue as a whole.' 'Now I can well
imagine a fool's paradise, in which everybody is eating and drinking,
clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their
wheel at hand, that they may work a little when they please; and cobblers
and all the other classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And a
State may get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into
boon companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not
talking of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man is
expected to do his own work. The happiness resides not in this or that class,
but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to make:—A middle
condition is best for artisans; they should have money enough to buy tools,
and not enough to be independent of business. And will not the same

condition be best for our citizens? If they are poor, they will be mean; if
rich, luxurious and lazy; and in neither case contented. 'But then how will
our poor city be able to go to war against an enemy who has money?' There
may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy; against two there will be
none. In the first place, the contest will be carried on by trained warriors
against well-to-do citizens: and is not a regular athlete an easy match for
two stout opponents at least? Suppose also, that before engaging we send
ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, 'Silver and gold we have not;
do you help us and take our share of the spoil;'—who would fight against
the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in preying upon the
fatted sheep? 'But if many states join their resources, shall we not be in
danger?' I am amused to hear you use the word 'state' of any but our own
State. They are 'states,' but not 'a state'—many in one. For in every state
there are two hostile nations, rich and poor, which you may set one against
the other. But our State, while she remains true to her principles, will be in
very deed the mightiest of Hellenic states.
To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it must
be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of secondary
importance, like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the
parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied was that every
man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one with himself, and
then the whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary, if
education, which is the great matter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has
once been set in motion, the speed is always increasing; and each
generation improves upon the preceding, both in physical and moral
qualities. The care of the governors should be directed to preserve music
and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs of a country, Damon says,
and you will soon end by altering its laws. The change appears innocent at
first, and begins in play; but the evil soon becomes serious, working
secretly upon the characters of individuals, then upon social and
commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of a state; and there is
ruin and confusion everywhere. But if education remains in the established
form, there will be no danger. A restorative process will be always going
on; the spirit of law and order will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will
any regulations be needed for the lesser matters of life—rules of deportment
or fashions of dress. Like invites like for good or for evil. Education will
correct deficiencies and supply the power of self-government. Far be it

from us to enter into the particulars of legislation; let the guardians take
care of education, and education will take care of all other things.

But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will
make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by
some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. If
you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits, then they grow
angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,—nay, the very reverse.'
Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which
is like them. And such states there are which first ordain under penalty of
death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to
be flattered into and out of anything; and he who indulges them and fawns
upon them, is their leader and saviour. 'Yes, the men are as bad as the
states.' But do you not admire their cleverness? 'Nay, some of them are
stupid enough to believe what the people tell them.' And when all the world
is telling a man that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he
believe anything else? But don't get into a passion: to see our statesmen
trying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the
Hydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments
are superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad ones.
And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to
Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all things
—that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon the centre
and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense, in an affair
of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in our realms...
Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' (Greek) what has preceded:
thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but only of the
well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our principal
aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be
guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us
the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching the
relation of duty to happiness, of right to utility.
First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The
utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows to us a
side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that
right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the happiness of
mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives of human
action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor the aspect in
which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest

happiness of all is, as we believe, the far-off result of the divine government
of the universe. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be
found in a life of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a
law of right than we can be of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be
saved;' and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of
the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary
sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary
death. Further, the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities; it may mean
either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this
world or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men
everywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and
disinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although
they are commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word
happiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and 'right'; it
does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the
conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and
conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul which we desire
for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or temptation, or in any great
and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these reasons 'the greatest
happiness' principle is not the true foundation of ethics. But though not the
first principle, it is the second, which is like unto it, and is often of easier
application. For the larger part of human actions are neither right nor
wrong, except in so far as they tend to the happiness of mankind (Introd. to
Gorgias and Philebus).
The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient
seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For
concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the
happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term
expediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human
society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of
individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot
directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and
sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. They
are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as well as
in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to depend upon
them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the power of
ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them something

of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of
Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of men must be above the
motives of ambition, and that national character is of greater value than
material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato;
first, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable
circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is
assured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in
politics is sufficiently evident from other passages; in which 'the most
beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable', and also 'the most sacred'.
We may note
(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed to
draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates.
(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics
and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which,
under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity,
the Greek seems to have applied to works of art.
(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the
traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle, the fact
that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle.
(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the
light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the 'charming'
patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, the playful
assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave irony with which
the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high because he is
told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for his
ignorance—he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him.
(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over
when provision has been made for two great principles,—first, that religion
shall be based on the highest conception of the gods, secondly, that the true
national or Hellenic type shall be maintained...
Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, tell
me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother and the
rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,' replied
Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked about the
impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the way, but do you
follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain all the four

virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If we eliminate the three
first, the unknown remainder will be justice.
First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be
wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,—not
the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the husbandman,
but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State. Of
such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are a small class in number, far
smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the
State. And if this small ruling class have wisdom, then the whole State will
be wise.
Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in
another class—that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of
salvation—the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and
education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which
dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of
any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or lye
will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and the laws are the
colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor
the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This power which preserves
right opinion about danger I would ask you to call 'courage,' adding the
epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to distinguish it from mere animal
courage and from a higher courage which may hereafter be discussed.
Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding
virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown
upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as 'master
of himself'—which has an absurd sound, because the master is also the
servant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man
masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes—women, slaves and
the like—who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better; and in
our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which
of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.' And our State if
any will be the abode of temperance; and we were right in describing this
virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole, making the
dwellers in the city to be of one mind, and attuning the upper and middle
and lower classes like the strings of an instrument, whether you suppose
them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth.

And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and
watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me, if
you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well then, offer
up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we must push on.
I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, our dulness of scent is
quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into the distance, justice is
tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people looking for a thing which
they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our old principle of the
division of labour, or of every man doing his own business, concerning
which we spoke at the foundation of the State—what but this was justice? Is
there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and
temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue? For 'every one
having his own' is the great object of government; and the great object of
trade is that every man should do his own business. Not that there is much
harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself
into a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last
and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single individual is
trainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man
doing another's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to
arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition which we believe to hold
good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large
letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a
brilliant light may be struck out...
Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of
residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts
of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the third,
temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. If there
be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of the three
parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and
simple, and for that very reason has not been found out. The modern
logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated like
chemical substances, but that they run into one another and may be only
different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this instance
appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the
same as one of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the
Charmides, which however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected.
And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are

eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty
be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part only, and
one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Yet on
the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of harmony, and in this
respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree
rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant
elements, justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do
their own business, the right man in the right place, the division and cooperation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than
the other virtues, and therefore, from Plato's point of view, the foundation of
them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them. The
proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid
monotony.
There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of
Plato (Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), 'Whether the virtues are one or
many?' This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four
cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical
philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle's
conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole of
virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order in
the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still more universal
conception of the good in the second education and in the sphere of
speculative knowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally described
by the terms 'law,' 'order,' 'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces
'all time and all existence,' the conception of justice is not extended beyond
man.
...Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first
he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument
is as follows:—Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word 'just,'
whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same meaning.
And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in the State and
in the individual were doing their own business. But are they really three or
one? The question is difficult, and one which can hardly be solved by the
methods which we are now using; but the truer and longer way would take
up too much of our time. 'The shorter will satisfy me.' Well then, you would
admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who
compose them? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate, our own race

intellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous, because the
individual members of each have such and such a character; the difficulty is
to determine whether the several principles are one or three; whether, that is
to say, we reason with one part of our nature, desire with another, are angry
with another, or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of
action. This enquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The
same thing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways.
But there is no impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or
in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no
necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally assume
that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And
to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire and avoidance.
And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a new point—
thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of warm drink or of a
particular kind of food, with the single exception of course that the very fact
of our desiring anything implies that it is good. When relative terms have
no attributes, their correlatives have no attributes; when they have
attributes, their correlatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater'
is simply relative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge.
But on the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject.
Again, every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object;
medicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be
confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return to
the original instance of thirst, which has a definite object—drink. Now the
thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying 'Drink;'
the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.' The two impulses are
contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they spring from distinct
principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle, or akin to desire?
There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on this
question. He was coming up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, and he
passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He
felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence of them; at first he
turned away and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, he said,
—'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight.' Now is there not here a
third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason
against desire, but never of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit,
of the separate existence of which we may further convince ourselves by

putting the following case:—When a man suffers justly, if he be of a
generous nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes:
but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger
and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the
voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is
heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. Is passion then
the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children and brutes; and
Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he says, 'He
smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'
And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that
the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and
courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and
justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will
do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in the individual
soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized by
the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the
head and the arm, will act together in the town of Mansoul, and keep the
desires in proper subjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality
which preserves a right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and
pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has
authority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the
ruling and the subject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of
justice we have already spoken; and the notion already given of it may be
confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just individual
steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to gods and men? 'No.'
And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the state
or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is the quality which
makes just men and just states. Moreover, our old division of labour, which
required that there should be one man for one use, was a dream or
anticipation of what was to follow; and that dream has now been realized in
justice, which begins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and
then acts harmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the
insubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, is the
opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul
what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the body, good or
bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty

and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and
deformity of the soul.
Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more
profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like mortal
disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill which
overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and the
infinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, characteristic
both of states and of individuals. And the state which corresponds to the
single form of virtue is that which we have been describing, wherein reason
rules under one of two names—monarchy and aristocracy. Thus there are
five forms in all, both of states and of souls...
In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato
takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the
criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties.
The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early
reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a step
without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome digression,
which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. First, the
contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. Secondly,
no extraneous word must be introduced into either of the terms in which the
contradictory proposition is expressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of
warm drink. He implies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of
reason, or by the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this
proves that thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct from
anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term 'thirst' or 'desire' to be
modified, and say an 'angry thirst,' or a 'revengeful desire,' then the two
spheres of desire and anger overlap and become confused. This case
therefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the
rule in the use of the term 'good,' which is always implied in the object of
desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic; and any one who is
wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up
of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.
The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul
into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as we
know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and
succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the

mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (Greek), which
may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation, spirit,
passion. It is the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato moral
courage, the courage of enduring pain, and of surmounting intellectual
difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational, it
inclines to side with the rational: it cannot be aroused by punishment when
justly inflicted: it sometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains
a man in the performance of great actions. It is the 'lion heart' with which
the reason makes a treaty. On the other hand it is negative rather than
positive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the
Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the
peremptory military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It
differs from anger (Greek), this latter term having no accessory notion of
righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we may
observe that 'passion' (Greek) has with him lost its affinity to the rational
and has become indistinguishable from 'anger' (Greek). And to this
vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws seems to revert, though not
always. By modern philosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation,
the words anger or passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense;
there is no connotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are
aroused. The feeling of 'righteous indignation' is too partial and accidental
to admit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted
also to doubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender, however
justly condemned, could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his
sentence; this is the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a
criminal.
We may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's famous thesis,
that 'good actions produce good habits.' The words 'as healthy practices
(Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce justice,' have a sound
very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an incidental
remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in Aristotle, and an
inseparable part of a great Ethical system.
There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer
way': he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be
satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and
seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given us a sketch
of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the

idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied
the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued
about such questions from a higher point of view, we can only conjecture.
Perhaps he hoped to find some a priori method of developing the parts out
of the whole; or he might have asked which of the ideas contains the other
ideas, and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the 'ego' and
the 'universal.' Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in
some manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers in the
mathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato
the universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or
opinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole
of induction and experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always
tended to pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem
to have reached a height at which they are 'moving about in worlds
unrealized,' and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their own
minds, become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not therefore
surprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his
doctrine of ideas; or that his school in a later generation, like his
contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this
region of speculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism
which maintained either that there was no such thing as predication, or that
all might be predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas
combine with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps
forward on this path; he nowhere attains to any connected system of ideas,
or even to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to
one another.
BOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in
states, when Polemarchus—he was sitting a little farther from me than
Adeimantus—taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said
something in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let
him off?' 'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. Whom, I said,
are you not going to let off? 'You,' he said. Why? 'Because we think that
you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom
you have slily disposed under the general formula that friends have all
things in common.' And was I not right? 'Yes,' he replied, 'but there are
many sorts of communism or community, and we want to know which of
them is right. The company, as you have just heard, are resolved to have a

further explanation.' Thrasymachus said, 'Do you think that we have come
hither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?' Yes, I said; but the
discourse should be of a reasonable length. Glaucon added, 'Yes, Socrates,
and there is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions; but
pray, without more ado, tell us how this community is to be carried out, and
how the interval between birth and education is to be filled up.' Well, I said,
the subject has several difficulties—What is possible? is the first question.
What is desirable? is the second. 'Fear not,' he replied, 'for you are speaking
among friends.' That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall destroy my
friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent laughter; but he
who kills the truth is a murderer. 'Then,' said Glaucon, laughing, 'in case
you should murder us we will acquit you beforehand, and you shall be held
free from the guilt of deceiving us.'
Socrates proceeds:—The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as
we have already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes—we do
not take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to
look after their puppies. They have the same employments—the only
difference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other weaker.
But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must have
the same education—they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the art
of war. I know that a great joke will be made of their riding on horseback
and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing
their agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a vision of beauty, and may
be expected to become a famous jest. But we must not mind the wits; there
was a time when they might have laughed at our present gymnastics. All is
habit: people have at last found out that the exposure is better than the
concealment of the person, and now they laugh no more. Evil only should
be the subject of ridicule.
The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially to
share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with
inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started originally with
the division of labour; and the diversity of employments was based on the
difference of natures. But is there no difference between men and women?
Nay, are they not wholly different? THERE was the difficulty, Glaucon,
which made me unwilling to speak of family relations. However, when a
man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can only swim
for his life; and we must try to find a way of escape, if we can.

The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the
natures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal
opposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal
and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a
single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a
cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is such an
inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial
only, like the difference between a male physician and a female physician,
not running through the whole nature, like the difference between a
physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes is only that the
one beget and the other bear children, this does not prove that they ought to
have distinct educations. Admitting that women differ from men in
capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not nature
scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up and
down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not
women often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough
surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men, and have the same
aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a less
degree. One woman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good
must be chosen to be the colleagues of our guardians. If however their
natures are the same, the inference is that their education must also be the
same; there is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman
learning music and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will
be the very best, far superior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very
best women, and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than this.
Therefore let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of
war and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for
his pains.
The first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men
and women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is
rolling in—community of wives and children; is this either expedient or
possible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the possibility.
'Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained on both points.' I
meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, but as you have
detected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only allow me to feed my
fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a dream of what might be, and then
I will return to the question of what can be.

In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones
where they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as
legislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the
women. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common
houses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a
necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be allowed
to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which the rulers are
determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy marriage festivals
will be instituted, and their holiness will be in proportion to their
usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask (as I know that you are a
breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take the greatest care in the
mating? 'Certainly.' And there is no reason to suppose that less care is
required in the marriage of human beings. But then our rulers must be
skilful physicians of the State, for they will often need a strong dose of
falsehood in order to bring about desirable unions between their subjects.
The good must be paired with the good, and the bad with the bad, and the
offspring of the one must be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this way
the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be
celebrated at times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides and
bridegrooms will meet at them; and by an ingenious system of lots the
rulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and that those
of inferior breed are paired with inferiors—the latter will ascribe to chance
what is really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born, the
offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a certain
part of the city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the rest will be
hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold
and will suckle the children; care however must be taken that none of them
recognise their own offspring; and if necessary other nurses may also be
hired. The trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred to
attendants. 'Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time
when they are having children.' And quite right too, I said, that they should.
The parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be
reckoned at thirty years—from twenty-five, when he has 'passed the point at
which the speed of life is greatest,' to fifty-five; and at twenty years for a
woman—from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who
partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also every one who
forms a marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the rulers.

This latter regulation applies to those who are within the specified ages,
after which they may range at will, provided they avoid the prohibited
degrees of parents and children, or of brothers and sisters, which last,
however, are not absolutely prohibited, if a dispensation be procured. 'But
how shall we know the degrees of affinity, when all things are common?'
The answer is, that brothers and sisters are all such as are born seven or
nine months after the espousals, and their parents those who are then
espoused, and every one will have many children and every child many
parents.
Socrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous
and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State is
unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be unity
where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests—where if one
member suffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all are
quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of the State runs
through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true State, like an
individual, is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every State has
subjects and rulers, who in a democracy are called rulers, and in other
States masters: but in our State they are called saviours and allies; and the
subjects who in other States are termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers
and paymasters, and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in
other places, are by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other
States members of the same government regard one of their colleagues as a
friend and another as an enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another;
for every citizen is connected with every other by ties of blood, and these
names and this way of speaking will have a corresponding reality—brother,
father, sister, mother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not
be mere words. Then again the citizens will have all things in common, in
having common property they will have common pleasures and pains.
Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or
lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they
call their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend
himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an 'antidote' to the
knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no younger man will
strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from laying hands on his
kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. Moreover,
our citizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life; there will be no flattery of

the rich, no sordid household cares, no borrowing and not paying.
Compared with the citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors,
and crowned with blessings greater still—they and their children having a
better maintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor
has the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the
State; our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he has a
happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any conceited
youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself, he must be
reminded that 'half is better than the whole.' 'I should certainly advise him
to stay where he is when he has the promise of such a brave life.'
But is such a community possible?—as among the animals, so also
among men; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no
difficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service.
Parents will take their children to look on at a battle, just as potters' boys are
trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents
themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their young ones will prove a
great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn, but they must not run
into danger, although a certain degree of risk is worth incurring when the
benefit is great. The young creatures should be placed under the care of
experienced veterans, and they should have wings—that is to say, swift and
tractable steeds on which they may fly away and escape. One of the first
things to be done is to teach a youth to ride.
Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen;
gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to
the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be
crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the right
hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any harm in his
being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more wives
than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible. And at
a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the authority of Homer for
honouring brave men with 'long chines,' which is an appropriate
compliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl then,
and give the best seats and meats to the brave—may they do them good!
And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the golden race,
and will, as we believe, become one of Hesiod's guardian angels. He shall
be worshipped after death in the manner prescribed by the oracle; and not

only he, but all other benefactors of the State who die in any other way,
shall be admitted to the same honours.
The next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be
enslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing under
the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? Certainly not;
for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has been the ruin of
many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in making an enemy
of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has fled—like a dog
who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels with the stones which are
thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of Hellenes should not be offered up
in the temples of the Gods; they are a pollution, for they are taken from
brethren. And on similar grounds there should be a limit to the devastation
of Hellenic territory—the houses should not be burnt, nor more than the
annual produce carried off. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the
first of which is properly termed 'discord,' and only the second 'war;' and
war between Hellenes is in reality civil war—a quarrel in a family, which is
ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted
with a view to reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who
would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against a whole nation
who are a friendly multitude of men, women, and children, but only against
a few guilty persons; when they are punished peace will be restored. That is
the way in which Hellenes should war against one another—and against
barbarians, as they war against one another now.
'But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a
State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of
being one family—fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war
together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.' You are
too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly escaped,
and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see the
towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. 'Not a whit.'
Well, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after justice,
and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all the worse for
being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any
the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any reality come up to the
idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully realized; but if I am to try and
realize the ideal of the State in a measure, I think that an approach may be

made to the perfection of which I dream by one or two, I do not say slight,
but possible changes in the present constitution of States. I would reduce
them to a single one—the great wave, as I call it. Until, then, kings are
philosophers, or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no,
nor the human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being. I know
that this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. 'Socrates, all the
world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and stones, and
therefore I would advise you to prepare an answer.' You got me into the
scrape, I said. 'And I was right,' he replied; 'however, I will stand by you as
a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.' Having the help of such a
champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first, I must
explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who are to be
philosophers and rulers. As you are a man of pleasure, you will not have
forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their attachments; they love all,
and turn blemishes into beauties. The snub-nosed youth is said to have a
winning grace; the beak of another has a royal look; the featureless are
faultless; the dark are manly, the fair angels; the sickly have a new term of
endearment invented expressly for them, which is 'honey-pale.' Lovers of
wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of their affection in
every form. Now here comes the point:—The philosopher too is a lover of
knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity. 'But will curiosity
make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let out their
ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, to be called philosophers?'
They are not true philosophers, but only an imitation. 'Then how are we to
describe the true?'
You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice,
beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various
combinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are
philosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, and
understand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or waking
vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the light of
knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only. Perhaps he of
whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify him without
revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, if he has
knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of something
which is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and there is a third
thing, which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion and

knowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct faculties.
And by faculties I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the
difference in their objects, as opinion and knowledge differ, since the one is
liable to err, but the other is unerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties.
If being is the object of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these
are the extremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker
than the one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent
matter is and is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence and of
non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend, who denies abstract
beauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a many just, whether
everything he sees is not in some point of view different—the beautiful
ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is not the double also the half, and
are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another?
Everything is and is not, as in the old riddle—'A man and not a man shot
and did not shoot a bird and not a bird with a stone and not a stone.' The
mind cannot be fixed on either alternative; and these ambiguous,
intermediate, erring, half-lighted objects, which have a disorderly
movement in the region between being and not-being, are the proper matter
of opinion, as the immutable objects are the proper matter of knowledge.
And he who grovels in the world of sense, and has only this uncertain
perception of things, is not a philosopher, but a lover of opinion only...
The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the
community of property and of family are first maintained, and the transition
is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato, after his
manner, has been preparing in some chance words of Book IV, which fall
unperceived on the reader's mind, as they are supposed at first to have fallen
on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The 'paradoxes,' as Morgenstern
terms them, of this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place;
a few remarks on the style, and some explanations of difficulties, may be
briefly added.
First, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme
or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and greatest
wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can be said of
the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated by himself. Nothing is
more admirable than the hesitation with which he proposes the solemn text,
'Until kings are philosophers,' etc.; or the reaction from the sublime to the

ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the manner in which the new truth will
be received by mankind.
Some defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the
communistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to
the lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being
made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal festival may
marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of its parents, at
another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at the same time he does
not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided into
families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal festival.
If it were worth while to argue seriously about such fancies, we might
remark that while all the old affinities are abolished, the newly prohibited
affinity rests not on any natural or rational principle, but only upon the
accident of children having been born in the same month and year. Nor does
he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the legislature as to
bring together the fairest and best. The singular expression which is
employed to describe the age of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from
some poet.
In the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of
philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of
Glaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings.
They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. That science is a
whole, remains a true principle of inductive as well as of metaphysical
philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is still the characteristic of
the philosopher in modern as well as in ancient times.
At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent
matter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and
Theology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first time in
the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge
in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the object. With him a
word must answer to an idea; and he could not conceive of an opinion
which was an opinion about nothing. The influence of analogy led him to
invent 'parallels and conjugates' and to overlook facts. To us some of his
difficulties are puzzling only from their simplicity: we do not perceive that
the answer to them 'is tumbling out at our feet.' To the mind of early
thinkers, the conception of not-being was dark and mysterious; they did not

see that this terrible apparition which threatened destruction to all
knowledge was only a logical determination. The common term under
which, through the accidental use of language, two entirely different ideas
were included was another source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity
of (Greek) Plato, attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of human
thought, seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have failed
to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus the first of
these difficulties begins to clear up; in the Sophist the second; and for this,
as well as for other reasons, both these dialogues are probably to be
regarded as later than the Republic.
BOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true
being, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, truth, and
that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask whether they or
the many shall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt that philosophers
should be chosen, if they have the other qualities which are required in a
ruler? For they are lovers of the knowledge of the eternal and of all truth;
they are haters of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in the
interests of knowledge; they are spectators of all time and all existence; and
in the magnificence of their contemplation the life of man is as nothing to
them, nor is death fearful. Also they are of a social, gracious disposition,
equally free from cowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember
easily; they have harmonious, well-regulated minds; truth flows to them
sweetly by nature. Can the god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such
an assemblage of good qualities?
Here Adeimantus interposes:—'No man can answer you, Socrates; but
every man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is
driven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say, just as
an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a more skilled
opponent. And yet all the time he may be right. He may know, in this very
instance, that those who make philosophy the business of their lives,
generally turn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are good.
What do you say?' I should say that he is quite right. 'Then how is such an
admission reconcileable with the doctrine that philosophers should be
kings?'
I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a
hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their

governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an
illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship, taller
by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a little blind,
and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. The sailors want to steer, although
they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that it cannot be
learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain's posset, bind him
hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who joins in the mutiny
is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no conception that the true
pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and must be their master,
whether they like it or not;—such an one would be called by them fool,
prater, star-gazer. This is my parable; which I will beg you to interpret for
me to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name,
and to explain to them that not he, but those who will not use him, are to
blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not beg of mankind to be
put in authority over them. The wise man should not seek the rich, as the
proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at the door
of the physician when he has need of him. Now the pilot is the philosopher
—he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are
the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered useless. Not that these are
the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own
professing sons when they are corrupted by the world. Need I recall the
original image of the philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he
loved truth and hated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the
multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature to
the contemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is
the leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were
observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see that the persons who
were thus described, with the exception of a small and useless class, are
utter rogues.
The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in
nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description of him,
is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these rare
beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil—health,
wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed under
unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world the
strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and soil, so the
best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall upon an

unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any considerable good
or harm; they are not the stuff out of which either great criminals or great
heroes are made. The philosopher follows the same analogy: he is either the
best or the worst of all men. Some persons say that the Sophists are the
corrupters of youth; but is not public opinion the real Sophist who is
everywhere present—in those very persons, in the assembly, in the courts,
in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the
surrounding hills? Will not a young man's heart leap amid these discordant
sounds? and will any education save him from being carried away by the
torrent? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to opinion, there follows the
gentle compulsion of exile or death. What principle of rival Sophists or
anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest? Characters there
may be more than human, who are exceptions—God may save a man, but
not his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the hireling
Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions; he is the keeper of
the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the
meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he
dislikes; truth and beauty are determined only by the taste of the brute. Such
is the Sophist's wisdom, and such is the condition of those who make public
opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon
them of being and doing what it approves, and when they attempt first
principles the failure is ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether
the world is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the
multiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea
cannot be a philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers.
There is another evil:—the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and
so they flatter the young (Alcibiades) into a magnificent opinion of his own
capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of
kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, 'Now the
gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool' and must be educated—do you think
that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted towards
philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him?
Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no less than riches,
may divert him? Men of this class (Critias) often become politicians—they
are the authors of great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great
good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others
enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush

from the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a
soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her
suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own—
and he, like a bald little blacksmith's apprentice as he is, having made some
money and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself as a bridegroom
and marries his master's daughter. What will be the issue of such marriages?
Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature? 'They will.'
Small, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers; there may be a few
who are citizens of small states, in which politics are not worth thinking of,
or who have been detained by Theages' bridle of ill health; for my own case
of the oracular sign is almost unique, and too rare to be worth mentioning.
And these few when they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have
taken a look at that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human
life, will stand aside from the storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to
preserve their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too,
will have been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for
man is a social being, and can only attain his highest development in the
society which is best suited to him.
Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name.
Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of
them; at present she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in a strange
soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth.
'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all points but one,
which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some
living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were
afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs
and has not grown easier:—How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us
bring her into the light of day, and make an end of the inquiry.
In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present
mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in early youth,
and in the intervals of business, but they never master the real difficulty,
which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally go to a lecture on
philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, unlike that of
Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of education should be
reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth, and as the man
strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of his soul. Then, when
active life is over, let him finally return to philosophy. 'You are in earnest,

Socrates, but the world will be equally earnest in withstanding you—no
more than Thrasymachus.' Do not make a quarrel between Thrasymachus
and me, who were never enemies and are now good friends enough. And I
shall do my best to convince him and all mankind of the truth of my words,
or at any rate to prepare for the future when, in another life, we may again
take part in similar discussions. 'That will be a long time hence.' Not long in
comparison with eternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for
they have never seen the natural unity of ideas, but only artificial
juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of controversy and
quips of law;—a perfect man ruling in a perfect state, even a single one they
have not known. And we foresaw that there was no chance of perfection
either in states or individuals until a necessity was laid upon philosophers—
not the rogues, but those whom we called the useless class—of holding
office; or until the sons of kings were inspired with a true love of
philosophy. Whether in the infinity of past time there has been, or is in
some distant land, or ever will be hereafter, an ideal such as we have
described, we stoutly maintain that there has been, is, and will be such a
state whenever the Muse of philosophy rules. Will you say that the world is
of another mind? O, my friend, do not revile the world! They will soon
change their opinion if they are gently entreated, and are taught the true
nature of the philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? Or be
jealous of one who has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not
the true but the false philosophers—the pretenders who force their way in
without invitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles,
which is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher despises
earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance with which
he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only, but other
men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as public. When
mankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that image,
will they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it? 'Certainly not. But
what will be the process of delineation?' The artist will do nothing until he
has made a tabula rasa; on this he will inscribe the constitution of a state,
glancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving the
godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and painting
in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and human. But
perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What will they
doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin to the

best?—and if they admit this will they still quarrel with us for making
philosophers our kings? 'They will be less disposed to quarrel.' Let us
assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may hesitate about the
probability of the son of a king being a philosopher. And we do not deny
that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages
there might be one exception—and one is enough. If one son of a king were
a philosopher, and had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into
being. Hence we conclude that our laws are not only the best, but that they
are also possible, though not free from difficulty.
I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose
concerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that
we must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the education
of our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers of their country,
and were to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures and pains, and those
who came forth pure and remained fixed in their principles were to have
honours and rewards in life and after death. But at this point, the argument
put on her veil and turned into another path. I hesitated to make the
assertion which I now hazard,—that our guardians must be philosophers.
You remember all the contradictory elements, which met in the philosopher
—how difficult to find them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit
are not often combined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is averse
to intellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are all necessary, and
therefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures
and dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the highest branches
of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues
mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave
unexplored. 'Enough seemed to have been said.' Enough, my friend; but
what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the guardian
must not faint in the search after truth; he must be prepared to take the
longer road, or he will never reach that higher region which is above the
four virtues; and of the virtues too he must not only get an outline, but a
clear and distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so precise about trifles,
so careless about the highest truths!) 'And what are the highest?' You to
pretend unconsciousness, when you have so often heard me speak of the
idea of good, about which we know so little, and without which though a
man gain the world he has no profit of it! Some people imagine that the
good is wisdom; but this involves a circle,—the good, they say, is wisdom,

wisdom has to do with the good. According to others the good is pleasure;
but then comes the absurdity that good is bad, for there are bad pleasures as
well as good. Again, the good must have reality; a man may desire the
appearance of virtue, but he will not desire the appearance of good. Ought
our guardians then to be ignorant of this supreme principle, of which every
man has a presentiment, and without which no man has any real knowledge
of anything? 'But, Socrates, what is this supreme principle, knowledge or
pleasure, or what? You may think me troublesome, but I say that you have
no business to be always repeating the doctrines of others instead of giving
us your own.' Can I say what I do not know? 'You may offer an opinion.'
And will the blindness and crookedness of opinion content you when you
might have the light and certainty of science? 'I will only ask you to give
such an explanation of the good as you have given already of temperance
and justice.' I wish that I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to
the height of the knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal I cannot
introduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which I may compare
with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let
me give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember our old
distinction of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and
the universal, the objects of sight and the objects of thought? Did you ever
consider that the objects of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the most
complex and costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but
also a medium, which is light; without which the sight will not distinguish
between colours and all will be a blank? For light is the noble bond between
the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us
light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be confounded with
the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call the child of the
good, standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to the
intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the intellectual world
where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is the sun of
intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge and truth,
yet other and fairer than they are, and standing in the same relation to them
in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable height of beauty, which is
above knowledge and above truth! ('You cannot surely mean pleasure,' he
said. Peace, I replied.) And this idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause
of growth, and the author not of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater
far than either in dignity and power. 'That is a reach of thought more than

human; but, pray, go on with the image, for I suspect that there is more
behind.' There is, I said; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles,
imagine further their corresponding worlds—one of the visible, the other of
the intelligible; you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under
the image of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may again subdivide
each part into two lesser segments representative of the stages of knowledge
in either sphere. The lower portion of the lower or visible sphere will
consist of shadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller portion will
contain real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the
intelligible will also have two divisions,—one of mathematics, in which
there is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but only
drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and
numbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from the
objects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and
they are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other
division reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the
idea of good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking
firmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as
descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; 'you
mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical
conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to be
the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make subjects of
pure intellect, because they have no first principle, although when resting
on a first principle, they pass into the higher sphere.' You understand me
very well, I said. And now to those four divisions of knowledge you may
assign four corresponding faculties—pure intelligence to the highest sphere;
active intelligence to the second; to the third, faith; to the fourth, the
perception of shadows—and the clearness of the several faculties will be in
the same ratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related...
Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In
language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country,
he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence.' He has the
noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his desires
are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. None of the
graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he fear death, or
think much of human life. The ideal of modern times hardly retains the
simplicity of the antique; there is not the same originality either in truth or

error which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in
the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance;
nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by
regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has abated;
there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon
nature and human life as a whole; more of exact observation and less of
anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the altered conditions of knowledge,
the parallel is not wholly lost; and there may be a use in translating the
conception of Plato into the language of our own age. The philosopher in
modern times is one who fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their
sequence and connexion, not on fragments or pictures of nature; on history,
not on controversy; on the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not
on the opinions of the many. He is aware of the importance of 'classifying
according to nature,' and will try to 'separate the limbs of science without
breaking them' (Phaedr.). There is no part of truth, whether great or small,
which he will dishonour; and in the least things he will discern the greatest
(Parmen.). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by
analogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single instance is
sufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic), while in other cases a thousand
examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge
only, because the whole has grown too vast to be embraced by a single
mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the divisions of science and of
their relation to the mind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like
Plato, he has a vision of the unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of
philosophy to be attained by a study of elementary mathematics, but as the
far-off result of the working of many minds in many ages. He is aware that
mathematical studies are preliminary to almost every other; at the same
time, he will not reduce all varieties of knowledge to the type of
mathematics. He too must have a nobility of character, without which
genius loses the better half of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in
immensity, and each individual as a link in a never-ending chain of
existence, he will not think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of
death.
Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus
showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He
brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against him
by a modern logician—that he extracts the answer because he knows how

to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change their
meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with
rather too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step may be
unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable. Hence the
failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulae to logic. The
imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature of language, does
not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of symbols. And this
quality in language impairs the force of an argument which has many steps.
The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance,
may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of
reasoning. And here, as elsewhere, Plato seems to intimate that the time had
come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must be
superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are given
in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal is
wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers to be
either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation Socrates has no
hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains the anomaly in an
allegory, first characteristically depreciating his own inventive powers. In
this allegory the people are distinguished from the professional politicians,
and, as elsewhere, are spoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure
under the image of 'the noble captain who is not very quick in his
perceptions.'
The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that
mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between
contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no
other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the
best is most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to
suffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there are some kinds of
excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy of constitution; as is
evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which often
seems to depend on impressions, and hence can only breathe or live in a
certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater
pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play
of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the
disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil personal
enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,—he can say the word
which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into the

follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a
Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states,
or 'of great good, when they are drawn in that direction.'

Yet the thesis, 'corruptio optimi pessima,' cannot be maintained generally
or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The alien
conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of
culture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest
development in a congenial state or family, among friends or fellowworkers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to
such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms them. And while
weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of evil, say in a corrupt
state of the church or of society, and live on happily, allowing the evil to
remain, the finer or stronger natures may be crushed or spoiled by
surrounding influences—may become misanthrope and philanthrope by
turns; or in a few instances, like the founders of the monastic orders, or the
Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves or in their age, may
break away entirely from the world and from the church, sometimes into
great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into both. And the same
holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family.
Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are
overpowered by public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will
make to get possession of them. The world, the church, their own
profession, any political or party organization, are always carrying them off
their legs and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own
prejudices and interests. The 'monster' corporation to which they belong
judges right and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual
becomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for him,
and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided
but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of mankind when
they 'sit down together at an assembly,' either in ancient or modern times.
When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take
possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of
those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic
expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at intervals.
The question is asked,—Why are the citizens of states so hostile to
philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet there is also
a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were taught. But
hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of philosophy,
words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; a (divine)

person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of man holding
communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in that image,
they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the mass of
mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that the people
are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this only arises out of an
accidental error and confusion, and that they do not really hate those who
love them, if they could be educated to know them.
In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be considered:
1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which is contrasted
with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd, the heavenly
pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the divisions of knowledge to
one another and to the corresponding faculties of the soul:
1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse.
Neither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus or
Sophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would
probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a
system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole
rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by him
in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of the soul; there,
like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues from experience and the
common use of language. But at the end of the sixth book he conceives
another and more perfect method, in which all ideas are only steps or grades
or moments of thought, forming a connected whole which is selfsupporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth. He does not
explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other thinkers
both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with a vacant
form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to have a
natural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said to exist.
He is hastening on to the 'end of the intellectual world' without even making
a beginning of them.
In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of
acquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute
knowledge. In all science a priori and a posteriori truths mingle in various
proportions. The a priori part is that which is derived from the most
universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the a
posteriori is that which grows up around the more general principles and

becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines that
the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of science
can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of a priori knowledge
he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning may be sufficiently
explained by the similar attempts of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even of
Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or divinations, or
prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or nature, seem to
stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear to
modern inductive science. These 'guesses at truth' were not made at
random; they arose from a superficial impression of uniformities and first
principles in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the
expanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor can
we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the
human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if
philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience.
2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will
fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or
mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? The
answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the omission of particulars,
partly by imagination perfecting the form which experience supplies
(Phaedo). Plato represents these ideals in a figure as belonging to another
world; and in modern times the idea will sometimes seem to precede, at
other times to co-operate with the hand of the artist. As in science, so also
in creative art, there is a synthetical as well as an analytical method. One
man will have the whole in his mind before he begins; to another the
processes of mind and hand will be simultaneous.
3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge are
based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and intellectual which
pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is implied also the
opposition of the permanent and transient, of the universal and particular.
But the age of philosophy in which he lived seemed to require a further
distinction;—numbers and figures were beginning to separate from ideas.
The world could no longer regard justice as a cube, and was learning to see,
though imperfectly, that the abstractions of sense were distinct from the
abstractions of mind. Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows
of phenomena, the Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was,
as Aristotle remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence

Plato is led to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the
scheme of his philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in
education; they were the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective
relation between them further suggested an objective one; although the
passage from one to the other is really imaginary (Metaph.). For
metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics;
number and figure are the abstractions of time and space, not the
expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of metaphor,
a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and justice than a
crooked line with vice. The figurative association was mistaken for a real
one; and thus the three latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were
constructed.
There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first
term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to
any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to
objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has
been led by the love of analogy (Timaeus) to make four terms instead of
three, although the objects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere
are equally objects of sense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner is,
for the shadows of images at the beginning of the seventh book, and the
imitation of an imitation in the tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching
from unity to infinity, and is divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided
into two more; each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of
the four faculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position
(cp. for the use of the word faith or belief, (Greek), Timaeus), contrasting
equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows (Greek) and the
higher certainty of understanding (Greek) and reason (Greek).
The difference between understanding and mind or reason (Greek) is
analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and
the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest;
consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this self-evidencing
knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to correspond. But
there is a knowledge of the understanding which is incomplete and in
motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate ideas. Those ideas
are called both images and hypotheses—images because they are clothed in
sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only, until they are brought
into connexion with the idea of good.

The general meaning of the passage, 'Noble, then, is the bond which links
together sight...And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible...' so far as the
thought contained in it admits of being translated into the terms of modern
philosophy, may be described or explained as follows:—There is a truth,
one and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down from above,
the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun in the
heavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which they are
created and sustained. It is the IDEA of good. And the steps of the ladder
leading up to this highest or universal existence are the mathematical
sciences, which also contain in themselves an element of the universal.
These, too, we see in a new manner when we connect them with the idea of
good. They then cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential
parts of a higher truth which is at once their first principle and their final
cause.
We cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage,
but we may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are
common to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the
sciences, or rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet parted off
or distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or cause
or reason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the Timaeus and
elsewhere under the form of a person; (3) the recognition of the
hypothetical and conditional character of the mathematical sciences, and in
a measure of every science when isolated from the rest; (4) the conviction
of a truth which is invisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature,
which permeates the intellectual rather than the visible world.
The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller
explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the seventh
book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of Socrates
to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The allusion to
Theages' bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign, of Socrates,
which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the remark that the
salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state of the world is due
to God only; the reference to a future state of existence, which is unknown
to Glaucon in the tenth book, and in which the discussions of Socrates and
his disciples would be resumed; the surprise in the answers; the fanciful
irony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange
position of the philosopher in a figure of speech; the original observation

that the Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders of
public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the shower
of sleet under a wall; the figure of 'the great beast' followed by the
expression of good-will towards the common people who would not have
rejected the philosopher if they had known him; the 'right noble thought'
that the highest truths demand the greatest exactness; the hesitation of
Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of the idea of good;
the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the comparison of philosophy to a
deserted maiden who marries beneath her—are some of the most interesting
characteristics of the sixth book.
Yet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft
discussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and Adeimantus,
would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, we are dissatisfied
when we are told that the idea of good can only be revealed to a student of
the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined to think that neither we nor
they could have been led along that path to any satisfactory goal. For we
have learned that differences of quantity cannot pass into differences of
quality, and that the mathematical sciences can never rise above themselves
into the sphere of our higher thoughts, although they may sometimes
furnish symbols and expressions of them, and may train the mind in habits
of abstraction and self-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an
ancient philosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by
which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary,
may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We remark, first, that in
all ages, and especially in primitive philosophy, words such as being,
essence, unity, good, have exerted an extraordinary influence over the
minds of men. The meagreness or negativeness of their content has been in
an inverse ratio to their power. They have become the forms under which
all things were comprehended. There was a need or instinct in the human
soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, and to this new
mythology the men of a later generation began to attach the powers and
associations of the elder deities.
The idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which
were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in
which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all
things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to
intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power by

which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason divested of
a human personality. It was the life as well as the light of the world, all
knowledge and all power were comprehended in it. The way to it was
through the mathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on it. To
ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking
whether God could be conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart
from God. The God of the Timaeus is not really at variance with the idea of
good; they are aspects of the same, differing only as the personal from the
impersonal, or the masculine from the neuter, the one being the expression
or language of mythology, the other of philosophy.
This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as
conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may
also be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it
goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the stage
of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at, better
than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly and at a
distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some conception of the
same kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which he was aiming, and
the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly have recognized that
more was contained in his own thoughts than he himself knew. As his
words are few and his manner reticent and tentative, so must the style of his
interpreter be. We should not approach his meaning more nearly by
attempting to define it further. In translating him into the language of
modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It
is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first
principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except
in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his disciples in
a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor does the
mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any other
passage in his extant writings.
BOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or
unenlightenment of our nature:—Imagine human beings living in an
underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from
childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the
den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a
raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which
marionette players show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving

figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and among them
images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are
talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' he said, 'and strange captives.'
They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only the shadows of the images
which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give names, and
if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the passengers
will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly
turn them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at
the real images; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be
dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something which
they are able to behold without blinking? And suppose further, that they are
dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself,
will not their sight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will
pass before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be
able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they will
recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his
own proper place as he is. Last of all they will conclude:—This is he who
gives us the year and the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How
will they rejoice in passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them
will seem the honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that
they descend into their old habitations;—in that underground dwelling they
will not see as well as their fellows, and will not be able to compete with
them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there will be many
jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if
they find anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of their number, they
will put him to death, if they can catch him. Now the cave or den is the
world of sight, the fire is the sun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge,
and in the world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with
difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right—
parent of the lord of light in this world, and of truth and understanding in
the other. He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he
is unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for his
eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they behold
in them—he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never in their
lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. But blindness
is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out of darkness into
light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense will distinguish

between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but the blindness
which arises from fulness of light he will deem blessed, and pity the other;
or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he will have more
reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from
above. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some
persons fancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say
that the faculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to
be turned round towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are
almost like bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but
intelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or
evil according to the direction given. Did you never observe how the mind
of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the
more evil he does? Now if you take such an one, and cut away from him
those leaden weights of pleasure and desire which bind his soul to earth, his
intelligence will be turned round, and he will behold the truth as clearly as
he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers
must neither be so uneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so overeducated as to be unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the
world? We must choose out therefore the natures who are most likely to
ascend to the light and knowledge of the good; but we must not allow them
to remain in the region of light; they must be forced down again among the
captives in the den to partake of their labours and honours. 'Will they not
think this a hardship?' You should remember that our purpose in framing the
State was not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they should
serve the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly say to our
philosopher,—Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other States philosophy
grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but you have
been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and therefore we
must insist on your descending into the den. You must, each of you, take
your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and with a little
practice you will see far better than those who quarrel about the shadows,
whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It may
be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least
inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live
in the heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. For those
who rule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to
our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a

chance that the rich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and
wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of
political ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation
for the government of a State.
Then now comes the question,—How shall we create our rulers; what
way is there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy;
it is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul
from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the
soul upwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which
was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused a
natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences gave
any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but that
universal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences are partakers,
I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of war? 'Yes,
certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes in the
tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had
counted the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count
his feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty
sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and
indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these
practical applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be
regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what I mean by
the last expression:—Things sensible are of two kinds; the one class invite
or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now the
stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. For
example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers—a fore finger, a
middle finger, a little finger—the sight equally recognizes all three fingers,
but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or again, suppose two
objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of greatness and
smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. And the
perception of their contrast or relation quickens and sets in motion the
mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has
recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated are one
or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, and are to
be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds great and small,
but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the
question arise of their respective natures; we are thus led on to the

distinction between the visible and intelligible. That was what I meant when
I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was thinking of the contradictions
which arise in perception. The idea of unity, for example, like that of a
finger, does not arouse thought unless involving some conception of
plurality; but when the one is also the opposite of one, the contradiction
gives rise to reflection; an example of this is afforded by any object of sight.
All number has also an elevating effect; it raises the mind out of the foam
and flux of generation to the contemplation of being, having lesser military
and retail uses also. The retail use is not required by us; but as our guardian
is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one may be retained.
And to our higher purpose no science can be better adapted; but it must be
pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned,
not with visible objects, but with abstract truth; for numbers are pure
abstractions—the true arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is
capable of division. When you divide, he insists that you are only
multiplying; his 'one' is not material or resolvable into fractions, but an
unvarying and absolute equality; and this proves the purely intellectual
character of his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of
sharpening the wits; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal test of
general ability, or equally improving to a stupid person.
Let our second branch of education be geometry. 'I can easily see,' replied
Glaucon, 'that the skill of the general will be doubled by his knowledge of
geometry.' That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to which I refer, is
the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the idea of good, and the
compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at generation only. Yet
the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any one who is the least of a
mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous; they are made to look
downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal existence. The geometer
is always talking of squaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in view
action; whereas knowledge is the real object of the study. It should elevate
the soul, and create the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what has
fallen down, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in
the improvement of the faculties.
Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? 'Very
good,' replied Glaucon; 'the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at once
for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.' I like your way of giving useful
reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And there is a

difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only useful
information but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is better than the
bodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. Now, will you appeal to mankind
in general or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to look to yourself
only? 'Every man is his own best friend.' Then take a step backward, for we
are out of order, and insert the third dimension which is of solids, after the
second which is of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion.
But solid geometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor
is the use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of
the study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins
upon men, and, if government would lend a little assistance, there might be
great progress made. 'Very true,' replied Glaucon; 'but do I understand you
now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids,
and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?' Yes, I said; my hastiness
has only hindered us.
'Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am
willing to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the
contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.' I am an exception,
then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not
upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling—no
better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water—he may look up or
look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of
which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. All the
magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which falls far
short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the absolute
harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the beauty of figures
drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which may be used
for illustration, but no mathematician would seek to obtain from them true
conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How ridiculous then to look
for these in the map of the heavens, in which the imperfection of matter
comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the symmetry of day
and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only
by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the
heavens alone, and exert the intellect.
Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say,
and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to the
ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications also. Let

us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that we have an
aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences to the idea of
good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The
musicians put their ears in the place of their minds. 'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I
like to see them laying their ears alongside of their neighbours' faces—some
saying, "That's a new note," others declaring that the two notes are the
same.' Yes, I said; but you mean the empirics who are always twisting and
torturing the strings of the lyre, and quarrelling about the tempers of the
strings; I am referring rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost
equally in error. For they investigate only the numbers of the consonances
which are heard, and ascend no higher,—of the true numerical harmony
which is unheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a
conception. 'That last,' he said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing, I
replied, which is only useful if pursued with a view to the good.
All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if they
are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I dare say, Socrates,'
said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless business.' What study do
you mean—of the prelude, or what? For all these things are only the
prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician is also a
dialectician? 'Certainly not. I have hardly ever known a mathematician who
could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic
which is the music of the intellectual world, and which was by us compared
to the effort of sight, when from beholding the shadows on the wall we
arrived at last at the images which gave the shadows? Even so the
dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at
the contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end of
the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the light, and
the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to contemplate the shadows
of reality, not the shadows of an image only—this progress and gradual
acquisition of a new faculty of sight by the help of the mathematical
sciences, is the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the highest
ideal of being.
'So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to
the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths
which lead thither?' Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can
be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined in
the previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, which is

attained in some way very different from those now practised, I am
confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative to human needs and
opinions; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream or hypothesis of
true being, and never analyse their own principles. Dialectic alone rises to
the principle which is above hypotheses, converting and gently leading the
eye of the soul out of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the
upper world, with the help of the sciences which we have been describing—
sciences, as they are often termed, although they require some other name,
implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and
this in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we get four names—
two for intellect, and two for opinion,—reason or mind, understanding,
faith, perception of shadows—which make a proportion—
being:becoming::intellect:opinion—and
science:belief::understanding:
perception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science
which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which
distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all
opponents in the cause of good. To him who is not a dialectician life is but a
sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave before his is well waked up.
And would you have the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings,
or stupid as posts? 'Certainly not the latter.' Then you must train them in
dialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the
coping-stone of the sciences.
I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and
the process of selection may be carried a step further:—As before, they
must be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now
they must also have natural ability which education will improve; that is to
say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, retentive, solid,
diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues; not lame and
one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or conversely;
not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet unintentionally is always
wallowing in the mire of ignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but
sound in wind and limb, and in perfect condition for the great gymnastic
trial of the mind. Justice herself can find no fault with natures such as these;
and they will be the saviours of our State; disciples of another sort would
only make philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my
enthusiasm; I am becoming excited; but when I see her trampled underfoot,
I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. 'I did not notice that you were

more excited than you ought to have been.' But I felt that I was. Now do not
let us forget another point in the selection of our disciples—that they must
be young and not old. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can
be always learning; youth is the time of study, and here we must remember
that the mind is free and dainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to
work against the grain. Learning should be at first a sort of play, in which
the natural bent is detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs
should at first only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over
which during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily
exercise, then the education of the soul will become a more serious matter.
At twenty years of age, a selection must be made of the more promising
disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will begin. The sciences
which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be brought into
relation with each other and with true being; for the power of combining
them is the test of speculative and dialectical ability. And afterwards at
thirty a further selection shall be made of those who are able to withdraw
from the world of sense into the abstraction of ideas. But at this point,
judging from present experience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the
source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:—
Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a
crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly informed that he is a supposititious
son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the
flatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is just what happens with a
man's principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and
which exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds that
imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks,
'What is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and
his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and obey them
as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes
a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very pitiable,
and, in order that our thirty years' old pupils may not require this pity, let us
take every possible care that young persons do not study philosophy too
early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays with an argument;
and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; he soon begins to
believe nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of
thirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and not merely contradict,
and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his conduct. What

time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of the soul?—say,
twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five
years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen years let the student go
down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. At
fifty let him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes uplifted to the
idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if necessary, taking his
turn at the helm of State, and training up others to be his successors. When
his time comes he shall depart in peace to the islands of the blest. He shall
be honoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship as the Pythian oracle
approves.
'You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our
governors.' Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all
things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere
aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise
philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and will
be the servants of justice only. 'And how will they begin their work?' Their
first act will be to send away into the country all those who are more than
ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are left...
At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his
explanation of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in
this, as in other passages, following the order which he prescribes in
education, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the
commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening
towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view the
divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result
which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the previous
discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the dialectical
process, which is represented by the way leading from darkness to light.
The shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water, the
stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,—the first, to the realm of
fancy and poetry,—the second, to the world of sense,—the third, to the
abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences
furnish the type,—the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when seen in
the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and power.
The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of the real stars,
and not mere reflections of them, and ends with the recognition of the sun,
or idea of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth.

To the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly answer:—first,
there is the early education of childhood and youth in the fancies of the
poets, and in the laws and customs of the State;—then there is the training
of the body to be a warrior athlete, and a good servant of the mind;—and
thirdly, after an interval follows the education of later life, which begins
with mathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general.
There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,—first, to
realize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the true
education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a
comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human
mind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the
particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then
seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, not
perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the common
use of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel says, are
'mere abstractions'—of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, but
adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or
with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the faculty
of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played a great
part in the education of the human race. Plato appreciated the value of this
faculty, and saw that it might be quickened by the study of number and
relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive
of reflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or
of mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and distinguished,
then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first suggests such
distinctions. The follow in order the other sciences of plain and solid
geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is astronomy or the
harmony of the spheres,—to this is appended the sister science of the
harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the possibility of other
applications of arithmetical or mathematical proportions, such as we
employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as the Pythagoreans and
even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and Politics, e.g. his distinction
between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the Ethics (Book V), or
between numerical and proportional equality in the Politics.
The modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato's delight in
the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with
him:—Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure

in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the arts.
He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which figures
are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming to
anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a more
general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the backward
state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not encouraged by the aid of the
State in the age of Plato; and he will recognize the grasp of Plato's mind in
his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion including the earth
as well as the heavens,—not forgetting to notice the intimation to which
allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the
science of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he
be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time
when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in
relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle of
truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) that in
that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has fallen into the
error of supposing that he can construct the heavens a priori by
mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony
irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion was a
natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of
astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and
complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance that there was
some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time or
vibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The
modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors equally great; and Plato can
hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim a sort of
prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that the greater part of
astronomy at the present day consists of abstract dynamics, by the help of
which most astronomical discoveries have been made.
The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes
mathematics as an instrument of education,—which strengthens the power
of attention, developes the sense of order and the faculty of construction,
and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative
differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in
education, he sees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral
and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them,
we easily trace the influences of ancient Pythagorean notions. There is no

reason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers; but he is
describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he assigns a real
and separate existence, which, as 'the teachers of the art' (meaning probably
the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision,
and in which unity and every other number are conceived of as absolute.
The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from
phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient
philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness may
have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men, 'who,' in the
words of the Timaeus, 'might learn to regulate their erring lives according to
them.' It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols still
exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in modern times
see the world pervaded by universal law, may also see an anticipation of
this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which is
the source and measure of all things, and yet only an abstraction (Philebus).
Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that
which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage may be
explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of conception
prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the perceptions of
sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which accompanies them.
The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is indistinguishable from the
simple sensation, which is the medium of them. Whereas to Plato sense is
the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the vision of objects in the order in which
they actually present themselves to the experienced sight, but as they may
be imagined to appear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the
infant. The first action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order
this chaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under
which the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the
question, 'What is great, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of
the visible and the intelligible.
The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three
classes of harmonists are distinguished by him:—first, the Pythagoreans,
whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was
to consult Damon—they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are
altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to the
good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with
them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as

experimenting by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of
these fall short in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which
must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems,
and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of
good.
The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den
or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (compare the
description of the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus), and the light
of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the
minds of those who return to this lower world. In other words, their
principles are too wide for practical application; they are looking far away
into the past and future, when their business is with the present. The ideal is
not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life, and may often be at
variance with them. And at first, those who return are unable to compete
with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of the shadows, and are
derided and persecuted by them; but after a while they see the things below
in far truer proportions than those who have never ascended into the upper
world. The difference between the politician turned into a philosopher and
the philosopher turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of
disordered eyesight, the one which is experienced by the captive who is
transferred from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger who
voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men descends into the den. In what
way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or
how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle of politics, is left
unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which
Glaucon impatiently demands to be informed, perhaps he would have said
that the explanation could not be given except to a disciple of the previous
sciences. (Symposium.)
Many illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern
Politics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two
sorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in
two different ways. First, there have been great men who, in the language of
Burke, 'have been too much given to general maxims,' who, like J.S. Mill or
Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they were
politicians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed some
great historical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or possibly
Athenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through

which they viewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting
shadow of some existing institution may have darkened their vision. The
Church of the future, the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the
future, have so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their true
proportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with great
ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer care to
consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or harmonized with the
conditions of human life. They are full of light, but the light to them has
become only a sort of luminous mist or blindness. Almost every one has
known some enthusiastic half-educated person, who sees everything at false
distances, and in erroneous proportions.
With this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another—of those who
see not far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been engaged
all their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or sect of
their own. Men of this kind have no universal except their own interests or
the interests of their class, no principle but the opinion of persons like
themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what they pick up in the streets
or at their club. Suppose them to be sent into a larger world, to undertake
some higher calling, from being tradesmen to turn generals or politicians,
from being schoolmasters to become philosophers:—or imagine them on a
sudden to receive an inward light which reveals to them for the first time in
their lives a higher idea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by
this sudden conversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset;
and on the other hand will not many of their old prejudices and
narrownesses still adhere to them long after they have begun to take a more
comprehensive view of human things? From familiar examples like these
we may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to two kinds
of disorders.
Nor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young
Athenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new
ideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject of a
similar 'aufklarung.' We too observe that when young men begin to criticise
customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human nature, they are
apt to lose hold of solid principle (Greek). They are like trees which have
been frequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they have
no roots reaching far into the soil. They 'light upon every flower,' following

their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They catch
opinions, as diseases are caught—when they are in the air. Borne hither and
thither, 'they speedily fall into beliefs' the opposite of those in which they
were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of right and wrong; they
seem to think one thing as good as another. They suppose themselves to be
searching after truth when they are playing the game of 'follow my leader.'
They fall in love 'at first sight' with paradoxes respecting morality, some
fancy about art, some novelty or eccentricity in religion, and like lovers
they are so absorbed for a time in their new notion that they can think of
nothing else. The resolution of some philosophical or theological question
seems to them more interesting and important than any substantial
knowledge of literature or science or even than a good life. Like the youth
in the Philebus, they are ready to discourse to any one about a new
philosophy. They are generally the disciples of some eminent professor or
sophist, whom they rather imitate than understand. They may be counted
happy if in later years they retain some of the simple truths which they
acquired in early education, and which they may, perhaps, find to be worth
all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws and which we only
reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers which beset youth in
times of transition, when old opinions are fading away and the new are not
yet firmly established. Their condition is ingeniously compared by him to
that of a supposititious son, who has made the discovery that his reputed
parents are not his real ones, and, in consequence, they have lost their
authority over him.
The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also
noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician is
quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and
combines first principles. The contempt which he expresses for distinctions
of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology which Socrates
makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic
style and mode of thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the
inventor of number Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by
which we are made to believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the
gravity with which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State,
namely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of age,
in order to expedite the business of education by a generation, are also truly
Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end of the third book, in

which he expects the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the
second generation.)
BOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect
State wives and children are to be in common; and the education and
pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and
kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State are
to live together, having all things in common; and they are to be warrior
athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the other citizens. Now
let us return to the point at which we digressed. 'That is easily done,' he
replied: 'You were speaking of the State which you had constructed, and of
the individual who answered to this, both of whom you affirmed to be good;
and you said that of inferior States there were four forms and four
individuals corresponding to them, which although deficient in various
degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with a view to determining the
relative happiness or misery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus
and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led to another argument,—and so
here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves again in the same position, and
do you repeat your question. 'I should like to know of what constitutions
you were speaking?' Besides the perfect State there are only four of any
note in Hellas:—first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan
commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly,
democracy, which follows next in order; fourthly, tyranny, which is the
disease or death of all government. Now, States are not made of 'oak and
rock,' but of flesh and blood; and therefore as there are five States there
must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And
first, there is the ambitious nature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian
State; secondly, the oligarchical nature; thirdly, the democratical; and
fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the
perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier,
and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of
Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began
with the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with
timocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the
other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.
But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all
changes of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came
division? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says;—let them condescend to

answer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in
jest. 'And what will they say?' They will say that human things are fated to
decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law of destiny,
when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short or long. Plants or
animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the intelligence of rulers
because alloyed by sense will not enable them to ascertain, and children
will be born out of season. For whereas divine creations are in a perfect
cycle or number, the human creation is in a number which declines from
perfection, and has four terms and three intervals of numbers, increasing,
waning, assimilating, dissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with
each other. The base of the number with a fourth added (or which is 3:4),
multiplied by five and cubed, gives two harmonies:—the first a square
number, which is a hundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred);
the second, an oblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a
figure the side of which is five, subtracting one from each square or two
perfect squares from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire
number is geometrical and contains the rule or law of generation. When this
law is neglected marriages will be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who
are then born will in time become the rulers; the State will decline, and
education fall into decay; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold
and silver and brass and iron will form a chaotic mass—thus division will
arise. Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a true answer, of
course:—but what more have they to say?' They say that the two races, the
iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways;—
the one will take to trade and moneymaking, and the others, having the true
riches and not caring for money, will resist them: the contest will end in a
compromise; they will agree to have private property, and will enslave their
fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers. But they will
retain their warlike character, and will be chiefly occupied in fighting and
exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate between
aristocracy and oligarchy.
The new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers
and contempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion to
warlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy,
and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for
only in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace;
the ruler is no longer a philosopher; as in oligarchies, there springs up

among them an extravagant love of gain—get another man's and save your
own, is their principle; and they have dark places in which they hoard their
gold and silver, for the use of their women and others; they take their
pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from their father—the
law; and their education is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the
strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of this State is party spirit
and ambition.
And what manner of man answers to such a State? 'In love of contention,'
replied Adeimantus, 'he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that respect,
perhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and ill-educated, yet fond of
literature, although not himself a speaker,—fierce with slaves, but obedient
to rulers, a lover of power and honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of
arms,—fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he
grows avaricious, for he has lost philosophy, which is the only saviour and
guardian of men. His origin is as follows:—His father is a good man
dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in order that
he may lead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of precedence
among other women; she is disgusted at her husband's selfishness, and she
expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father. The
old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth:—'When you
grow up you must be more of a man than your father.' All the world are
agreed that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while a busybody is
highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this spirit with
his father's words and ways, and as he is naturally well disposed, although
he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a middle point and becomes
ambitious and a lover of honour.
And now let us set another city over against another man. The next form
of government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it
difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the
possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented;
one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh
virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers of
politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by law to the rich,
who do not shrink from violence in order to effect their purposes.
Thus much of the origin,—let us next consider the evils of oligarchy.
Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because

he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the
analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: two
nations are struggling together in one—the rich and the poor; and the rich
dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay for
defenders out of their own money. And have we not already condemned
that State in which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers?
The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his property and have no place
in the State; while there is one class which has enormous wealth, the other
is entirely destitute. But observe that these destitutes had not really any
more of the governing nature in them when they were rich than now that
they are poor; they were miserable spendthrifts always. They are the drones
of the hive; only whereas the actual drone is unprovided by nature with a
sting, the two-legged things whom we call drones are some of them without
stings and some of them have dreadful stings; in other words, there are
paupers and there are rogues. These are never far apart; and in oligarchical
cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, you will find
abundance of both. And this evil state of society originates in bad education
and bad government.
Like State, like man,—the change in the latter begins with the
representative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his father, who
may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and presently he sees him
'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of informers, dying in prison or
exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he thus receives,
makes him cautious; he leaves politics, represses his pride, and saves pence.
Avarice is enthroned as his bosom's lord, and assumes the style of the Great
King; the rational and spirited elements sit humbly on the ground at either
side, the one immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration
of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money; the conversion is
instantaneous. The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one passion
which is the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of the State? He has
had no education, or he would never have allowed the blind god of riches to
lead the dance within him. And being uneducated he will have many slavish
desires, some beggarly, some knavish, breeding in his soul. If he is the
trustee of an orphan, and has the power to defraud, he will soon prove that
he is not without the will, and that his passions are only restrained by fear
and not by reason. Hence he leads a divided existence; in which the better
desires mostly prevail. But when he is contending for prizes and other

distinctions, he is afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren
honour; in time of war he fights with a small part of his resources, and
usually keeps his money and loses the victory.
Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the
oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an oligarchy;
and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may gain by the ruin
of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose their property or rights
of citizenship; but they remain in the city, full of hatred against the new
owners of their estates and ripe for revolution. The usurer with stooping
walk pretends not to see them; he passes by, and leaves his sting—that is,
his money—in some other victim; and many a man has to pay the parent or
principal sum multiplied into a family of children, and is reduced into a
state of dronage by him. The only way of diminishing the evil is either to
limit a man in his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at his
own risk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care only for
money, and are as careless of virtue as the poorest of the citizens. Now there
are occasions on which the governors and the governed meet together,—at
festivals, on a journey, voyaging or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in
the hour of danger he is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and
panting, and draws the conclusion which he privately imparts to his
companions,—'that our people are not good for much;' and as a sickly
frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, or sometimes without
external impulse is ready to fall to pieces of itself, so from the least cause,
or with none at all, the city falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. And
democracy comes into power when the poor are the victors, killing some
and exiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.
The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom
and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes,
and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of
character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and
figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and
children, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is not
one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great charm
is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it alone if
you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, and all quite
irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death they remain
alive all the same; a gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks

about the streets like a hero; and nobody sees him or cares for him.
Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine
theories of education,—how little she cares for the training of her
statesmen! The only qualification which she demands is the profession of
patriotism. Such is democracy;—a pleasing, lawless, various sort of
government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.
Let us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of the
State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly oligarch, and
has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary pleasures.
Perhaps I ought to explain this latter term:—Necessary pleasures are those
which are good, and which we cannot do without; unnecessary pleasures
are those which do no good, and of which the desire might be eradicated by
early training. For example, the pleasures of eating and drinking are
necessary and healthy, up to a certain point; beyond that point they are alike
hurtful to body and mind, and the excess may be avoided. When in excess,
they may be rightly called expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful
ones. And the drone, as we called him, is the slave of these unnecessary
pleasures and desires, whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to the
necessary.
The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:—The
youth who has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone's honey;
he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure.
As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides,
temptations from without and passions from within; there is reason also and
external influences of parents and friends in alliance with the oligarchical
principle; and the two factions are in violent conflict with one another.
Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again new desires and new
disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions gets possession of the
Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which they find void and unguarded by
true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions ascend to take their place;
the prodigal goes back into the country of the Lotophagi or drones, and
openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or parley of individual
elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates of the castle and
permit no one to enter,—there is a battle, and they gain the victory; and
straightway making alliance with the desires, they banish modesty, which
they call folly, and send temperance over the border. When the house has
been swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and, crowning

them with garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they call
good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage.
Such is the process by which the youth passes from the necessary pleasures
to the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time impartially between
them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the violence of passion has
abated, he restores some of the exiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium,
indulging first one pleasure and then another; and if reason comes and tells
him that some pleasures are good and honourable, and others bad and vile,
he shakes his head and says that he can make no distinction between them.
Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and
then he turns abstainer; he practises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at
all; then again he would be a philosopher or a politician; or again, he would
be a warrior or a man of business; he is

'Every thing by starts and nothing long.'

There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all States—
tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as
democracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess; the one from
excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great natural good
of life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive love of freedom
and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the change from
democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of freedom, and
unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them;
equality and fraternity of governors and governed is the approved principle.
Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but of private houses, and extends
even to the animals. Father and son, citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil,
old and young, are all on a level; fathers and teachers fear their sons and
pupils, and the wisdom of the young man is a match for the elder, and the
old imitate the jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being
thought morose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and
there is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in a
democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The
she-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march
along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their
way. 'That has often been my experience.' At last the citizens become so
sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten;
they would have no man call himself their master. Such is the glorious
beginning of things out of which tyranny springs. 'Glorious, indeed; but
what is to follow?' The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; for there
is a law of contraries; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of
slavery, and the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will
remember that in the oligarchy were found two classes—rogues and
paupers, whom we compared to drones with and without stings. These two
classes are to the State what phlegm and bile are to the human body; and the
State-physician, or legislator, must get rid of them, just as the bee-master
keeps the drones out of the hive. Now in a democracy, too, there are drones,
but they are more numerous and more dangerous than in the oligarchy;
there they are inert and unpractised, here they are full of life and animation;
and the keener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and
prevent their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in
democratic States, of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be squeezed

when the drones have need of their possessions; there is moreover a third
class, who are the labourers and the artisans, and they make up the mass of
the people. When the people meet, they are omnipotent, but they cannot be
brought together unless they are attracted by a little honey; and the rich are
made to supply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part
themselves, giving a taste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to resist;
they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and so become downright
oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for
treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse into greatness,
and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is
indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, which tells how he
who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims will turn
into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human blood, and slays some
and exiles others with or without law, who hints at abolition of debts and
division of lands, must either perish or become a wolf—that is, a tyrant.
Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back from exile; and then if his
enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, they plot his assassination.
Thereupon the friend of the people makes his well-known request to them
for a body-guard, which they readily grant, thinking only of his danger and
not of their own. Now let the rich man make to himself wings, for he will
never run away again if he does not do so then. And the Great Protector,
having crushed all his rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a
full-blown tyrant: Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness.
In the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he
is not a 'dominus,' no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and the
monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself
necessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus enabled to depress
the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; and he can get rid of
bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes
unpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to oppose him.
The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the State; but, unlike
the physician who purges away the bad, he must get rid of the high-spirited,
the wise and the wealthy; for he has no choice between death and a life of
shame and dishonour. And the more hated he is, the more he will require
trusty guards; but how will he obtain them? 'They will come flocking like
birds—for pay.' Will he not rather obtain them on the spot? He will take the
slaves from their owners and make them his body-guard; these are his

trusted friends, who admire and look up to him. Are not the tragic poets
wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise by
association with the wise? And are not their praises of tyranny alone a
sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State? They may go
to other cities, and gather the mob about them with fine words, and change
commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and
rewards for their services; but the higher they and their friends ascend
constitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become 'too asthmatic
to mount.' To return to the tyrant—How will he support that rare army of
his? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which will enable him
to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father's property, and spend it
on his companions, male or female. Now his father is the demus, and if the
demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not to be a burden
on his parents, and bids him and his riotous crew begone, then will the
parent know what a monster he has been nurturing, and that the son whom
he would fain expel is too strong for him. 'You do not mean to say that he
will beat his father?' Yes, he will, after having taken away his arms. 'Then
he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural son.' And the people have jumped
from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus
liberty, when out of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of
servitude...
In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns
to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the
end of Book IV. These he describes in a succession of parallels between the
individuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in the State or
individual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at which
he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance of the
three former books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher and the
State.
Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have
liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, which
to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the natural
antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of mystery
over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of the law of
population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or number is the
expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of the gradual
perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race. His ideal was

not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring in full armour
from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been given, he thought
only of the manner in which they were likely to be corrupted, or of how
they might be filled up in detail or restored in accordance with their original
spirit. He appears not to have reflected upon the full meaning of his own
words, 'In the brief space of human life, nothing great can be accomplished';
or again, as he afterwards says in the Laws, 'Infinite time is the maker of
cities.' The order of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an
order of thought rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as
the first attempt to frame a philosophy of history.
The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of
soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is a
government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but
imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of organization have
disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and the
soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, rules in his stead. The
individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable qualities. He is
described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover of literature; and
although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no natural superiority
over them. His character is based upon a reaction against the circumstances
of his father, who in a troubled city has retired from politics; and his
mother, who is dissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him
towards the life of political ambition. Such a character may have had this
origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a feminine jealousy
of a similar kind. But there is obviously no connection between the manner
in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere accident
by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.
The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less
historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity like
the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the
oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears
to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or patriarchal
form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded by an
oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was only the
accident of the hereditary possession of land and power. Sometimes this
oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon a
qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using

words, would have been called a timocracy; and this in some cities, as at
Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the
necessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can any order be
discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in the
Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy
to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a similar
inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession; for tyranny, instead of
being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history appears rather as
a stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus and his sons is an
episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the constitution
of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all seems to have
led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the dawn of history,
e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the
exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either
in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is
describing rather the contemporary governments of the Sicilian States,
which alternated between democracy and tyranny, than the ancient history
of Athens or Corinth.
The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek delighted
to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of mediaeval
saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to
another in order to fill up the outline. There was no enormity which the
Greek was not today to believe of them; the tyrant was the negation of
government and law; his assassination was glorious; there was no crime,
however unnatural, which might not with probability be attributed to him.
In this, Plato was only following the common thought of his countrymen,
which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of his genius.
There is no need to suppose that he drew from life; or that his knowledge of
tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner
in which he speaks of them would rather tend to render doubtful his ever
having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the schemes, which are
attributed to him in the Epistles, of regenerating Sicily by their help.
Plato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of
democracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is
a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what is
right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of liberty,
rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading idea of

democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. But if he
is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of tyranny. His deeper and
more serious condemnation is reserved for the tyrant, who is the ideal of
wickedness and also of weakness, and who in his utter helplessness and
suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible existence, without that
remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was required to give power to
evil (Book I). This ideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the
reverse of that other portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and
splendour, which first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of
Ariston had drawn, and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is
the good of his subjects.
Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical
gradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing but
harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; in the timocracy and
the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or of the
individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of
honour; this latter virtue, which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has
superseded all the rest. In the second stage of decline the virtues have
altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded to them; in the
third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed to have free
play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this freedom,
which leads to many curious extravagances of character, is in reality only a
state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes
possession of the whole nature of man—this is tyranny. In all of them
excess—the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the element of
decay.
The eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful
allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent
than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark,
(1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and
more divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in
our own;
(2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula
as equality among unequals;
(3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic
of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant;

(4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a
speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in
modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation.
Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver: in
modern times we may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the first of
these difficulties, but hardly the second.
Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: there
is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of the
timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness of
the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, in
which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as
he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country (note
here the play of language by which the democratic man is himself
represented under the image of a State having a citadel and receiving
embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his
successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide; the representation of
the tyrant's life as an obscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of a more
miserable than the most miserable of men in Book IX; the hint to the poets
that if they are the friends of tyrants there is no place for them in a
constitutional State, and that they are too clever not to see the propriety of
their own expulsion; the continuous image of the drones who are of two
kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having wings (Book IX),—are
among Plato's happiest touches.
There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the
Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as great
as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though
apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of
obscurity (Ep. ad Att.). And some have imagined that there is no answer to
the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But such a
deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks
of the number (Pol.), and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the
Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. As little reason is
there for supposing that Plato intentionally used obscure expressions; the
obscurity arises from our want of familiarity with the subject. On the other
hand, Plato himself indicates that he is not altogether serious, and in
describing his number as a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply

some degree of satire on the symbolical use of number. (Compare Cratylus;
Protag.)
Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an
accurate study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by
the parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in
Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the passage
(Greek) describes a solid figure. (Pol.—'He only says that nothing is
abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of
the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of 4:3; and this when
combined with a figure of five gives two harmonies; he means when the
number of this figure becomes solid.') Some further clue may be gathered
from the appearance of the Pythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the
numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in every right-angled triangle, the squares
of the two lesser sides equal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25).
Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (Tim.), i.e. a
number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the divine
or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are complete. He
also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms and three
intervals of numbers which are related to one another in certain proportions;
these he converts into figures, and finds in them when they have been raised
to the third power certain elements of number, which give two 'harmonies,'
the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that the square number
answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any
intimation given that the first or divine number represents the period of the
world, the second the period of the state, or of the human race as Zeller
supposes; nor is the divine number afterwards mentioned (Arist.). The
second is the number of generations or births, and presides over them in the
same mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which,
according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are
represented by some number or figure. This is probably the number 216.
The explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up
the number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the
circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens
(Herod.), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number which
nearly concerns the population of a city'; the mysterious disappearance of
the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first cause

of his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony,' of 400, might be a
symbol of the guardians,—the larger or oblong 'harmony,' of the people,
and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively to the three orders in the
State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government.
The harmony of the musical scale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of
the harmony of the state, is also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which
represent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of
the scale.
The terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as
follows. A perfect number (Greek), as already stated, is one which is equal
to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or cyclical
number, = 1 + 2 + 3. The words (Greek), 'terms' or 'notes,' and (Greek),
'intervals,' are applicable to music as well as to number and figure. (Greek)
is the 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, or the 'lowest term'
from which it can be worked out. The words (Greek) have been variously
translated—'squared and cubed' (Donaldson), 'equalling and equalled in
power' (Weber), 'by involution and evolution,' i.e. by raising the power and
extracting the root (as in the translation). Numbers are called 'like and
unlike' (Greek) when the factors or the sides of the planes and cubes which
they represent are or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and 27 = 2 cubed and 3
cubed; and conversely. 'Waxing' (Greek) numbers, called also 'increasing'
(Greek), are those which are exceeded by the sum of their divisors: e.g. 12
and 18 are less than 16 and 21. 'Waning' (Greek) numbers, called also
'decreasing' (Greek) are those which succeed the sum of their divisors: e.g.
8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated 'commensurable and
agreeable to one another' (Greek) seem to be different ways of describing
the same relation, with more or less precision. They are equivalent to
'expressible in terms having the same relation to one another,' like the series
8, 12, 18, 27, each of which numbers is in the relation of (1 and 1/2) to the
preceding. The 'base,' or 'fundamental number, which has 1/3 added to it' (1
and 1/3) = 4/3 or a musical fourth. (Greek) is a 'proportion' of numbers as of
musical notes, applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to
the relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a 'square'
number (Greek); the second harmony is an 'oblong' number (Greek), i.e. a
number representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are equal.
(Greek) = 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; (Greek) = 'rational,'
i.e. omitting fractions, (Greek), 'irrational,' i.e. including fractions; e.g. 49 is

a square of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which = 5: 50, of an
irrational diameter of the same. For several of the explanations here given
and for a good deal besides I am indebted to an excellent article on the
Platonic Number by Dr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society).
The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him
as follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle is
the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the number
of the state, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined by the perfect
number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number or 216, which is the
product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic Tetractys (a series of seven
terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27); and if we take this as the basis of our
computation, we shall have two cube numbers (Greek), viz. 8 and 27; and
the mean proportionals between these, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three
intervals and four terms, and these terms and intervals stand related to one
another in the sesqui-altera ratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as 3/2.
Now if we remember that the number 216 = 8 x 27 = 3 cubed + 4 cubed + 5
cubed, and 3 squared + 4 squared = 5 squared, we must admit that this
number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians attach so much
importance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3 with the number 5, or multiply
the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first squaring and then
cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio of the two last pairs
of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former multiplied by the square, the
latter by the cube of the number 10, the sum of the first four digits which
constitute the Platonic Tetractys.' The two (Greek) he elsewhere explains as
follows: 'The first (Greek) is (Greek), in other words (4/3 x 5) all squared =
100 x 2 squared over 3 squared. The second (Greek), a cube of the same
root, is described as 100 multiplied (alpha) by the rational diameter of 5
diminished by unity, i.e., as shown above, 48: (beta) by two
incommensurable diameters, i.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and
(gamma) by the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x
2 cubed. This second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the
former harmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of
3. In other words, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first harmony,
400/9: (2), for the second harmony, 8000/27.'
The reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and
also with Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of
births are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number given in

the first part of the passage (Greek...): (2) that the number 216 with its
permutations would have been familiar to a Greek mathematician, though
unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of 3 cubed,
4 cubed, 5 cubed, the numbers 3, 4, 5 representing the Pythagorean triangle,
of which the sides when squared equal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16
= 25): (4) that it is also the period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5)
the three ultimate terms or bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer
to the third, fourth, fifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the
product of the cubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic
Tetractys: (7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et
Osir.), Proclus (super prima Eucl.), and Quintilian (de Musica) to be
contained in this passage, so that the tradition of the school seems to point
in the same direction: (8) that the Pythagorean triangle is called also the
figure of marriage (Greek).
But though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for
supposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the
human or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that the
second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that (Greek) can mean 'two
incommensurables,' which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but rather,
as the preceding clause implies, (Greek), i.e. two square numbers based
upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is 5 = 50 x 2.
The greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words
(Greek), 'a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by 5.' In this
somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the numbers of the
Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers which follow are
in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, as has been already
remarked, probably represents the rulers; the second and oblong harmony of
7600, the people.
And here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle
would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The
point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so
much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general
meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented or presided
over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is imperfect, and
represented or presided over by an imperfect number or series of numbers.
The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens in the Laws, is

expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of
the number for division; it is also made up of the first seven digits
multiplied by one another. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect number
may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, which were
made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the latter is said to have
been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of exactness to be
attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book IX (729 = 365 x
2), and the slight correction of the error in the number 5040/12 (Laws), may
furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in the circumstance that
those who were seeking for order in nature and had found order in number,
should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato believes in a power
of number far beyond what he could see realized in the world around him,
and he knows the great influence which 'the little matter of 1, 2, 3' exercises
upon education. He may even be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of
the discoveries of Quetelet and others, that numbers depend upon numbers;
e.g.—in population, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of
children born of either sex, on the respective ages of parents, i.e. on other
numbers.
BOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to
enquire, Whence is he, and how does he live—in happiness or in misery?
There is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the
appetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are unlawful,
and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various degrees by the
power of reason and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I mean those which
are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which get up and walk
about naked without any self-respect or shame; and there is no conceivable
folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, in imagination, they
may not be guilty. 'True,' he said; 'very true.' But when a man's pulse beats
temperately; and he has supped on a feast of reason and come to a
knowledge of himself before going to rest, and has satisfied his desires just
enough to prevent their perturbing his reason, which remains clear and
luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and heat,—the visions which he
has on his bed are least irregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is
such an irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.
To return:—You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was
the son of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and
repressed the ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into

fine company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways;
and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean,
and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and
successive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a father,
and has a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions
who lead him into every sort of iniquity, and parents and friends who try to
keep him right. The counsellors of evil find that their only chance of
retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love; while other
desires buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this
monster love takes possession of him, and puts an end to every true or
modest thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny;
and the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a drinking,
lusting, furious sort of animal.
And how does such an one live? 'Nay, that you must tell me.' Well then, I
fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be the
lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so he
spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has nothing the
young ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for
food. Love urges them on; and they must be gratified by force or fraud, or if
not, they become painful and troublesome; and as the new pleasures
succeed the old ones, so will the son take possession of the goods of his
parents; if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and deceive them;
and if they openly resist, what then? 'I can only say, that I should not much
like to be in their place.' But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some
new-fangled and unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother,
best and dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour! Truly
a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother! When there is no
more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket, or robs a temple.
Love overmasters the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes in sober reality
the monster that he was sometimes in sleep. He waxes strong in all violence
and lawlessness; and is ready for any deed of daring that will supply the
wants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State there are only a few such,
and these in time of war go out and become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But
in time of peace they stay at home and do mischief; they are the thieves,
footpads, cut-purses, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to
speak, they turn false-witnesses and informers. 'No small catalogue of
crimes truly, even if the perpetrators are few.' Yes, I said; but small and

great are relative terms, and no crimes which are committed by them
approach those of the tyrant, whom this class, growing strong and
numerous, create out of themselves. If the people yield, well and good, but,
if they resist, then, as before he beat his father and mother, so now he beats
his fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries over them. Such
men in their early days live with flatterers, and they themselves flatter
others, in order to gain their ends; but they soon discard their followers
when they have no longer any need of them; they are always either masters
or servants,—the joys of friendship are unknown to them. And they are
utterly treacherous and unjust, if the nature of justice be at all understood by
us. They realize our dream; and he who is the most of a tyrant by nature,
and leads the life of a tyrant for the longest time, will be the worst of them,
and being the worst of them, will also be the most miserable.
Like man, like State,—the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which
is the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the other
the worst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the tyrant may
appear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in and ask;
and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the tyrannical
the most miserable of States. And may we not ask the same question about
the men themselves, requesting some one to look into them who is able to
penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be panic-struck by the vain
pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he is one who has lived with him, and
has seen him in family life, or perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.
Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek,
let us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all,
whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved—Will there not be a little
freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and the
slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as well as to the State; for
his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part is enslaved to
the worse. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full of confusion;
he is the very reverse of a freeman. The State will be poor and full of
misery and sorrow; and the man's soul will also be poor and full of sorrows,
and he will be the most miserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for
there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The tyrannical man who has the
misfortune also to become a public tyrant. 'There I suspect that you are
right.' Say rather, 'I am sure;' conjecture is out of place in an enquiry of this
nature. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of them than

any private individual. You will say, 'The owners of slaves are not generally
in any fear of them.' But why? Because the whole city is in a league which
protects the individual. Suppose however that one of these owners and his
household is carried off by a god into a wilderness, where there are no
freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of terror?—will he not be
compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise them many things sore
against his will? And suppose the same god who carried him off were to
surround him with neighbours who declare that no man ought to have
slaves, and that the owners of them should be punished with death. 'Still
worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his enemies.' And is not our
tyrant such a captive soul, who is tormented by a swarm of passions which
he cannot indulge; living indoors always like a woman, and jealous of those
who can go out and see the world?
Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more
miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of
himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of
slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never able to
satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, like the State of which he
is the representative. His jealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with
command; he is more and more faithless, envious, unrighteous,—the most
wretched of men, a misery to himself and to others. And so let us have a
final trial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the
result? 'Made the proclamation yourself.' The son of Ariston (the best) is of
opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this is
he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he
who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I add further
—'seen or unseen by gods or men.'
This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of
pleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul—reason, passion,
desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual
appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of reputation.
Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, and careless of
money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of men's natures,
one of these three principles is in the ascendant, and they have their several
pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the three natures, and
each one will be found praising his own pleasures and depreciating those of
others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of knowledge with the

solid advantages of wealth. The ambitious man will despise knowledge
which brings no honour; whereas the philosopher will regard only the
fruition of truth, and will call other pleasures necessary rather than good.
Now, how shall we decide between them? Is there any better criterion than
experience and knowledge? And which of the three has the truest
knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth makes the
philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious and
the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom. Honour he
has equally with them; they are 'judged of him,' but he is 'not judged of
them,' for they never attain to the knowledge of true being. And his
instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth and honour; and
if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And so we arrive at
the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul, and a life passed
in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who has a right to judge judges thus.
Next comes the life of ambition, and, in the third place, that of moneymaking.
Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust—once more, as in an
Olympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try
a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true and
pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this: Is not pleasure
opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither? When a
man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this he never
found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease from pain; on
the other hand, when he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him.
Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But can that which is
neither become both? Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the
absence of them is rest; but if so, how can the absence of either of them be
the other? Thus we are led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance
only, and witchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for
there are others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not
the absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure; although most of
the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are reliefs of pain, and
have not only their reactions when they depart, but their anticipations
before they come. They can be best described in a simile. There is in nature
an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes from the lower to
the middle imagines that he is going up and is already in the upper world;
and if he were taken back again would think, and truly think, that he was

descending. All this arises out of his ignorance of the true upper, middle,
and lower regions. And a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain,
and with many other things. The man who compares grey with black, calls
grey white; and the man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the
absence of pain pleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the
body, ignorance and folly of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one,
knowledge of the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction—that of eating
and drinking, or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The
satisfaction of that which has more existence is truer than of that which has
less. The invariable and immortal has a more real existence than the
variable and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and
truth. The soul, again, has more existence and truth and knowledge than the
body, and is therefore more really satisfied and has a more natural pleasure.
Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up to the
middle and down again; but they never pass into the true upper world, or
have a taste of true pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and
sensuality, and ready to kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust;
for they are not filled with true being, and their vessel is leaky (Gorgias).
Their pleasures are mere shadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured
and intensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go
fighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the
shadow of Helen at Troy, because they know not the truth.
The same may be said of the passionate element:—the desires of the
ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction.
Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles do
their own business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When not
attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow of
pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from philosophy
and reason, the more distant they will be from law and order, and the more
illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love and tyranny are the
farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest to it. There is one
genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the
latter; he has run away altogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure
of his inferiority be told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed
from the oligarch, and has therefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the
shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from the
king, and thus we get the formula 3 x 3, which is the number of a surface,

representing the shadow which is the tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to
cube this 'number of the beast,' you will find that the measure of the
difference amounts to 729; the king is 729 times more happy than the
tyrant. And this extraordinary number is NEARLY equal to the number of
days and nights in a year (365 x 2 = 730); and is therefore concerned with
human life. This is the interval between a good and bad man in happiness
only: what must be the difference between them in comeliness of life and
virtue!
Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our
discussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of
justice. Now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an
image of the soul, which will personify his words. First of all, fashion a
multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame
and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. Suppose now
another form of a lion, and another of a man; the second smaller than the
first, the third than the second; join them together and cover them with a
human skin, in which they are completely concealed. When this has been
done, let us tell the supporter of injustice that he is feeding up the beasts
and starving the man. The maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying
to strengthen the man; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and
making an alliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep
down the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and
with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to
pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust wrong.
But now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. Is
not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God
in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And if so,
who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest part
of himself under the worst?—who would sell his son or daughter into the
hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he sell
his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most
godless and foul? Would he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her
husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of the
multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the growth and increase of
the lion and serpent element, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by a
too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the
spirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become

a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are
engaged in them have to flatter, instead of mastering their desires; therefore
we say that they should be placed under the control of the better principle in
another because they have none in themselves; not, as Thrasymachus
imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for their good. And our intention
in educating the young, is to give them self-control; the law desires to nurse
up in them a higher principle, and when they have acquired this, they may
go their ways.
'What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world' and become
more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if
the concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the
brute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element
liberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his
soul—a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of
understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place he will
keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but in
order to attain the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the acquisition
of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not desire to heap
up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the increase of wealth will
disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the same reason he will only
accept such honours as will make him a better man; any others he will
decline. 'In that case,' said he, 'he will never be a politician.' Yes, but he
will, in his own city; though probably not in his native country, unless by
some divine accident. 'You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city,
which has no place upon earth.' But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of
such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image. Whether
such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act according to that
pattern and no other...
The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:—(1) the
account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king
from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.
1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this
respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are attributed
to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to all pleasure, but
rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall have their natural
satisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in describing pleasure as

something more than the absence of pain. This is proved by the
circumstance that there are pleasures which have no antecedent pains (as he
also remarks in the Philebus), such as the pleasures of smell, and also the
pleasures of hope and anticipation. In the previous book he had made the
distinction between necessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated
by Aristotle, and he now observes that there are a further class of 'wild
beast' pleasures, corresponding to Aristotle's (Greek). He dwells upon the
relative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which
arises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority
of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of
sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact
that reason is able to form a judgment of the lower pleasures, while the two
lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the pleasures of reason.
Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy
of Plato is 'sawn up into quantities' by Aristotle; the analysis which was
originally made by him became in the next generation the foundation of
further technical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the
illusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure
as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding the permanence of the
intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from
which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of
knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting than other
pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily
state (Introduction to Philebus).
2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant,
and royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato
characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life,
because NEARLY equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year.
He is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is
immeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those
who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (Prot.), saw
no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the
pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the pleasure of the king by the
numerical interval of 729. And in modern times we sometimes use
metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical formula. 'It is not
easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says
Plato. So we might say, that although the life of a good man is not to be

compared to that of a bad man, yet you may measure the difference between
them by valuing one minute of the one at an hour of the other ('One day in
thy courts is better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an
infinite difference.' But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase,
'They are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the natural
vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical
formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in the
number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth of his
speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure; just as persons
in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is verified when it has been
only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking of the number 729 as proper
to human life, he probably intended to intimate that one year of the
tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life.
The simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is
effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical
groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in
explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is
removed in the third degree from the royal and aristocratical, and the tyrant
in the third degree from the oligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms
as the sides of a square and to count the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning
them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a
step towards the cube.
3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more
convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of the
9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of
philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at
his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant
kingdom is also the rule of man's life. ('Say not lo! here, or lo! there, for the
kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is struck which prepares for
the revelation of a future life in the following Book. But the future life is
present still; the ideal of politics is to be realized in the individual.
BOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there
was nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The
division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I do
not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on the
understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which heals

error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now he appears
to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man, I
love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, will you
explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely then
that I should understand!' That might very well be, for the duller often sees
better than the keener eye. 'True, but in your presence I can hardly venture
to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the
doctrine of universals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables.
There is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his
mind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but
he made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker of
the works of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but plants and
animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven and under the
earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be a wizard indeed!' But do you
not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You have only
to take a mirror, and catch the reflection of the sun, and the earth, or
anything else—there now you have made them. 'Yes, but only in
appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are with the
mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter; although neither the
carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make the absolute bed.
'Not if philosophers may be believed.' Nor need we wonder that his bed has
but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect:—Here are three beds; one in
nature, which is made by God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and
the third, by the painter. God only made one, nor could he have made more
than one; for if there had been two, there would always have been a third—
more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would have been
included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the
bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter is
rather the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a creation
which is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and,
like every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth.
The painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the carpenter.
And this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has
many points of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who
represents everything because he represents a piece of everything, and that
piece an image. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows
nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or

simple people. Suppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he
had met a man who knew all that everybody knows, and better than
anybody:—should we not infer him to be a simpleton who, having no
discernment of truth and falsehood, had met with a wizard or enchanter,
whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying that
Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must we not
infer that they are under a similar delusion? they do not see that the poets
are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations. 'Very true.' But if a
person could create as well as imitate, he would rather leave some
permanent work and not an imitation only; he would rather be the receiver
than the giver of praise? 'Yes, for then he would have more honour and
advantage.'
Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him,
I am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems
incidentally refer, but about their main subjects—war, military tactics,
politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth—not
an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have
ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received
laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from
Lycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your
counsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and
Anacharsis? Or is there any Homeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean
was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after you? 'No,
indeed; and Creophylus (Flesh-child) was even more unfortunate in his
breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in his lifetime
was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.' Yes, but could this ever
have happened if Homer had really been the educator of Hellas? Would he
not have had many devoted followers? If Protagoras and Prodicus can
persuade their contemporaries that no one can manage house or State
without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been allowed
to go about as beggars—I mean if they had really been able to do the world
any good?—would not men have compelled them to stay where they were,
or have followed them about in order to get education? But they did not;
and therefore we may infer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators,
who do but imitate the appearances of things. For as a painter by a
knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in
cobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and

give harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you
know how mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like
a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once
more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The
painter paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither
understands the use of them—the knowledge of this is confined to the
horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use,
another of invention, a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to
the two others. The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the
maker will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have
faith—neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation,
then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the
tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree.
And now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to
imitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen
when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a
distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose
upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating comes in to
save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for, as we were
saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the same and at the same
time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is true is determined
by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the better faculty in the soul, as
the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the same holds of the ear as well
as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. The imitation is of actions
voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an expectation of a good or bad
result, and present experience of pleasure and pain. But is a man in
harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting
influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask,
whether he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is
in company. 'In the latter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge his
sorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he cannot
know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of any
great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good counsel.
For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an uproar; we
should take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a lament, but
finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while the
irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the recollection of our

troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials of
the imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be
displayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of her.
Thus the poet is like the painter in two ways: first he paints an inferior
degree of truth, and secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the
soul. He indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse
to allow him to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure
of greater and less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.
But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment—the
power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear
some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you
know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own
sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and
unmanly (Ion). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what
he hates and abominates in himself? Is he not giving way to a sentiment
which in his own case he would control?—he is off his guard because the
sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge his feelings without
disgrace, and will be the gainer by the pleasure. But the inevitable
consequence is that he who begins by weeping at the sorrows of others, will
end by weeping at his own. The same is true of comedy,—you may often
laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to utter, and the love of
coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home.
Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires; she lets them rule instead
of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer
affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that all life should be
regulated by his precepts, we may allow the excellence of their intentions,
and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and tragedian. But we
shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond hymns to the Gods
and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and reason shall
rule in our State.
These are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us
with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her
that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which
there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of 'the
she-dog, yelping at her mistress,' and 'the philosophers who are ready to
circumvent Zeus,' and 'the philosophers who are paupers.' Nevertheless we
bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return upon condition that

she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her supporters who are not
poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms; but if she cannot show
that she is useful as well as delightful, like rational lovers, we must
renounce our love, though endeared to us by early associations. Having
come to years of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man
should be careful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which
he himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake—no less than the good or
evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue
for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth.
'I agree with you.'
And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. 'And
can we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief span of life:
but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity? 'I do not
understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the soul is immortal?
'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I am. 'Then let me hear
this argument, of which you make so light.'
You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In
all things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy them,
nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, which are
injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these destroy
the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The soul may be
full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, brought any nearer to
death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within ever perished by
external affection of evil. The body, which is one thing, cannot be destroyed
by food, which is another, unless the badness of the food is communicated
to the body. Neither can the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the
body, which is another, unless she herself is infected. And as no bodily evil
can infect the soul, neither can any bodily evil, whether disease or violence,
or any other destroy the soul, unless it can be shown to render her unholy
and unjust. But no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more
unjust when they die. If a person has the audacity to say the contrary, the
answer is—Then why do criminals require the hand of the executioner, and
not die of themselves? 'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very terrible
if it brought a cessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which
murders others may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.'
You are quite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot
destroy the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul which

cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be immortal and
everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in the same number.
They cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; nor yet increase,
for the increase of the immortal must come from something mortal, and so
all would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse; for
that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. If
we would conceive her truly, and so behold justice and injustice in their
own nature, she must be viewed by the light of reason pure as at birth, or as
she is reflected in philosophy when holding converse with the divine and
immortal and eternal. In her present condition we see her only like the seagod Glaucus, bruised and maimed in the sea which is the world, and
covered with shells and stones which are incrusted upon her from the
entertainments of earth.
Thus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards
and honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented
ourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in herself,
even if a man should put on a Gyges' ring and have the helmet of Hades too.
And now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will enumerate the
rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument,
as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of
Gods and men, although this was really impossible. And since I have shown
that justice has reality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of
appearance. In the first place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he is
therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will receive at their hands every
good, always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former
sins. All things end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what
appears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their
likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the best policy? The
clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks down before he reaches
the goal, and slinks away in dishonour; whereas the true runner perseveres
to the end, and receives the prize. And you must allow me to repeat all the
blessings which you attributed to the fortunate unjust—they bear rule in the
city, they marry and give in marriage to whom they will; and the evils
which you attributed to the unfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the
unjust, although, as you implied, their sufferings are better veiled in silence.
But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared
with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear about

them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of Armenius, a
valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten days
afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home for
burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and there he
came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world below. He said
that his soul went with a great company to a place, in which there were two
chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two corresponding chasms in
the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in the intermediate space,
bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the
seal of their judgment set upon them before, while the unjust, having the
seal behind, were bidden to descend by the way on the left hand. Him they
told to look and listen, as he was to be their messenger to men from the
world below. And he beheld and saw the souls departing after judgment at
either chasm; some who came from earth, were worn and travel-stained;
others, who came from heaven, were clean and bright. They seemed glad to
meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they discoursed with one another
of what they had seen in the other world. Those who came from earth wept
at the remembrance of their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of
glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they
were punished tenfold—now the journey was of a thousand years' duration,
because the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years—and the rewards
of virtue were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth
repeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of
parricides and other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate.
He was present when one of the spirits asked—Where is Ardiaeus the
Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had murdered his father, and
his elder brother, a thousand years before.) Another spirit answered, 'He
comes not hither, and will never come. And I myself,' he added, 'actually
saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of the chasm, as we were about to
reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners—most of whom had
been tyrants, but not all—and just as they fancied that they were returning
to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then wild, fiery-looking men who knew
the meaning of the sound, seized him and several others, and bound them
hand and foot and threw them down, and dragged them along at the side of
the road, lacerating them and carding them like wool, and explaining to the
passers-by, that they were going to be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of
the pilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there

was silence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there
were corresponding delights.
On the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in
four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in
colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought
them to the place, and they saw that this was the column of light which
binds together the whole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to
heaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the
heavenly bodies turned—the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the
whorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes
fitting into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together a
single whorl which was pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim
broadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims
narrower. The largest (the fixed stars) was spangled—the seventh (the sun)
was brightest—the eighth (the moon) shone by the light of the seventh—the
second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and
yellower than the eighth—the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light—the
fourth (Mars) was red—the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The
whole had one motion, but while this was revolving in one direction the
seven inner circles were moving in the opposite, with various degrees of
swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a
Siren stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos,
the daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of past,
present, and future, responsive to the music of the Sirens; Clotho from time
to time guiding the outer circle with a touch of her right hand; Atropos with
her left hand touching and guiding the inner circles; Lachesis in turn putting
forth her hand from time to time to guide both of them. On their arrival the
pilgrims went to Lachesis, and there was an interpreter who arranged them,
and taking from her knees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit
and said: 'Mortal souls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of
Necessity. A new period of mortal life has begun, and you may choose what
divinity you please; the responsibility of choosing is with you—God is
blameless.' After speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one
took up the lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before
them the samples of lives, many more than the souls present; and there were
all sorts of lives, of men and of animals. There were tyrannies ending in
misery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their different

qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty, sickness and
health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of human life, and therefore the
whole of education should be directed to the acquisition of such a
knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He
should know all the combinations which occur in life—of beauty with
poverty or with wealth,—of knowledge with external goods,—and at last
choose with reference to the nature of the soul, regarding that only as the
better life which makes men better, and leaving the rest. And a man must
take with him an iron sense of truth and right into the world below, that
there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the allurements of evil, and
be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the
messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the true happiness of
man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding,
have a good lot, even though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in
his choice, nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who
had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated to
devour his own children—and when he discovered his mistake, he wept and
beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather than
himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his
previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had only
habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, because
he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth and had
seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man had followed
philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot,
he might not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage both from and to this
world would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the
spectacle of the choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of
the souls only seeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He
saw the soul of Orpheus changing into a swan because he would not be
born of a woman; there was Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical
birds, like the swan, choosing to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that
of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the
injustice which was done to him in the judgment of the arms; and
Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle.
About the middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an
athlete, and next to her Epeus taking the nature of a workwoman; among
the last was Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither,

the last of all, came Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which
lay neglected and despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing,
and said that if he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been
the same. Men, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame
animals changing into one another.

When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each
of them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all brought
them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the
spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were carried to Atropos, who
made the threads irreversible; whence, without turning round, they passed
beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they moved
on in scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness and rested at evening by
the river Unmindful, whose water could not be retained in any vessel; of
this they had all to drink a certain quantity—some of them drank more than
was required, and he who drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented
from drinking. When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night
there were thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all
driven divers ways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return
to the body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found
himself lying on the pyre.
Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we
believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way of
Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of
Forgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown
of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial
pilgrimage of the other.
The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first,
resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the
poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are seen to be
very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of the
happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to him,
and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, as in
the Phaedo and Gorgias, is supplemented by the vision of a future life.
Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and
dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to
the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be
embodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable
lights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in poetry—
some elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why he
should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably associated with the
impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and

Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of utility,—are questions which have
always been debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give a
complete answer to them, we may show—first, that his views arose
naturally out of the circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit
the truth as well as the error which is contained in them.
He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own
lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws, had taken the place of
an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the tragic
drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and the
Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not yet
arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek
literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no 'second or
third' to Aeschylus and Sophocles in the generation which followed them.
Aristophanes, in one of his later comedies (Frogs), speaks of 'thousands of
tragedy-making prattlers,' whose attempts at poetry he compares to the
chirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far beyond Euripides,'—'they
appeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of
genius who had a real appreciation of the godlike Aeschylus and the noble
and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their 'theology'
(Rep.), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and intolerable.
There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of the
decline and decay both in literature and in politics which marked his own
age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on the licence of
Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by satirizing
Socrates in the Clouds, and in a similar spirit forty years afterwards had
satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his Eccleziazusae, or
Female Parliament (Laws).
There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The
profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human
nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the characters
which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave
nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his life
and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it. Taking this
view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic than of the epic
poets, though he must have known that the Greek tragedians afforded noble
lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer
can be compared. But great dramatic or even great rhetorical power is

hardly consistent with firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is
often incidentally associated with a weak or dissolute character.
In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he
says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree removed
from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; they are
only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not merely
imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. Even
adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his argument derives a
colour, we should maintain that the artist may ennoble the bed which he
paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of home which he
introduces; and there have been modern painters who have imparted such
an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind
which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a
straw-built shed (Rembrandt), to the hull of a vessel 'going to its last home'
(Turner). Still more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which
seem to be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked
whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation
only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something more was
to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of
proportion to which they conformed was 'higher far than any geometry or
arithmetic could express?' (Statesman.)
Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional
rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit Aristotle's
theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a purgation of the
passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford the opportunity
of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we may sometimes cure
disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and that they often gain
strength when pent up within our own breast. It is not every indulgence of
the feelings which is to be condemned. For there may be a gratification of
the higher as well as of the lower—thoughts which are too deep or too sad
to be expressed by ourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets.
Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when they were
consoled and elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture
or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in the earlier
part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of harmonizing as
well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards them
through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only 'What good have they

done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, that 'They have given innocent
pleasure to mankind.'
He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has
found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior
faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do with
universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level with
their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was well
aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any
process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a
denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics—as he
says in the Apology, 'Any one was a better interpreter of their writings than
they were themselves. He himself ceased to be a poet when he became a
disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, 'he might have been
one of the greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits'
(Tim.) Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between
Plato and the poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel
between philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras,
were the Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one class is reflected
on the other. He regards them both as the enemies of reasoning and
abstraction, though in the case of Euripides more with reference to his
immoral sentiments about tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who
'came into the world to convince men'—first of the fallibility of sense and
opinion, and secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness
there may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us
seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will disappear
if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent
to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word 'idea,' which to
Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds
with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he
differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than history, for the
opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not like history,
with particulars (Poet).
The things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which
are unseen—they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To
him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have
a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that this is an
illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an individual man, horse,

bed, etc., than in the class man, horse, bed, etc.; nor is the truth which is
displayed in individual instances less certain than that which is conveyed
through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the
real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them
an essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be
often false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of
the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or
had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the
ambiguity of the words (Greek) and the like, tended to confuse, he would
not have denied truth to the particulars of sense.
But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all
departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of the
Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying spirits,
enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the indictment
against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the
sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of
false ideas and false teachers at its service—in the history of Modern
Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends
solely upon force; without some corruption of literature and morals—some
appeal to the imagination of the masses—some pretence to the favour of
heaven—some element of good giving power to evil, tyranny, even for a
short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible to
the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling; they
were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not devoid of the
love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first instance of Greek
poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus: and the old
spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of the Tragic
Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond them
to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of the government
under which they live. He compares the corruption of his contemporaries
with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up into one mass of evil the
evils and errors of mankind; to him they are personified in the rhetoricians,
sophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.
A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is
that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to
introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the
emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to

be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate
indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the
form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire even
for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of infinity
and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of attaining. True,
the same power which in the purer age of art embodies gods and heroes
only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a Corinthian
courtezan. But this only shows that art, like other outward things, may be
turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely connected with the
higher than with the lower part of the soul. All imitative art is subject to
certain limitations, and therefore necessarily partakes of the nature of a
compromise. Something of ideal truth is sacrificed for the sake of the
representation, and something in the exactness of the representation is
sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent element; they
idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the intermediates between
sense and ideas.
In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction
may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence
of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or
transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different
place at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of mankind,
poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of literature, and the
only instrument of intellectual culture; in modern times she is the shadow or
echo of her former self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton
in his day doubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the
same time we must remember, that what Plato would have called the
charms of poetry have been partly transferred to prose; he himself
(Statesman) admits rhetoric to be the handmaiden of Politics, and proposes
to find in the strain of law (Laws) a substitute for the old poets. Among
ourselves the creative power seems often to be growing weaker, and
scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering to the mind than
formerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called love, has hitherto
been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance, and has
exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the world. But
may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted?
The modern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading
is not more than a century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years

hence, after so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still
received with unabated interest?
Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may
often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all
artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression,
either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest forms
may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact that the
Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use of
pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether Christian or
Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' but a spirit moving in the hearts of
men. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in 'holes and caves of
the earth'; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques,
temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions, like
the first revelation of them, has come from within and has generally
disregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.
But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the
purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite views
—when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought up
amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he banishes the poets
from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify,
have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that
to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal as well as impossible. For
nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single glance at
the varying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine the
extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of
civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes man from the
animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to banish language,
to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of
external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and
images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and
beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought are
not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can execute. And
the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us, are always
tending to pass into the form of feeling.
Plato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But
he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting against the

degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest against the want of
serious purpose in modern fiction, against the unseemliness or extravagance
of some of our poets or novelists, against the time-serving of preachers or
public writers, against the regardlessness of truth which to the eye of the
philosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the world. For we too
have reason to complain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth'
and 'are concerned with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of
them become what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we
look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,—'the
beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the
soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'
For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine
perfection, the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which
should renew the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which the
poet was man's only teacher and best friend,—which would find materials
in the living present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue
to the fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern
civilisation,—which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato would
have called them, the essential forms, of truth and justice out of the variety
of opinion and the complexity of modern society,—which would preserve
all the good of each generation and leave the bad unsung,—which should be
based not on vain longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into
the nature of man. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or
prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God
and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts
and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of
manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the
ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (Laws),
be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been heard
among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato
quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious
approval,—in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of
other English poets,—first and above all in the Hebrew prophets and
psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act;
he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth; he has ennobled
the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep.), he 'has left no way of life.' The
next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with 'a lower

degree of truth'; he paints the world as a stage on which 'all the men and
women are merely players'; he cultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no
ideals of truth and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set
limits to his fancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not
poetry. Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his
adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking, 'How may
the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?'
Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and
error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity of
mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the
Phaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational
principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he
deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that Homer, if he had
been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been
allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and
contrary to the spirit of Plato (Rep.). It may be compared with those other
paradoxes of the Gorgias, that 'No statesman was ever unjustly put to death
by the city of which he was the head'; and that 'No Sophist was ever
defrauded by his pupils' (Gorg.)...
The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of
soul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force
which is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if she
cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet Plato
has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the incrustations of
earth as to lose her original form; and in the Timaeus he recognizes more
strongly than in the Republic the influence which the body has over the
mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the ground that
they proceed from physical states (Tim.). In the Republic, as elsewhere, he
wavers between the original soul which has to be restored, and the character
which is developed by training and education...
The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who
is said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has
certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages
of the soul in the Zend Avesta (Haug, Avesta). But no trace of acquaintance
with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and there is no reason
for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The philosophy of

Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, and still less
the myths of Plato.
The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the
Phaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and
mythology; the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a
cylinder or box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed
stars; this is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of
Necessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder are
guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces the music of the
spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the moon, is
passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the continuation of the
column of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate the heavens; the
words of Plato imply that they are connected, but not the same. The column
itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which is of adamant) is
fastened to the ends of the chains which extend to the middle of the column
of light—this column is said to hold together the heaven; but whether it
hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not explained. The
cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol as the
figure of Necessity turning the spindle;—for the outermost rim is the sphere
of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space which
divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is both a picture
and an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with itself. The
column of light is not the Milky Way—which is neither straight, nor like a
rainbow—but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the
rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of
a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the
undergirders meet.
The orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its
mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the
Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and they
move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction: in the
Republic as in the Timaeus they are all moving round the axis of the world.
But we are not certain that in the former they are moving round the earth.
No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the circles of the same and
other; although both in the Timaeus and in the Republic the motion of the
fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the motion of the whole. The
relative thickness of the rims is perhaps designed to express the relative

distances of the planets. Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from
which Er and his companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in
place; but whether or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the
revolution of the axis, is uncertain (Timaeus). The spectator may be
supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The
earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the Phaedrus,
on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is
borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator
and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have
an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for their
appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow, and the
retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of Homer.
The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as
forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of
the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of
the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making of
them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates—Lachesis, Clotho,
Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in
human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however
adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to
choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is
himself. He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot—even
the very last comer—might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And
as Plato does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more than
confirms this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of
Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not
sufficient to enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he
is to act rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good
actions and good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge
says, 'Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,' so
Plato would have said, 'Habit is worthless which is not based upon
philosophy.'
The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is
distinctly asserted. 'Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her
he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded' by necessity;
there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (Pol.). But within the
walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his own master, and

can study for himself the effects which the variously compounded gifts of
nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act accordingly. All men cannot
have the first choice in everything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if
they choose wisely and will live diligently.
The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years,
by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the
coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed to
have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the
meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of
light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the
twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character
among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one
rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was
necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered
from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the conception
of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er returned to
the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to their birth,—add
greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are such touches of nature
as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he wished to win credibility
for marvels and apparitions.
There still remain to be considered some points which have been
intentionally reserved to the end: (1) the Janus-like character of the
Republic, which presents two faces—one an Hellenic state, the other a
kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are
(2) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by
Morgenstern: (a) the community of property; (b) of families; (c) the rule of
philosophers; (d) the analogy of the individual and the State, which, like
some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We may then
proceed to consider (3) the subject of education as conceived by Plato,
bringing together in a general view the education of youth and the
education of after-life; (4) we may note further some essential differences
between ancient and modern politics which are suggested by the Republic;
(5) we may compare the Politicus and the Laws; (6) we may observe the
influence exercised by Plato on his imitators; and (7) take occasion to
consider the nature and value of political, and (8) of religious ideals.

1. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State
(Book V). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such as
the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the
military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The
life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws), enforced even more rigidly in
time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like Plato's, were forbidden
to trade—they were to be soldiers and not shopkeepers. Nowhere else in
Greece was the individual so completely subjected to the State; the time
when he was to marry, the education of his children, the clothes which he
was to wear, the food which he was to eat, were all prescribed by law. Some
of the best enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to
parents and elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed
children, are borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of
friendships between men and youths, or of men with one another, as
affording incentives to bravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer
approach was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes,
and to community of property; and while there was probably less of
licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was regarded
more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the
preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The coarse strength
of a military government was not favourable to purity and refinement; and
the excessive strictness of some regulations seems to have produced a
reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most accessible to bribery;
several of the greatest of them might be described in the words of Plato as
having a 'fierce secret longing after gold and silver.' Though not in the strict
sense communists, the principle of communism was maintained among
them in their division of lands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and
in the free use of one another's goods. Marriage was a public institution:
and the women were educated by the State, and sang and danced in public
with the men.
Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the
magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in the
Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to the
Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal State, were
the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, though an
unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of poetry; they had been stirred by
the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they had crowded around Hippias to hear his

recitals of Homer; but in this they resembled the citizens of the timocratic
rather than of the ideal State. The council of elder men also corresponds to
the Spartan gerousia; and the freedom with which they are permitted to
judge about matters of detail agrees with what we are told of that
institution. Once more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering
arms at the temples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the
importance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens; the use of
warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression—are features
probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta.
To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the
character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen.
The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was
shared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a
principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The (Greek) of the
Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but
the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed. Fascinated by the idea,
citizens of Athens would imitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and
manners; they were known to the contemporaries of Plato as 'the persons
who had their ears bruised,' like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth.
The love of another church or country when seen at a distance only, the
longing for an imaginary simplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a
past which never has been, or of a future which never will be,—these are
aspirations of the human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such
feelings meet with a response in the Republic of Plato.
But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the
literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of life, which
are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a taste of
Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His individual
genius is purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of Sparta; and he
is something more than either—he has also a true Hellenic feeling. He is
desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one another; he
acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary interpreter of
all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and
the whole State is to have an external beauty which is the reflex of the
harmony within. But he has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards
enunciated in the Laws—that he was a better legislator who made men to be
of one mind, than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other

Hellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class;
for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to
fade away into the distance, and are represented in the individual by the
passions. Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes are
harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas or the world in which different
nations or States have a place. His city is equipped for war rather than for
peace, and this would seem to be justified by the ordinary condition of
Hellenic States. The myth of the earth-born men is an embodiment of the
orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the allusion to the four ages of the world is
also sanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that
the Republic is partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek polis, partly on
the actual circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like the old painters,
retains the traditional form, and like them he has also a vision of a city in
the clouds.
There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the
work; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league.
The 'way of life' which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like the
Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an
individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally
suggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval institutions.'
The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and
intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to us seems
exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not to be regarded as
representing the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly
than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three
hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind the
philosophy of order or (Greek), expressing and consequently enlisting on its
side the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the
management of public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable
time (until about B.C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian
institutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's
(Greek), were required to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the
way for the education of the other members of the community. Long after
the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of
Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of Magna
Graecia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred spirit of
Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life of

Pythagoras' (Rep.) and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are to
be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which
expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of
transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great though
secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education.
But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far
beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which is
to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, analogous
to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of Christendom,
the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the kingdom of Christ.
Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles Plato's ideal State;
nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible. This he repeats
again and again; e.g. in the Republic, or in the Laws where, casting a glance
back on the Republic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and
philosophy was impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a
pattern. The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues
in the Republic that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be
realized in fact, and in the chorus of laughter, which like a breaking wave
will, as he anticipates, greet the mention of his proposals; though like other
writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality to his inventions. When
asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he answers ironically,
'When one son of a king becomes a philosopher'; he designates the fiction
of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and when the structure is finally
complete, he fairly tells you that his Republic is a vision only, which in
some sense may have reality, but not in the vulgar one of a reign of
philosophers upon earth. It has been said that Plato flies as well as walks,
but this falls short of the truth; for he flies and walks at the same time, and
is in the air and on firm ground in successive instants.
Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in
this place—Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to
Athenian institutions?—he can hardly be said to be the friend of
democracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of
government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws); none
attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, which
seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the
worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any
meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant

for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The
decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to
frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the
departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustine,
whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for not
being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded
by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens
because, though 'subject to the higher powers,' they were looking forward to
a city which is in heaven.
2. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of
according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age
have been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes
of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries.
The modern world has either sneered at them as absurd, or denounced them
as unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased to find in Aristotle's
criticisms of them the anticipation of their own good sense. The wealthy
and cultivated classes have disliked and also dreaded them; they have
pointed with satisfaction to the failure of efforts to realize them in practice.
Yet since they are the thoughts of one of the greatest of human
intelligences, and of one who had done most to elevate morality and
religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our hands. We may have
to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them that we mean no
harm to existing institutions. There are serious errors which have a side of
truth and which therefore may fairly demand a careful consideration: there
are truths mixed with error of which we may indeed say, 'The half is better
than the whole.' Yet 'the half' may be an important contribution to the study
of human nature.
(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned
slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle observes, is
confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of the other classes.
But the omission is not of any real significance, and probably arises out of
the plan of the work, which prevents the writer from entering into details.
Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of
modern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away
with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the
subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common

opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of
property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The
world has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive
society offered many examples of land held in common, either by a tribe or
by a township, and such may probably have been the original form of
landed tenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing
and preserving the divisions of land among the citizens; according to
Aristotle there were nations who held the land in common and divided the
produce, and there were others who divided the land and stored the produce
in common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far greater
in ancient than in modern times, and the accidents to which property was
subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference,
were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and
sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held their
property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of Christ
himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost all
ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern
enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of
religious excitement notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' have
tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has appeared in
politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' soon becomes the red flag
of Republicanism.
We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own
contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an
exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would
acknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, and
may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other
mode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, would
in time acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words,
'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages
would have spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant
by such language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any
invasion of the rights of individuals and of the Church.
When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate
application to practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure
that the received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of
wealth which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that

can be conceived for the education and development of the mass of
mankind? Can 'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite
convinced that one or two thousand years hence, great changes will not
have taken place in the rights of property, or even that the very notion of
property, beyond what is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have
disappeared? This was a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be
laughed at among ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some
other changes through which the world has passed in the transition from
ancient to modern society, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in
Russia, or the abolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and not
so great as the difference which separates the Eastern village community
from the Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in the course of a
few centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has
actually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of
Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six
hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among
ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away;
and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or
entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate.
Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be final in
which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character of a
single person. And many will indulge the hope that our present condition
may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to a higher, in which
property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the few, may also furnish
the means of the highest culture to all, and will be a greater benefit to the
public generally, and also more under the control of public authority. There
may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a right to do what I will with
my own?' will appear to be a barbarous relic of individualism;—when the
possession of a part may be a greater blessing to each and all than the
possession of the whole is now to any one.
Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman,
but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can
imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of
some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as
deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private
property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is not more
than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to the

beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of legislation, and
an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on practical politics.
The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community
of property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion would be
taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon
all. Every man would produce as little and consume as much as he liked.
The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse to Socialism.
The effort is too great for human nature; men try to live in common, but the
personal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand it may be doubted
whether our present notions of property are not conventional, for they differ
in different countries and in different states of society. We boast of an
individualism which is not freedom, but rather an artificial result of the
industrial state of modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he
is also powerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic
necessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become
disinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization which
fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces which
have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a similar
change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And if we suppose
the influence of some good as well as neutral motives working in the
community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the mass of
mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher
possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable for
all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue the
common interest with an intelligence and persistency which mankind have
hitherto never seen.
Now that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held
fast under the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has
pierced the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,
—the progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter
than heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we may
arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination to
foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not in an arithmetical,
but in a geometrical ratio of increase. Education, to use the expression of
Plato, moves like a wheel with an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say
how great may be its influence, when it becomes universal,—when it has
been inherited by many generations,—when it is freed from the trammels of

superstition and rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different
classes of men and women. Neither do we know how much more the cooperation of minds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether
in labour or in study. The resources of the natural sciences are not halfdeveloped as yet; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, may
become many times more fertile than hitherto; the uses of machinery far
greater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of physiology
may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its innermost recesses.
The standard of health may be raised and the lives of men prolonged by
sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace, there may be leisure,
there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The ever-increasing
power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. There may be
mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only at great crises
of history. The East and the West may meet together, and all nations may
contribute their thoughts and their experience to the common stock of
humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation of this kind. But it
is better to make an end of them. For such reflections appear to the majority
far-fetched, and to men of science, commonplace.
(b) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of
community of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to be the
same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community of
wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, that the
occupations of men and women shall be the same, and that to this end they
shall have a common training and education. Male and female animals have
the same pursuits—why not also the two sexes of man?
But have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying that
different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and
women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion
of the division of labour?—These objections are no sooner raised than
answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between
men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and women
bear children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he contends that
all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among both sexes, though
there may be a superiority of degree on the part of the men. The objection
on the score of decency to their taking part in the same gymnastic exercises,
is met by Plato's assertion that the existing feeling is a matter of habit.

That Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own
country and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence
of mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, in some
respects the more important half (Laws); and for the sake both of men and
women he desires to raise the woman to a higher level of existence. He
brings, not sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a question which both in
ancient and modern times has been chiefly regarded in the light of custom
or feeling. The Greeks had noble conceptions of womanhood in the
goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the heroines Antigone and
Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual life. The
Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was not the
entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his
housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military or
political matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages of Greece of a
woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers is the greatest glory who has
the least renown among men,' is the historian's conception of feminine
excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by Plato to the
world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share with him in the
toils of war and in the cares of government. She is to be similarly trained
both in bodily and mental exercises. She is to lose as far as possible the
incidents of maternity and the characteristics of the female sex.
The modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the
differences between men and women are not confined to the single point
urged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of
women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for in
men. And the criticism is just: the differences affect the whole nature, and
are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But neither can we say
how far these differences are due to education and the opinions of mankind,
or physically inherited from the habits and opinions of former generations.
Women have been always taught, not exactly that they are slaves, but that
they are in an inferior position, which is also supposed to have
compensating advantages; and to this position they have conformed. It is
also true that the physical form may easily change in the course of
generations through the mode of life; and the weakness or delicacy, which
was once a matter of opinion, may become a physical fact. The
characteristics of sex vary greatly in different countries and ranks of society,
and at different ages in the same individuals. Plato may have been right in

denying that there was any ultimate difference in the sexes of man other
than that which exists in animals, because all other differences may be
conceived to disappear in other states of society, or under different
circumstances of life and training.
The first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second—
community of wives and children. 'Is it possible? Is it desirable?' For as
Glaucon intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, 'Great doubts may be
entertained about both these points.' Any free discussion of the question is
impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the ultimate
bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely enquire into the
things which nature hides, any more than we can dissect our own bodies.
Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be
considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing, that
one of the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of morality
which are wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do Plato
justice, we must examine carefully the character of his proposals. First, we
may observe that the relations of the sexes supposed by him are the reverse
of licentious: he seems rather to aim at an impossible strictness. Secondly,
he conceives the family to be the natural enemy of the state; and he
entertains the serious hope that an universal brotherhood may take the place
of private interests—an aspiration which, although not justified by
experience, has possessed many noble minds. On the other hand, there is no
sentiment or imagination in the connections which men and women are
supposed by him to form; human beings return to the level of the animals,
neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural instincts. All that
world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love has called forth in
modern literature and romance would have been banished by Plato. The
arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object—the
improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development
both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy of
animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a
change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best
for breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of
the human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved.
We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, that
the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out;
secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be

poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best
things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human
beings—the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us one
of the noblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet
imperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of
God, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured
image of Him (Laws). This is the lesson which Christ taught in a parable
when He said, 'Their angels do always behold the face of My Father which
is in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in any age; they were
foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very different degrees of strength in
different countries or ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family
was a religious and customary institution binding the members together by
a tie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and
sacred sound than that of country. The relationship which existed on the
lower level of custom, Plato imagined that he was raising to the higher level
of nature and reason; while from the modern and Christian point of view we
regard him as sanctioning murder and destroying the first principles of
morality.
The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference
between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is
regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier, or at best of a slave-owner;
the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals aims
chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at courage or temper;
most often the fitness of the animal for food is the great desideratum. But
mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for their superiority in fighting or
in running or in drawing carts. Neither does the improvement of the human
race consist merely in the increase of the bones and flesh, but in the growth
and enlightenment of the mind. Hence there must be 'a marriage of true
minds' as well as of bodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts
and instincts. Men and women without feeling or imagination are justly
called brutes; yet Plato takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their
place, not even the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know
their own children. The most important transaction of social life, he who is
the idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to
have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their
children are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to unite
them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a

gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration.' For the
'nobler sort of birds and beasts' nourish and protect their offspring and are
faithful to one another.
An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a
physical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon the
physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the human and
rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and in
times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only
different aspects of a common human nature which includes them both.
Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and
enlargement of it,—the highest form which the physical is capable of
receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body, and
still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human action
not that which is common to man and the animals is the characteristic
element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even if we admit the
physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body 'la facon que notre
sang circule,' still on merely physical grounds we must come back to ideas.
Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under these or other names, are
always reappearing. There cannot be health of body without health of mind;
nor health of mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (Charm).
That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about
marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does
indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should
have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but
that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly
credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into the crudest
animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to
have thought out a subject about which he had better have followed the
enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of Hellas was
opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later time the
tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which much of
their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps in some
degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled him. He
will make one family out of all the families of the state. He will select the
finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.

Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human
nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy as
well as of poetry), and also because any departure from established
morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may be
worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the Platonic
marriage. In the first place, history shows that wherever polygamy has been
largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law
of God and nature. Nearly all the civilized peoples of the world at some
period before the age of written records, have become monogamists; and
the step when once taken has never been retraced. The exceptions occurring
among Brahmins or Mahometans or the ancient Persians, are of that sort
which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions formed between
superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because
they are licentious; and because the children in such cases usually despise
the mother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed of them.
Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die out;
polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other countries,
or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies which have
disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and degenerated
in stature; 'mariages de convenance' leave their enfeebling stamp on the
offspring of them (King Lear). The marriage of near relations, or the
marrying in and in of the same family tends constantly to weakness or
idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming the form as they grow older of
passionate licentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring.
By such unmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the
relations of the sexes: and so many more elements enter into this 'mystery'
than are dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.
Recent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among
primitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that
the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any man
was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs among
some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in
the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of
similar institutions having been once universal. There can be no question
that the study of anthropology has considerably changed our views
respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know more about
the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing knowledge

shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps which written
monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of man two
thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was when
removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of
mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing
upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (Laws) and
Aristotle (Metaph.) may have been more right than we imagine in
supposing that some forms of civilisation were discovered and lost several
times over. If we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization,
neither can we set any limits to the depth of degradation to which the
human race may sink through war, disease, or isolation. And if we are to
draw inferences about the origin of marriage from the practice of barbarous
nations, we should also consider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many
birds and animals, especially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the
love and care of offspring which seems to be natural is inconsistent with the
primitive theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which
men were almost animals and the companions of them, we have as much
right to argue from what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous
to the civilized man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,
—the connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of
social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that
our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by
which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of
China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly
unknown to us.
Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show
that an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only
the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of marriage,
and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars and contests,
it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. We stand face to
face with human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are compelled to
accept, not the highest, but the lowest account of the origin of human
society. But on the other hand we may truly say that every step in human
progress has been in the same direction, and that in the course of ages the
idea of marriage and of the family has been more and more defined and
consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably in advance of any savage
tribes; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon the East; the Christian

nations have been stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of
the ancients. In this as in so many other things, instead of looking back with
regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the future. We must
consecrate that which we believe to be the most holy, and that 'which is the
most holy will be the most useful.' There is more reason for maintaining the
sacredness of the marriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we
only felt a vague religious horror about the violation of it. But in all times
of transition, when established beliefs are being undermined, there is a
danger that in the passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go
the moral principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion
in the uncertainty of knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there
are many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the study of
anthropology, and fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the
language of fear, others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time will
come when through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious spirit of
children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force of outward
circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or greatly relaxed.
They point to societies in America and elsewhere which tend to show that
the destruction of the family need not necessarily involve the overthrow of
all morality. Wherever we may think of such speculations, we can hardly
deny that they have been more rife in this generation than in any other; and
whither they are tending, who can predict?
To the doubts and queries raised by these 'social reformers' respecting the
relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a sufficient
answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us is really one of
fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to be, but we are
speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of his nature; we
regard him as a creature having many sides, or aspects, moving between
good and evil, striving to rise above himself and to become 'a little lower
than the angels.' We also, to use a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of the
dissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of
trade, of the flatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments
which the family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we
are conscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater
still, which are not appreciated, because they are either concealed or
suppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in which human
passions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in which there

was no shame or decency, no higher affection overcoming or sanctifying the
natural instincts, but simply a rule of health! Is it for this that we are asked
to throw away the civilization which is the growth of ages?
For strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there are
the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We
know how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by
artificial means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem
is a complex one, for if we go back only four steps (and these at least enter
into the composition of a child), there are commonly thirty progenitors to be
taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, are told
us respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a remote ancestor.
We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and children in the same
family—
'Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat';
but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both
from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental
peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the animals,
to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty in
distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities, and
what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great men and
great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing that we
know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will explain their
appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two preceding centuries
scarcely a descendant remains,—none have ever been distinguished. So
deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous is the fancy which
has been entertained by some that we might in time by suitable marriage
arrangements or, as Plato would have said, 'by an ingenious system of lots,'
produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed
men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or, like the Spartans, 'lacking the wit to
run away in battle,' would the world be any the better? Many of the noblest
specimens of the human race have been among the weakest physically.
Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been exposed at Sparta;
and some of the fairest and strongest men and women have been among the
wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting the strong and
fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and morality, nor yet by
his other device of combining dissimilar natures (Statesman), have mankind

gradually passed from the brutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage
to marriage Christian and civilized.
Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of
mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through
them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from the
general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner
than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his uncle'; and an aged
person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to a longforgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes skips a generation.' It
may be true also, that if we knew more about our ancestors, these
similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting the facts which
are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark that there is
no method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated, and that
they constitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of heredity
may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own lives, but it is the
idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to us. For what we have received
from our ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or may become. The
knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent in a family may
be the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future generation. The
parent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in his child of which he is
most sensible within himself. The whole of life may be directed to their
prevention or cure. The traces of consumption may become fainter, or be
wholly effaced: the inherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated.
And so heredity, from being a curse, may become a blessing. We
acknowledge that in the matter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there
are previous circumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of
circumstances or within this wall of necessity, we have still the power of
creating a life for ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.
There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a
stranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never occurred
to him that the greater part of them, according to universal experience,
would have perished. For children can only be brought up in families. There
is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child which cannot be
supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or more' (Laws). If
Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Creches of Paris, or the foundling hospital of
Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children would have perished. There
would have been no need to expose or put out of the way the weaklier

children, for they would have died of themselves. So emphatically does
nature protest against the destruction of the family.

What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken
way to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the
Spartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other
Greeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and
customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble
offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical
superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to
their temperance and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not
in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a
political principle stronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least
of all did he observe that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens
of the Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love
of liberty—all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were wanting
among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus,
or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to
appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to alter
or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations arisen, if
not from remarkable individuals, coming into the world we know not how,
and from causes over which we have no control? Something too much may
have been said in modern times of the value of individuality. But we can
hardly condemn too strongly a system which, instead of fostering the
scattered seeds or sparks of genius and character, tends to smother and
extinguish them.
Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither
Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been
able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that the side
from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. Population is
the most untameable force in the political and social world. Do we not find,
especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to the amelioration of
the poor is their improvidence in marriage?—a small fault truly, if not
involving endless consequences. There are whole countries too, such as
India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a right solution of the marriage
question seems to lie at the foundation of the happiness of the community.
There are too many people on a given space, or they marry too early and
bring into the world a sickly and half-developed offspring; or owing to the
very conditions of their existence, they become emaciated and hand on a
similar life to their descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence

to the 'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws), especially when they have
been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of
education, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in
these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard
whispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of
mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the principle of utility,
just in that action of our lives in which we have the most need of it. The
influences which we can bring to bear upon this question are chiefly
indirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration, improvements in
agriculture and manufactures, may have provided the solution. The state
physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is beyond his art; a matter
which he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch:
'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.'
When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping
into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents
perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day
twenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid
the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined
hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing
physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to
make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the
extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is
said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because
he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved
to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of
wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being
liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses
of affection: he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts
suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of
duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances,
if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were
about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages without
any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and the prohibition
in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror naturalis' similar to
that which, in all civilized ages and countries, has prevented the marriage of
near relations by blood. Mankind would have been the happier, if some
things which are now allowed had from the beginning been denied to them;

if the sanction of religion could have prohibited practices inimical to health;
if sanitary principles could in early ages have been invested with a
superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the world's history, we are
no longer able to stamp at once with the impress of religion a new
prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated by law; and the
execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the
uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who can
weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities
against bodily? Who can measure probabilities against certainties? There
has been some good as well as evil in the discipline of suffering; and there
are diseases, such as consumption, which have exercised a refining and
softening influence on the character. Youth is too inexperienced to balance
such nice considerations; parents do not often think of them, or think of
them too late. They are at a distance and may probably be averted; change
of place, a new state of life, the interests of a home may be the cure of
them. So persons vainly reason when their minds are already made up and
their fortunes irrevocably linked together. Nor is there any ground for
supposing that marriages are to any great extent influenced by reflections of
this sort, which seem unable to make any head against the irresistible
impulse of individual attachment.
Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in
youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind
and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to them by
the imagination, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in
our method of treating them. That the most important influence on human
life should be wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of
being disciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an
external standard of propriety—cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a
safe or satisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the
charge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the
manliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general
admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate this terrible
evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts the moral
sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there more need of
reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who would be the
counsellor of another should reveal the secret prematurely, lest he should

get another too much into his power; or fix the passing impression of evil
by demanding the confession of it.
Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere
with higher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was
meant for mankind,' there have certainly been others who to family gave up
what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the
necessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich by
the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the
tendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the
heroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we prefer
to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the affections,
the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a family for the
good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel
with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented
to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of
morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world which has not
unnaturally led him into error.
We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other
abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to be
built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which
family and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of mind
the family is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling up, tends
to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is needed except
a political, which, regarded from another point of view, is a military one.
The State is all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the
Church in later ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war
the thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the
world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and their
duties to the State, which are also their duties to one another, take up their
whole life and time. The only other interest which is allowed to them
besides that of war, is the interest of philosophy. When they are too old to
be soldiers they are to retire from active life and to have a second novitiate
of study and contemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in
Plato's communism. If he could have done without children, he might have
converted his Republic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws, when the
daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In
the state of which he would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in

marriage: but because of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow
the law of nature to prevail.
(c) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater
paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings are
philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill.' And
by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are capable of
apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the attainment of this
higher knowledge the second education is directed. Through a process of
training which has already made them good citizens they are now to be
made good legislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling
which Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato's
lectures as experiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good,
expecting to be instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them
arithmetical and mathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his
future legislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of
abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception
of good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea
of good, if he does not know what is good for this individual, this state, this
condition of society? We cannot understand how Plato's legislators or
guardians are to be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five
mathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's own writings for any
explanation of this seeming absurdity.
The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the
mind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of
estimating its value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his
own speculations; in his own judgment they have been above criticism; nor
has he understood that what to him seemed to be absolute truth may
reappear in the next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of
thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the
real value of his speculations. They appear to them to have contributed
nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The IDEA of good is apt to be
regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets
that this abstraction is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up
by the divisions of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the
world is subject to law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or
design or final cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of
knowledge, are great steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the

unity of all things leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may
easily affect their conception of human life and of politics, and also their
own conduct and character (Tim). We can imagine how a great mind like
that of Pericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with
Anaxagoras (Phaedr.). To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable
conception is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied
in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have
sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later
period. How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the magnificent
language of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence!'
Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast
metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first
enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply them
in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of
ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate axioms.' Plato
himself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like those of
astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of deduction,
and that the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring
them from experience and the use of language, was imperfect and only
provisional. But when, after having arrived at the idea of good, which is the
end of the science of dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are
the divisions of the science? He refuses to answer, as if intending by the
refusal to intimate that the state of knowledge which then existed was not
such as would allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The
previous sciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to
be studied tell the end of time, although in a sense different from any which
Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is aware of
the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the contemplation
of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing, but he is warmed and
elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith in God would enable him
to govern the world; the Greek philosopher imagined that contemplation of
the good would make a legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the
one case as in the other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite
what the other is to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine perfection,
which, whether in a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them
and independently of them, as well as within them.

There is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the divine
Creator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led to ask in what
relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of good?
Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter appears
to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection and unity of
God was a far higher conception than his personality, which he hardly
found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to be
borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the
modern thinker in general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach reality
to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the
truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of
thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation of his own mind only. But
if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of good by the words
'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe, embracing equally
man and nature,' we begin to find a meeting-point between him and
ourselves.
The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is
one that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe
and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united
the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as there
have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind of
speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life; like the
rhetorician in the Phaedrus, men require to have a conception of the
varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions above the
commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman
has never been popular with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot
take the world into his confidence or make them understand the motives
from which he acts; and also because they are jealous of a power which
they do not understand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect
step by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year
or life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may
disregard the common feelings of humanity, he is too apt to be looking into
the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see actions or
events which, to use an expression of Plato's 'are tumbling out at his feet.'
Besides, as Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these
philosophical statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er
with the pale cast of thought,' and at the moment when action above all

things is required he is undecided, or general principles are enunciated by
him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world
has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in some cases
he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys the luxury of holding
liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal action. No
wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this
class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be
allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have seen bad
imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the power of
thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching
forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional state, 'they have
never seen.'
But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so the
ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When the face
of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the distance, he is
still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his inveterate party
prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times; instead of looking
forward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets nothing; with 'wise
saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising tide of revolution. He
lives more and more within the circle of his own party, as the world without
him becomes stronger. This seems to be the reason why the old order of
things makes so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why churches
can never reform, why most political changes are made blindly and
convulsively. The great crises in the history of nations have often been met
by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of
principles which have lost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a
reactionary statesman may be compared to madness; they grow upon him,
and he becomes possessed by them; no judgement of others is ever admitted
by him to be weighed in the balance against his own.
(d) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been
a confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and fails to
distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a state which
is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest uniformity
of character. He does not see that the analogy is partly fallacious, and that
the will or character of a state or nation is really the balance or rather the
surplus of individual wills, which are limited by the condition of having to
act in common. The movement of a body of men can never have the pliancy

or facility of a single man; the freedom of the individual, which is always
limited, becomes still more straitened when transferred to a nation. The
powers of action and feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced
when they are diffused through a community; whence arises the often
discussed question, 'Can a nation, like an individual, have a conscience?'
We hesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the
sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because there
may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another. A whole
nation may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be animated by some
common opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected the mind
of a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader of genius to
perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have analysed the
complications which arise out of the collective action of mankind. Neither
is he capable of seeing that analogies, though specious as arguments, may
often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing between what is
intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what is true. In this respect
he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively seldom imposed upon by
false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts from the virtues—at least he
is always arguing from one to the other. His notion of music is transferred
from harmony of sounds to harmony of life: in this he is assisted by the
ambiguities of language as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean
notions. And having once assimilated the state to the individual, he
imagines that he will find the succession of states paralleled in the lives of
individuals.
Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is
attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the
mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts;
for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward
principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmonies of
the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid illustration
which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same way the
identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give definiteness to
ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's notions of the aims of
government and of the duties of citizens; for ethics from one point of view
may be conceived as an idealized law and politics; and politics, as ethics
reduced to the conditions of human society. There have been evils which
have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the

separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern
political writers. But we may likewise feel that something has been lost in
their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral
and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of nations and
individuals second, may have a salutary influence on the speculations of
modern times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction against an
opposite error; and when the errors against which they were directed have
passed away, they in turn become errors.
3. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like the
rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with
the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to after-life.
Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that education is to comprehend
the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which education
begins again. This is the continuous thread which runs through the
Republic, and which more than any other of his ideas admits of an
application to modern life.
He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is
disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and
not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his scheme of
truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of vice, which
is maintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws (Protag., Apol.,
Gorg.). Nor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state of
existence affect his theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him
the remains of the old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be
elicited from within, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of
sense. Education, as he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which
is better than ten thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one, and
the kindred notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely renounced;
the first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the rest; the second in
the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all
goodness in the contemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is
still depreciated and identified with opinion, though admitted to be a
shadow of the true. In the Republic he is evidently impressed with the
conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by
education; the multitude are hardly to be deemed responsible for what they
do. A faint allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth
Book; but Plato's views of education have no more real connection with a

previous state of existence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the
mind that which is there already. Education is represented by him, not as the
filling of a vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the light.
He treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and false,
and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes no
notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of
children and the management of the mothers, and would have an education
which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age at
which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in
language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught
the false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient philosophical
world are not agreed about truth and falsehood; the one identifies truth
almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. This is the difference
between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a difference of
words. For we too should admit that a child must receive many lessons
which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught some things in a
figure only, some too which he can hardly be expected to believe when he
grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the necessity of the
case. Plato would draw the line differently; according to him the aim of
early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a matter of
principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious truths, and then
simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and
good taste. He would make an entire reformation of the old mythology; like
Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm which
separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests
with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and
treacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the world below are
to be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a
model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may
teach our youth endurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from
the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is
to be based are two only: first, that God is true; secondly, that he is good.
Modern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these; they can
hardly be said to have gone beyond them.
The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of
sights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are
to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting to

them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be
realized, or if our modern religious education could be bound up with truth
and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would be the best hope of
human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes in
the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He recognizes the
danger of unsettling young men's minds by sudden changes of laws and
principles, by destroying the sacredness of one set of ideas when there is
nothing else to take their place. He is afraid too of the influence of the
drama, on the ground that it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he
would not have his children taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect on
the spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education is
that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the lessons of
temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develope in equal
proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and nature is
simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human life.
The second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period
of muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in
music is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body
may be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily exercise
may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to give men a
headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy, and this they
attribute not to the true cause, but to the nature of the subject. Two points
are noticeable in Plato's treatment of gymnastic:—First, that the time of
training is entirely separated from the time of literary education. He seems
to have thought that two things of an opposite and different nature could not
be learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we
may judge by experience, the effect of spending three years between the
ages of fourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from
improving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and gymnastic
are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the one for the
cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that they are both
equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The body, in his view, is
the servant of the mind; the subjection of the lower to the higher is for the
advantage of both. And doubtless the mind may exercise a very great and
paramount influence over the body, if exerted not at particular moments and
by fits and starts, but continuously, in making preparation for the whole of
life. Other Greek writers saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan

discipline (Arist. Pol; Thuc.). But only Plato recognized the fundamental
error on which the practice was based.
The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine,
which he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief in
medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to a
demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they
often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of
them (Rep.). In two thousand years their art has made but slender progress;
what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in a great degree lost by
their feebler conception of the human frame as a whole. They have attended
more to the cure of diseases than to the conditions of health; and the
improvements in medicine have been more than counterbalanced by the
disuse of regular training. Until lately they have hardly thought of air and
water, the importance of which was well understood by the ancients; as
Aristotle remarks, 'Air and water, being the elements which we most use,
have the greatest effect upon health' (Polit.). For ages physicians have been
under the dominion of prejudices which have only recently given way; and
now there are as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal
degree of scepticism and some want of toleration about both. Plato has
several good notions about medicine; according to him, 'the eye cannot be
cured without the rest of the body, nor the body without the mind' (Charm.).
No man of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would take physic; and we
heartily sympathize with him in the Laws when he declares that 'the limbs
of the rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than
from the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor.' But we can hardly praise
him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he depreciates diet, or
approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get rid of invalid and
useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem to have considered
that the 'bridle of Theages' might be accompanied by qualities which were
of far more value to the State than the health or strength of the citizens; or
that the duty of taking care of the helpless might be an important element of
education in a State. The physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle
observation) should not be a man in robust health; he should have, in
modern phraseology, a nervous temperament; he should have experience of
disease in his own person, in order that his powers of observation may be
quickened in the case of others.

The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in
which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity.
Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of
Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the
citizens themselves. Plato is aware that laissez faire is an important element
of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a hydra; they
multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is not extirpation
but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take care of education,
and education will take care of all the rest. So in modern times men have
often felt that the only political measure worth having—the only one which
would produce any certain or lasting effect, was a measure of national
education. And in our own more than in any previous age the necessity has
been recognized of restoring the ever-increasing confusion of law to
simplicity and common sense.
When the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the
first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin again
from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and Seventh
Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence been
led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true
knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with
particulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with the beauties of
poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of education is
the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be acquired through the
study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas
of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies of thought.
Mathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that
which is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to
the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought
which the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by
which the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The
faculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or
imaginative; and hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for abstractions
and trying to get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly the whole of education
is contained in them. They seemed to have an inexhaustible application,
partly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato himself
is beginning to investigate; though not aware that number and figure are
mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the forms used by geometry

are borrowed from the sensible world. He seeks to find the ultimate ground
of mathematical ideas in the idea of good, though he does not satisfactorily
explain the connexion between them; and in his conception of the relation
of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness attributed to
him by Aristotle (Met.). But if he fails to recognize the true limits of
mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them; in his view, ideas of
number become secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The
dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the mathematician is
above the ordinary man. The one, the self-proving, the good which is the
higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all things ascend, and
in which they finally repose.
This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no
distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in Greek
philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are
comprehended, a whole which has no parts (Arist., Nic. Eth.). The vacancy
of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. Nor did he
recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or more methods
of investigation which are at variance with each other. He did not see that
whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no advance could be made in
this way. And yet such visions often have an immense effect; for although
the method of science cannot anticipate science, the idea of science, not as
it is, but as it will be in the future, is a great and inspiring principle. In the
pursuit of knowledge we are always pressing forward to something beyond
us; and as a false conception of knowledge, for example the scholastic
philosophy, may lead men astray during many ages, so the true ideal,
though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a
great difference whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this
indefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound judgment. For
mankind may often entertain a true conception of what knowledge ought to
be when they have but a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the
sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of classification,
the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to
confound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher
education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that he
could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an influence on
the human mind which even at the present day is not exhausted; and

political and social questions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato
may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning.
The Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of
it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and from this
point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, who out of
his goodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain extent with the
modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of both in one,
and in this regard may be connected with the measure and symmetry of the
Philebus. It is represented in the Symposium under the aspect of beauty, and
is supposed to be attained there by stages of initiation, as here by regular
gradations of knowledge. Viewed subjectively, it is the process or science of
dialectic. This is the science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true
basis of rhetoric, which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes
of men and things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and
reunites the scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines
the abstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them;
which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first
principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of good.
This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be described
as the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with eternal truth
and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question and answer—the
ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of Plato are themselves
examples of the nature and method of dialectic. Viewed objectively, the
idea of good is a power or cause which makes the world without us
correspond with the world within. Yet this world without us is still a world
of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is another department of
knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only probable conclusions
(Timaeus).
If we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains
to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his mind
the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the subjective
and objective aspects of the world and of man, which German philosophy
has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether his science of dialectic is
at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of absolute being, or
with a process of development and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be
described as the science of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of
thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere

Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of method. The germ of
both of them is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have
something in common with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived
something from the method of Plato. The nearest approach in modern
philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be found in the Hegelian
'succession of moments in the unity of the idea.' Plato and Hegel alike seem
to have conceived the world as the correlation of abstractions; and not
impossibly they would have understood one another better than any of their
commentators understand them (Swift's Voyage to Laputa. 'Having a desire
to see those ancients who were most renowned for wit and learning, I set
apart one day on purpose. I proposed that Homer and Aristotle might appear
at the head of all their commentators; but these were so numerous that some
hundreds were forced to attend in the court and outward rooms of the
palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two heroes, at first sight, not
only from the crowd, but from each other. Homer was the taller and
comelier person of the two, walked very erect for one of his age, and his
eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever beheld. Aristotle stooped
much, and made use of a staff. His visage was meagre, his hair lank and
thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered that both of them were perfect
strangers to the rest of the company, and had never seen or heard of them
before. And I had a whisper from a ghost, who shall be nameless, "That
these commentators always kept in the most distant quarters from their
principals, in the lower world, through a consciousness of shame and guilt,
because they had so horribly misrepresented the meaning of these authors to
posterity." I introduced Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on
him to treat them better than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they
wanted a genius to enter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all
patience with the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented
them to him; and he asked them "whether the rest of the tribe were as great
dunces as themselves?"'). There is, however, a difference between them: for
whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which
developes the stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in
the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order
of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon
him.
Many criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in
some respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is

in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which
prevailed in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new
ones. He does not see that education is relative to the characters of
individuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state on the
minds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the
formation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His aim
is above all things to train the reasoning faculties; to implant in the mind the
spirit and power of abstraction; to explain and define general notions, and,
if possible, to connect them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual
knowledge his followers, and at times even he himself, should have fallen
away from the doctrine of ideas, and have returned to that branch of
knowledge in which alone the relation of the one and many can be truly
seen—the science of number. In his views both of teaching and training he
might be styled, in modern language, a doctrinaire; after the Spartan fashion
he would have his citizens cast in one mould; he does not seem to consider
that some degree of freedom, 'a little wholesome neglect,' is necessary to
strengthen and develope the character and to give play to the individual
nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge which in the
vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from their experience
of evil.
On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and
theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life
and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of some
kind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon, 'I
grow old learning many things,' cannot be applied literally. Himself
ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in solid
geometry (Rep.), he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime might be
passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of
business there are in the world than real students or thinkers, are not equally
sanguine. The education which he proposes for his citizens is really the
ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius, interrupted, but only for a
time, by practical duties,—a life not for the many, but for the few.
Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to
our own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it
may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising
them above the routine of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is the
best form under which we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless the

idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. For the education of after life is
necessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men and women
cannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or fifty years of
age; and if they could the result would be disappointing. The destination of
most men is what Plato would call 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with
that they are content. Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom
they can take counsel in riper years. There is no 'schoolmaster abroad' who
will tell them of their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty,
or with the ambition of a true success in life; no Socrates who will convict
them of ignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them
of sin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of
improvement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir
them; they rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who
have come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion
and morality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a
candle from the fire of their genius.
The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons
continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know
the way. They 'never try an experiment,' or look up a point of interest for
themselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge; their minds,
like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been defined as
'the power of taking pains'; but hardly any one keeps up his interest in
knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family, the business
of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the
mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once capable of
receiving 'true thoughts and clear impressions' becomes hard and crowded;
there is not room for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet.). The student,
as years advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his
stores. There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or
History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is
enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to any
one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a
thousand things, commonplace in themselves,—in adding to what we are by
nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others
see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; in seeking
out the society of superior minds; in a study of lives and writings of great
men; in observation of the world and character; in receiving kindly the

natural influence of different times of life; in any act or thought which is
raised above the practice or opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some
new or original enquiry; in any effort of mind which calls forth some latent
power.
If any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of
after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to him:—
That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind most
distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either one
which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps,
furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative side
the profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may make
Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends and companions of his
life. He may find opportunities of hearing the living voice of a great teacher.
He may select for enquiry some point of history or some unexplained
phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed in such scientific or literary
pursuits will furnish as many facts as the memory can retain, and will give
him 'a pleasure not to be repented of' (Timaeus). Only let him beware of
being the slave of crotchets, or of running after a Will o' the Wisp in his
ignorance, or in his vanity of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or
assuming the air of a philosopher. He should know the limits of his own
powers. Better to build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly
from one thing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests
in knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are never destined to be
realized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is part of another subject'
(Tim.); though we may also defend our digression by his example (Theaet.).
4. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural
growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political philosophy
seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato and Aristotle. The
ancients were familiar with the mutability of human affairs; they could
moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of empires (Plato, Statesman,
and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero); by them fate and chance were deemed to be
real powers, almost persons, and to have had a great share in political
events. The wiser of them like Thucydides believed that 'what had been
would be again,' and that a tolerable idea of the future could be gathered
from the past. Also they had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once
upon a time and might still exist in some unknown land, or might return
again in the remote future. But the regular growth of a state enlightened by

experience, progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the
citizens were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears never to
have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a state had
never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them. Their
experience (Aristot. Metaph.; Plato, Laws) led them to conclude that there
had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been discovered and
lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and rebuilt again and
again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural convulsions had altered
the face of the earth. Tradition told them of many destructions of mankind
and of the preservation of a remnant. The world began again after a deluge
and was reconstructed out of the fragments of itself. Also they were
acquainted with empires of unknown antiquity, like the Egyptian or
Assyrian; but they had never seen them grow, and could not imagine, any
more than we can, the state of man which preceded them. They were
puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian monuments, of which the forms,
as Plato says, not in a figure, but literally, were ten thousand years old
(Laws), and they contrasted the antiquity of Egypt with their own short
memories.
The early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later
history: they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed from
view; there is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At the
beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen standing
first of all the figure of the legislator, himself the interpreter and servant of
the God. The fundamental laws which he gives are not supposed to change
with time and circumstances. The salvation of the state is held rather to
depend on the inviolable maintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the
authority of heaven, and it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to
maintain them unaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very
surprising to us—the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in religion
or politics (Laws); although with a happy inconsistency he is also willing
that the laws of other countries should be studied and improvements in
legislation privately communicated to the Nocturnal Council (Laws). The
additions which were made to them in later ages in order to meet the
increasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed by a fiction to the
original legislator; and the words of such enactments at Athens were
disputed over as if they had been the words of Solon himself. Plato hopes to
preserve in a later generation the mind of the legislator; he would have his

citizens remain within the lines which he has laid down for them. He would
not harass them with minute regulations, he would have allowed some
changes in the laws: but not changes which would affect the fundamental
institutions of the state, such for example as would convert an aristocracy
into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of government.
Passing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the
exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not
surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of ancient
date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more than a century
or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression left on the human
mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the Christian Church, and
to be due to the political and social improvements which they introduced
into the world; and still more in our own century to the idealism of the first
French Revolution and the triumph of American Independence; and in a yet
greater degree to the vast material prosperity and growth of population in
England and her colonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a
measure to the greater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist
temperament of some great writers has assisted the creation of it, while the
opposite character has led a few to regard the future of the world as dark.
The 'spectator of all time and of all existence' sees more of 'the increasing
purpose which through the ages ran' than formerly: but to the inhabitant of a
small state of Hellas the vision was necessarily limited like the valley in
which he dwelt. There was no remote past on which his eye could rest, nor
any future from which the veil was partly lifted up by the analogy of
history. The narrowness of view, which to ourselves appears so singular,
was to him natural, if not unavoidable.
5. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and the
two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the
Introductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may be
touched upon in this place.
And first of the Laws.
(1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking
generally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be
reasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato's life: the Laws are
certainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at any
rate seem to have been written in extreme old age.

(2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the stamp
of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received
the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and
apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the other
has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity and knowledge of
life which is characteristic of old age.
(3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic
power, whereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and
oppositions of character.
(4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the
Republic of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more intellectual.
(5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the government
of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; the immortality of
the soul is first mentioned in xii; the person of Socrates has altogether
disappeared. The community of women and children is renounced; the
institution of common or public meals for women (Laws) is for the first
time introduced (Ar. Pol.).
(6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets, who are
ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are
peremptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit their
poems to the censorship of the magistrates (Rep.).
(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages
in the Laws, such as the honour due to the soul, the evils of licentious or
unnatural love, the whole of Book x. (religion), the dishonesty of retail
trade, and bequests, which come more home to us, and contain more of
what may be termed the modern element in Plato than almost anything in
the Republic.
The relation of the two works to one another is very well given:
(1) by Aristotle in the Politics from the side of the Laws:—
'The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the
Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is
therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a
few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the
community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is
divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors;

from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the state.
But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artists are to
have a share in the government, and whether they too are to carry arms and
share in military service or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to
share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The
remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main
subject, and with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the
Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the
constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary
type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the
exception of the community of women and property, he supposes
everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education;
the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to
be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws the
common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number about
5000, but in the Republic only 1000.'
(2) by Plato in the Laws (Book v.), from the side of the Republic:—
'The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the
law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that
"Friends have all things in common." Whether there is now, or ever will be,
this communion of women and children and of property, in which the
private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are
by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common,
and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same
occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is
possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever
constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a
state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed
who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the
state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is
like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be
nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the
grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by
speaking of the nature and origin of the second.'
The comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its
style and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it rather

resembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various indications of
language and thought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier
than the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a close connection is
maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the Statesman, enquiries into
the principles of Method are interspersed with discussions about Politics.
The comparative advantages of the rule of law and of a person are
considered, and the decision given in favour of a person (Arist. Pol.). But
much may be said on the other side, nor is the opposition necessary; for a
person may rule by law, and law may be so applied as to be the living voice
of the legislator. As in the Republic, there is a myth, describing, however,
not a future, but a former existence of mankind. The question is asked,
'Whether the state of innocence which is described in the myth, or a state
like our own which possesses art and science and distinguishes good from
evil, is the preferable condition of man.' To this question of the comparative
happiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed in
the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, though
less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range, may justly be
regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues.
6. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the vehicle
of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went beyond
their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the
Republic of Plato is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but neither in this nor in
any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The manners are
clumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent at every turn.
Yet noble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true note of Roman
patriotism—'We Romans are a great people'—resounds through the whole
work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of the heavens
to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two Suns' of
which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about 'the two nations in
one' which had divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. Like
Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he should
assume too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal who is
discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would confine the
terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he will not
concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But under the rule
of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural superior ruling over
the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul ruling over the body. He

prefers a mixture of forms of government to any single one. The two
portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in the second book of the
Republic, are transferred to the state—Philus, one of the interlocutors,
maintaining against his will the necessity of injustice as a principle of
government, while the other, Laelius, supports the opposite thesis. His
views of language and number are derived from Plato; like him he
denounces the drama. He also declares that if his life were to be twice as
long he would have no time to read the lyric poets. The picture of
democracy is translated by him word for word, though he had hardly shown
himself able to 'carry the jest' of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence
the humorous fancy about the animals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of
democracy that they make the passers-by get out of their way.' His
description of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The
second book is historical, and claims for the Roman constitution (which is
to him the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to
have given to the Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of
Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into
the 'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic,
adding an argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus,
and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though
a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis;
is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly allows the
reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own creation. Whether his
dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, as he
himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many superficial
resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not conversing, but making
speeches, and is never able to mould the intractable Latin to the grace and
ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. But if he is defective in form, much
more is he inferior to the Greek in matter; he nowhere in his philosophical
writings leaves upon our minds the impression of an original thinker.
Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such an
ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world,
and is embodied in St. Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei,' which is suggested by
the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same manner in which
we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been influenced by the
decline of Greek politics in the writer's own age. The difference is that in
the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, was gradual and

insensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths stirred like an
earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men were inclined to believe that the
overthrow of the city was to be ascribed to the anger felt by the old Roman
deities at the neglect of their worship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite
thesis; he argues that the destruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the
rise of Christianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman
history, and over Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere
crime, impiety and falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile
religions with the best elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of
the spirit which led others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the
writings of the Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. He traces
the parallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the Jews,
contained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, which are
found in gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal future. It need
hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and of Roman historians and
of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen
mythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the dreams of NeoPlatonists are equally regarded by him as matter of fact. He must be
acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or controversial writer who makes
the best of everything on one side and the worst of everything on the other.
He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life,
nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of
the ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the defects of the
Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan
shall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God
shall appear...The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of
antiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian ethics,
but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of the
Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a noble character,
yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding anything external to his own
theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato,
though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is inclined to
believe that the idea of creation in the Timaeus is derived from the narrative
in Genesis; and he is strangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato's
saying that 'the philosopher is the lover of God,' and the words of the Book
of Exodus in which God reveals himself to Moses (Exod.) He dwells at
length on miracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is

regarded by him as irresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of
the beauty and utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives
to afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of the
body. The book is not really what to most persons the title of it would
imply, and belongs to an age which has passed away. But it contains many
fine passages and thoughts which are for all time.
The short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable of
mediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy
and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of an Universal
Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary government of
the world, having a divine authority distinct from the Papacy, yet
coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman Empire sitting
crowned upon the grave thereof,' but the legitimate heir and successor of it,
justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and the beneficence of their
rule. Their right to be the governors of the world is also confirmed by the
testimony of miracles, and acknowledged by St. Paul when he appealed to
Caesar, and even more emphatically by Christ Himself, Who could not have
made atonement for the sins of men if He had not been condemned by a
divinely authorized tribunal. The necessity for the establishment of an
Universal Empire is proved partly by a priori arguments such as the unity of
God and the unity of the family or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture
and history, by false analogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the
classics, and by odd scraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar
but by no means exact knowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a
more convincing argument still is the miserable state of the world, which he
touchingly describes. He sees no hope of happiness or peace for mankind
until all nations of the earth are comprehended in a single empire. The
whole treatise shows how deeply the idea of the Roman Empire was fixed
in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much argument was needed to
maintain the truth of a theory which to his own contemporaries seemed so
natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather preaches, from the point of view,
not of the ecclesiastic, but of the layman, although, as a good Catholic, he is
willing to acknowledge that in certain respects the Empire must submit to
the Church. The beginning and end of all his noble reflections and of his
arguments, good and bad, is the aspiration 'that in this little plot of earth
belonging to mortal man life may pass in freedom and peace.' So

inextricably is his vision of the future bound up with the beliefs and
circumstances of his own age.
The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius,
and shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was
written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous
sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the miserable
state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the Roses, and in
the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant at the
corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the nobility and gentry, at the
sufferings of the poor, at the calamities caused by war. To the eye of More
the whole world was in dissolution and decay; and side by side with the
misery and oppression which he has described in the First Book of the
Utopia, he places in the Second Book the ideal state which by the help of
Plato he had constructed. The times were full of stir and intellectual
interest. The distant murmur of the Reformation was beginning to be heard.
To minds like More's, Greek literature was a revelation: there had arisen an
art of interpretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be
understood as it had never been before, and has not often been since, in its
natural sense. The life there depicted appeared to him wholly unlike that of
Christian commonwealths, in which 'he saw nothing but a certain
conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name
and title of the Commonwealth.' He thought that Christ, like Plato,
'instituted all things common,' for which reason, he tells us, the citizens of
Utopia were the more willing to receive his doctrines ('Howbeit, I think this
was no small help and furtherance in the matter, that they heard us say that
Christ instituted among his, all things common, and that the same
community doth yet remain in the rightest Christian communities'
(Utopia).). The community of property is a fixed idea with him, though he
is aware of the arguments which may be urged on the other side ('These
things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do
nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them that refused those
laws, whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of riches and
commodities. For the wise men did easily foresee this to be the one and
only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should be
brought in and established' (Utopia).). We wonder how in the reign of
Henry VIII, though veiled in another language and published in a foreign
country, such speculations could have been endured.

He is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who
succeeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a
worthy disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion of fact, he
founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin narrative of
the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about dates and facts,
and has the power of making us believe that the narrator of the tale must
have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his manner of mixing up
real and imaginary persons; his boy John Clement and Peter Giles, citizen
of Antwerp, with whom he disputes about the precise words which are
supposed to have been used by the (imaginary) Portuguese traveller,
Raphael Hythloday. 'I have the more cause,' says Hythloday, 'to fear that my
words shall not be believed, for that I know how difficultly and hardly I
myself would have believed another man telling the same, if I had not
myself seen it with mine own eyes.' Or again: 'If you had been with me in
Utopia, and had presently seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived
there five years and more, and would never have come thence, but only to
make the new land known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to
ask Hythloday in what part of the world Utopia is situated; he 'would have
spent no small sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,' and
he begs Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer
to the question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of
Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,' as the
translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by the
High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia,
nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he
counteth that a godly suit which proceedeth not of the desire of honour or
lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may have failed through the
disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have 'very uncertain
news' after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that he had told More
and Giles the exact situation of the island, but unfortunately at the same
moment More's attention, as he is reminded in a letter from Giles, was
drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold caught on
shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. And 'the secret
has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia remains unknown.

The words of Phaedrus, 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or
anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet the
greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality of
thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and far
more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the
immortality of the soul to share in the administration of the state (Laws),
'howbeit they put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it is
in no man's power to believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for
reasoning in support of his own religion ('One of our company in my
presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began,
against our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of
Christ's religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only
prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn all
other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and devilish,
and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned
the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into
exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up
of dissension among the people').' In the public services 'no prayers be used,
but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving offence to any
sect.' He says significantly, 'There be that give worship to a man that was
once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the
chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting all
these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far above the
capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the world, not in
bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father of all. To Him
alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the proceedings, the
changes, and the ends of all things. Neither give they any divine honours to
any other than him.' So far was More from sharing the popular beliefs of his
time. Yet at the end he reminds us that he does not in all respects agree with
the customs and opinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we
should let him have the benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely
withdraw the veil behind which he has been pleased to conceal himself.
Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral
speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he would
set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in the same
class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and valiant
beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. His dislike

of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of offenders; his
detestation of priests and lawyers (Compare his satirical observation: 'They
(the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few.);
his remark that 'although every one may hear of ravenous dogs and wolves
and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find states that are well and wisely
governed,' are curiously at variance with the notions of his age and indeed
with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a modern
feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he
maintains that civilized states have a right to the soil of waste countries; he
is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but
herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who
define virtue to be a life according to nature. He extends the idea of
happiness so as to include the happiness of others; and he argues
ingeniously, 'All men agree that we ought to make others happy; but if
others, how much more ourselves!' And still he thinks that there may be a
more excellent way, but to this no man's reason can attain unless heaven
should inspire him with a higher truth. His ceremonies before marriage; his
humane proposal that war should be carried on by assassinating the leaders
of the enemy, may be compared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a
charming fancy, like the affinities of Greeks and barbarians in the Timaeus,
that the Utopians learnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness
because they were originally of the same race with them. He is penetrated
with the spirit of Plato, and quotes or adapts many thoughts both from the
Republic and from the Timaeus. He prefers public duties to private, and is
somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His citizens have no
silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to pay them to their
mercenaries. There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the
love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and
pearls for children's necklaces (When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold
and peacocks' feathers 'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few,
which had been in other countries for some reasonable cause, all that
gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that
they most reverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords—
passing over the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them
by their wearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen
children also, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they
saw the like sticking upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their

mothers under the sides, saying thus to them—"Look, though he were a
little child still." But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace,
son," saith she, "I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools."')
Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes;
on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse
(Hythloday) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering
that he would lose his independence and his advice would never be heeded
(Compare an exquisite passage, of which the conclusion is as follows: 'And
verily it is naturally given...suppressed and ended.') He ridicules the new
logic of his time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the
doctrine of Second Intentions ('For they have not devised one of all those
rules of restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented
in the small Logicals, which here our children in every place do learn.
Furthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second intentions;
insomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in common, as
they call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant,
yea, and pointed to of us even with our finger.') He is very severe on the
sports of the gentry; the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, the vilest, and
the most abject part of butchery.' He quotes the words of the Republic in
which the philosopher is described 'standing out of the way under a wall
until the driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which admit of a
singular application to More's own fate; although, writing twenty years
before (about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen
this. There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark
that the greater part of the precepts of Christ are more at variance with the
lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia ('And yet the most
part of them is more dissident from the manners of the world now a days,
than my communication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following
your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame
their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine,
and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's manners, that by some
means at the least way, they might agree together.')
The 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the
'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, and by
no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some places
Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More, as, for
example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor of

Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas
More such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of
dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he pitied
men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the Timaeus; but he has
injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are taken
from the Hebrew Scriptures.
The 'City of the Sun' written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican
friar, several years after the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, has many
resemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and children
in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and are
arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, adopt
his system of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and female,
'according to philosophical rules.' The infants until two years of age are
brought up by their mothers in public temples; and since individuals for the
most part educate their children badly, at the beginning of their third year
they are committed to the care of the State, and are taught at first, not out of
books, but from paintings of all kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls
of the city. The city has six interior circuits of walls, and an outer wall
which is the seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of legislators
and philosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms of
some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most part,
trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they have two
special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the boys soothe
and relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them with embraces
and pleasant words. Some elements of the Christian or Catholic religion are
preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is greatly admired by this
people because they had all things in common; and the short prayer which
Jesus Christ taught men is used in their worship. It is a duty of the chief
magistrates to pardon sins, and therefore the whole people make secret
confession of them to the magistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort
of Rector Metaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is
going on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to the
citizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There also exists
among them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a succession of
priests, who change every hour. Their religion is a worship of God in
Trinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, but without any distinction of

persons. They behold in the sun the reflection of His glory; mere graven
images they reject, refusing to fall under the 'tyranny' of idolatry.
Many details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about
their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks
forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and
not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time in the
consideration of what he calls 'the dead signs of things.' He remarks that he
who knows one science only, does not really know that one any more than
the rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge.
More scholars are turned out in the City of the Sun in one year than by
contemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon,
that henceforward natural science will play a great part in education, a hope
which seems hardly to have been realized, either in our own or in any
former age; at any rate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred.
There is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work, and a
most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm of style, and
falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, and still more of the
'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of inconsistencies, and though
borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial acquaintance with his
writings. It is a work such as one might expect to have been written by a
philosopher and man of genius who was also a friar, and who had spent
twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the Inquisition. The most
interesting feature of the book, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is
the deep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance
prevailing among the lower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note
of Aristotle's answer to Plato's community of property, that in a society
where all things are common, no individual would have any motive to work
(Arist. Pol.): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in
themselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have
greater regard for their fellows than exists among men at present. He thinks,
like Plato, that if he abolishes private feelings and interests, a great public
feeling will take their place.
Other writings on ideal states, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in
which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but
as he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an historical
allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth mentioning. More

interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic in style and thought,
is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man,' in which the prisoner of the Tower,
no longer able 'to be a politician in the land of his birth,' turns away from
politics to view 'that other city which is within him,' and finds on the very
threshold of the grave that the secret of human happiness is the mastery of
self. The change of government in the time of the English Commonwealth
set men thinking about first principles, and gave rise to many works of this
class...The great original genius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there
any trace in the conversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any
acquaintance with his writings. He probably would have refuted Plato
without reading him, in the same fashion in which he supposed himself to
have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of the non-existence of matter. If we
except the so-called English Platonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never
understood their master, and the writings of Coleridge, who was to some
extent a kindred spirit, Plato has left no permanent impression on English
literature.
7. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that
they are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the
other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing
from them which tends to raise individuals above the common routine of
society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce
or the necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly
framed by the omission of particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain
distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt to approach them. They
gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a State or in a system of
philosophy, but they still remain the visions of 'a world unrealized.' More
striking and obvious to the ordinary mind are the examples of great men,
who have served their own generation and are remembered in another. Even
in our own family circle there may have been some one, a woman, or even a
child, in whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. The ideal
then approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The ideal of the
past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of society, has a
singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we learn that such
ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of them may have a
humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of philosophy are
to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without warmth; they are
like the full moon in the heavens when there are no stars appearing. Men

cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is always breaking in upon
them. They are for the most part confined to a corner of earth, and see but a
little way beyond their own home or place of abode; they 'do not lift up
their eyes to the hills'; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But in
Plato we have reached a height from which a man may look into the
distance and behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of
the State and of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education
continuing through life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the
unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality—are
the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of
mankind.
8. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek
Philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more
clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us
nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring
from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still
remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man.
The first ideal is the future of the human race in this world; the second the
future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect realization
of our own present life; the second, the abnegation of it: the one, limited by
experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have been and are
powerful motives of action; there are a few in whom they have taken the
place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first
sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual existence
the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when men have learned to
resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or for the world into the
will of God—'not my will but Thine,' the difference between them falls
away; and they may be allowed to make either of them the basis of their
lives, according to their own individual character or temperament. There is
as much faith in the willingness to work for an unseen future in this world
as in another. Neither is it inconceivable that some rare nature may feel his
duty to another generation, or to another century, almost as strongly as to
his own, or that living always in the presence of God, he may realize
another world as vividly as he does this.
The greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under
similitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the
Jewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe

the nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a
positive meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher truths
either of philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one form of
expression for another, lest through the necessities of language we should
become the slaves of mere words.
There is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place in
the home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, and in which
men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man, the Son
of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of the
whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that
which is without and that which is within the range of our earthly faculties,
are indissolubly united. Neither is this divine form of goodness wholly
separable from the ideal of the Christian Church, which is said in the New
Testament to be 'His body,' or at variance with those other images of good
which Plato sets before us. We see Him in a figure only, and of figures of
speech we select but a few, and those the simplest, to be the expression of
Him. We behold Him in a picture, but He is not there. We gather up the
fragments of His discourses, but neither do they represent Him as He truly
was. His dwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in the heart of man.
This is that image which Plato saw dimly in the distance, which, when
existing among men, he called, in the language of Homer, 'the likeness of
God,' the likeness of a nature which in all ages men have felt to be greater
and better than themselves, and which in endless forms, whether derived
from Scripture or nature, from the witness of history or from the human
heart, regarded as a person or not as a person, with or without parts or
passions, existing in space or not in space, is and will always continue to be
to mankind the Idea of Good.

THE REPUBLIC.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
Socrates, who is the narrator.
Glaucon.
Adeimantus.
Polemarchus.
Cephalus.
Thrasymachus.
Cleitophon.
And others who are mute auditors.
The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole
dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to
Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced
in the Timaeus.

BOOK I.
I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston,
that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian
Artemis.); and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would
celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the
procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not
more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the
spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant
Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a
distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run
and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind,
and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.
I turned round, and asked him where his master was.
There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.
Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus
appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son
of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.
Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your
companion are already on your way to the city.
You are not far wrong, I said.
But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?
Of course.
And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain
where you are.
May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let
us go?
But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.
Certainly not, replied Glaucon.
Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.
Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in
honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and
pass them one to another during the race?
Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated
at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and
see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a
good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.
Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.
Very good, I replied.
Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found
his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the
Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of
Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I
had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was
seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been
sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room
arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me
eagerly, and then he said:—
You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still
able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I
can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the
Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade
away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not
then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company
with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home
with us.
I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than
conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a
journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire,
whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a
question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time
which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'—Is life harder towards the
end, or what report do you give of it?
I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age
flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our
meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot
drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time

once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the
slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of
how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these
complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age
were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as
they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have
known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to
the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the
man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of
which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master.
His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to
me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a
great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then,
as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only,
but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the
complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is
not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and
happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an
opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.
I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go
on—Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general are not
convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly
upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich,
and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.
You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something
in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer
them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and
saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an
Athenian: 'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of
us would have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and are
impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man
old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace
with himself.
May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part
inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the
art of making money I have been midway between my father and
grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled
the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I
possess now; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is
at present: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a
little more than I received.
That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you
are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who
have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the
makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own,
resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for
their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit
which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad
company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.
That is true, he said.
Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?—What do you
consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your
wealth?
One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For
let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death,
fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a
world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here
were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the
thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because
he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these
things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to
reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds
that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child
start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to
him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is
the kind nurse of his age:
'Hope,' he says, 'cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and
holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;—
hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.'

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not
say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to
deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and
when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about
offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace
of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say,
that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth
has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.
Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?—to
speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this
are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has
deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right
mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or
that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought
always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.
You are quite right, he replied.
But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct
definition of justice.
Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus
interposing.
I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the
sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.
Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.
To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.
Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and
according to you truly say, about justice?
He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears
to me to be right.
I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but
his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For
he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to
return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he
is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.
True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no
means to make the return?
Certainly not.
When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not
mean to include that case?
Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a
friend and never evil.
You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the
receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,—that
is what you would imagine him to say?
Yes.
And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?
To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy,
as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to
say, evil.
Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken
darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the
giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.
That must have been his meaning, he said.
By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is
given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would
make to us?
He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to
human bodies.
And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?
Seasoning to food.
And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?
If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding
instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to
enemies.
That is his meaning then?
I think so.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in
time of sickness?
The physician.
Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?
The pilot.
And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man
most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?
In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.
But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a
physician?
No.
And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?
No.
Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?
I am very far from thinking so.
You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?
Yes.
Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?
Yes.
Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,—that is what you mean?
Yes.
And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of
peace?
In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.
And by contracts you mean partnerships?
Exactly.
But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner
at a game of draughts?
The skilful player.
And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or
better partner than the builder?
Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the
harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better
partner than the just man?
In a money partnership.
Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not
want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a
man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?
Certainly.
And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be
better?
True.
Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be
preferred?
When you want a deposit to be kept safely.
You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?
Precisely.
That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?
That is the inference.
And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to
the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of
the vine-dresser?
Clearly.
And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you
would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art
of the soldier or of the musician?
Certainly.
And so of all other things;—justice is useful when they are useless, and
useless when they are useful?
That is the inference.
Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point:
Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of
fighting best able to ward off a blow?
Certainly.

And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is
best able to create one?
True.
And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon
the enemy?
Certainly.
Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?
That, I suppose, is to be inferred.
Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.
That is implied in the argument.
Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a
lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking
of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of
his, affirms that
'He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.'
And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of
theft; to be practised however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of
enemies,'—that was what you were saying?
No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I
still stand by the latter words.
Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean
those who are so really, or only in seeming?
Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks
good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.
Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not
good seem to be so, and conversely?
That is true.
Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?
True.
And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to
the good?
Clearly.
But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.
Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no
wrong?
Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.
Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the
unjust?
I like that better.
But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature
has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to
them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we
shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the
meaning of Simonides.
Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into
which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'
What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.
We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.
And how is the error to be corrected?
We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good;
and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a
friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.
You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?
Yes.
And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good
to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to
do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when
they are evil?
Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.
But ought the just to injure any one at all?
Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his
enemies.
When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?
The latter.
Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.
And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of
horses?
Of course.
And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the
proper virtue of man?
Certainly.
And that human virtue is justice?
To be sure.
Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?
That is the result.
But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?
Certainly not.
Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?
Impossible.
And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can
the good by virtue make them bad?
Assuredly not.
Any more than heat can produce cold?
It cannot.
Or drought moisture?
Clearly not.
Nor can the good harm any one?
Impossible.
And the just is the good?
Certainly.
Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of
the opposite, who is the unjust?
I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.
Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and
that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt

which he owes to his enemies,—to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if,
as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.
I agree with you, said Polemarchus.
Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who
attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise
man or seer?
I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.
Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?
Whose?
I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban,
or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own
power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and
harm to your enemies.'
Most true, he said.
Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other
can be offered?
Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an
attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by
the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when
Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no
longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild
beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of
him.
He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken
possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one
another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should
not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from
the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many
a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that
justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of
nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.
I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without
trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should
have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first,
and was therefore able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus
and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can
assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece
of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one
another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are
seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you
say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to
get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do
so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things
should pity us and not be angry with us.
How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;—that's
your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that
whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any
other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?
You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if
you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him
whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times
two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,'—then
obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer
you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean?
If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the
question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?
—is that your meaning?'—How would you answer him?
Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.
Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only
appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he
thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?
I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted
answers?
I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I
approve of any of them.
But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said,
than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?
Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that
is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!
I will pay when I have the money, I replied.
But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be
under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for
Socrates.
Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to
answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.
Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and
says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions
of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing
is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know
and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification
of the company and of myself?
Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and
Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he
thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But
at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to
begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself,
and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.
That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I
wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all
I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak
well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will
answer well.
Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the
interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course
you won't.
Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest
of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot
mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we
are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat
beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right
and just for us?
That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense
which is most damaging to the argument.

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish
that you would be a little clearer.
Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ;
there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?
Yes, I know.
And the government is the ruling power in each state?
Certainly.
And the different forms of government make laws democratical,
aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these
laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which
they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as
a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in
all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the
government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the
only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of
justice, which is the interest of the stronger.
Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try
to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself
used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however,
that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added.
A small addition, you must allow, he said.
Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether
what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is
interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this
addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.
Proceed.
I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey
their rulers?
I do.
But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes
liable to err?
To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.
Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and
sometimes not?

True.
When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest;
when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?
Yes.
And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and
that is what you call justice?
Doubtless.
Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the
interest of the stronger but the reverse?
What is that you are saying? he asked.
I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider:
Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own
interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has
not that been admitted?
Yes.
Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest
of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done
which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience
which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men,
is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to
do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?
Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.
Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.
But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus
himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for
their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.
Yes, Polemarchus,—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was
commanded by their rulers is just.
Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the
stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further
acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his
subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is
the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the
stronger thought to be his interest,—this was what the weaker had to do;
and this was affirmed by him to be justice.
Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.
Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his
statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the
stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?
Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken
the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?
Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that
the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.
You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he
who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that
he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at
the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we
say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake,
but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the
grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as
he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails
them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs
at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said
to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly
accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the
ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always
commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to
execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat,
justice is the interest of the stronger.
Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an
informer?
Certainly, he replied.
And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring
you in the argument?
Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word—I know it; but you will be
found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any
misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense
do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he
being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in
the popular or in the strict sense of the term?
In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the
informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be
able, never.
And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat,
Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.
Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.
Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a
question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are
speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I
am now speaking of the true physician.
A healer of the sick, he replied.
And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a
mere sailor?
A captain of sailors.
The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account;
neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is
distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill
and of his authority over the sailors.
Very true, he said.
Now, I said, every art has an interest?
Certainly.
For which the art has to consider and provide?
Yes, that is the aim of art.
And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body.
Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has
wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill
and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of

medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you
will acknowledge. Am I not right?
Quite right, he replied.
But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any
quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail
of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of
seeing and hearing—has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or
defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for
its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to
look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of
themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need
to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they
have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art
remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while
perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me
whether I am not right.
Yes, clearly.
Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest
of the body?
True, he said.
Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of
horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care
for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the
subject of their art?
True, he said.
But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their
own subjects?
To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.
Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the
stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?
He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally
acquiesced.
Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers
his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true

physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a
mere money-maker; that has been admitted?
Yes.
And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors
and not a mere sailor?
That has been admitted.
And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of
the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?
He gave a reluctant 'Yes.'
Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as
he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always
what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks,
and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.
When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that
the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead
of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?
Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be
answering?
Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not
even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.
What makes you say that? I replied.
Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the
sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself
or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are
true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not
studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray
are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that
justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of
the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice
the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the
stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his
happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most
foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the
unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of
the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man

has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State:
when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less
on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received
the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when
they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps
suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is
just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to
serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the
unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which
the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most
clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal
is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice
are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force
takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale;
comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public;
for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them
singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such
wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers
and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking
away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of
these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the
citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of
injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the
victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I
have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more
strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice
is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and
interest.
Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man,
deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company
would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his
position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not
leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are
your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught
or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way
of man's life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be
passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?
You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us,
Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what
you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not
keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit
which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I
openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to
be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free
play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit
injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the
superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the
same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in
your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice
to injustice.
And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced
by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me
put the proof bodily into your souls?
Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you
change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark,
Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although
you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not
observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that
the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own
good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the
table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet
surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his
subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the
art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And
that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art
of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could
only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think
that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.
Think! Nay, I am sure of it.
Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly
without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage
not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the

several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function?
And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a
little progress.
Yes, that is the difference, he replied.
And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—
medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?
Yes, he said.
And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do
not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be
confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be
improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you,
that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact
use of language?
Certainly not.
Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not
say that the art of payment is medicine?
I should not.
Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a
man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
Certainly not.
And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially
confined to the art?
Yes.
Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be
attributed to something of which they all have the common use?
True, he replied.
And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained
by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?
He gave a reluctant assent to this.
Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective
arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art
of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of
pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that

over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his
art unless he were paid as well?
I suppose not.
But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.
Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts
nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before
saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the
weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good
of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I
was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to
take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without
remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to
another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of
his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they
must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a
penalty for refusing.
What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of
payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand,
or how a penalty can be a payment.
You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to
the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that
ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?
Very true.
And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for
them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for
governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping
themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not
being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must
be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of
punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to
take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed
dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses
to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear
of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they
would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going
to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and
because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is
better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if
a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be

as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we
should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard
his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this
would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the
trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus
that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be
further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of
the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement
appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken
truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?
I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he
answered.
Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was
rehearsing?
Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.
Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he
is saying what is not true?
Most certainly, he replied.
If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the
advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a
numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side,
and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our
enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall
unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.
Very good, he said.
And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.
That which you propose.
Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and
answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect
justice?
Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.
And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue
and the other vice?
Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?
What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be
profitable and justice not.
What else then would you say?
The opposite, he replied.
And would you call justice vice?
No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.
Then would you call injustice malignity?
No; I would rather say discretion.
And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?
Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust,
and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you
imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected
has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I
was just now speaking.
I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I
replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice
with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.
Certainly I do so class them.
Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable
ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had
been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer
might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive
that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will
attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just,
seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.
You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.
Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the
argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are
speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and
are not amusing yourself at our expense.
I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the
argument is your business.

Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as
answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage
over the just?
Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature
which he is.
And would he try to go beyond just action?
He would not.
And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the
unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?
He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would
not be able.
Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My
question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than
another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?
Yes, he would.
And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man
and to do more than is just?
Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.
And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust
man or action, in order that he may have more than all?
True.
We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than
his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both
his like and his unlike?
Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.
And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
Good again, he said.
And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?
Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of
a certain nature; he who is not, not.
Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts:
you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?
Yes.
And which is wise and which is foolish?
Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.
And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?
Yes.
And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?
Yes.
And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts
the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the
tightening and loosening the strings?
I do not think that he would.
But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?
Of course.
And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and
drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the
practice of medicine?
He would not.
But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?
Yes.
And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think
that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of
saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not
rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?
That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.
And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either
the knowing or the ignorant?
I dare say.
And the knowing is wise?
Yes.
And the wise is good?

True.
Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but
more than his unlike and opposite?
I suppose so.
Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?
Yes.
But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his
like and unlike? Were not these your words?
They were.
And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?
Yes.
Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and
ignorant?
That is the inference.
And each of them is such as his like is?
That was admitted.
Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and
ignorant.
Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them,
but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration
poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before,
Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and
wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:
Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not
also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?
Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you
are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be
quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have
my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Very good,'
as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.'
Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.
Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What
else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you
shall answer.
Proceed.
Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our
examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on
regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more
powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom
and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is
ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view
the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a
state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states,
or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in
subjection?
True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust
state will be most likely to do so.
I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further
consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can
exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.
If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with
justice; but if I am right, then without justice.
I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and
dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.
That is out of civility to you, he replied.
You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to
inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers
and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured
one another?
No indeed, he said, they could not.
But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act
together better?
Yes.
And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting,
and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?
I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice,
having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or
among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at
variance and render them incapable of common action?
Certainly.
And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and
fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?
They will.
And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say
that she loses or that she retains her natural power?
Let us assume that she retains her power.
Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that
wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family,
or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of
united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become
its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is
not this the case?
Yes, certainly.
And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the
first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with
himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the
just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?
Yes.
And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?
Granted that they are.
But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be
their friend?
Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not
oppose you, lest I should displease the company.
Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of
my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and
better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of
common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil
acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had

been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is
evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which
enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one
another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their
enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would
have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the
matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and
happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to
consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but
still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing
less than the rule of human life.
Proceed.
I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has
some end?
I should.
And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could
not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?
I do not understand, he said.
Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?
Certainly not.
Or hear, except with the ear?
No.
These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?
They may.
But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in
many other ways?
Of course.
And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?
True.
May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?
We may.
Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my
meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be

that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any
other thing?
I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.
And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask
again whether the eye has an end?
It has.
And has not the eye an excellence?
Yes.
And the ear has an end and an excellence also?
True.
And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end
and a special excellence?
That is so.
Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own
proper excellence and have a defect instead?
How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?
You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight;
but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more
generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil
them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their
own defect?
Certainly, he replied.
I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper
excellence they cannot fulfil their end?
True.
And the same observation will apply to all other things?
I agree.
Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for
example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not
these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any
other?
To no other.
And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.
And has not the soul an excellence also?
Yes.
And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that
excellence?
She cannot.
Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent,
and the good soul a good ruler?
Yes, necessarily.
And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and
injustice the defect of the soul?
That has been admitted.
Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will
live ill?
That is what your argument proves.
And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the
reverse of happy?
Certainly.
Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
So be it.
But happiness and not misery is profitable.
Of course.
Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable
than justice.
Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.
For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle
towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well
entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure
snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not
having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from
one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the
nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether
justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a

further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I
could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole
discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice
is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor
can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

BOOK II.
With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion;
but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is
always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus'
retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do
you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to
be just is always better than to be unjust?
I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.
Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:—How
would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their
own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example,
harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although
nothing follows from them?
I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.
Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight,
health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?
Certainly, I said.
And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the
care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of moneymaking—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one
would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some
reward or result which flows from them?
There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place
justice?
In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who would
be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.
Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be
reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued
for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable
and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the
thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured
justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.
I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall
see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake,
to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but
to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear.
Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in
themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you, please, then, I
will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the
nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them.
Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their
will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is
reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the
life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of
their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the
voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on
the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice
maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised
in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from
whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise
the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will
indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and
censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?
Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense
would oftener wish to converse.
I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by
speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.
They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil;
but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done
and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to
avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree
among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual
covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and
just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or
compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be

punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power
of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is
tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the
inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a
man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he
would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the
nature and origin of justice.
Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they
have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of
this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they
will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall
discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the
same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good,
and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty
which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form
of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of
Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the
service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake
made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock.
Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other
marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he
stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him,
more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from
the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together,
according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the
flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger,
and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring
inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the
company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present.
He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet
outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always
with the same result—when he turned the collet inwards he became
invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be
chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; whereas soon as
he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the
king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two
such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other;

no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand
fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own
when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses
and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he
would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the
just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to
the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man
is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him
individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely
be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice
is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I
have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any
one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong
or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to
be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's
faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too
might suffer injustice. Enough of this.
Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust,
we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be
effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man
entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are
to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the
unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or
physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their
limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the
unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means
to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the highest
reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say
that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice;
there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most
unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have
taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who
can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force
his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command
of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his
nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem
good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be

honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for
the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him
be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be
imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of
men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the
proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy
and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being
just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost
extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given
which of them is the happier of the two.
Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up
for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.
I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is
no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This
I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too
coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not
mine.—Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They
will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged,
racked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering
every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand that he
ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be
more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a
reality; he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really
unjust and not to seem only:—
'His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent
counsels.'
In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city;
he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he
can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage,
because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether
in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their
expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and
harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to
the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man
whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he
is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and

men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of
the just.
I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus,
his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is
nothing more to be urged?
Why, what else is there? I answered.
The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.
Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'—if he
fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has
already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power
of helping justice.
Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another
side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice
and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I
believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their
sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake
of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of
obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages,
and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing
to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of
appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they
throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of
benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this
accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of
whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just—
'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;
And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,'

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And
Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is—
'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice;
to whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are
bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him
fish.'
Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son
vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where
they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk,
crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of
drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet
further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the
third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice.
But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in

Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living
they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which
Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust;
nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising
the one and censuring the other.
Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking
about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found
in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that
justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the
pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured
by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less
profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men
happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or
in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who
may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than
the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about
virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to
many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant
prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power
committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or
his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and
they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with
magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their
will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing
the path of vice with the words of Hesiod;—
'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and
her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,'
and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the
gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:—
'The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them
and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations
and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.'
And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who
were children of the Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—
according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only
individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be

made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are
equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call
mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them
no one knows what awaits us.
He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue
and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their
minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,—those of them, I mean, who
are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from
all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of
persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would
make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of
Pindar—
'Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower
which may be a fortress to me all my days?'
For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just
profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are
unmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a
heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove,
appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I
must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of
virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the
subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I
hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often
difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the
argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which
we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret
brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who
teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by
persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be
punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived,
neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose
them to have no care of human things—why in either case should we mind
about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us,
yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets;
and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and
turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be

consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why
then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are
just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the
gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our
sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated,
and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below in which either we
or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the
reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great
power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who
were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.
On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than
the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard
to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life
and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us.
Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind
or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to
refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there
should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who
is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is
very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of
their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the
divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has
attained knowledge of the truth—but no other man. He only blames
injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the
power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains
the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of
the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to
find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the
ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending
with the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed injustice or praised
justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow
from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose
the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible
to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul
which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the
greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade

us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to
keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his
own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself
the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would
seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words
even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive,
perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must
frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side;
and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over
injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes
the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon
requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from
each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you
do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are
only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with
Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of
the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though
injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that
highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far
greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or
health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I
would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the
essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of
them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the
rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of
arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who
have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I
hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And
therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but
show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the
one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and
men.
I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on
hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious
father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer
of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at
the battle of Megara:—

'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.'
The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in
being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and
remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you
are not convinced—this I infer from your general character, for had I judged
only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater
my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say.
For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to
the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were
not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I
thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot
refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there
would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not
lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I
can.
Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question
drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth,
first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their
relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry
would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing
then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a
method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had
been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it
occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which
was larger and in which the letters were larger—if they were the same and
he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this
would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.
Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our
enquiry?
I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as
you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and
sometimes as the virtue of a State.
True, he replied.
And is not a State larger than an individual?
It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more
easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of
justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the
individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.
That, he said, is an excellent proposal.
And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the
justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.
I dare say.
When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our
search will be more easily discovered.
Yes, far more easily.
But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am
inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.
I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should
proceed.
A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one
is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a
State be imagined?
There can be no other.
Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply
them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when
these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body
of inhabitants is termed a State.
True, he said.
And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another
receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.
Very true.
Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true
creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.
Of course, he replied.
Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of
life and existence.
Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.
True.
And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand:
We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some
one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some
other purveyor to our bodily wants?
Quite right.
The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.
Clearly.
And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into
a common stock?—the individual husbandman, for example, producing for
four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the
provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will
he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for
them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the
time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making
a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but
supplying himself all his own wants?
Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at
producing everything.
Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you
say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities
of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.
Very true.
And will you have a work better done when the workman has many
occupations, or when he has only one?
When he has only one.
Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the
right time?
No doubt.
For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at
leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the
business his first object.
He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and
easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural
to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.
Undoubtedly.
Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will
not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if
they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—
and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.
True.
Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in
our little State, which is already beginning to grow?
True.
Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order
that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as
husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and
hides,—still our State will not be very large.
That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all
these.
Then, again, there is the situation of the city—to find a place where
nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.
Impossible.
Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required
supply from another city?
There must.
But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require
who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.
That is certain.
And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for
themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those
from whom their wants are supplied.
Very true.
Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?
They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?
Yes.
Then we shall want merchants?
We shall.
And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also
be needed, and in considerable numbers?
Yes, in considerable numbers.
Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions?
To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal
objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.
Clearly they will buy and sell.
Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of
exchange.
Certainly.
Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to
market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,
—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?
Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the
office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are
the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other
purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange
for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who
desire to buy.
This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not
'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place
engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to
another are called merchants?
Yes, he said.
And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on
the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for
labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake,
hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.
True.
Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.
And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?
I think so.
Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the
State did they spring up?
Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot
imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else.
I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better
think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.
Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that
we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and
clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are
housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in
winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and
flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves;
these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves
reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and
their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made,
wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in
happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families
do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.
But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their
meal.
True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish—salt,
and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country
people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans;
and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in
moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and
health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after
them.
Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how
else would you feed the beasts?
But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.
Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life.
People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine

off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.
Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me
consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and
possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely
to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and
healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if
you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect
that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for
adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes,
and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in
every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first
speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and
the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all
sorts of materials must be procured.
True, he said.
Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no
longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude
of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole
tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms
and colours; another will be the votaries of music—poets and their
attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of
divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more
servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry,
tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds,
too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition
of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there
will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.
Certainly.
And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians
than before?
Much greater.
And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants
will be too small now, and not enough?
Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and
tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the
limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of
wealth?
That, Socrates, will be inevitable.
And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?
Most certainly, he replied.
Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus
much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from
causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as
well as public.
Undoubtedly.
And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will
be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with
the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons
whom we were describing above.
Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?
No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged
by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will
remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.
Very true, he said.
But is not war an art?
Certainly.
And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?
Quite true.
And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a
weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but
to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was
by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and
at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a
good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a
soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man
may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan;
although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who

merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years
devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a
skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has
not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon
them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war
become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other
kind of troops?
Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be
beyond price.
And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill,
and art, and application will be needed by him?
No doubt, he replied.
Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?
Certainly.
Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for
the task of guarding the city?
It will.
And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and
do our best.
We must.
Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding
and watching?
What do you mean?
I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake
the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught
him, they have to fight with him.
All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.
Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?
Certainly.
And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or
any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and
unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any
creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.
Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are
required in the guardian.
True.
And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?
Yes.
But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and
with everybody else?
A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.
Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle
to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their
enemies to destroy them.
True, he said.
What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which
has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?
True.
He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two
qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and
hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.
I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.
Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.—My
friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight
of the image which we had before us.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite
qualities.
And where do you find them?
Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is
a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their
familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.
Yes, I know.
Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our
finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.
Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature,
need to have the qualities of a philosopher?
I do not apprehend your meaning.
The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog,
and is remarkable in the animal.
What trait?
Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance,
he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the
other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?
The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your
remark.
And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;—your dog is a true
philosopher.

Why?
Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only
by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a
lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of
knowledge and ignorance?
Most assuredly.
And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?
They are the same, he replied.
And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be
gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of
wisdom and knowledge?
That we may safely affirm.
Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will
require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?
Undoubtedly.
Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found
them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which
may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end
—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either
to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient
length.
Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.
Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if
somewhat long.
Certainly not.
Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story
shall be the education of our heroes.
By all means.
And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the
traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and
music for the soul.
True.
Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means.
And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?
I do.
And literature may be either true or false?
Yes.
And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the
false?
I do not understand your meaning, he said.
You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though
not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are
told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.
Very true.
That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before
gymnastics.
Quite right, he said.
You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work,
especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at
which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more
readily taken.
Quite true.
And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which
may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for
the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have
when they are grown up?
We cannot.
Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of
fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and
reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children
the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even
more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those
which are now in use must be discarded.
Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are
necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.
Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the
greater.
Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of
the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.
But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with
them?
A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is
more, a bad lie.
But when is this fault committed?
Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and
heroes,—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a
likeness to the original.
Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are
the stories which you mean?
First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which
the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what
Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings
of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even
if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and
thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if
there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear
them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig,
but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers
will be very few indeed.
Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.
Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the
young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is
far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father
when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the
example of the first and greatest among the gods.
I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite
unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling
among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to
them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods
against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the
battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall
be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their
friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that
quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any
quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin
by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to
compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus
binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying
for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the
gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether
they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young
person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he
receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and
unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the
young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.
There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such
models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we
answer him?
I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but
founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general
forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be
observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.
Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?
Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he
truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the
representation is given.
Right.
And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?
Certainly.
And no good thing is hurtful?
No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?
Certainly not.
And that which hurts not does no evil?
No.
And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?
Impossible.
And the good is advantageous?
Yes.
And therefore the cause of well-being?
Yes.
It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the
good only?
Assuredly.
Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many
assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that
occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils,
and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to
be sought elsewhere, and not in him.
That appears to me to be most true, he said.
Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of
the folly of saying that two casks
'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil
lots,'
and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two
'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;'
but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,
'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.'
And again—
'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.'
And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was
really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that
the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he

shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear
the words of Aeschylus, that
'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.'
And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject of the
tragedy in which these iambic verses occur—or of the house of Pelops, or
of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to
say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise
some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did
what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but
that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of
their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that
the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are
benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is
the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said
or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any
well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.
I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.
Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to
which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,—that God is not
the author of all things, but of good only.
That will do, he said.
And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether
God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape,
and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many
forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations;
or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?
I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.
Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be
effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?
Most certainly.
And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or
discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame
is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in
the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any
similar causes.

Of course.
And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by
any external influence?
True.
And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite
things—furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are
least altered by time and circumstances.
Very true.
Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is
least liable to suffer change from without?
True.
But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?
Of course they are.
Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many
shapes?
He cannot.
But may he not change and transform himself?
Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.
And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse
and more unsightly?
If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot
suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.
Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man,
desire to make himself worse?
Impossible.
Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as
is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains
absolutely and for ever in his own form.
That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.
Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that
'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and
down cities in all sorts of forms;'

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in
tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the
likeness of a priestess asking an alms
'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;'
—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers
under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of
these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about by night in
the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;' but let them take
heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak
blasphemy against the gods.
Heaven forbid, he said.
But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft
and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?
Perhaps, he replied.
Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in
word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?
I cannot say, he replied.
Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be
allowed, is hated of gods and men?
What do you mean? he said.
I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and
highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above
all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.
Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.
The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my
words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or
uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves,
which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is
what mankind least like;—that, I say, is what they utterly detest.
There is nothing more hateful to them.
And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who
is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of
imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure
unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.
The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?
Yes.
Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in
dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, when those
whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do
some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in
the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because we
do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like
truth as we can, and so turn it to account.
Very true, he said.
But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is
ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?
That would be ridiculous, he said.
Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?
I should say not.
Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?
That is inconceivable.
But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?
But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.
Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?
None whatever.
Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?
Yes.
Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes
not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.
Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.
You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in
which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not
magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in
any way.
I grant that.

Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying
dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses
of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials
'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long,
and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things
blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I
thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would
not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at
the banquet, and who said this—he it is who has slain my son.'
These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our
anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we
allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young,
meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true
worshippers of the gods and like them.
I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them
my laws.

BOOK III.
Such then, I said, are our principles of theology—some tales are to be
told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards,
if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value
friendship with one another.
Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.
But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons
besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of
death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?
Certainly not, he said.
And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather
than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and
terrible?
Impossible.
Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as
well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but rather to
commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are
untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.
That will be our duty, he said.
Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages,
beginning with the verses,
'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than
rule over all the dead who have come to nought.'
We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,
'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen
both of mortals and immortals.'
And again:—
'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form
but no mind at all!'
Again of Tiresias:—

'(To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,) that he alone
should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.'
Again:—
'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate,
leaving manhood and youth.'
Again:—
'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth.'
And,—
'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped
out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one
another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved.'
And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike
out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or
unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of
them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to
be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.
Undoubtedly.
Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which
describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and
sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a
shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not
say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is
a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and
effeminate by them.
There is a real danger, he said.
Then we must have no more of them.
True.
Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.
Clearly.
And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous
men?
They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that
the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is
his comrade.
Yes; that is our principle.
And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had
suffered anything terrible?
He will not.
Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own
happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.
True, he said.
And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of
fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.
Assuredly.
And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the
greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.
Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.
Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men,
and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for
anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us
to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.
That will be very right.
Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict
Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his
back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the
shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and
pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes
which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of
the gods as praying and beseeching,
'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.'
Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the
gods lamenting and saying,
'Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.'
But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so
completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—

'O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased
round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.'
Or again:—
Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me,
subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.'
For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy
representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought,
hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be
dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which
may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any
shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight
occasions.
Yes, he said, that is most true.
Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has
just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a
better.
It ought not to be.
Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter
which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent
reaction.
So I believe.
Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented
as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the
gods be allowed.
Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.
Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as
that of Homer when he describes how
'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw
Hephaestus bustling about the mansion.'
On your views, we must not admit them.
On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit
them is certain.
Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is
useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of

such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have
no business with them.
Clearly not, he said.
Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the
State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies
or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But
nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the
rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be
deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a
gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the
physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is
happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going
with himself or his fellow sailors.
Most true, he said.
If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,
'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,'
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive
and destructive of ship or State.
Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.
In the next place our youth must be temperate?
Certainly.
Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience
to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?
True.
Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,
'Friend, sit still and obey my word,'
and the verses which follow,
'The Greeks marched breathing prowess, ...in silent awe of their leaders,'
and other sentiments of the same kind.
We shall.
What of this line,
'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,'

and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar
impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their
rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?
They are ill spoken.
They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not
conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our
young men—you would agree with me there?
Yes.
And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his
opinion is more glorious than
'When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries
round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups,'
is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words?
Or the verse
'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?'
What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and
men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but
forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely
overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but
wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in
such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another
'Without the knowledge of their parents;'
or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a
chain around Ares and Aphrodite?
Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that
sort of thing.
But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these
they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,
'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart; far
worse hast thou endured!'
Certainly, he said.
In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of
money.
Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of
'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.'
Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to
have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the
gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay
aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to
have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that
when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that
without payment he was unwilling to do so.
Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.
Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these
feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he
is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his
insolence to Apollo, where he says,
'Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I
would be even with thee, if I had only the power;'
or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to
lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had
been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he
actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of
Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot
believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe
that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who
was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered
in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent
passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening
contempt of gods and men.
You are quite right, he replied.
And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of
Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they
did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to
do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our
day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts
were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;—both in the
same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them

trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that
heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying, are
neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come
from the gods.
Assuredly not.
And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them;
for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that
similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—
'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the
altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,'
and who have
'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.'
And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of
morals among the young.
By all means, he replied.
But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to
be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner
in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be
treated has been already laid down.
Very true.
And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion
of our subject.
Clearly so.
But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my
friend.
Why not?
Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets
and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they
tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that
injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss
and another's gain—these things we shall forbid them to utter, and
command them to sing and say the opposite.
To be sure we shall, he replied.

But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you
have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.
I grant the truth of your inference.
That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which
we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how
naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not.
Most true, he said.
Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when
this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been
completely treated.
I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.
Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more
intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all
mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to
come?
Certainly, he replied.
And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of
the two?
That again, he said, I do not quite understand.
I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty
in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take
the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my
meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that
Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon
flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object,
invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these
lines,
'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the
chiefs of the people,'
the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that
he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and
then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not
Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the

entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and
throughout the Odyssey.
Yes.
And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites
from time to time and in the intermediate passages?
Quite true.
But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that
he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is
going to speak?
Certainly.
And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or
gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?
Of course.
Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way
of imitation?
Very true.
Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again
the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration.
However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you
may no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change might be
effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom
in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;' and then
if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his
own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration.
The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop
the metre), 'The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks
that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they
would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought,
and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest
and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not
come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to
him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said—she should
grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to
provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went
away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon

Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done
pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice,
and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the
Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'—and so on. In
this way the whole becomes simple narrative.
I understand, he said.
Or you may suppose the opposite case—that the intermediate passages
are omitted, and the dialogue only left.
That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.
You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what
you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and
mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative—instances of this are
supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in
which the poet is the only speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best
example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other
styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?
Yes, he said; I see now what you meant.
I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done
with the subject and might proceed to the style.
Yes, I remember.
In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding
about the mimetic art,—whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to
be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the
latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?
You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be
admitted into our State?
Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not
know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.
And go we will, he said.
Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be
imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already
laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that
if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in
any?

Certainly.
And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things
as well as he would imitate a single one?
He cannot.
Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life,
and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well;
for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons
cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy
—did you not just now call them imitations?
Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot
succeed in both.
Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?
True.
Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but
imitations.
They are so.
And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet
smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of
performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.
Quite true, he replied.
If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our
guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves
wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft,
and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to
practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate
from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their
profession—the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they
should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or
baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did
you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing
far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature,
affecting body, voice, and mind?
Yes, certainly, he said.

Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of
whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether
young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against
the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow,
or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labour.
Very right, he said.
Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the
offices of slaves?
They must not.
And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the
reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile
one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against
themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is.
Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or
women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not
to be practised or imitated.
Very true, he replied.
Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or
boatswains, or the like?
How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to
the callings of any of these?
Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the
murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?
Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the
behaviour of madmen.
You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of
narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has
anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite
character and education.
And which are these two sorts? he asked.
Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a
narration comes on some saying or action of another good man,—I should
imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this
sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man

when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken
by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he
comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of
that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for
a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he
will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like
to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the
employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind
revolts at it.
So I should expect, he replied.
Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of
Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there
will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?
Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must
necessarily take.
But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the
worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for
him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right
good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will
attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the
creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes,
trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a
sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice
and gesture, and there will be very little narration.
That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.
These, then, are the two kinds of style?
Yes.
And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and
has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for
their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is
always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a
single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will
make use of nearly the same rhythm?
That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of
rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has
all sorts of changes.
That is also perfectly true, he replied.
And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all
poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything
except in one or other of them or in both together.
They include all, he said.
And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the
two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?
I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.
Yes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and
indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is
the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world
in general.
I do not deny it.
But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State,
in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one
part only?
Yes; quite unsuitable.
And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall
find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman
to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a
trader also, and the same throughout?
True, he said.
And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so
clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to
exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a
sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in
our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them.
And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool
upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to
employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller,

who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models
which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.
We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.
Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education
which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the
matter and manner have both been discussed.
I think so too, he said.
Next in order will follow melody and song.
That is obvious.
Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to
be consistent with ourselves.
I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes
me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may
guess.
At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words, the
melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?
Yes, he said; so much as that you may.
And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words
which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same
laws, and these have been already determined by us?
Yes.
And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?
Certainly.
We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no
need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?
True.
And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and
can tell me.
The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the
full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.
These then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a
character to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.
Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly
unbecoming the character of our guardians.
Utterly unbecoming.
And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?
The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.'
Well, and are these of any military use?
Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are
the only ones which you have left.
I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one
warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of
danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to
wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis
meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure;
and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action,
when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by
prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he
is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or
admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has
attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and
wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two
harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of
freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the
strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.
And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I
was just now speaking.
Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and
melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?
I suppose not.
Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and
complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiouslyharmonised instruments?
Certainly not.
But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit
them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony

the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the
panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?
Clearly not.
There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the
shepherds may have a pipe in the country.
That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.
The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his
instruments is not at all strange, I said.
Not at all, he replied.
And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the
State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.
And we have done wisely, he replied.
Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies,
rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules,
for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every
kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a
courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall
adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to
the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you
must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.
But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some
three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as
in sounds there are four notes (i.e. the four notes of the tetrachord.) out of
which all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have
made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable
to say.
Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us
what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other
unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite
feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning
a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in
some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in
the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am
mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and
assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared

to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm;
or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant.
These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon
himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?
(Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed
ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the sentence he
appears to be speaking of paeonic rhythms which are in the ratio of 3/2; in
the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, which are in the ratio of
1/1; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio
of 1/2 or 2/1.)
Rather so, I should say.
But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an
effect of good or bad rhythm.
None at all.
And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad
style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our
principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not
the words by them.
Just so, he said, they should follow the words.
And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the
temper of the soul?
Yes.
And everything else on the style?
Yes.
Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on
simplicity,—I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind
and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for
folly?
Very true, he replied.
And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these
graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?
They must.
And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive
art are full of them,—weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of

manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,—in all of them there is
grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious
motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony
are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.
That is quite true, he said.
But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be
required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if
they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control
to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from
exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and
indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he
who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his
art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would
not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in
some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb
and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering
mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are
gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our
youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the
good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into
the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and
insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with
the beauty of reason.
There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.
And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent
instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into
the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting
grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of
him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received
this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions
or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and
rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and
good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth,
even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he
will recognise and salute the friend with whom his education has made him
long familiar.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be
trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.
Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the
letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and
combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a
space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not
thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise them
wherever they are found:
True—
Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror,
only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us
the knowledge of both:
Exactly—
Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to
educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential
forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as
well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise
them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in
small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one
art and study.
Most assuredly.
And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two
are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an
eye to see it?
The fairest indeed.
And the fairest is also the loveliest?
That may be assumed.
And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the
loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?
That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any
merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the
same.
I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I
agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any

affinity to temperance?
How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his
faculties quite as much as pain.
Or any affinity to virtue in general?
None whatever.
Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?
Yes, the greatest.
And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?
No, nor a madder.
Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and
harmonious?
Quite true, he said.
Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true
love?
Certainly not.
Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near
the lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their
love is of the right sort?
No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.
Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a
law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than
a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he
must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his
intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is
to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.
I quite agree, he said.
Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the
end of music if not the love of beauty?
I agree, he said.
After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.
Certainly.
Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it
should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,—and

this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in
confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,—not that the good body by
any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good
soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be
possible. What do you say?
Yes, I agree.
Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing
over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we
will now only give the general outlines of the subject.
Very good.
That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by
us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not
know where in the world he is.
Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care
of him is ridiculous indeed.
But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for
the great contest of all—are they not?
Yes, he said.
And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?
Why not?
I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy
sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these
athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if
they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?
Yes, I do.
Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior
athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the
utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of
summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a
campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.

That is my view.
The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which
we were just now describing.
How so?
Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple
and good; and especially the military gymnastic.
What do you mean?
My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes
at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no
fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not
allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for
soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the
trouble of carrying about pots and pans.
True.
And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere
mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all
professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good
condition should take nothing of the kind.
Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.
Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements
of Sicilian cookery?
I think not.
Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a
Corinthian girl as his fair friend?
Certainly not.
Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of
Athenian confectionary?
Certainly not.
All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and
song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.
Exactly.
There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas
simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity

in gymnastic of health in the body.
Most true, he said.
But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice
and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the
lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only
the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.
Of course.
And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of
education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people
need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who would
profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great
sign of want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his
law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore
surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and
judges over him?
Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.
Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further
stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all
his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by
his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a
master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and
out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice:
and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he
not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping
judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more
disgraceful?
Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.
Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to
be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and
a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with
waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious
sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and
catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?
Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names
to diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the
days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero
Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of
Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which
are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the
Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke
Patroclus, who is treating his case.
Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a
person in his condition.
Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as
is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did
not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate
diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly
constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of
torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.
How was that? he said.
By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he
perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his
entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself,
and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his
usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to
old age.
A rare reward of his skill!
Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never
understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in
valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience
of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered
states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has
therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the
case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to
people of the richer sort.
How do you mean? he said.
I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and
ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,—these are his
remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells

him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he
replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life
which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary
employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he
resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his
business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.
Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of
medicine thus far only.
Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his
life if he were deprived of his occupation?
Quite true, he said.
But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has
any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.
He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.
Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man
has a livelihood he should practise virtue?
Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.
Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask
ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live
without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question,
whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application
of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand
in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?
Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the
body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the
practice of virtue.
Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of
a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all,
irreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection—there is
a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to
philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher
sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being
made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.
Yes, likely enough.

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited
the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy
constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured
by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the
interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and
through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of
evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing
lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons;—if a man was not
able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a
cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State.
Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.
Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they
were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am
speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus
wounded Menelaus, they
'Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,'
but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink
in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the
remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he
was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did
happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same.
But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects,
whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of
medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as
Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.
They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.
Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar
disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the
son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was
at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we,
in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe
them when they tell us both;—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that
he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.
All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you:
Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those
who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and

are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all
sorts of moral natures?
Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do
you know whom I think good?
Will you tell me?
I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join
two things which are not the same.
How so? he asked.
Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful
physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with
the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better
not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their
own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which
they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to
have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which
has become and is sick can cure nothing.
That is very true, he said.
But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he
ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have
associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the
whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes
of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness;
the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had
no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the
reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily
practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what
evil is in their own souls.
Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.
Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned
to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of
the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal
experience.
Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.
Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your
question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and

suspicious nature of which we spoke,—he who has committed many
crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is
amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes,
because he judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company
of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool
again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognise an honest
man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as
the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener,
he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.
Most true, he said.
Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but
the other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated
by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and
not the vicious, man has wisdom—in my opinion.
And in mine also.
This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will
sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health
both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they
will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to
themselves.
That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.
And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music
which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.
Clearly.
And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise
the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some
extreme case.
That I quite believe.
The very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to stimulate
the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will
not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develope his
muscles.
Very right, he said.

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is
often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training
of the body.
What then is the real object of them?
I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the
improvement of the soul.
How can that be? he asked.
Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive
devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to
music?
In what way shown? he said.
The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of
softness and effeminacy, I replied.
Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of
a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is
good for him.
Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly
educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to
become hard and brutal.
That I quite think.
On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness.
And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if
educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.
True.
And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?
Assuredly.
And both should be in harmony?
Beyond question.
And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?
Yes.
And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?
Very true.

And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his
soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs
of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in
warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the
passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful,
instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and
soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has
wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a
feeble warrior.
Very true.
If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily
accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music
weakening the spirit renders him excitable;—on the least provocation he
flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he
grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.
Exactly.
And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great
feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first
the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he
becomes twice the man that he was.
Certainly.
And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the
Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having
no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble
and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and
his senses not being purged of their mists?
True, he said.
And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using
the weapon of persuasion,—he is like a wild beast, all violence and
fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance
and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.
That is quite true, he said.
And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the
other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two
arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order

that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed
or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.
That appears to be the intention.
And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and
best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and
harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.
You are quite right, Socrates.
And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the
government is to last.
Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.
Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be
the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or
about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests?
For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall
have no difficulty in discovering them.
I dare say that there will be no difficulty.
Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who
are to be rulers and who subjects?
Certainly.
There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.
Clearly.
And that the best of these must rule.
That is also clear.
Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to
husbandry?
Yes.
And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be
those who have most the character of guardians?
Yes.
And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special
care of the State?
True.
And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

To be sure.
And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the
same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is
supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?
Very true, he replied.
Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those
who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the
good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her
interests.
Those are the right men.
And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see
whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either
of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.
How cast off? he said.
I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind
either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a
falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a
truth.
I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the
unwilling I have yet to learn.
Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good,
and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the
truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to
possess the truth?
Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of
truth against their will.
And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or
enchantment?
Still, he replied, I do not understand you.
I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only
mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget;
argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this
I call theft. Now you understand me?
Yes.

Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain
or grief compels to change their opinion.
I understand, he said, and you are quite right.
And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who
change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the
sterner influence of fear?
Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.
Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best
guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the
State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth
upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to
forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be
selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?
Yes.
And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for
them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.
Very right, he replied.
And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third
sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take colts
amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take
our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures,
and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we
may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a
noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which
they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and
harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to
the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has
come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and
guardian of the State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall
receive sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have
to give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is
the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and
appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.
And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.

And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied
to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and
maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the
will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before
called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and
supporters of the principles of the rulers.
I agree with you, he said.
How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we
lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be
possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?
What sort of lie? he said.
Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale (Laws) of what has
often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made
the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such
an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if
it did.
How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!
You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.
Speak, he said, and fear not.
Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the
face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to
communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to
the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the
education and training which they received from us, an appearance only; in
reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of
the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were
manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them
up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are
bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her
citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.
You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were
going to tell.
True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half.
Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has
framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in

the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the
greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again
who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and
iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all
are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver
son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle
to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so
anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the
purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their
offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of
brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of
the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in
the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of
artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to
honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a
man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale;
is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?
Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of
accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and
their sons' sons, and posterity after them.
I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make
them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the
fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we arm
our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their
rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress
insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves
against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from
without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them
sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.
Just so, he said.
And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of
winter and the heat of summer.
I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.
Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shopkeepers.
What is the difference? he said.

That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who,
from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn
upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves,
would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?
Truly monstrous, he said.
And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being
stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and
become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?
Yes, great care should be taken.
And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?
But they are well-educated already, he replied.
I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more
certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be,
will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their
relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.
Very true, he replied.
And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to
them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor
tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must
acknowledge that.
He must.
Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to
realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any
property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should
they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to
enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained
warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to
receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of
the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like
soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from
God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of
the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine
by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the
source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of
all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same

roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their
salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever
acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become
housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants
instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and
being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror
of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to
themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which
reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these
shall be the regulations appointed by us for guardians concerning their
houses and all other matters?
Yes, said Glaucon.

BOOK IV.
Here Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer,
Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people
miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in
fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men
acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything
handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account,
and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have
gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of fortune; but our
poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city
and are always mounting guard?
Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in
addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they
would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a
mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought
to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be
added.
But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.
You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?
Yes.
If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find
the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians
may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the
State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the
greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered
with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find
justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found them, we
might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we
are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a
few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view
the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and
some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful

colours on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be
purple, but you have made them black—to him we might fairly answer, Sir,
you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they
are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other
features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to
you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which
will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our
husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid
them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also
might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing
round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working
at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class
happy—and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do
not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman
will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no
one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not
of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be
what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the
laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then
see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone
have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our
guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas
our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of
revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we
mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State.
And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we
would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle
of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter
be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with
them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way.
And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several
classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to
them.
I think that you are quite right.
I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to
me.

What may that be?
There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.
What are they?
Wealth, I said, and poverty.
How do they act?
The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think
you, any longer take the same pains with his art?
Certainly not.
He will grow more and more indolent and careless?
Very true.
And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?
Yes; he greatly deteriorates.
But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself
with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he
teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.
Certainly not.
Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and
their work are equally liable to degenerate?
That is evident.
Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the
guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.
What evils?
Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence,
and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.
That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how
our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich
and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.
There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one
such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.
How so? he asked.
In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained
warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.
And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was
perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do
gentlemen who were not boxers?
Hardly, if they came upon him at once.
What, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at
the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times
under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn
more than one stout personage?
Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.
And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and
practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.
Likely enough.
Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or
three times their own number?
I agree with you, for I think you right.
And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one
of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither
have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and
help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these
words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the
dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?
That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the
wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.
But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!
Why so?
You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them
is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city,
however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other
of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many
smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you
treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and
give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will
always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State,

while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in
her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or
appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a
thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find,
either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great
and many times greater.
That is most true, he said.
And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are
considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are
to include, and beyond which they will not go?
What limit would you propose?
I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that,
I think, is the proper limit.
Very good, he said.
Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our
guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and
self-sufficing.
And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon
them.
And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,—I
mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior,
and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower
classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the
citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature
intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own
business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and
not many.
Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.
The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not,
as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be
taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,—a thing, however, which I
would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our purpose.
What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow
into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as
other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession
of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general
principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.
That will be the best way of settling them.
Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating
force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good
constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education
improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as
in other animals.
Very possibly, he said.
Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our
rulers should be directed,—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their
original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to
maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard
'The newest song which the singers have,'
they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind
of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of
the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and
ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him;—
he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the
State always change with them.
Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and
your own.
Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in
music?
Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.
Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears
harmless.
Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this
spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and
customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between
man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter

recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private
as well as public.
Is that true? I said.
That is my belief, he replied.
Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a
stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths
themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted
and virtuous citizens.
Very true, he said.
And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of
music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a
manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in
all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any
fallen places in the State will raise them up again.
Very true, he said.
Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which
their predecessors have altogether neglected.
What do you mean?
I mean such things as these:—when the young are to be silent before
their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making
them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be
worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general.
You would agree with me?
Yes.
But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,—I
doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them
likely to be lasting.
Impossible.
It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a
man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?
To be sure.
Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and
may be the reverse of good?
That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about
them.
Naturally enough, he replied.
Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings
between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about
insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of
juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any
impositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be
required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours,
and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of
these particulars?
I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good
men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for
themselves.
Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which
we have given them.
And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever
making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining
perfection.
You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no selfrestraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?
Exactly.
Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring
and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that
they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.
Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.
Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst
enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up
eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor
spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.
Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion
with a man who tells you what is right.
These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.
Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men
whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in
which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the
constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this
regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in
anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good
statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was
describing?
Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from
praising them.
But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready
ministers of political corruption?
Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the
applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really
statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.
What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When
a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure
declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?
Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.
Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play,
trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always
fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts,
and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are
in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?
Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.
I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this
class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an
ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are quite
useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and
many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.
What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?
Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there remains
the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.
Which are they? he said.

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods,
demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and
the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the
inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant
ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to
any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre,
on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.
You are right, and we will do as you propose.
But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now
that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get
your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us
see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they
differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy
should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.
Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying
that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?
I do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as
my word; but you must join.
We will, he replied.
Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin
with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.
That is most certain.
And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.
That is likewise clear.
And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is
not found will be the residue?
Very good.
If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them,
wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the
first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other
three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.
Very true, he said.
And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are
also four in number?

Clearly.
First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and
in this I detect a certain peculiarity.
What is that?
The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good
in counsel?
Very true.
And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance,
but by knowledge, do men counsel well?
Clearly.
And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?
Of course.
There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge
which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?
Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in
carpentering.
Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge
which counsels for the best about wooden implements?
Certainly not.
Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said,
nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?
Not by reason of any of them, he said.
Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would
give the city the name of agricultural?
Yes.
Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State
among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in
the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with
itself and with other States?
There certainly is.
And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.
It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among
those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this
sort of knowledge?
The name of good in counsel and truly wise.
And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more
smiths?
The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.
Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a
name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?
Much the smallest.
And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge
which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State,
being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has
the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by
nature to be of all classes the least.
Most true.
Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four
virtues has somehow or other been discovered.
And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.
Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in
what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the
State.
How do you mean?
Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will
be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's
behalf.
No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.
The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their
courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the
city either the one or the other.
Certainly not.
The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which
preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to
be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and
this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think
that I perfectly understand you.
I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.
Salvation of what?
Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what
nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words
'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the
influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion.
Shall I give you an illustration?
If you please.
You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the
true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare
and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take
the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is
dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes
or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not
been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of
purple or of any other colour.
Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous
appearance.
Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting
our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were
contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws
in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every
other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to
be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in
washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the
mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of
true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and
maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.
But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere
uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this, in
your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have
another name.
Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?
Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you
will not be far wrong;—hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination
further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the
purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.
You are right, he replied.
Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first, temperance, and
then justice which is the end of our search.
Very true.
Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?
I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that
justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and
therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance
first.
Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.
Then consider, he said.
Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of
temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the
preceding.
How so? he asked.
Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures
and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being
his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be found in
language.
No doubt, he said.
There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for
the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these
modes of speaking the same person is denoted.
Certainly.
The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also
a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a
man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when,
owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the

smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is
blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.
Yes, there is reason in that.
And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find
one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge,
may be justly called master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'selfmastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.
Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.
Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires
and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in
the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.
Certainly, he said.
Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are
under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few,
and those the best born and best educated.
Very true.
These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the
meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and
wisdom of the few.
That I perceive, he said.
Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own
pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a
designation?
Certainly, he replied.
It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?
Yes.
And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to
the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?
Undoubtedly.
And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will
temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?
In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance
was a sort of harmony?
Why so?
Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which
resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant;
not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the
notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger
and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in
wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then
may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and
inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals.
I entirely agree with you.
And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been
discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state
virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.
The inference is obvious.
The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should
surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass
out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this
country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her
first, let me know.
Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who
has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I
am good for.
Offer up a prayer with me and follow.
I will, but you must show me the way.
Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must
push on.
Let us push on.
Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I
believe that the quarry will not escape.
Good news, he said.
Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.
Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was
justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be
more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in
their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were
seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we
missed her.
What do you mean?
I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of
justice, and have failed to recognise her.
I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.
Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the
original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of
the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which
his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not
being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said
the same to us.

Yes, we said so.
Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be
justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I cannot, but I should like to be told.
Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State
when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are
abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence
of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and
we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the
fourth or remaining one.
That follows of necessity.
If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence
contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of
rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which
the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and
watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning,
and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan,
ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and
not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily
answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work
appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance,
courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
Exactly.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers
in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits
at law?
Certainly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither
take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.

Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and
doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?
Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a
carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter;
and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same
person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you
think that any great harm would result to the State?
Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a
trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his
followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of
warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is
unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or
when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you
will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one
with another is the ruin of the State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of
one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to
the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed
by you injustice?
Certainly.
This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the
auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and
will make the city just.
I agree with you.
We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception
of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be
no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh

enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you
remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine
justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in
the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and
accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in
the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be
now applied to the individual—if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if
there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and
have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed
together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the
vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.
That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.
I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the
same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?
Like, he replied.
The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the
just State?
He will.
And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the
State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and
valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these
same classes?
True, he said.
And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three
principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be
rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same
manner?
Certainly, he said.
Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—
whether the soul has these three principles or not?
An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the
good.
Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are
employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the

true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution
not below the level of the previous enquiry.
May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I
am quite content.
I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.
Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.
Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same
principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the
individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take
the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this
quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are
supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the
northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which
is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money,
which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.
Exactly so, he said.
There is no difficulty in understanding this.
None whatever.
But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether
these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one
part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the
satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into
play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.
Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.
Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.
How can we? he asked.
I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon
in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary
ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently
the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.
Good.
For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the
same time in the same part?
Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should
hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and
also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one
and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a
mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him
is in motion while another is at rest.
Very true.
And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice
distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round
with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time
(and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his
objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not
at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say
that they have both an axis and a circumference, and that the axis stands
still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the
circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to
the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they
be at rest.
That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.
Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe
that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the
same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.
Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.
Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections,
and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and
go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out
to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.
Yes, he said, that will be the best way.
Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and
aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they
are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of
their opposition)?
Yes, he said, they are opposites.
Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again
willing and wishing,—all these you would refer to the classes already

mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who
desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to
himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person
wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his
desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been
asked a question?
Very true.
And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of
desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and
rejection?
Certainly.
Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular
class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are
termed, which are the most obvious of them?
Let us take that class, he said.
The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
Yes.
And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of
drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for
example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any
particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of
cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst
be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not
great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will
desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as
food is of hunger?
Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple
object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.
But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an
opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good
drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire,
and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the
same is true of every other desire.
Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality
attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their
correlatives simple.
I do not know what you mean.
Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?
Certainly.
And the much greater to the much less?
Yes.
And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to
be to the less that is to be?
Certainly, he said.
And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the
double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the
slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;—is not this true of
all of them?
Yes.
And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of
science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object
of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for
example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is
defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed
architecture.
Certainly.
Because it has a particular quality which no other has?
Yes.
And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular
kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?
Yes.
Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original
meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of
a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified,
the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be
disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily
diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil;

but only that, when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a
qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it
becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of
medicine.
I quite understand, and I think as you do.
Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms,
having clearly a relation—
Yes, thirst is relative to drink.
And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst
taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any
particular kind of drink, but of drink only?
Certainly.
Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only
drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?
That is plain.
And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from
drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like
a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same
time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.
Impossible.
No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the
bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the
other pulls.
Exactly so, he replied.
And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?
Yes, he said, it constantly happens.
And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was
something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else
forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids
him?
I should say so.
And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids
and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

Clearly.
Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from
one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational
principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts
and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or
appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?
Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.
Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the
soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the
preceding?
I should be inclined to say—akin to desire.
Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in
which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up
one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed
some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a
desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he
struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of
him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye
wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.
I have heard the story myself, he said.
The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as
though they were two distinct things.
Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a
man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is
angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the
struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;—but for
the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason
decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe
that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in
any one else?
Certainly not.
Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he
is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or
cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him—

these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by
them.
True, he said.
But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and
chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he
suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to
persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either
slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason,
bidding his dog bark no more.
The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying,
the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are
their shepherds.
I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a
further point which I wish you to consider.
What point?
You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of
desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the
soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.
Most assuredly.
But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or
only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the
soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as
the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so
may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or
spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of
reason?
Yes, he said, there must be a third.
Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different
from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.
But that is easily proved:—We may observe even in young children that
they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them
never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.
Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals,
which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may

once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted
by us,
'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,'
for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons
about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which
is rebuked by it.
Very true, he said.
And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed
that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual,
and that they are three in number.
Exactly.
Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in
virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
Certainly.
Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State
constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the
individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?
Assuredly.
And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same
way in which the State is just?
That follows, of course.
We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of
the three classes doing the work of its own class?
We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.
We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his
nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?
Yes, he said, we must remember that too.
And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of
the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the
subject and ally?
Certainly.
And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic
will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble

words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness
of passion by harmony and rhythm?
Quite true, he said.
And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to
know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of
us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over
this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of
bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer
confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who
are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?
Very true, he said.
Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and
the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the
other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands
and counsels?
True.
And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and
in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?
Right, he replied.
And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and
which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a
knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the
whole?
Assuredly.
And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements
in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the
two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to
rule, and do not rebel?
Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the
State or individual.
And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue
of what quality a man will be just.
That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is
she the same which we found her to be in the State?
There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace
instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.
What sort of instances do you mean?
If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man
who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the
unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny
this?
No one, he replied.
Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or
treachery either to his friends or to his country?
Never.
Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or
agreements?
Impossible.
No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father
and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?
No one.
And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether
in ruling or being ruled?
Exactly so.
Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such
states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?
Not I, indeed.
Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we
entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine
power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been
verified?
Yes, certainly.
And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the
shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business,

and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?
Clearly.
But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned
however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true
self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several
elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the
work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master
and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound
together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the
higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals
—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has
become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he
proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the
treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business;
always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this
harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which
presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition,
he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
You have said the exact truth, Socrates.
Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man
and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not
be telling a falsehood?
Most certainly not.
May we say so, then?
Let us say so.
And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.
Clearly.
Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles—a
meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul
against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a
rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—
what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and
cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?
Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of
acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be
perfectly clear?
What do you mean? he said.
Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what
disease and health are in the body.
How so? he said.
Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is
unhealthy causes disease.
Yes.
And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?
That is certain.
And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and
government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of
disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural
order?
True.
And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and
government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of
injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural
order?
Exactly so, he said.
Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice
the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?
True.
And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?
Assuredly.
Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and
injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just
and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men,
or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?
In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We
know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable,

though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth
and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital
principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if
only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he
is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice;
assuming them both to be such as we have described?
Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the
spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own
eyes, let us not faint by the way.
Certainly not, he replied.
Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of
them, I mean, which are worth looking at.
I am following you, he replied: proceed.
I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from
some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one,
but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones
which are deserving of note.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as
there are distinct forms of the State.
How many?
There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.
What are they?
The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may
be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is
exercised by one distinguished man or by many.
True, he replied.
But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the
government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been
trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the
State will be maintained.
That is true, he replied.

BOOK V.
Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of
the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one
which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of
the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.
What are they? he said.
I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared
to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little
way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth
his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and
drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and
saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let
him off, or what shall we do?'
Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.
Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?
You, he said.
I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?
Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a
whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy
that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were selfevident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children 'friends have
all things in common.'
And was I not right, Adeimantus?
Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else,
requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please,
therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long
expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your
citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when
they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of
women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong
management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on

the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still
undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved,
as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this.
To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.
And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be
equally agreed.
I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an
argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had
finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and
was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said,
you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a
hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering
trouble, and avoided it.
For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said
Thrasymachus,—to look for gold, or to hear discourse?
Yes, but discourse should have a limit.
Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which
wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us;
take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of
community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our
guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and
education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these
things will be.
Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more
doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the
practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point
of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is
also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our
aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.
Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they
are not sceptical or hostile.
I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by
these words.
Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the
encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself
believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about
matters of high interest which a man honours and loves among wise men
who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on
an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my
condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I
shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall
miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag
my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the
words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an
involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or
goodness or justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would
rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to
encourage me.
Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your
argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the
homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and
speak.
Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from
guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.
Then why should you mind?
Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I
perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men
has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the
women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am
invited by you.
For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my
opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of
women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started,
when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the
herd.
True.
Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject
to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result
accords with our design.

What do you mean?
What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs
divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in
keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males
the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at
home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour
enough for them?
No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the
males are stronger and the females weaker.
But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are
bred and fed in the same way?
You cannot.
Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the
same nurture and education?
Yes.
The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.
Yes.
Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war,
which they must practise like the men?
That is the inference, I suppose.
I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are
carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.
No doubt of it.
Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked
in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no
longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than
the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to
frequent the gymnasia.
Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be
thought ridiculous.
But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not
fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of
innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and

gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon
horseback!
Very true, he replied.
Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at
the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be
serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the
opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the
sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the
Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of
that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.
No doubt.
But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far
better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye
vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man
was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other
sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful
by any other standard but that of the good.
Very true, he replied.
First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us
come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of
sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is
the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will
be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the
fairest conclusion.
That will be much the best way.
Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves;
in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.
Why not? he said.
Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say:
'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves,
at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody
was to do the one work suited to his own nature.' And certainly, if I am not
mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And do not the natures of
men and women differ very much indeed?' And we shall reply: Of course
they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men and to

women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different
natures?' Certainly they should. 'But if so, have you not fallen into a serious
inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely
different, ought to perform the same actions?'—What defence will you
make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?
That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall
and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.
These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like
kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take
in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.
By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.
Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth,
whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has
to swim all the same.
Very true.
And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that
Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?
I suppose so, he said.
Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We
acknowledged—did we not? that different natures ought to have different
pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what
are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,—
this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.
Precisely.
Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!
Why do you say so?
Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will.
When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he
cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he
will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of
fair discussion.
Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with
us and our argument?

A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally
into a verbal opposition.
In what way?
Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that
different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered
at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we
distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures
and the same to the same natures.
Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.
I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question
whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy
men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should
forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?
That would be a jest, he said.
Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we
constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every
difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which
the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a
physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same
nature.
True.
Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?
Certainly.
And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for
any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be
assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in
women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof
that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she
should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our
guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.
Very true, he said.
Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits
or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?
That will be quite fair.

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer
on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.
Yes, perhaps.
Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and
then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the
constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the
State.
By all means.
Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:—when
you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to
say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little
learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after
much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did
you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind,
while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?—would not these be the
sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one
who is ungifted?
No one will deny that.
And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has
not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I
waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of
pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be
great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most
absurd?
You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of
the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many
men, yet on the whole what you say is true.
And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration
in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has
by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the
pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman
is inferior to a man.
Very true.
Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on
women?

That will never do.
One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and
another has no music in her nature?
Very true.
And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and
another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?
Certainly.
And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy;
one has spirit, and another is without spirit?
That is also true.
Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not.
Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of
this sort?
Yes.
Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they
differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.
Obviously.
And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the
companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom
they resemble in capacity and in character?
Very true.
And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?
They ought.
Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning
music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come
round again.
Certainly not.
The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore
not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which
prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.
That appears to be true.
We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and
secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes.
And the possibility has been acknowledged?
Yes.
The very great benefit has next to be established?
Quite so.
You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good
guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is
the same?
Yes.
I should like to ask you a question.
What is it?
Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better
than another?
The latter.
And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the
guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more
perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?
What a ridiculous question!
You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that
our guardians are the best of our citizens?
By far the best.
And will not their wives be the best women?
Yes, by far the best.
And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that
the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?
There can be nothing better.
And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such
manner as we have described, will accomplish?
Certainly.
Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest
degree beneficial to the State?
True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their
robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country;
only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the
women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to
be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising
their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking
'A fruit of unripe wisdom,'
and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about;
—for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the useful is the
noble and the hurtful is the base.
Very true.
Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say
that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for
enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in
common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the
consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.
Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.
Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when
you see the next.
Go on; let me see.
The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is
to the following effect,—'that the wives of our guardians are to be common,
and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own
child, nor any child his parent.'
Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the
possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.
I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great
utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite
another matter, and will be very much disputed.
I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.
You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I
meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I
should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the
possibility.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a
defence of both.
Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me feast
my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting
themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered
any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles
them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities;
but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed
with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their
wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good
to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning
to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the
question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the
proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these
arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of
the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you
have no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the
advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.
I have no objection; proceed.
First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the
name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the
power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the
laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are
entrusted to their care.
That is right, he said.
You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now
select the women and give them to them;—they must be as far as possible
of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at
common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own;
they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at
gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their
natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a
word, I think?
Yes, he said;—necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity
which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to
the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an
orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing
which the rulers will forbid.
Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.
Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the
highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?
Exactly.
And how can marriages be made most beneficial?—that is a question
which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the
nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever
attended to their pairing and breeding?
In what particulars?
Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some
better than others?
True.
And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to
breed from the best only?
From the best.
And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?
I choose only those of ripe age.
And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would
greatly deteriorate?
Certainly.
And the same of horses and animals in general?
Undoubtedly.
Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our
rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!
Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any
particular skill?
Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body
corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require
medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of

practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be
given, then the doctor should be more of a man.
That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?
I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of
falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were
saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of
advantage.
And we were very right.
And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the
regulations of marriages and births.
How so?
Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of
either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the
inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the
one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in
first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers
only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians
may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.
Very true.
Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring
together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and
suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is
a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be
to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which
they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any
similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from
becoming either too large or too small.
Certainly, he replied.
We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less
worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then
they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.
To be sure, he said.
And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours
and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given

them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many
sons as possible.
True.
And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to
be held by women as well as by men—
Yes—
The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen
or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they
chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown
place, as they should be.
Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept
pure.
They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold
when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother
recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are
required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be
protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or
other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and
attendants.
You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it
when they are having children.
Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our
scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?
Very true.
And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about
twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?
Which years do you mean to include?
A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the
State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-andtwenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats
quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.
Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of
physical as well as of intellectual vigour.

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public
hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the
child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived
under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each
hymeneal priestesses and priest and the whole city will offer, that the new
generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful
parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.
Very true, he replied.
And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed
age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without
the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to
the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.
Very true, he replied.
This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age:
after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry
his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's
mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their
sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction.
And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to
prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and
if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the
offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.
That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know
who are fathers and daughters, and so on?
They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the
hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male
children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons,
and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he
will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder
generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the
time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their
brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of
the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favours them, and they
receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.
Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our
State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would
have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of
our polity, and also that nothing can be better—would you not?
Yes, certainly.
Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to
be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a
State,—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then
consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of
the evil?
By all means.
Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality
where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?
There cannot.
And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—
where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and
sorrow?

No doubt.
Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is
disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the
other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the
citizens?
Certainly.
Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of
the terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.'
Exactly so.
And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of
persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same
thing?
Quite true.
Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the
individual—as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole
frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under
the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the
part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same
expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation
of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.
Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State
there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.
Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the
whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow
with him?
Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.
It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether
this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental
principles.
Very good.
Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?
True.
All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.
But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other
States?
Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply
call them rulers.
And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people
give the rulers?
They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.
And what do the rulers call the people?
Their maintainers and foster-fathers.
And what do they call them in other States?
Slaves.
And what do the rulers call one another in other States?
Fellow-rulers.
And what in ours?
Fellow-guardians.
Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would
speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his
friend?
Yes, very often.
And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an
interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?
Exactly.
But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as
a stranger?
Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded
by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter,
or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.
Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in
name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For
example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be
implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the
law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an

impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good
either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains
which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about
those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their
kinsfolk?
These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for
them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the
spirit of them?
Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often
heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or
ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'
Most true.
And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying
that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?
Yes, and so they will.
And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will
alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a
common feeling of pleasure and pain?
Yes, far more so than in other States.
And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the
State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and
children?
That will be the chief reason.
And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was
implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the
body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?
That we acknowledged, and very rightly.
Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly
the source of the greatest good to the State?
Certainly.
And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,—that
the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their
pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens,

and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to
preserve their true character of guardians.
Right, he replied.
Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am
saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city
in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging any
acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he
has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will
be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they
are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore
they all tend towards a common end.
Certainly, he replied.
And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own,
suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be
delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations
are the occasion.
Of course they will.
Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among
them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall
maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the
person a matter of necessity.
That is good, he said.
Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a quarrel
with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed
to more dangerous lengths.
Certainly.
To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the
younger.
Clearly.
Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other
violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight
him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to
prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those

who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be
succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.
That is true, he replied.
Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with
one another?
Yes, there will be no want of peace.
And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be
no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against
one another.
None whatever.
I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be
rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich
by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing
up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household,
borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the
money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so
many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious
enough, and not worth speaking of.
Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.
And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be
blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.
How so?
The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of
the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more
glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost.
For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and
the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of
all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country
while living, and after death have an honourable burial.
Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.
Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion
some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians
unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom
we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider

this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians
truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the
greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?
Yes, I remember.
And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be
far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of
shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with
it?
Certainly not.
At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if
any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will
cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life,
which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some
youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to
appropriate the whole state to himself, then he will have to learn how
wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole.'
If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when
you have the offer of such a life.
You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way
of life such as we have described—common education, common children;
and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the
city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt
together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able,
women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is
best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.
I agree with you, he replied.
The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community be
found possible—as among other animals, so also among men—and if
possible, in what way possible?
You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.
There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by
them.
How?

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with
them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of
the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do
when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and
be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never
observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they
touch the wheel?
Yes, I have.
And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in
giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our
guardians will be?
The idea is ridiculous, he said.
There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals,
the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour.
That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often
happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as
their parents, and the State will never recover.
True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?
I am far from saying that.
Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some
occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?
Clearly.
Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their
youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly
be incurred.
Yes, very important.
This then must be our first step,—to make our children spectators of war;
but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all
will be well.
True.
Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to
know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what
dangerous?
That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the
dangerous ones?
True.
And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans
who will be their leaders and teachers?
Very properly.
Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal
of chance about them?
True.
Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with
wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.
What do you mean? he said.
I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and
when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses
must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest
that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is
hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they have only to
follow their elder leaders and escape.
I believe that you are right, he said.
Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one
another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the
soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any
other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman
or artisan. What do you think?
By all means, I should say.
And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a
present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they
like with him.
Certainly.
But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him?
In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful
comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you
say?
I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?
To that too, I agree.
But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.
What is your proposal?
That he should kiss and be kissed by them.
Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no
one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the
expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be
youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.
Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has
been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters
more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?
Agreed.
Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave
youths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had
distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which
seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age,
being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.
Most true, he said.
Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices
and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure of
their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other
distinctions which we were mentioning; also with
'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;'
and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.
That, he replied, is excellent.
Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the
first place, that he is of the golden race?
To be sure.
Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are
dead
'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the
guardians of speech-gifted men'?

Yes; and we accept his authority.
We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and
heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must
do as he bids?
By all means.
And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their
sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are
deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other
way, shall be admitted to the same honours.
That is very right, he said.
Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?
In what respect do you mean?
First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes
should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can
help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger
which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the
barbarians?
To spare them is infinitely better.
Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which
they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.
Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians
and will keep their hands off one another.
Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but
their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an
excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending
that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost
from this love of plunder.
Very true.
And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a
degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead
body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear
behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant,
quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?
Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?
Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.
Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the
arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes;
and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from
kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?
Very true.
Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of
houses, what is to be the practice?
May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?
Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual
produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?
Pray do.
Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I
imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive
of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign;
and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.
That is a very proper distinction, he replied.
And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all
united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the
barbarians?
Very good, he said.
And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with
Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and
by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but
when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a
state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity
is to be called discord.
I agree.
Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be
discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and
burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true
lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and
mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of

their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and
would not mean to go on fighting for ever.
Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.
And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?
It ought to be, he replied.
Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?
Yes, very civilized.
And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own
land, and share in the common temples?
Most certainly.
And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as
discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?
Certainly not.
Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?
Certainly.
They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their
opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?
Just so.
And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor
will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city
—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that
the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are
their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their
lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the
many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?
I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic
enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.
Then let us enact this law also for our guardians:—that they are neither to
devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.
Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our
previous enactments, are very good.
But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way
you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of

this discussion you thrust aside:—Is such an order of things possible, and
how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you
propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add,
what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors,
and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and
each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women
to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror
to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be
absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might
also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all
these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours
were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming
then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility
and ways and means—the rest may be left.
If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and
have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you
seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is
the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I
think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear
and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that
which I have now to state and investigate.
The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more
determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak
out and at once.
Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the
search after justice and injustice.
True, he replied; but what of that?
I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to
require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may
we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a
higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?
The approximation will be enough.
We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the
character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust,
that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might
judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard

which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not
with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.
True, he said.
Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with
consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to
show that any such man could ever have existed?
He would be none the worse.
Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?
To be sure.
And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the
possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?
Surely not, he replied.
That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how
and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having
this in view, to repeat your former admissions.
What admissions?
I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does
not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a
man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What
do you say?
I agree.
Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every
respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city
may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have
discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am
sure that I should be contented—will not you?
Yes, I will.
Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the
cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which
will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if
possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes
be as few and slight as possible.
Certainly, he replied.

I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change
were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.
What is it? he said.
Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the
waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and
drown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.
Proceed.
I said: 'Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this
world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and
wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the
exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have
rest from their evils,—nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will
this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.' Such
was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had
not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can
there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.
Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word
which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very
respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment,
and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main,
before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if
you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be 'pared
by their fine wits,' and no mistake.
You got me into the scrape, I said.
And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but
I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able
to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now,
having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers
that you are right.
I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I
think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to
them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State;
then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be
some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State;

and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be
followers rather than leaders.
Then now for a definition, he said.
Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to
give you a satisfactory explanation.
Proceed.
I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a
lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one
part of that which he loves, but to the whole.
I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.
Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of
pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth
do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are
thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way
which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his
charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he
who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage
is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet 'honey pale,'
as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who
talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek
of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and
nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that
blooms in the spring-time of youth.
If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the
argument, I assent.
And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the
same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.
Very good.
And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army,
they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by really
great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and
meaner people,—but honour of some kind they must have.
Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the
whole class or a part only?
The whole.
And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of
wisdom only, but of the whole?
Yes, of the whole.
And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power
of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be
a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not
hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?
Very true, he said.
Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is
curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher?
Am I not right?
Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a
strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a
delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too,
are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last
persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical
discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac
festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the
performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are
there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar
tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?
Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.
He said: Who then are the true philosophers?
Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.
That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?
To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am
sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.
What is the proposition?
That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?
Certainly.
And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

True again.
And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same
remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various
combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they
are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?
Very true.
And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, artloving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone
worthy of the name of philosophers.
How do you distinguish them? he said.
The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine
tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out
of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.
True, he replied.
Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.
Very true.
And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute
beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable
to follow—of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is
not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who
puts the copy in the place of the real object?
I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.
But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute
beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate
in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in
the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake?
He is wide awake.
And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge,
and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?
Certainly.
But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our
statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without
revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?
We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin
by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have,
and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a
question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You
must answer for him.)
I answer that he knows something.
Something that is or is not?
Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?
And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of
view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly
non-existent is utterly unknown?
Nothing can be more certain.
Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not
to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the
absolute negation of being?
Yes, between them.
And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to
not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be
discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and
knowledge, if there be such?
Certainly.
Do we admit the existence of opinion?
Undoubtedly.
As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?
Another faculty.
Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter
corresponding to this difference of faculties?
Yes.
And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I
proceed further I will make a division.
What division?
I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers
in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing,

for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class
which I mean?
Yes, I quite understand.
Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and
therefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to
discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of
a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the
same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has
another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of
speaking?
Yes.
And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would
you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?
Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.
And is opinion also a faculty?
Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an
opinion.
And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not
the same as opinion?
Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which
is infallible with that which errs?
An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a
distinction between them.
Yes.
Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct
spheres or subject-matters?
That is certain.
Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to
know the nature of being?
Yes.
And opinion is to have an opinion?
Yes.

And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the
same as the subject-matter of knowledge?
Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty
implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying,
opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge
and of opinion cannot be the same.
Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be
the subject-matter of opinion?
Yes, something else.
Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can
there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an
opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion
which is an opinion about nothing?
Impossible.
He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?
Yes.
And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?
True.
Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of
being, knowledge?
True, he said.
Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?
Not with either.
And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?
That seems to be true.
But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a
greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?
In neither.
Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge,
but lighter than ignorance?
Both; and in no small degree.
And also to be within and between them?
Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?
No question.
But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort
which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to
lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that the
corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found
in the interval between them?
True.
And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we
call opinion?
There has.
Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally
of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either,
pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call
the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,—the
extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the
mean.
True.
This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that
there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the
beautiful is the manifold—he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who
cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that
anything is one—to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind,
sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will
not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the
holy, which will not also be unholy?
No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly;
and the same is true of the rest.
And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?—doubles, that
is, of one thing, and halves of another?
Quite true.
And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not
be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?
True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular
names be said to be this rather than not to be this?
He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or
the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit
him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The
individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a
double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or notbeing, or both, or neither.
Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place
than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater
darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than
being.
That is quite true, he said.
Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the
multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing
about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure notbeing?
We have.
Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might
find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of
knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the
intermediate faculty.
Quite true.
Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute
beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the
many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,—such persons may be said
to have opinion but not knowledge?
That is certain.
But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to
know, and not to have opinion only?
Neither can that be denied.
The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of
opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who

listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate
the existence of absolute beauty.
Yes, I remember.
Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of
opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us
for thus describing them?
I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.
But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of
wisdom and not lovers of opinion.
Assuredly.

BOOK VI.
And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true
and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.
I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.
I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better
view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one
subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he
who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the
unjust must consider.
And what is the next question? he asked.
Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as
philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those
who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I
must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?
And how can we rightly answer that question?
Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of
our State—let them be our guardians.
Very good.
Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep
anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?
There can be no question of that.
And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of
the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern,
and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to
that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order
the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and
to guard and preserve the order of them—are not such persons, I ask,
simply blind?
Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.
And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being
their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of

virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?
There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest
of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail
in some other respect.
Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and
the other excellences.
By all means.
In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher
has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and,
when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also
acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in
whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.
What do you mean?
Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort
which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and
corruption.
Agreed.
And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there
is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they
are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of
ambition.
True.
And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another
quality which they should also possess?
What quality?
Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind
falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.
Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.
'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be
affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all
that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.
Right, he said.
And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?
Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?
Never.
The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in
him lies, desire all truth?
Assuredly.
But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in
one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream
which has been drawn off into another channel.
True.
He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be
absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure—
I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.
That is most certain.
Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the
motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no
place in his character.
Very true.
Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.
What is that?
There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more
antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole
of things both divine and human.
Most true, he replied.
Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of
all time and all existence, think much of human life?
He cannot.
Or can such an one account death fearful?
No indeed.
Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?
Certainly not.
Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or
mean, or a boaster, or a coward—can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his

dealings?
Impossible.
Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and
unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the
philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.
True.
There is another point which should be remarked.
What point?
Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that
which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.
Certainly not.
And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he
not be an empty vessel?
That is certain.
Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless
occupation? Yes.
Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic
natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?
Certainly.
And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to
disproportion?
Undoubtedly.
And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?
To proportion.
Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally wellproportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards
the true being of everything.
Certainly.
Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go
together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have
a full and perfect participation of being?
They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who
has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,—noble, gracious, the
friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?
The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a
study.
And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and
to these only you will entrust the State.
Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no
one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes
over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at
each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and
answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the
discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their
former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of
draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no
piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have
nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all
the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is
now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not
able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the
votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a
part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them
become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may
be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very
study which you extol.
Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?
I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.
Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.
Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from
evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged
by us to be of no use to them?
You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a
parable.
Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all
accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into
such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be
still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in
which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no
single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their
cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of
many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in
pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is
taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a
similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much
better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—
every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never
learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he
learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to
cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain,
begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time
they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or
throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's
senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of
the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they
proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them. Him
who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship
out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion,
they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the
other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot
must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and
whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the
command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other
people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the
steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made
part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by
sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not
be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?
Of course, said Adeimantus.
Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure,
which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you
understand already.

Certainly.
Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is
surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain
it to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far
more extraordinary.
I will.
Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless
to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their
uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to
themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded
by him—that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise to go to the
doors of the rich'—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the
truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the physician
he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern.
The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled
by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp;
they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen
to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers.
Precisely so, he said.
For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest
pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite
faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her
opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you
suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant
rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.
Yes.
And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?
True.
Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also
unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any
more than the other?
By all means.
And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of
the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader,

whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an
impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.
Yes, that was said.
Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance
with present notions of him?
Certainly, he said.
And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of
knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature; he will not rest
in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go
on—the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until
he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a
sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near
and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten
mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and
then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.
Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.
And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he
not utterly hate a lie?
He will.
And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band
which he leads?
Impossible.
Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will
follow after?
True, he replied.
Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the
philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage,
magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you
objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you
leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some
of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we
were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have
now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question

of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true
philosopher.
Exactly.
And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature,
why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of
those who were said to be useless but not wicked—and, when we have done
with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of
men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of
which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring
upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of
which we speak.
What are these corruptions? he said.
I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature
having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher, is
a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.
Rare indeed.
And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare
natures!
What causes?
In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance,
and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is
a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the
soul which is the possessor of them.
That is very singular, he replied.
Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, wealth, strength,
rank, and great connections in the State—you understand the sort of things
—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.
I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean
about them.
Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then
have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no
longer appear strange to you.
And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or
animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in
proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable
environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.
Very true.
There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien
conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is
greater.
Certainly.
And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they
are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the
spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education
rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable
of any very great good or very great evil?
There I think that you are right.
And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a plant which,
having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue,
but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all
weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think,
as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that
private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of?
Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do
they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and
fashion them after their own hearts?
When is this accomplished? he said.
When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a
court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and
there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or
done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and
clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they
are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time
will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private
training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular
opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the

notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as
they do, and as they are, such will he be?
Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.
And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been
mentioned.
What is that?
The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are
aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when
their words are powerless.
Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.
Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be
expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?
None, he replied.
No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly;
there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of
character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is
supplied by public opinion—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what
is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not
have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is
saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly
say.
I quite assent, he replied.
Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.
What are you going to say?
Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists
and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but
the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and
this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the
tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would
learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what
causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his
several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed
or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually
attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his

knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to
teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or
passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that
dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the
tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in
which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can
give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the
necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to
others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is
immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?
Indeed he would.
And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of
the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or
music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing?
For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or
other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them
his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will
oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly
ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the
honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?
No, nor am I likely to hear.
You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you
to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the
existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the
absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?
Certainly not.
Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?
Impossible.
And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the
world?
They must.
And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?
That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in
his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he
was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence—these
were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.
Yes.
Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among
all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?
Certainly, he said.
And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older
for their own purposes?
No question.
Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and
flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which
he will one day possess.
That often happens, he said.
And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such
circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble,
and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and
fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and
having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself
in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?
To be sure he will.
Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him
and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only
be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse
circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?
Far otherwise.
And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural
reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken
captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that
they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from
his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from
yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to
this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

There can be no doubt of it.
And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?
Impossible.
Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make
a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy,
no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods
of life?
We were quite right.
Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which
I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits;
they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the
class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to
States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries
them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great
thing either to individuals or to States.
That is most true, he said.
And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for
her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a
false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no
kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon
her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her
votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve
the severest punishment.
That is certainly what people say.
Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny
creatures who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair
names and showy titles—like prisoners running out of prison into a
sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so
being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For,
although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about
her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her
whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by
their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this
unavoidable?
Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of
durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat,
and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter,
who is left poor and desolate?
A most exact parallel.
What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and
bastard?
There can be no question of it.
And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy
and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of
ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms
captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin
to true wisdom?
No doubt, he said.
Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but
a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained
by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains
devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which
he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts,
which they justly despise, and come to her;—or peradventure there are
some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle; for everything in the
life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept
him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth
mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other
man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and
blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the
madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is
there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved.
Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts
—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able
singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be
of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to
throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he
holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of
dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter
of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if

only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and
depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.
Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.
A great work—yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to
him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and
be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.
The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been
sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been
shown—is there anything more which you wish to say?
Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which
of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.
Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring
against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and
hence that nature is warped and estranged;—as the exotic seed which is
sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be
overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of
philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another
character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she
herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other
things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human;—and now, I
know, that you are going to ask, What that State is:
No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question
—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or
some other?
Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying
before, that some living authority would always be required in the State
having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as
legislator you were laying down the laws.
That was said, he replied.
Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing
objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and
difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.
What is there remaining?
The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be
the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the

good,' as men say.
Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be
complete.
I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want
of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what
I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should
pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.
In what manner?
At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning
when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from
moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them
who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come
within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take
themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may,
perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for
philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last,
when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than
Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again. (Heraclitus said that
the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning.)
But what ought to be their course?
Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what
philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this
period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special
care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the
service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let
them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our
citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will
and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily here, and
to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.
How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet
most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest
in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least
of all.
Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have
recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I

shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men,
or do something which may profit them against the day when they live
again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.
You are speaking of a time which is not very near.
Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with
eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for
they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have
seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words
artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity.
But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he
can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such a man ruling in a
city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor
many of them—do you think that they ever did?
No indeed.
No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble
sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means
in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look
coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and
strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.
They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.
And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced
us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor
individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers
whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled,
whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity
be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of
kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy.
That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to
affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and
visionaries. Am I not right?
Quite right.
If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some
foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected
philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior
power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death,

that this our constitution has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the
Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there
is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.
My opinion agrees with yours, he said.
But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?
I should imagine not, he replied.
O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their
minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of
soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them
your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now
doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of
whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view him in
this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in
another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is
himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is
no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper
may be found but not in the majority of mankind.
I quite agree with you, he said.
And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many
entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in
uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who
make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing
can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.
It is most unbecoming.
For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no
time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and
envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed
and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another,
but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these
he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that
with which he holds reverential converse?
Impossible.
And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes
orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one
else, he will suffer from detraction.

Of course.
And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but
human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he
beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice,
temperance, and every civil virtue?
Anything but unskilful.
And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth,
will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell
them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who
imitate the heavenly pattern?
They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they
draw out the plan of which you are speaking?
They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which,
as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface.
This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference
between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do
either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have
either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.
They will be very right, he said.
Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the
constitution?
No doubt.
And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn
their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at
absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy;
and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a
man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which,
when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.
Very true, he said.
And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they
have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of
God?
Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described
as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is
such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant
because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little
calmer at what they have just heard?
Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.
Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt
that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?
They would not be so unreasonable.
Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the
highest good?
Neither can they doubt this.
But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable
circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will
they prefer those whom we have rejected?
Surely not.
Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear
rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our
imaginary State ever be realized?
I think that they will be less angry.
Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and
that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason,
cannot refuse to come to terms?
By all means, he said.
Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any
one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are
by nature philosophers?
Surely no man, he said.
And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of
necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by
us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—
who will venture to affirm this?
Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient
to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which
the world is so incredulous.
Yes, one is enough.
The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been
describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?
Certainly.
And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or
impossibility?
I think not.
But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if
only possible, is assuredly for the best.
We have.
And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would
be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not
impossible.
Very good.
And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but
more remains to be discussed;—how and by what studies and pursuits will
the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to
apply themselves to their several studies?
Certainly.
I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the
procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew
that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of
attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I
had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now
disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from
the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were
to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and
neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were
to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who
always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a
ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was

the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside
and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.
I perfectly remember, he said.
Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word;
but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a
philosopher.
Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.
And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which
were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly
found in shreds and patches.
What do you mean? he said.
You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity,
cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that
persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and
magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a
peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and
all solid principle goes out of them.
Very true, he said.
On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended
upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally
immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid
state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.
Quite true.
And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to
whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any
office or command.
Certainly, he said.
And will they be a class which is rarely found?
Yes, indeed.
Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers
and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of
probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many
kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the
highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by
the highest of all knowledge?
You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and
distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and
wisdom?
Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.
And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion
of them?
To what do you refer?
We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in
their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end
of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition
of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied
that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was
continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether
you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.
Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair
measure of truth.
But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls
short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the
measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think
that they need search no further.
Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.
Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State
and of the laws.
True.
The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and
toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest
knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.
What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than
justice and the other virtues?
Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline
merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should
satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in

order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how
ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the
highest accuracy!
A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from
asking you what is this highest knowledge?
Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the
answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather
think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that
the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become
useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be
ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have
often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other
knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think
that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess
the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of
beauty and goodness?
Assuredly not.
You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good,
but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?
Yes.
And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by
knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?
How ridiculous!
Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance
of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for the good they
define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when
they use the term 'good'—this is of course ridiculous.
Most true, he said.
And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they
are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.
Certainly.
And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?
True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this
question is involved.
There can be none.
Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem
to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied
with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of
the good, appearance is despised by every one.
Very true, he said.
Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all
his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet
hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same
assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good
there is in other things,—of a principle such and so great as this ought the
best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the
darkness of ignorance?
Certainly not, he said.
I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the
just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect
that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.
That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.
And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be
perfectly ordered?
Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you
conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or
different from either?
Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would
not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.
True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime
in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of
others, and never telling his own.
Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?
Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to
do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best
of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion
without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the
road?
Very true.
And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when
others will tell you of brightness and beauty?
Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as
you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the
good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other
virtues, we shall be satisfied.
Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help
fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon
me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the
good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great
for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if
I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.
By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our
debt for the account of the parent.
I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account
of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this
latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not
render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.
Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.
Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and
remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at
many other times.
What?
The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of
other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is
applied.
True, he said.
And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things
to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be

brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.
Very true.
The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known
but not seen.
Exactly.
And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
The sight, he said.
And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive
the other objects of sense?
True.
But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex
piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?
No, I never have, he said.
Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in
order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?
Nothing of the sort.
No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other
senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?
Certainly not.
But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no
seeing or being seen?
How do you mean?
Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to
see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature
specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and
the colours will be invisible.
Of what nature are you speaking?
Of that which you term light, I replied.
True, he said.
Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and
great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their
bond, and light is no ignoble thing?
Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of
this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and
the visible to appear?
You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.
May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?
How?
Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?
No.
Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
By far the most like.
And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is
dispensed from the sun?
Exactly.
Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by
sight?
True, he said.
And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in
his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the
things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind
and the things of mind:
Will you be a little more explicit? he said.
Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards
objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and
stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of
vision in them?
Very true.
But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they
see clearly and there is sight in them?
Certainly.
And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and
being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with
intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and

perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of
one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?
Just so.
Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to
the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you
will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter
becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and
knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more
beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be
truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other
sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the
good; the good has a place of honour yet higher.
What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of
science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot
mean to say that pleasure is the good?
God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another
point of view?
In what point of view?
You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of
visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and
growth, though he himself is not generation?
Certainly.
In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of
knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the
good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.
Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how
amazing!
Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made
me utter my fancies.
And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is
anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.
Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.
Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to
be omitted.
I hope not, he said.
You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one
of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not
say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name
('ourhanoz, orhatoz'). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the
visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?
I have.
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide
each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main
divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and
then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of
clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible
consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and
in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished
bodies and the like: Do you understand?
Yes, I understand.
Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to
include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.
Very good.
Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different
degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion
is to the sphere of knowledge?
Most undoubtedly.
Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the
intellectual is to be divided.
In what manner?
Thus:—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses
the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be
hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the
other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and
goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images

as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas
themselves.
I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.
Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made
some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry,
arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the
figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of
science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are
supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of
them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on
until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?
Yes, he said, I know.
And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible
forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the
ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the
absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they
draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their
own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to
behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the
mind?
That is true.
And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it
the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle,
because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing
the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as
images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a
greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.
I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry
and the sister arts.
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will
understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason
herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first
principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of
departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may
soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and

then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again
without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in
ideas she ends.
I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be
describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand
you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic
contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed,
which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the
understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from
hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them
appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a
first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason.
And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I
suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being
intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to
these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason
answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction)
to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale
of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the
same degree that their objects have truth.
I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your
arrangement.

BOOK VII.
And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened
or unenlightened:—Behold! human beings living in a underground den,
which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den;
here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks
chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being
prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind
them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners
there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along
the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them,
over which they show the puppets.
I see.
And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of
vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and
various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking,
others silent.
You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the
shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the
cave?
True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were
never allowed to move their heads?
And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would
only see the shadows?
Yes, he said.
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not
suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?
Very true.
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the
other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by
spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.
To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of
the images.
That is certain.
And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners
are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is
liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and
walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will
distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former
state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him,
that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is
approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real
existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may
further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and
requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy
that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are
now shown to him?
Far truer.
And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain
in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of
vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer
than the things which are now being shown to him?
True, he said.
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and
rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun
himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the
light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all
of what are now called realities.
Not all in a moment, he said.
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And
first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other
objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon
the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see
the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by
day?

Certainly.
Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him
in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another;
and he will contemplate him as he is.
Certainly.
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the
years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain
way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed
to behold?
Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den
and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate
himself on the change, and pity them?
Certainly, he would.
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on
those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark
which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were
together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the
future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or
envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,
'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,'
and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their
manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain
these false notions and live in this miserable manner.
Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to
be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full
of darkness?
To be sure, he said.
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the
shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his
sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time
which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very
considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he

went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to
think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to
the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
No question, he said.
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the
previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the
fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the
journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world
according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—
whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my
opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of
all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the
universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the
lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and
truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would
act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.
I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this
beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are
ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which
desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.
Yes, very natural.
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine
contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous
manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become
accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts
of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of
justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have
never yet seen absolute justice?
Anything but surprising, he replied.
Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments
of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming
out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye,
quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he
sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to

laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the
brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or
having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And
he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will
pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from
below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh
which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.
That, he said, is a very just distinction.
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong
when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not
there before, like sight into blind eyes.
They undoubtedly say this, he replied.
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning
exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from
darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of
knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the
world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the
sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of
the good.
Very true.
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the
easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that
exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking
away from the truth?
Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.
And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to
bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be
implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than
anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this
conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful
and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from
the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul
sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is
forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his
cleverness?

Very true, he said.
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of
their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such
as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at
their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls
upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from these
impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in
them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are
turned to now.
Very likely.
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a
necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated
and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their
education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have
no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as
public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon
compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of
the blest.
Very true, he replied.
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be
to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already
shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they
arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must
not allow them to do as they do now.
What do you mean?
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed;
they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and
partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.
But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when
they might have a better?
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator,
who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest;
the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together
by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and

therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to
please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.
True, he said, I had forgotten.
Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our
philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to
them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the
toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet
will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught,
they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have
never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the
hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you
far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are
better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his
turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the
habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see
ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know
what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have
seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State,
which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be
administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with
one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power,
which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in
which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most
quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.
Quite true, he replied.
And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the
toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time
with one another in the heavenly light?
Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which
we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them
will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present
rulers of State.
Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for
your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you
may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will
they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and

wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the
administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private
advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there
can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and
domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves
and of the whole State.
Most true, he replied.
And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is
that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?
Indeed, I do not, he said.
And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are,
there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.
No question.
Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they
will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the
State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and
another and a better life than that of politics?
They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.
And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced,
and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to
have ascended from the world below to the gods?
By all means, he replied.
The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell (In allusion
to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell
which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.),
but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than
night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we
affirm to be true philosophy?
Quite so.
And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of
effecting such a change?
Certainly.
What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from
becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You

will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?
Yes, that was said.
Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?
What quality?
Usefulness in war.
Yes, if possible.
There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?
Just so.
There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the
body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and
corruption?
True.
Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?
No.
But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into
our former scheme?
Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic,
and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making
them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and
the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of
rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended
to that good which you are now seeking.
You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there
certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there,
my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts
were reckoned mean by us?
Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts
are also excluded, what remains?
Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then
we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal
application.
What may that be?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in
common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of
education.
What is that?
The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three—in a word,
number and calculation:—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of
them?
Yes.
Then the art of war partakes of them?
To be sure.
Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon
ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares
that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array
the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been
numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been
incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of
number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?
I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.
Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?
Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of
military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.
I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of
this study?
What is your notion?
It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and
which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for
the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.
Will you explain your meaning? he said.
I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say
'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of
knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer
proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.
Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not
invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the
case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is
imperatively demanded.
You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are
imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.
No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.
Then what is your meaning?
When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass
from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in
this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or
near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite.
An illustration will make my meaning clearer:—here are three fingers—a
little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.
Very good.
You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the
point.
What is it?
Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at
the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no
difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not
compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight
never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.
True.
And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which
invites or excites intelligence.
There is not, he said.
But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can
sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the
circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the
extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the
qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the
other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their
mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the

quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of
softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both
hard and soft?
You are quite right, he said.
And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense
gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and
heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?
Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious
and require to be explained.
Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her
aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several
objects announced to her are one or two.
True.
And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?
Certainly.
And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a
state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be conceived
of as one?
True.
The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused
manner; they were not distinguished.
Yes.
Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was
compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate
and not confused.
Very true.
Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is
small?'
Exactly so.
And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.
Most true.
This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the
intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite

impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.
I understand, he said, and agree with you.
And to which class do unity and number belong?
I do not know, he replied.
Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the
answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by
any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there
would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is some
contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the
conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the
soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is absolute
unity?' This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing
and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.
And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the
same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?
Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?
Certainly.
And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?
Yes.
And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?
Yes, in a very remarkable manner.
Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a
double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art
of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher
also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true
being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.
That is true.
And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?
Certainly.
Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe;
and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men
of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry
on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor
again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but

for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this
will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.
That is excellent, he said.
Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the
science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued
in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!
How do you mean?
I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating
effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling
against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You
know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who
attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide,
they multiply (Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because
they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by
them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be
units.), taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in
fractions.
That is very true.
Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these
wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say,
there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable,
indivisible,—what would they answer?
They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of
those numbers which can only be realized in thought.
Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary,
necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the
attainment of pure truth?
Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.
And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for
calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even
the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive
no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would
otherwise have been.
Very true, he said.

And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many
as difficult.
You will not.
And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the
best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.
I agree.
Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall
we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?
You mean geometry?
Exactly so.
Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which
relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or
extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in
actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general
is or is not a geometrician.
Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or
calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and
more advanced part of geometry—whether that tends in any degree to make
more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all
things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place,
where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to
behold.
True, he said.
Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming
only, it does not concern us?
Yes, that is what we assert.
Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny
that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary
language of geometricians.
How so?
They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow
and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like
—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas
knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.
Then must not a further admission be made?
What admission?
That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal,
and not of aught perishing and transient.
That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.
Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and
create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily
allowed to fall down.
Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.
Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants
of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science
has indirect effects, which are not small.
Of what kind? he said.
There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all
departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied
geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.
Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.
Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our
youth will study?
Let us do so, he replied.
And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?
I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of
months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.
I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard
against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit
the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul
which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and reillumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it
alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those
who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another
class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem
them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained
from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the

two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and
that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement;
at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may
receive.
I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own
behalf.
Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the
sciences.
What was the mistake? he said.
After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in
revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second
dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of
depth, ought to have followed.
That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these
subjects.
Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government
patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and
they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless
they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he
could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would
not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State
became the director of these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples
would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and
discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the
world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their
votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their
natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would
some day emerge into light.
Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly
understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of
plane surfaces?
Yes, I said.
And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?
Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid
geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over

this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.
True, he said.
Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence
if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.
The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar
manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in
your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels
the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.
Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not
to me.
And what then would you say?
I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy
appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.
What do you mean? he asked.
You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our
knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to
throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that
his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right,
and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is
of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a
man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some
particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is
matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his
way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on
his back.
I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to
ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to
that knowledge of which we are speaking?
I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought
upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect
of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions
of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each
other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true
number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by
reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.
The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that
higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures
excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist,
which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would
appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never
dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true
double, or the truth of any other proportion.
No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.
And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at
the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in
heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But
he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the
month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one
another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be
eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd; and it is equally
absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.
I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.
Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems,
and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way
and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.
That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.
Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a
similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But
can you tell me of any other suitable study?
No, he said, not without thinking.
Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are
obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I
imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.
But where are the two?
There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already
named.
And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first
is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the
stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister
sciences—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?
Yes, he replied.
But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and
learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications
of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own
higher object.
What is that?
There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our
pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they
did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the
same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and
consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the
astronomers, is in vain.
Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking
about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close
alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbour's
wall—one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note
and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement;
the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either
party setting their ears before their understanding.
You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and
rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and
speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make
accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to
sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are
not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just
now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the
astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are
heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the
natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious
and others not.
That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after
with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit,
useless.
Very true, he said.
Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and
connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual
affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a
value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.
I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.
What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all
this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you
surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?
Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who
was capable of reasoning.
But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason
will have the knowledge which we require of them?
Neither can this be supposed.
And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic.
This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of
sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember,
was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and
last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the
discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any
assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at
the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the
intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.
Exactly, he said.
Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?
True.
But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from
the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the
underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to
look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive
even with their weak eyes the images in the water (which are divine), and

are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of
fire, which compared with the sun is only an image)—this power of
elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which
is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty
which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in
the material and visible world—this power is given, as I was saying, by all
that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.
I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe,
yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not
a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again
and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all
this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain (A
play upon the Greek word, which means both 'law' and 'strain.'), and
describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the
divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these
paths will also lead to our final rest.
Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I
would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the
absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or
would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have
seen something like reality; of that I am confident.
Doubtless, he replied.
But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal
this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.
Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.
And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of
comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining
what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned
with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to
production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and
constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were
saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—
they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality
so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are
unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first
principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also

constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a
fabric of convention can ever become science?
Impossible, he said.
Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and
is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her
ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish
slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and
helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been
discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other
name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than
science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why
should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance
to consider?
Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the
thought of the mind with clearness?
At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for
intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the
second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of
shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being;
and so to make a proportion:—
As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect
is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of
shadows.
But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of
opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer
than this has been.
As far as I understand, he said, I agree.
And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who
attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not
possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever
degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will
you admit so much?
Yes, he said; how can I deny it?
And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the
person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless

he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not
by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of
the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows
neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow,
if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science;—dreaming
and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the
world below, and has his final quietus.
In all that I should most certainly agree with you.
And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom
you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you
would not allow the future rulers to be like posts (Literally 'lines,' probably
the starting-point of a race-course.), having no reason in them, and yet to be
set in authority over the highest matters?
Certainly not.
Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will
enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?
Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.
Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and
is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of
knowledge can no further go?
I agree, he said.
But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to
be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.
Yes, clearly.
You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?
Certainly, he said.
The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to
the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble
and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will
facilitate their education.
And what are these?
Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind
more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of

gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with
the body.
Very true, he replied.
Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and
be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will
never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go
through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.
Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.
The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no
vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen
into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.
What do you mean?
In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry—
I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example,
when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily
exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or
listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may
be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.
Certainly, he said.
And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame
which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and
others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does
not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has
no shame at being detected?
To be sure.
And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every
other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and
the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and
individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and the
individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in
a figure lame or a bastard.
That is very true, he said.
All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if
only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training

are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against
us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if
our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall
pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at
present.
That would not be creditable.
Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I
am equally ridiculous.
In what respect?
I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much
excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under
foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of
her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.
Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.
But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you
that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so
in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows
old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run
much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.
Of course.
And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of
instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the
mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of
education.
Why not?
Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of
knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to
the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no
hold on the mind.
Very true.
Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early
education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out
the natural bent.
That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle
on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought
close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?
Yes, I remember.
The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things—labours,
lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be
enrolled in a select number.
At what age?
At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of
two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any
other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the
trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests
to which our youth are subjected.
Certainly, he replied.
After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old
will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned
without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and
they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and
to true being.
Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.
Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of
dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.
I agree with you, he said.
These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who
have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their
learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have
arrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the select class,
and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by the help
of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of
sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute
being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.
Why great caution?
Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has
introduced?

What evil? he said.
The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.
Quite true, he said.
Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in
their case? or will you make allowance for them?
In what way make allowance?
I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son
who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family,
and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his
alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to
discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his
flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is
ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I
guess for you?
If you please.
Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely
to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than
the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do
or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in
any important matter.
He will.
But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would
diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted
to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would
now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he
were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more
about his supposed parents or other relations.
Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the
disciples of philosophy?
In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and
honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental
authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.
That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and
attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of
right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.
True.
Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is
fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then
arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into
believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just
and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most
valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before?
Impossible.
And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore,
and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other
than that which flatters his desires?
He cannot.
And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?
Unquestionably.
Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have
described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.
Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.
Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens
who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing
them to dialectic.
Certainly.
There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for
youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their
mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting
others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice
in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.
Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.
And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the
hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing
anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but

philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of
the world.
Too true, he said.
But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such
insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the
eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater
moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour
of the pursuit.
Very true, he said.
And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the
disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any
chance aspirant or intruder?
Very true.
Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics
and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the
number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be
enough?
Would you say six or four years? he asked.
Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down
again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which
young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience
of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are
drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.
And how long is this stage of their lives to last?
Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age,
then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every
action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their
consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of
the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the
absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order
the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives
also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes,
toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they
were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and
when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and

left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to
the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public
memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as
demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.
You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors
faultless in beauty.
Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not
suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women
as far as their natures can go.
There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all
things like the men.
Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been
said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although
difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been
supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State,
one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world which
they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the
honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and
most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles
will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?
How will they proceed?
They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the
city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their
children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they
will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have
given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were
speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation
which has such a constitution will gain most.
Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very
well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.
Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image—
there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.
There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that
nothing more need be said.

BOOK VIII.
And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect
State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and
the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best
philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?
That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.
Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when
appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such
as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing
private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we
agreed?
Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions
of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from
the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and
they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.
True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us
find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.
There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had
finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good,
and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears,
you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said
further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the
false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones,
and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to
them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and
finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we
were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst
the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of
which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word;
and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we
have now arrived.
Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same
position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same
answer which you were about to give me then.
Yes, if I can, I will, I said.
I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which
you were speaking.
That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I
spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and
Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes
next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems
with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although
very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs
from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know,
do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct
character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold,
and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are
nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among
barbarians.
Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government
which exist among them.
Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men
vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other?
For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out of
the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale
and draw other things after them?
Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human
characters.
Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual
minds will also be five?
Certainly.
Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good,
we have already described.
We have.
Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the
contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the

oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the
side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare
the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice
or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know
whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in
accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.
Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.
Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness,
of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin
with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a
government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare
with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider
oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our
attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and
view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul,
and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.
That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.
First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of
honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all
political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a
government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.
Very true, he said.
In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the
two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one
another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us
'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play
and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic
vein, making believe to be in earnest?
How would they address us?
After this manner:—A city which is thus constituted can hardly be
shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end,
even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be
dissolved. And this is the dissolution:—In plants that grow in the earth, as
well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of
soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are

completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in
long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human
fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not
attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an
intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will
bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of
divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number (i.e. a
cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3,
so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser
times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.), but the period
of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by
involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three intervals
and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the
terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. (Probably the numbers
3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of the Pythagorean triangle.
The terms will then be 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, which together = 6 cubed
= 216.) The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with
five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies; the first a
square which is a hundred times as great (400 = 4 x 100) (Or the first a
square which is 100 x 100 = 10,000. The whole number will then be 17,500
= a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.), and the other a figure
having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred
numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting
fractions), the side of which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them
being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc.
50) or less by (Or, 'consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational
diameters,' etc. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see
Introduction.) two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the
side of which is five = 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 x
100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a
geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For
when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and
bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And
though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still
they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into
power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the
Muses, first by under-valuing music; which neglect will soon extend to

gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated.
In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the
guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like
Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will be
mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise
dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places
are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from
which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.
Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.
Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak
falsely?
And what do the Muses say next?
When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the
iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and
silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true
riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of
things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to
distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they
enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected
in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and
they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.
I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.
And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate
between oligarchy and aristocracy?
Very true.
Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will
they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy
and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will
also have some peculiarities.
True, he said.
In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from
agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common
meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all
these respects this State will resemble the former.
True.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no
longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements;
and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who
are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them
upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting
wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar.
Yes.
Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those
who live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after gold and
silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and
treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles
which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums
on their wives, or on any others whom they please.
That is most true, he said.
And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring
the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on
the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away
like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by
gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true
Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured
gymnastic more than music.
Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a
mixture of good and evil.
Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is
predominantly seen,—the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are
due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.
Assuredly, he said.
Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been
described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a
sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most
perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of
men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.
Very true, he replied.
Now what man answers to this form of government-how did he come
into being, and what is he like?

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which
characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.
Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other
respects in which he is very different.
In what respects?
He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a
friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a
person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too
proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably
obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming
to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but
because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of
gymnastic exercises and of the chase.
Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.
Such an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets
older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of
the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue,
having lost his best guardian.
Who was that? said Adeimantus.
Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her
abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.
Good, he said.
Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical
State.
Exactly.
His origin is as follows:—He is often the young son of a brave father,
who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and
offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to
waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.
And how does the son come into being?
The character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother
complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the
consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further,
when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of

battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens
to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in
himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is
annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too
easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment
which women are so fond of rehearsing.
Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints
are so like themselves.
And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be
attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to
the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, or is
wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth
that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be
more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and
sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are
called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are
honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and
seeing all these things—hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a
nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others
—is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the
rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and
appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad
company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and
gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of
contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.
You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.
Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second
type of character?
We have.
Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,
'Is set over against another State;'
or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.
By all means.
I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.
And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have
power and the poor man is deprived of it.
I understand, he replied.
Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to
oligarchy arises?
Yes.
Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into
the other.
How?
The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin
of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or
their wives care about the law?
Yes, indeed.
And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the
great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.
Likely enough.
And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a
fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed
together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.
True.
And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue
and the virtuous are dishonoured.
Clearly.
And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is
neglected.
That is obvious.
And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers
of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a
ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.
They do so.
They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the
qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in
another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one

whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the
government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms,
if intimidation has not already done their work.
Very true.
And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is
established.
Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government,
and what are the defects of which we were speaking?
First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what
would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a
poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better
pilot?
You mean that they would shipwreck?
Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?
I should imagine so.
Except a city?—or would you include a city?
Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule
of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.
This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?
Clearly.
And here is another defect which is quite as bad.
What defect?
The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of
poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always
conspiring against one another.
That, surely, is at least as bad.
Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable
of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are
more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in
the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to
rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling
to pay taxes.
How discreditable!

And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have
too many callings—they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one.
Does that look well?
Anything but well.
There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which
this State first begins to be liable.
What evil?
A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet
after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being
neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor,
helpless creature.
Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.
The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the
extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.
True.
But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money,
was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of
citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body,
although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?
As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.
May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in
the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of
the hive?
Just so, Socrates.
And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings,
whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others
have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age
end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are
termed.
Most true, he said.
Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that
neighborhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers of
temples, and all sorts of malefactors.
Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?
Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.
And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to
be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are
careful to restrain by force?
Certainly, we may be so bold.
The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, illtraining, and an evil constitution of the State?
True.
Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may
be many other evils.
Very likely.
Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected
for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the
nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.
By all means.
Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?
How?
A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he
begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he
sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef,
and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other
high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers,
and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen,
and all his property taken from him.
Nothing more likely.
And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his
fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his
bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by
mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such
an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant
throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and
chain and scimitar?
Most true, he replied.

And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground
obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their
place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned
into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire
anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as
the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.
Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the
conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.
And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?
Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the
State out of which oligarchy came.
Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.
Very good.
First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon
wealth?
Certainly.
Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies
his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other
desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.
True.
He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes
a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is
he not a true image of the State which he represents?
He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as
well as by the State.
You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.
I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a
blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour.
Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to
this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of
pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?
True.
Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his
rogueries?

Where must I look?
You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting
dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.
Aye.
It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him
a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue;
not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by
necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his
possessions.
To be sure.
Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of
the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend
what is not his own.
Yes, and they will be strong in him too.
The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not
one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his
inferior ones.
True.
For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people;
yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away
and never come near him.
I should expect so.
And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a
State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he
will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of
awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the
struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his
resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his
money.
Very true.
Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers
to the oligarchical State?
There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be
considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic
man, and bring him up for judgment.
That, he said, is our method.
Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy
arise? Is it not on this wise?—The good at which such a State aims is to
become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?
What then?
The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to
curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain
by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus
increase their own wealth and importance?
To be sure.
There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation
cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable
extent; one or the other will be disregarded.
That is tolerably clear.
And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and
extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?
Yes, often.
And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully
armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship;
a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against
those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager
for revolution.
That is true.
On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and
pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their
sting—that is, their money—into some one else who is not on his guard
against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a
family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the
State.
Yes, he said, there are plenty of them—that is certain.

The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by
restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy:
What other?
One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the
citizens to look to their characters:—Let there be a general rule that every
one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be
less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were
speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.
Yes, they will be greatly lessened.
At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named,
treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the
young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and
idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of
resisting either pleasure or pain.
Very true.
They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as
the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.
Yes, quite as indifferent.
Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers
and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or
on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellowsoldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behaviour of each
other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is, there is no fear
that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry
sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who
has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when
he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, how can he avoid drawing
the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the
courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be
saying to one another 'Our warriors are not good for much'?
Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.
And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without
may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external
provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever
there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the

occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their
oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick,
and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there
is no external cause.
Yes, surely.
And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered
their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the
remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the
form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.
Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has
been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to
withdraw.
And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government
have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.
Clearly, he said.
In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and
frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?
'Tis said so, he replied.
And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself
his own life as he pleases?
Clearly.
Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human
natures?
There will.
This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an
embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as
women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most
charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled
with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of
States.
Yes.
Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a
government.
Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete
assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as
we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at
which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has
made his choice, he may found his State.
He will be sure to have patterns enough.
And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even
if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war
when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless
you are so disposed—there being no necessity also, because some law
forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or
be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the
moment is supremely delightful?
For the moment, yes.
And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite
charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons,
although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they
are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero, and
nobody sees or cares?
Yes, he replied, many and many a one.
See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care'
about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles
which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city—as when we
said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be
a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things
of beauty and make of them a joy and a study—how grandly does she
trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought
to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one
who professes to be the people's friend.
Yes, she is of a noble spirit.
These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is
a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing
a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.
We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather
consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.
Very good, he said.
Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father
who has trained him in his own habits?
Exactly.
And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of
the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called
unnecessary?
Obviously.
Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the
necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?
I should.
Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of
which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so,
because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what
is necessary, and cannot help it.
True.
We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?
We are not.
And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his
youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in
some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all
these are unnecessary?
Yes, certainly.
Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a
general notion of them?
Very good.
Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so
far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?
That is what I should suppose.
The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is
essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.
But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for
health?
Certainly.
And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other
luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in
youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of
wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?
Very true.
May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money
because they conduce to production?
Certainly.
And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds
good?
True.
And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures
and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires,
whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and
oligarchical?
Very true.
Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical:
the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.
What is the process?
When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now
describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has
come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for
him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may
imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into
the democratical?
Inevitably.
And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by
an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the
young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist

the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which
is akin and alike?
Certainly.
And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him,
whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him,
then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to
war with himself.
It must be so.
And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the
oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of
reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.
Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.
And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones
spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not
know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.
Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.
They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with
them, breed and multiply in him.
Very true.
At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they
perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words,
which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and
are their best guardians and sentinels.
None better.
False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their
place.
They are certain to do so.
And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and
takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by
his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut
the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself
to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will
they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day,
and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into

exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is
trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and
orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a
rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.
Yes, with a will.
And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now
in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the
next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste
and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great
company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet
names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste
magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of
his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the
freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.
Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.
After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on
unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be
fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have
elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then readmits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly
give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures
and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the
hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had
enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but
encourages them all equally.
Very true, he said.
Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of
advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of
good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use
and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is
repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that
one is as good as another.
Yes, he said; that is the way with him.
Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour;
and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he

becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at
gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more
living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to
his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is
emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of
business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this
distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.
Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.
Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of
many;—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled.
And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and
many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.
Just so.
Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the
democratic man.
Let that be his place, he said.
Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny
and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.
Quite true, he said.
Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?—that it has a
democratic origin is evident.
Clearly.
And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as
democracy from oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?
How?
The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it
was maintained was excess of wealth—am I not right?
Yes.
And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for
the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?
True.
And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings
her to dissolution?

What good?
Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of
the State—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of
nature deign to dwell.
Yes; the saying is in every body's mouth.
I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of
other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand
for tyranny.
How so?
When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers
presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of
freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful
draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are
cursed oligarchs.
Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.
Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who
hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like
rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart,
whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a
State, can liberty have any limit?
Certainly not.
By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by
getting among the animals and infecting them.
How do you mean?
I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his
sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no
respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and
the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the
stranger is quite as good as either.
Yes, he said, that is the way.
And these are not the only evils, I said—there are several lesser ones: In
such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the
scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and
the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him

in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of
pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative,
and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.
Quite true, he said.
The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money,
whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I
forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each
other.
Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?
That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does
not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals
who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other
State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their shemistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all
the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at any body who
comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all
things are just ready to burst with liberty.
When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you
describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.
And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the
citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and
at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or
unwritten; they will have no one over them.
Yes, he said, I know it too well.
Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which
springs tyranny.
Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?
The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease
magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy—the truth
being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the
opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in
vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.
True.

The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass
into excess of slavery.
Yes, the natural order.
And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most
aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of
liberty?
As we might expect.
That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired
to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and
democracy, and is the ruin of both?
Just so, he replied.
Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the
more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same
whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having
stings.
A very just comparison.
These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are
generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good
physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep
them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they
have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut
out as speedily as possible.
Yes, by all means, he said.
Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine
democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first
place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were
in the oligarchical State.
That is true.
And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.
How so?
Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from
office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a
democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener
sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a

word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is
managed by the drones.
Very true, he said.
Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.
What is that?
They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the
richest.
Naturally so.
They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of
honey to the drones.
Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.
And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.
That is pretty much the case, he said.
The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own
hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when
assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.
True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate
unless they get a little honey.
And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of
their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking
care to reserve the larger part for themselves?
Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.
And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to
defend themselves before the people as they best can?
What else can they do?
And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge
them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?
True.
And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but
through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to
do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality;
they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds
revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.
Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.
True.
The people have always some champion whom they set over them and
nurse into greatness.
Yes, that is their way.
This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first
appears above ground he is a protector.
Yes, that is quite clear.
How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he
does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of
Lycaean Zeus.
What tale?
The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim
minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf.
Did you never hear it?
Oh, yes.
And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his
disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the
favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders
them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips
tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he
banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of
lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at
the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a
tyrant?
Inevitably.
This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?
The same.
After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a
tyrant full grown.
That is clear.

And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by
a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.
Yes, he said, that is their usual way.
Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of
all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—'Let not the
people's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them.'
Exactly.
The people readily assent; all their fears are for him—they have none for
themselves.
Very true.
And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy
of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,
'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be
a coward.'
And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed
again.
But if he is caught he dies.
Of course.
And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'larding the
plain' with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the
chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant
absolute.
No doubt, he said.
And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State
in which a creature like him is generated.
Yes, he said, let us consider that.
At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes
every one whom he meets;—he to be called a tyrant, who is making
promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing
land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to
every one!
Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and
there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or
other, in order that the people may require a leader.
To be sure.
Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished
by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily
wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?
Clearly.
And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom,
and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying
them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons
the tyrant must be always getting up a war.
He must.
Now he begins to grow unpopular.
A necessary result.
Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power,
speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of
them cast in his teeth what is being done.
Yes, that may be expected.
And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop
while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.
He cannot.
And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is
high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of
them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until
he has made a purgation of the State.
Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.
Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the
body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the
reverse.
If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.
What a blessed alternative, I said:—to be compelled to dwell only with
the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative.
And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites
and the greater devotion in them will he require?
Certainly.
And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?
They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.
By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every
land.
Yes, he said, there are.
But will he not desire to get them on the spot?
How do you mean?
He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and
enrol them in his body-guard.
To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.
What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death
the others and has these for his trusted friends.
Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.
Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into
existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and
avoid him.
Of course.
Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.
Why so?
Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,
'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;'
and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes
his companions.
Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other
things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.
And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and
any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our
State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.
But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire
voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies
and democracies.
Very true.
Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour—the greatest honour,
as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies;
but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation
fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.
True.
But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and
enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and
ever-changing army of his.
If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and
spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice,
he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to
impose upon the people.
And when these fail?
Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or
female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.
You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being,
will maintain him and his companions?
Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves.
But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son
ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be
supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him
in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the
servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves
and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he
might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as
they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any
other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable
associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has
been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will
find that he is weak and his son strong.
Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What!
beat his father if he opposes him?
Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.
Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is
real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is,
the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen,
has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting
out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of
slavery.
True, he said.
Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed
the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to
tyranny?
Yes, quite enough, he said.

BOOK IX.
Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to
ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in
happiness or in misery?
Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.
There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.
What question?
I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number
of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be
confused.
Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.
Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand:
Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be
unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are
controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over
them—either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while
in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.
Which appetites do you mean?
I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling
power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink,
starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and
there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any other
unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food—which at
such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man
may not be ready to commit.
Most true, he said.
But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going
to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble
thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first
indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay
them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from

interfering with the higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude of
pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the
unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the
passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one—I say, when, after
pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is
reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most
nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.
I quite agree.
In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I
desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wildbeast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right,
and you agree with me.
Yes, I agree.
And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic
man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a
miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but
discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and
ornament?
True.
And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of
people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme
from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man
than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway
and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed
moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat
was generated out of the oligarch?
Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.
And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this
man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's
principles.
I can imagine him.
Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which
has already happened to the father:—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless
life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and
friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the

opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that
they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master
passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts—a sort of monstrous
winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.
Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.
And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and
garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose,
come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire
which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul,
having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy: and if
he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation,
and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles
he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance
and brought in madness to the full.
Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.
And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?
I should not wonder.
Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?
He has.
And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will
fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?
That he will.
And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being
when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes
drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?
Assuredly.
Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?
Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.
I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts
and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of thing; Love
is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.
That is certain.
Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and
formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.
His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.
True.
Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property.
Of course.
When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like
young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and
especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a
frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his
property, in order that he may gratify them?
Yes, that is sure to be the case.
He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and
pangs.
He must.
And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got
the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will
claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his
own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.
No doubt he will.
And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat
and deceive them.
Very true.
And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.
Yes, probably.
And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend?
Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?
Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.
But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a
harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he
would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very
existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is
brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he
would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable

of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the
reverse of indispensable?
Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.
Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.
He is indeed, he replied.
He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are
beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or
steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a
temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which
gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which
have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share
his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the
laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now
that he is under the dominion of love, he becomes always and in waking
reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit
the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid
act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being
himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of
any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his
associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from
without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him
by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of
his way of life?
Yes, indeed, he said.
And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people
are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary
soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if
there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in
the city.
What sort of mischief?
For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers
of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they
turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.
A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in
number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these
things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come
within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their
followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted
by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the
one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their
tyrant.
Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.
If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by
beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats
them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans
say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their
rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.
Exactly.
When such men are only private individuals and before they get power,
this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or
ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are
equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection
for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.
Yes, truly.
They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of
anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.
Certainly not.
And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?
No question.
Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?
Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.
Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is
the waking reality of what we dreamed.
Most true.
And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the
longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.
That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the
most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most
continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of
men in general?
Yes, he said, inevitably.
And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the
democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?
Certainly.
And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to
man?
To be sure.
Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city
which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?
They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the
other is the very worst.
There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will
at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their
relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be
panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may
perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every
corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.
A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny
is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.
And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I
should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human
nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled
at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder,
but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment
is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt
in the same place with him, and been present at his dally life and known
him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy
attire, and again in the hour of public danger—he shall tell us about the
happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?
That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and
have before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who
will answer our enquiries.
By all means.
Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State;
bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them,
will you tell me their respective conditions?
What do you mean? he asked.
Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is
governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?
No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.
And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?
Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people, speaking
generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.
Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail?
his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity—the best elements in him are
enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and
maddest.
Inevitably.
And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman,
or of a slave?
He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.
And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of
acting voluntarily?
Utterly incapable.
And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken
as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly
which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?
Certainly.
And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?
Poor.
And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?
True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?
Yes, indeed.
Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow
and groaning and pain?
Certainly not.
And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery
than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?
Impossible.
Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to
be the most miserable of States?
And I was right, he said.
Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man,
what do you say of him?
I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.
There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.
What do you mean?
I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.
Then who is more miserable?
One of whom I am about to speak.
Who is that?
He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has
been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.
From what has been said, I gather that you are right.
Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more
certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting
good and evil is the greatest.
Very true, he said.
Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light
upon this subject.
What is your illustration?
The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from
them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have

slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.
Yes, that is the difference.
You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from
their servants?
What should they fear?
Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?
Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the
protection of each individual.
Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of
some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried
off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—
will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should
be put to death by his slaves?
Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.
The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his
slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much
against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants.
Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.
And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with
neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and
who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?
His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere
surrounded and watched by enemies.
And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he
who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears
and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the
city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other
freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the
house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and
sees anything of interest.
Very true, he said.
And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own
person—the tyrannical man, I mean—whom you just now decided to be the
most miserable of all—will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of

leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He
has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a
diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in
retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.
Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.
Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a
worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?
Certainly.
He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and
is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the
flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable
to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know
how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear
and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he
resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?
Very true, he said.
Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power:
he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust,
more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and
cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely
miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.
No man of any sense will dispute your words.
Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests
proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the
scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow:
there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical,
democratical, tyrannical.
The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses
coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter,
by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.
Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston (the
best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this
is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst
and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who
being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.
And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'?
Let the words be added.
Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may
also have some weight.
What is that?
The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the
individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles,
the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.
Of what nature?
It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond;
also three desires and governing powers.
How do you mean? he said.
There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns,
another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no
special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the
extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking
and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also
money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of
money.
That is true, he said.
If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were
concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion;
and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain
or money.
I agree with you.
Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering
and getting fame?
True.
Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be
suitable?
Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is
wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain
or fame.
Far less.
'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly
apply to that part of the soul?
Certainly.
One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others,
as may happen?
Yes.
Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—
lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?
Exactly.
And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?
Very true.
Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn
which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and
depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of
honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of
gold and silver?
True, he said.
And the lover of honour—what will be his opinion? Will he not think
that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it
brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?
Very true.
And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on
other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in
that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of
pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that
if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?
There can be no doubt of that, he replied.
Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute,
and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or

worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know who
speaks truly?
I cannot myself tell, he said.
Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience
and wisdom and reason?
There cannot be a better, he said.
Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest
experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain,
in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of
knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?
The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of
necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood
upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity
tasted—or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have
tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.
Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain,
for he has a double experience?
Yes, very great.
Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover
of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?
Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their
object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have
their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have
experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found
in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.
His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?
Far better.
And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?
Certainly.
Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not
possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?
What faculty?
Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.
And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?
Certainly.
If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover
of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?
Assuredly.
Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the
ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?
Clearly.
But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges—
The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are
approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.
And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of
the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the
ruling principle has the pleasantest life.
Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he
approves of his own life.
And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the
pleasure which is next?
Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself
than the money-maker.
Last comes the lover of gain?
Very true, he said.
Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this
conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian
Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of
the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only; and surely
this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?
Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?
I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.
Proceed.
Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?
True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?
There is.
A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either
—that is what you mean?
Yes.
You remember what people say when they are sick?
What do they say?
That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew
this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.
Yes, I know, he said.
And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard
them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?
I have.
And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and
cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the
greatest pleasure?
Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.
Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be
painful?
Doubtless, he said.
Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?
So it would seem.
But can that which is neither become both?
I should say not.
And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?
Yes.
But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion,
and in a mean between them?
Yes.
How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is
pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?
Impossible.

This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is
pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in
comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by
the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?
That is the inference.
Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and
you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is
only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.
What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?
There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell,
which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment,
and when they depart leave no pain behind them.
Most true, he said.
Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation
of pain, or pain of pleasure.
No.
Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul
through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.
That is true.
And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?
Yes.
Shall I give you an illustration of them?
Let me hear.
You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and
middle region?
I should.
And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he
not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and
sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper
region, if he has never seen the true upper world?
To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?
But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine,
that he was descending?

No doubt.
All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and
lower regions?
Yes.
Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as
they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong
ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they
are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain
which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away
from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they
have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure,
err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting
black with grey instead of white—can you wonder, I say, at this?
No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.
Look at the matter thus:—Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of
the bodily state?
Yes.
And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?
True.
And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?
Certainly.
And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that
which has more existence the truer?
Clearly, from that which has more.
What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your
judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of
sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and
knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question
in this way:—Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with
the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is
found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the
variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?
Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the
invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same
degree as of essence?
Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.
And of truth in the same degree?
Yes.
And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of
essence?
Necessarily.
Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the
body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of
the soul?
Far less.
And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?
Yes.
What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real
existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real
existence and is less real?
Of course.
And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to
nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really
and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real
being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an
illusory and less real pleasure?
Unquestionably.
Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with
gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in
this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into
the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their
way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure
and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and
their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and
feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and
butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they
kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves

with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill
is also unsubstantial and incontinent.
Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an
oracle.
Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For
they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by
contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the
minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as
Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy
in ignorance of the truth.
Something of that sort must inevitably happen.
And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of
the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be
in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and
contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour
and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?
Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.
Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour,
when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of
reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which
wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest
degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they
will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for
each one is also most natural to him?
Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.
And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is
no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own
business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are
capable?
Exactly.
But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining
its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a
shadow only and which is not their own?
True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and
reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?
Yes.
And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from
law and order?
Clearly.
And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest
distance? Yes.
And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?
Yes.
Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural
pleasure, and the king at the least?
Certainly.
But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most
pleasantly?
Inevitably.
Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?
Will you tell me?
There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now
the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has
run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with
certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his
inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.
How do you mean?
I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the
democrat was in the middle?
Yes.
And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image
of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the
oligarch?
He will.
And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and
aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.
Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number
which is three times three?
Manifestly.
The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of
length will be a plane figure.
Certainly.
And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no
difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted
from the king.
Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.
Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by
which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find
him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more
pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.
What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which
separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!
Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human
life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and
years. (729 NEARLY equals the number of days and nights in the year.)
Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.
Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and
unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in
beauty and virtue?
Immeasurably greater.
Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we
may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying
that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?
Yes, that was said.
Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and
injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.
What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words
presented before his eyes.
Of what sort?
An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient
mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many
others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.
There are said of have been such unions.
Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed
monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild,
which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.
You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more
pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you
propose.
Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a
man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.
That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.
And now join them, and let the three grow into one.
That has been accomplished.
Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that
he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe
the beast to be a single human creature.
I have done so, he said.
And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human
creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be
right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and
strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the
man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either
of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them
with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and
devour one another.
Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.
To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so
speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most
complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the

many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating
the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should
be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be
uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.
Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say.
And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or
advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the
disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?
Yes, from every point of view.
Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not
intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you of
things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the
beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which
subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he
now?
Not if he has any regard for my opinion.
But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then
how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that
he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine
that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially
if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer,
however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say
that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine
being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the
necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order
to compass a worse ruin.'
Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for him.
Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge
multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?
Clearly.
And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent
element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?
Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this
same creature, and make a coward of him?
Very true.
And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates
the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of
which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to
be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?
True, he said.
And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only
because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the
individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court
them, and his great study is how to flatter them.
Such appears to be the reason.
And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the
best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine
rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but
because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within
him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we
may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and
equals.
True, he said.
And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of
the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over
children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in
them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation
of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like
our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.
Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.
From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a
man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will
make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his
wickedness?
From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He
who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and
punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the
gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and
ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more
than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in
proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.
Certainly, he said.
To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies
of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these
qualities on his soul and will disregard others?
Clearly, he said.
In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far
will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will
regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not
that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain
temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve
the harmony of the soul?
Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.
And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony
which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the
foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?
Certainly not, he said.
He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no
disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from
want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend
according to his means.
Very true.
And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours
as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or
public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?
Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.
By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly
will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine

call.
I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are
the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is
such an one anywhere on earth?
In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he
who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order.
But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for
he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any
other.
I think so, he said.

BOOK X.
Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there
is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.
To what do you refer?
To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be
received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been
distinguished.
What do you mean?
Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated
to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind
saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of
the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote
to them.
Explain the purport of your remark.
Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had
an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my
lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming
tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and
therefore I will speak out.
Very good, he said.
Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.
Put your question.
Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.
A likely thing, then, that I should know.
Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.
Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I
could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?
Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a
number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also
a corresponding idea or form:—do you understand me?

I do.
Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world
—plenty of them, are there not?
Yes.
But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the
other of a table.
True.
And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our
use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and
similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could
he?
Impossible.
And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of
him.
Who is he?
One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.
What an extraordinary man!
Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is
he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and
animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven, and the things
which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.
He must be a wizard and no mistake.
Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such
maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these
things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could
make them all yourself?
What way?
An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat
might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning
a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the
heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all
the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.
Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too
is, as I conceive, just such another—a creator of appearances, is he not?
Of course.
But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet
there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?
Yes, he said, but not a real bed.
And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too
makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed,
but only a particular bed?
Yes, I did.
Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true
existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say
that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real
existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.
At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking
the truth.
No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.
No wonder.
Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire
who this imitator is?
If you please.
Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by
God, as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?
No.
There is another which is the work of the carpenter?
Yes.
And the work of the painter is a third?
Yes.
Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend
them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?
Yes, there are three of them.
God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and
one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will

be made by God.
Why is that?
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind
them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the
ideal bed and not the two others.
Very true, he said.
God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a
particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is
essentially and by nature one only.
So we believe.
Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?
Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the
author of this and of all other things.
And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the
bed?
Yes.
But would you call the painter a creator and maker?
Certainly not.
Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?
I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that
which the others make.
Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an
imitator?
Certainly, he said.
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators,
he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?
That appears to be so.
Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?—I
would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which
originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?
The latter.
As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.
What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view,
obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will
appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all
things.
Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.
Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting
designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of
appearance or of reality?
Of appearance.
Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things
because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image.
For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist,
though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may
deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a
carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real
carpenter.
Certainly.
And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows
all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing
with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this,
I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to
have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he
thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature
of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.
Most true.
And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer,
who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well
as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well
unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can
never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a
similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been
deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their
works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and
could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are
appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right,

and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to
speak so well?
The question, he said, should by all means be considered.
Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as
well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making
branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if
he had nothing higher in him?
I should say not.
The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in
realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of
himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of
encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.
Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and
profit.
Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or
any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going
to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius,
or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or
whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we
have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which
are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask
him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the
second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—
not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what
pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what
State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of
Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have
been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good
legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of
Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has
anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name?
I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that
he was a legislator.
Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by
him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?

There is not.
Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life,
such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious
men have conceived, which is attributed to him?
There is absolutely nothing of the kind.
But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or
teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with
him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as
was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom,
and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was
named after him?
Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus,
the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us
laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer
was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?
Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if
Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had
possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say,
that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved
by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others,
have only to whisper to their contemporaries: 'You will never be able to
manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be
your ministers of education'—and this ingenious device of theirs has such
an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them
about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of
Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about
as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous?
Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and
have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would
not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere,
until they had got education enough?
Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.
Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with
Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the
truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already
observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing

of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more
than he does, and judge only by colours and figures.
Quite so.
In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on
the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only
enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and
judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of
military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he
speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by
nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what
a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours
which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.
Yes, he said.
They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming;
and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?
Exactly.
Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing
of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?
Yes.
Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an
explanation.
Proceed.
Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?
Yes.
And the worker in leather and brass will make them?
Certainly.
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly
even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman
who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.
Most true.
And may we not say the same of all things?
What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which
uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?
Yes.
And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or
inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which
nature or the artist has intended them.
True.
Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he
must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop
themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker
which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he
ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?
Of course.
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness
and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is
told by him?
True.
The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the
maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him
who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to
say, whereas the user will have knowledge?
True.
But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no
his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being
compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions
about what he should draw?
Neither.
Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge
about the goodness or badness of his imitations?
I suppose not.
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his
own creations?
Nay, very much the reverse.

And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing
good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which
appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?
Just so.
Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no
knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind
of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in
Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?
Very true.
And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be
concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?
Certainly.
And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?
What do you mean?
I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small
when seen at a distance?
True.
And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water,
and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to
the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of
confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human
mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow
and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.
True.
And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the
rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the
apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over
us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?
Most true.
And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational
principle in the soul?
To be sure.
And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are
equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent

contradiction?
True.
But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same
faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same
thing?
Very true.
Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not
the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?
True.
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure
and calculation?
Certainly.
And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the
soul?
No doubt.
This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that
painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper
work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and
associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason,
and that they have no true or healthy aim.
Exactly.
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior
offspring.
Very true.
And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing
also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?
Probably the same would be true of poetry.
Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting;
but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical
imitation is concerned is good or bad.
By all means.
We may state the question thus:—Imitation imitates the actions of men,
whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad

result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything
more?
No, there is nothing else.
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—
or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in
his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and
inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for
I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been
acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions
occurring at the same moment?
And we were right, he said.
Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must
now be supplied.
What was the omission?
Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his
son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more
equanimity than another?
Yes.
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help
sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?
The latter, he said, is the truer statement.
Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his
sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?
It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.
When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things
which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?
True.
There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as
well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his
sorrow?
True.
But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the
same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in
him?

Certainly.
One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?
How do you mean?
The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we
should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such
things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because
no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that
which at the moment is most required.
What is most required? he asked.
That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice
have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not,
like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and
wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul
forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen,
banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of
reason?
Clearly.
And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles
and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call
irrational, useless, and cowardly?
Indeed, we may.
And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great
variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament,
being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when
imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is
assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are
strangers.
Certainly.
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made,
nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the
soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily
imitated?

Clearly.
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter,
for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an
inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him
in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall
be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he
awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason.
As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are
put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet
implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has
no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time
great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far
removed from the truth.
Exactly.
But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our
accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and
there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a
passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some
pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping,
and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to
sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our
feelings most.
Yes, of course I know.
But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe
that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and
patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the
recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.
Very true, he said.
Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that
which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own
person?
No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.
Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

What point of view?
If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger
and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this
feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and
delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been
sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to
break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that
there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who
comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his
troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be
supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I
should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is
communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has
gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty
repressed in our own.
How very true!
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which
you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or
indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them,
and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;—the case of pity is
repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a
laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were
afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having
stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously
to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.
Quite true, he said.
And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections,
of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every
action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of
drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if
mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.
I cannot deny it.
Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists
of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is
profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you
should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your

whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these
things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are
ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of
tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to
the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be
admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed
muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of
mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but
pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.
That is most true, he said.
And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our
defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in
sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have
described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any
harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel
between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the
saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the
vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the
'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable other
signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure
our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove
her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her
—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account
betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her
as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?
Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.
Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon
this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some
other metre?
Certainly.
And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of
poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let
them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to
human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we
shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a
delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.
If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are
enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they
think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the
manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are
inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has
implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and
truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument
of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we
listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her
which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry
being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining
to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city
which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and
make our words his law.
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than
appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be
profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under
the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any
one else would have been.
And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards
which await virtue.
What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an
inconceivable greatness.
Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of
three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with
eternity?
Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.
And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather
than of the whole?
Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?
Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and
imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you
really prepared to maintain this?
Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it.
I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of
which you make so light.
Listen then.
I am attending.
There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?
Yes, he replied.
Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying
element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?
Yes.
And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as
ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew
is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in
almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?
Yes, he said.
And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at
last wholly dissolves and dies?
True.
The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and
if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good
certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor
evil.
Certainly not.
If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot
be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is
no destruction?
That may be assumed.
Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?
Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in
review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us
fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is
detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul.
Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which
wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we
were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption
attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this
true?
Yes.
Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which
exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul
and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the
body?
Certainly not.
And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish
from without through affection of external evil which could not be
destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?
It is, he replied.
Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether
staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the
actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of
food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the
body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought
on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the
badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural
infection—this we shall absolutely deny?
Very true.
And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil
of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be
dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?
Yes, he said, there is reason in that.
Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted,
let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the
throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces,
can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or

unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that
the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be
destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.
And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men
become more unjust in consequence of death.
But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul
boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and
unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like
disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take
this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has,
and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in
which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the
penalty of their deeds?
Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so
very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect
the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power,
will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye, and well awake too; so
far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.
True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill
or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of
some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was
appointed to be the destruction.
Yes, that can hardly be.
But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or
external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?
Certainly.
That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls
must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in
number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures
must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in
immortality.
Very true.
But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us—any more than we
can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference
and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said.
The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of
compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?
Certainly not.
Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are
many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her,
marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must
contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her
beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which
we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have
spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must
remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be
compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly
be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and
damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown
over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some
monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold
is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there,
Glaucon, not there must we look.
Where then?
At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society
and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and
eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly
following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the
ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and
things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because
she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as
they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she
have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of
the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said
enough.
True, he replied.
And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we
have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were
saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature
has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what

is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to
the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.
Very true.
And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how
many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues
procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.
Certainly not, he said.
Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?
What did I borrow?
The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust
just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not
possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be
made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be
weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?
I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.
Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the
estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we
acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she
has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess
her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win
that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.
The demand, he said, is just.
In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to
give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.
Granted.
And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other
the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?
True.
And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all
things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary
consequence of former sins?
Certainly.
Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in
poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the

end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a
care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as
man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?
Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.
And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?
Certainly.
Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?
That is my conviction.
And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and
you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well
from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go
off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their
ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner
comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the
way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion
of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have
to bestow.
True.
And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you
were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were
saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their
own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage
to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And,
on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though
they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end
of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted
alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things
unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have
their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have
repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume,
without reciting them, that these things are true?
Certainly, he said, what you say is true.
These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed
upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other
good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.
And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in
comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust
after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will
have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes
to them.
Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.
Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus
tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of
Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days
afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of
corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home
to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he
returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said
that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company,
and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings
in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other
openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges
seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them
and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly
way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them
to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of
their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him
that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other
world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and
seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing
at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on
them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the
earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and
bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long
journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they
encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and
conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the
things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things
beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those
from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which

they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the
journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing
heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon,
would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:—He said that for every
wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a
hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the
penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there
were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or
enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for
each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and
the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same
proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children
dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and
parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far
which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the
spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus
lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some
city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother,
and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The
answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will never come.
And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves
witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all
our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus
appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were
also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals:
they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the
mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these
incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried
to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and
heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they
bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with
scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on
thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes,
and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell.' And of all the
many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the
terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the
voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with

exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there
were blessings as great.
Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days,
on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the
fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from
above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the
whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only
brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and
there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let
down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the
circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is
extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The
shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made
partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form
like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is
one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted
another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight
in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges
on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous
whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the
centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and
the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth
is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth;
the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth
comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh
(or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of
the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like
one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the
whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness
second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole
revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other,
and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh,
sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move
according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared
fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and
on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them,
hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and

round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each
sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are
clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and
Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the
sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the
future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the
revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her
left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of
either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis;
but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he
took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having
mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the
daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and
mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your
genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life
which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours
or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with
the chooser—God is justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he
scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot
which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he
took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the
Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there
were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts.
There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there
were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which
broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and
beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for
their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or,
again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were
the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise;
there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul,
when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there
was every other quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also with
elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were
mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our
human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of

us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only,
if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will
make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose
always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should
consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned
severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of
beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and
what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of
private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and
dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the
operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the
soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to
determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose,
giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust,
and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will
disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in
life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an
adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by
the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon
tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and
suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and
avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but
in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.
And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this
was what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he
chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not
undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not
the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came
forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been
darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter
before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among
other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and
saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his
choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing
the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods,
and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came
from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his

virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true
of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them
came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial,
whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and
seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this
inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the
souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a
man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first
to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of
the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his
journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and
underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was
the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls
was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw
the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of
enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they
had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the
life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other
musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot
chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon,
who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in
the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life
of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his
sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great
fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there
followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a
woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul
of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came
also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened
to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had
disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in
search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty
in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody
else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his
lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not
only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were
animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into

corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the
savage, in all sorts of combinations.
All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of
their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had
severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the
choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the
revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of
each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos,
who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning
round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all
passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness,
which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards
evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no
vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and
those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and
each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest,
about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and
then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their
birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water.
But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not
say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the
pyre.
And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will
save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over
the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my
counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after
justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to
endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to
one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like
conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our
reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of
a thousand years which we have been describing.
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